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Abstract 
Devolution in Kenya was politically driven, motivated by the desire to share power 
and resources across regions, so as to remedy historical inequities.  This led to 
transfer of planning, management and budgeting responsibilities for a range of 
services, including health, from central government to 47 new sub-national 
governments (known as counties), starting in 2013.  This transition was driven by 
increasing frustration with inefficiencies and inequities associated with the former 
centralised government.  Objectives for devolution are to strengthen democracy and 
accountability, increase community participation, improve efficiency and reduce 
inequities.  However, global experiences have shown that transfer of powers does 
not always lead to achievement of these objectives.  Rather, potential risks include 
that inefficiencies will multiply, inequities will widen and corruption will become 
more widespread.   
Health has been the most controversial of all devolved services in Kenya, contributing 
to recurring health worker strikes.  Respondents described that ideally, priorities 
should be set following a series of consultations between local decision-making 
actors, guided by local evidence and community-generated priorities, bounded by 
available resources, using cost-effectiveness and equity principles to identify 
context-appropriate interventions which advance universal health coverage.   
This thesis which, to the best of our knowledge, is the first study of its kind, aims to 
explore priority-setting for community health and equity across counties and 
multiple health systems levels in Kenya post-devolution.  It uses mixed qualitative 
approaches in ten counties including interviews, focus group discussions and 
participatory photography research conducted two to three years after devolution 
took place. It includes respondents from national to community level to analyse 
county health priority-setting processes, power dynamics and implications for health 
equity and community health services.  
This study shows that many respondents across health systems levels identify equity 
as a guiding principle, with devolution bringing positive ramifications for previously 
neglected counties, reducing inequities between counties.  County decision-makers, 
who often hold greatest power compared with health workers and community 
members, perceive building health facilities as the most appropriate way to achieve 
health equity.  Community members who have a more holistic understanding are not 
yet sufficiently empowered to understand the benefits and limitations of choices 
available to them or to reflect this within the priorities they identify.  There is wide 
variation between counties, with emerging examples of stronger, more equitable 
health priority-setting, with inclusion of an illustrative case study.   
Overwhelmingly the findings from this study relate to power dynamics.  We found a 
lack of clarity surrounding roles for decision-making actors, inadequate information, 
unclear criteria and processes for guiding priority-setting.  Within the confusion 
created by the limited guidance and capacity, opportunistic actors have seized 
available power to manipulate priorities to align with personal objectives, such as 
political re-election.  The resulting increase in complexity blurs lines of accountability 
creating a situation that makes progress beyond a single elected term challenging. 
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This has led to increased focus on tangible curative services, stifling opportunities for 
strengthening quality and community-based primary health care.   
Devolution has brought a period of colossal upheaval with changes in roles and 
power locus within the health system.  Clearer guidance, capacity building, stronger 
community empowerment, involving marginalised groups in priority-setting 
processes and accountability mechanisms are needed if devolution’s objectives are 
to be realised.    
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Chapter 1:  Introduction  
The introductory chapter of this thesis will highlight the justification for this study, 
define the aim and objectives and provide an overview of the thesis structure.  Three 
key definitions frame the chapter: 
Health equity implies that ideally everyone should have a fair opportunity to attain 
their full health potential and that no one should be disadvantaged from achieving 
this potential, if it can be avoided [1].   
Community health services are delivered in the community, to encourage the 
involvement and empowerment of communities to change health-related beliefs, 
behaviours and improve access and uptake of preventive and curative health services 
[2]. 
Intersectionality approaches provide a framework within which to understand and 
respond to health inequities by trying to uncover underlying power structures that 
create them [3]. 
1.1 Justification for the study 
Dramatic differences in mortality and life expectancy exist between and within 
countries with poorer survival chances and lower use of facility-based services among 
more disadvantaged groups [1], [4]–[6].  Many countries, including Kenya, are 
seeking to attain Universal Health Coverage (UHC), which means the health system 
will need to be structured in a way which expands priority promotive, preventive, 
curative and rehabilitative services, includes more people and reduces out-of-pocket 
payments [7].  Barriers to demand for health services must first be addressed before 
equitable access to UHC can be achieved [8].  The well-planned introduction and 
inclusion of trained and adequately supported community health workers (CHWs1) 
                                                          
1 CHW refers to any health worker carrying out functions related to health care 
delivery; trained in some way in the context of the intervention, and having no formal 
professional or paraprofessional certificate or degree in tertiary education (page 7 
[108]).   
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within the health system can play a key role in addressing barriers to acceptability 
and use of health services [9].   
CHWs have been shown to improve equitable child survival, health and nutrition by 
bringing services closer to the homes of hard-to-reach and underserved populations 
[10]–[14].  They promote equitable access and utilisation of health services by 
reducing inequities relating to place of residence, gender, education and wealth and 
can contribute towards more equitable uptake of referrals at health facility level [9].  
Community-based approaches are likely to be cost-effective for delivery of some 
essential health interventions [15], resulting in an economic return of up to 10:1 in 
Sub-Saharan Africa through increased productivity from a healthier population [16].  
Not only this but CHWs are uniquely placed to enter their neighbour’s homes and 
observe social determinants of health, allowing them to provide targeted health 
promotion and disease prevention education.   
The Government of Kenya has described the need to promote equity since gaining 
independence in 1963  and has made excellent progress towards reducing child 
mortality, with under-five mortality rates reduced from 115 deaths per 1000 live 
births in 2003 to 52 deaths per 1000 live births in 2014 [17], [18].  However, these 
improvements mask an increasing relative inequity, with urban child survival gaps 
between the richest and poorest children doubling in recent years [19].  In fact Kenya 
is reported to have some of the most inequitable cities globally for health [20].  There 
are marked differences between and within Kenya’s 47 counties in access to essential 
health services, health facilities and health workers [21].  Differences in the use of 
health services are shaped by a number of intersecting factors including geographic 
location, wealth, education level, gender and age according to the recent 
Demographic Health Survey (2014).   
Kenya recognises the importance of community health services in policy documents, 
making community health the first tier of its four tier health system and describing 
the need for country wide scale-up of community health interventions [22], [23].  
However, despite support within policies and strategies, Kenya’s community health 
strategy prior to devolution (and at national level post-devolution) has been almost 
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entirely donor funded, with no allocation for community health funds available to 
the national community health and development unit for developing their annual 
work plan.  This donor reliance has upon occasion resulted in inequitable access to 
community health services, based on donor preference when establishing 
community units [24]. 
In 2013 Kenya devolved planning, management and budgeting responsibilities for a 
range of services, including health, from central government to 47 new sub-national 
governments, (now known as counties).  The reforms were driven by increasing 
frustration with inefficiencies and inequities associated with the former centralised 
government process and in response to growing local and international pressure, 
following the post-election violence of 2007-08 [25].  Devolution aims to strengthen 
democracy and accountability, increase community participation, improve efficiency 
and reduce inequities [26].  However, global experiences have shown that the 
transfer of powers to lower levels does not always lead to the achievement of 
devolution’s aims [27]–[32].   
Devolution in Kenya has been described as “among the most ambitious in the world, 
transferring key functions and financing to an entirely new level of sub-national 
government” [33].  Devolution is the most comprehensive of the four forms of 
decentralisation (de-concentration, delegation, privatisation and devolution) and in 
Kenya included transfer of administrative, political and fiscal functions from the 
national to the sub-national (county) levels [32], [34].  Article 43.1 of the new 
Constitution (2010) demonstrates commitment within devolution to the equitable 
provision of health services as “Every person has the right to the highest attainable 
standard of health which includes the right to health care services”  (page31[26]).   
Kenya’s decision to vote for a new Constitution, and with it devolution, has the 
potential to transform longstanding inequities.  Each county government now has 
the power to determine which services (including community health) are prioritised, 
informed directly by community participation and the local county context.  Little is 
known about the impact of devolution in Kenya, or about how and why priorities for 
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health are set and how this influences the access, use and effective coverage of 
health services.   
1.2 Study Aim and Objectives 
This thesis aims to understand decision-making and priority-setting for community 
health and equity following devolution of health services in Kenya by pursuing a 
mixed qualitative approach, two to three years after devolution began.  It will seek 
to develop lessons for health equity following devolution by addressing three main 
objectives:   
Objective 1:  Understand how process, power and politics effect equitable county 
level priority-setting processes. 
Objective 2:  Explore felt impact of devolution for the health system, particularly 
delivery of community health services. 
Objective 3:  Identify early successes and challenges for health equity from 
community to national level following devolution. 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is presented in five chapters (see Figure 1).  Chapter 2, will introduce the 
concepts of decentralisation, priority-setting, health equity and community health 
workers both globally and within Kenya.  This will include findings from two papers 
arising from this work and published in the peer reviewed literature - a systematic 
review on CHW programme equity and an outline of devolution in Kenya and its 
implications for community health policy change [9], [26].   
Chapter 3 describes and justifies the methods and their relationship to fulfilling each 
of the three research objectives.  It outlines which methods were used in each level 
and in each county. Interviews with 269 individuals and 14 focus group discussions 
were conducted in total. 14 key informant interviews were conducted at national 
level and in-depth interviews with 120 county level decision-makers in each of ten 
diverse counties.  In three of these counties data from interviews with 49 health 
workers were included.  In two of these counties 86 interviews with close-to-
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community (CTC) providers2, their supervisors and community members were 
carried out. Finally, participatory photography research was conducted among youth 
from Korogocho informal settlement, who often do not adequately engage with 
health services.  There is also reflexive consideration of my role within the research. 
Chapter 4 documents the research findings, introducing the leading decision-making 
actors, decision-making processes for health, influencing factors associated with 
decision-making (including power dynamics) at the county level.  Following this, the 
successes and challenges identified by county level decision-makers, national key 
informants and health workers from facility and community levels are analysed.  This 
provides insight into the early impact of devolution across the health system, 
particularly the delivery of community health services.  Finally, qualitative findings 
about ‘health equity’ are presented, as understood and experienced by all 
respondents, including community health volunteers (CHVs) and community 
members from two counties.  This incorporates participatory photography research 
findings generated by youth from Korogocho informal settlement.  
Chapter 5 draws together and provides a discussion of the results and how these 
relate to the literature, highlighting the implications of devolution in Kenya for 
progress towards Universal Health Coverage, limitations associated with the study, 
contribution to new knowledge along with recommendations for improvement and 
closing conclusions. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 A CTC provider is a health worker who carries out promotional, preventive and/or 
curative health services and who is the first point of contact at community level. A  
CTC provider has a minimum level of training in the intervention they carry-out, but 
not more than two or three years para- professional training [291]. 
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Figure 1 Thesis structure 
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Chapter 2:  Literature review 
This chapter will introduce the concepts and global literature surrounding key 
thematic areas upon which this study is built.  Literature presented in this chapter 
will later be explored in the discussion section, where study findings will be related 
back to current literature by demonstrating similarities and differences, and 
highlighted contributions of the results to expanding the global body of evidence.  
The main thematic areas explored through the literature review are: 
1) Global experiences with decentralisation for health services 
2) Priority-setting processes 
3) Health equity and community health 
4) Health in Kenya 
These thematic areas were selected in order to provide the framework and context 
within which to understand priority-setting for community health and equity after 
devolution in Kenya.  Literature was selected to highlight the key concepts and 
definitions for each theme; former experiences with devolution and priority-setting, 
including best practices and challenges experienced in a range of contexts; evidence-
based pathways to achieving equity and the role of community health approaches 
for achieving universal health coverage.  Finally, the health in Kenya theme seeks to 
establish understanding of the health system context by outlining the health context 
in Kenya, including health policy changes over the years and Kenya’s experiences with 
priority-setting and decentralisation to date.   
The search engine PubMed was used to search for relevant papers.  Key search terms 
relating to the main study areas were applied, including: (‘Kenya’ and) ‘health 
system’ and ‘decentralisation’ or ‘devolution’ or ‘health reform’ or ‘priority-setting’ 
or ‘decision-making’ or ‘equity’ or ‘inequity’ or ‘intersectionality’.  No restriction was 
placed on age of literature for the time frame searched.  English language papers only 
were included.  In addition, references from suitable papers were used to snowball 
and identify other key literature, including further peer-reviewed studies; reports 
from World Health Organisation and The World Bank and grey literature.  Given the 
media focus on devolution and health in Kenya, grey literature also included local 
25 | P a g e  
 
newspaper reporting of the implications of devolution for health in Kenya.  Shared 
documents or specific google searches were used to identify key Kenyan 
development and health policy documents recommended by colleagues and 
interviewees.  The section for equity and community health was performed as a 
systematic review that is published elsewhere [9].   
2.1 Global experiences with decentralisation for health services 
This section will provide an overview of the literature explaining decentralisation, 
why countries choose to decentralise and the role of process, power and politics 
within these reforms.  In addition, facilitators and threats to successful 
decentralisation, the ‘decision space’ approach and decentralisation’s influence on 
health system performance are summarised. 
2.1.1 What is decentralisation? 
Decentralisation can be defined as “the transfer of authority, or dispersal of power 
in public planning, management and decision-making from the national level to sub-
national levels” (page11 [32]).  It is usually dynamic, with the extent of 
(de)centralisation of services changing over time, depending on the political context 
[35]. 
Within any health system there are both central and local/ sub-national levels, with 
each level having a variety of roles and responsibilities.  Decentralisation reforms lead 
to changes in authority, power and functions between levels.  This may include 
transfer of responsibility for administrative, political and fiscal functions to sub-
national levels, as follows: 
1) Administrative decentralisation expands the local level role for delivering public 
services 
2) Political decentralisation includes procedures for greater citizen participation and 
provides locally elected government with greater policy making power and 
authority  
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3) Fiscal decentralisation includes mechanisms for sharing public revenue between 
all levels of government, with local authority over revenue generation and use 
[36], [37]. 
Rondinelli (1981) described four main classifications for decentralisation (de-
concentration, devolution, delegation and privatisation) [38].  These were 
subsequently applied to the decentralisation of health systems by Mills et al. (1990) 
[32].  These four types reflect the differing degrees of decentralisation of authority 
between levels, with de-concentration describing the change which occurs when the 
authority shift for administrative functions is to sub-national offices within the 
Ministry of Health; delegation when semi-autonomous agencies are granted new 
powers (typically still administrative); devolution when the shift of administrative, 
political and fiscal responsibilities is to sub-national level of locally elected 
government, often considered to be the ‘strong’ form of decentralisation; and 
privatisation when ownership is granted to private bodies [29], [37].  However, this 
classification which identifies the institutional location of powers does not fully 
account for the dynamic nature of changes which occur over time.  The ‘de facto’ 
range of choice which is granted to decision-makers at the sub-national levels may 
vary with time due to the dynamic nature of changing power relationships [29].  
Devolution was undertaken in Kenya starting in 2013 (see section 2.4.5). 
2.1.2 Why decentralise? 
The objectives for decentralisation are diverse, and typically politically driven.  In 
addition to internal political motivations, external pressure exerted by international 
donors, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, have 
promoted decentralisation by making it a component of structural adjustment 
policies [37].  The most frequently cited benefits of decentralisation are [28], [29], 
[36], [37], [39]:  
 Improved ‘allocative’ efficiency, by bringing decision-making closer to the general 
population and allowing local users to shape service provision  
 Improved ‘technical’ efficiency with greater cost-consciousness at local level  
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 Local consultations and better information about citizen needs and wants at sub-
national level provide opportunity for local innovation for services delivery 
 Increased responsiveness and faster implementation bypassing central 
bureaucracy  
 Improved quality, transparency, accountability and legitimacy through 
community oversight and involvement within selection, planning and 
implementation of public projects which respond to citizen needs and wants  
 Greater accountability of public officials for priorities set and use of resources  
 Promotion of national unity and stability 
 Greater equity through distribution of resources to traditionally marginalised 
areas or populations.   
However, the health system is complex and if certain requirements which influence  
use of “decision space” (see section 2.1.7), correct timing, willingness to learn and 
improve over time are not in place then decentralisation reforms may in fact lead to 
negative outcomes [36].   
2.1.3 Governance, accountability and health systems perspective on 
decentralisation 
Governance and accountability are crucial to both an effective health system and 
decentralisation reforms.  The institutionalist governance perspective views 
governance as concerning the distribution of roles/responsibilities and interactions 
among societal actors (citizens, state actors and health service providers) that shape 
the ‘principal –agent’ interactions among them [40].  ‘Principal-agent’ theory is an 
approach to analysis of the different actors, a ‘principal’ contracts an ‘agent’ to 
undertake a certain service.  It is based on the assumption that the goals of principals 
and agents differ and that agents typically have more information than the principal, 
permitting them to pursue their own interests at the expense of the principal, while 
principals seek to increase their control over agents without expensive efforts to 
overcome information gaps [40], [41].  Through application of this theory Brinkerhoff 
and Bossert (2008, 2014) identify governance relationships between three main 
actors – the state, providers and citizens as described below [40], [42]:  
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1. Citizens and state actors:  Combination and expression of citizen demands to 
politicians and policymakers, who ideally are responsiveness to these demands.  
It may be challenging to mobilise voters and therefore needs an informed 
electorate who understand and demand holistic health care.   
2. State actors and providers:  Contract-like connections between state actors and 
providers, whereby providers carry-out agreed upon responsibilities in exchange 
for resources and support, with accountability mechanisms in place to encourage 
compliance.  Mechanisms include political accountability where politicians 
encourage health providers and actors to pursue citizen demands, performance 
accountability and financial accountability for budgeting, accounting and auditing 
of resources, with governance relationships including reporting, provision of 
information for monitoring and accountability.  
3. Citizens and providers:  Ideally citizen satisfaction is considered and incorporated 
to ensure provision of quality services by providers to meet citizen demands.  This 
may be subject to power and information asymmetries, capacity gaps, 
accountability failures and perverse incentives.  Civil society organisations and 
community health committees can participate in health provider needs 
assessments to encourage accountability. 
Accountability mechanisms are governance tools which endeavour to “regulate 
answerability between the health system and / or citizens and between different 
levels of the health system” (page 321 [43]).  Brinkerhoff and Bossert (2008) identify 
three main governance principles: build and reinforce political will for reform; 
balance supply-side interventions with support for demand; and integrate health 
governance with health systems operations, financing, and capacity building. 
Accountability mechanisms typically include two main aspects – ‘external’ or 
community accountability used by citizens to hold public sector actors (e.g. health 
providers, policymakers and politicians) to account and ‘internal’ or bureaucratic 
mechanisms, which include institutional oversights, checks and balances internal to 
the public sector  [43].  Cleary et al. (2013) identify a range of accountability 
mechanisms which promote both internal and external accountability.  The 
functionality of these mechanisms was found to be influenced by – resources (time, 
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space and capacity), attitudes and perceptions of actors, values, beliefs and culture 
of the system.  The mechanisms described include [43]:   
Internal accountability 
 Human resource management – performance appraisals between staff and 
managers 
 Budgeting, planning, priority setting, target setting – annual plans based on 
assessment of local needs guide resource allocation, budget allocation and 
targets set, facilities report back on progress towards targets. 
External accountability 
 Clinic committees – exchange of information between citizens and providers, 
opportunity for patients to ask questions or raise complaints, information used 
for priority-setting 
 Provider report cards – patients rate quality of care, citizens given information 
about rights to care, information shared upwards 
 Complaints boxes – patients give input to service aspects in need of 
improvement, information shared with providers. 
Objectives for decentralisation of health services relate to whether a governance or 
health systems perspective is prioritised,  as described by Mitchell and Bossert (2010) 
[37].  The governance perspective emphasises the need for increased local 
accountability with increased ‘decision-space’ at lower levels, with citizen 
involvement in priority-setting to increase responsiveness of the health system to the 
needs of citizens [37], [43].  Citizen preferences are of foremost importance and 
there is little place for the use of central directives such as ‘earmarking’ of funds.  It 
focuses on the direction of accountability downward to citizens.  Meaningful social 
participation is integral to health systems governance and is needed to mobilise 
political support for redistributing power and resources and addressing disparities in 
social determinants [44].   
The health system perspective states that the underlying goal for public policy is 
improved health system performance and not necessarily responsiveness to local 
30 | P a g e  
 
preference per se.  Decentralisation is considered one of a number of factors which 
may influence health systems performance in attaining access, quality, efficiency, 
equity and health outcomes( such as improved health status, client satisfaction, 
financial risk protection and equity). The health system perspective is concerned with 
accountability for improving population health in an acceptable, sustainable and fair 
manner [37].   
This thesis seeks to outline the points of convergence between these two 
perspectives, by identifying opportunities for how developing social participation for 
health systems governance can contribute to challenging power imbalances for 
health and improve population health.    
2.1.4 Power and politics 
Practices of power are at the heart of every policy process [45].  Naturally, 
decentralisation is driven and shaped by politics and institutional power dynamics 
[46].   
What is power? Power is “the degree of control over material, human, intellectual 
and financial resources exercised by different sections of society” (page41 [47]).   
What is politics?  Politics has been defined as the “contestation and bargaining 
between interest groups with competing claims over rights and resources”  (page 4 
[48]).   
Power is both dynamic and relational, rather than absolute and is exercised through 
the social, economic and political relations between individuals and groups[47].  
Power can change with the context, circumstances and interest of actors and can be 
expressed in a range of forms from domination and resistance to collaboration and 
transformation [47].   
Gaventa’s work on power is summarised by the power cube, which considers the 
spaces, places and forms of power (see Figure 2).  The spaces for power include 
opportunities and channels where actors can potentially influence policy and 
decisions [49].  Naturally, these spaces are shaped by power relations surrounding 
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who can participate within them.  Gaventa summarises these spaces as three main 
types: 
 Closed spaces where elites make decisions behind closed doors, which in Kenya 
include discussions between county executive committee members and the 
governor or among members of county assembly;  
 Invited spaces where citizens are invited to participate by authorities, which in 
Kenya includes the public participation forums;  
 Claimed spaces where less powerful actors claim spaces from the power holders, 
which in Kenya includes the use of social media platforms by citizens to raise 
awareness about poor quality services.   
Power relations adapt and change as these spaces are realised, with power gained 
from one space through skills, capacity and experience, used to enter and affect 
other spaces [49].  Places for power include household, local, national and global 
arenas.  The final aspect of power considered in the power cube is forms of power.  
This builds on ‘three dimensions of power’ work by Steven Lukes (1974)[50], and 
subsequent expansion by Veneklasen et al (2002) to identify three main forms – 
visible, hidden and invisible [47].   
 ‘Visible power’ – observable decision making.  This includes the visible and 
definable rules, structures, authorities, institutions and procedures for decision-
making.  Strategies targeting this level seek to change the ‘who, how and what’ 
to increase accountability of priority-setting processes.   
 ‘Hidden power’ – setting the political agenda, is less obvious.  Certain powerful 
people and institutions maintain their influence by controlling who is involved 
with decision-making and what is on the agenda.  Actions to address this level 
include empowering advocacy strategies that seek to strengthen organisations of 
the poor to influence the way in which political agenda is shaped.   
 ‘Invisible power’ – shaping meaning and what is important.  Problems and issues 
are kept from the minds of the actors involved, by influencing how they think 
about their place in the world and controlling access to information, so that 
people are unable to make informed choices.  In this dimension power operates 
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at a deeper ‘invisible’ level, so that actors may unwittingly follow against their 
own best interests, thereby avoiding conflict by making it impossible for people 
to imagine anything different to the status quo [51], [52].  Power is closely 
associated with ideology.  Beliefs, values, attitudes and ways of analysing life, 
enforced by structures such as family, education system, religion, the media, the 
economy and the state, tend to reinforce the dominant ideology and power of 
the dominant groups within it [47].  Change strategies at this level target social 
and political culture and individual consciousness.   
Figure 2 The 'power cube' (Gaventa, 2006) 
 
How power is expressed can be summarised through four main distinctions, one 
negative (power over) and three positive (power with, power to, power within) 
summarised by Veneklasen et al. (2002).   
1. Power over – This is the most commonly recognised form, with typically negative 
associations.  Power is viewed as ‘zero-sum’ where the more power one person 
has, then the less the other has [52].  Having power involves taking it from 
someone else and then using it to dominate and prevent others from gaining it. 
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2. Power with – based on mutual support and collaboration to build collective 
strength.  It helps build bridges and promote more equitable relations, e.g. 
advocacy groups seek to build a coalition which draws on this expression of 
power. 
3. Power to – refers to the potential of every person to shape their life.  Citizen 
education is based on the belief that every person has the power to make a 
difference. 
4. Power within – relates to a person’s sense of self-worth, values and self-
knowledge, having the capacity to have hope and affirming dignity and fulfilment.   
Within implementation work, a range of theoretical models seek to outline the 
practice of power.  These include: ‘Top-down’ model where power is viewed as 
coordination and control of others by those with authority at the upper levels within 
an organisation or institution’s hierarchy, with implementing actors simply tasked 
with carrying out plans [45].  ‘Bottom-up’ theories, which focus on the dynamics 
within organisations, at times emphasising consensus-building, conflict and power 
bargaining and highlighting the discretionary power of implementing actors.  For 
example, in street-level bureaucracy theory implementers use their discretionary 
power as a coping mechanism in challenging environments within the public sector 
[45].   
Walt and Gilson (1994) identified that attention was primarily placed on the content 
of health reforms, rather than on the actors involved in creating these reforms, the 
processes for developing and implementing change and the context within which 
new policy and reforms are developed [53].  Policy and reforms do not occur in a 
vacuum but are the outcome of complex social, political and economic interactions 
[53].  In response to gaps with the recognition of these features, Walt and Gilson 
applied aspects of political economy in the development of their model for health 
policy analysis (see Figure 3).  This provides a useful tool to understand the process 
of health policy reform and to plan for its effective implementation.  It is based 
around four main components:  the content of reform; the actors involved in the 
reform; the processes for developing and implementing change and the context 
within which policy or reform is developed and applied [53]. 
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2.1.5 Decision space approach to decentralisation 
Despite their popularity, decentralisation reforms have a mixed record in terms of 
realising their many objectives (for health and more broadly).  This is often due to 
difference between the official public policy goals for health and the goals of local 
politicians and other decision-making actors [46].  Within priority-setting processes 
there are a range of political actors/ interest groups, each with their own claim to 
available health resources, but with differing degrees of authority and ability to 
bargain and influence others, when competing for these.  Applying a political lens to 
understand changing power dynamics when interpreting the processes and 
interactions is a useful approach to understanding political behaviours and how they 
shape policies and priority-setting.  There are commonalities between application of 
the political lens and Bossert’s work on ‘Decision Space Approach’ [28], with three 
main aspects common to both highlighted below [28], [32], [48], [54]–[56].  
1) Interactions between different interest groups/actors, including between 
‘principal’ - national Ministry of Health and the ‘agent’ – the sub-national level of 
government.  
2) Interactions between the institutional ‘rules of the game’ including formal laws, 
regulations and Constitutional rules, which create the ‘de jure’ decision space. 
Figure 3 Walt and Gilson model for health policy analysis. 
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3) Interactions with informal political, social and cultural norms and the structural 
social, economic and political context.  In practice the actual decision space 
(known as ‘de facto’ informal decision space) may be very different to that 
described in the official laws and regulations due to the ‘informal influences’.   
The ‘decision space approach’ provides an opportunity to examine the ‘decision 
space’ allowed at the sub-national level in line with the health systems perspective.  
It also studies the relationship between the centre and sub-national levels, in order 
to identify how the centre shapes decisions made at the sub-national level to achieve 
objectives for decentralisation and health reform.  Mechanisms to influence sub-
national decisions include use of positive incentives, sanctions and information 
monitoring [28]. 
2.1.6 Analysis of decision space following decentralisation 
Changes following decentralisation will only lead to improved service delivery when 
the appropriate degree of discretion to make decisions by sub-national levels 
(decision space), is balanced by the needed capacity to set priorities that reflect local 
need [54], [57].  Following decentralisation, the use of any new decision space by the 
sub-national level is critical.  Sub-national levels are given greater opportunity for 
decision-making and are presented with three options: 1) No change - for a range of 
reasons, including lack of capacity or insufficient funding, the sub/national 
authorities may choose not to take advantage of their new powers and instead 
continue to pursue activities as previously implemented under central government 
[28].  2) Innovation - sub-national levels may choose to innovate, making new choices 
not formerly made by central government or 3) Directed change – sub-national levels 
may choose to follow new change directives suggested by central authorities [58].   
Collection of information and monitoring are critical in order to evaluate whether 
sub-national authorities are achieving the objectives of reform [28].  Bossert (1998) 
identified decision space indicators related to the key functions at sub-national level 
following decentralisation: financing; service organisation; human resources; access 
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rules and governance [28].  This framework has subsequently been widely applied 
across a range of settings [29], [59]–[63].    
In order to understand the changes and their implications, it is fundamental for 
researchers and policy makers to assess how sub-national levels make decisions to 
identify priorities and allocate resources within their control.  Once this process is 
understood, it is important to consider how do the new decisions compare with 
those of the former central government?  Are the priorities set and the resources 
allocated by sub-national level different from decisions made under central 
government?  If they are different, are these decisions and priorities better or 
worse, in terms of producing health system performance for equity, community 
empowerment, effectiveness/ patient safety, relevance, social and financial risk 
protection and efficiency [29], [28].  
2.1.7 What influences use of decision space? 
There are a number of facilitators (or pre-requisites) for the success of 
decentralisation through appropriate use of decision space at sub-national levels 
[27], [31], [36]:    
 Strong and committed political leadership at national and sub-national levels, 
with willingness to share power, authority and financial resources 
 Acceptance of participation of community and other groups in planning and 
management by decision-makers 
 A clear understanding of the successes, gaps and challenges in the health system  
 Involvement and empowerment of health workers throughout the transition to 
ensure support and ability to hold decision-makers to account  
 Availability of easily interpretable quality data  
 Re-distribution of adequate funding from central to sub-national levels, with 
sufficient opportunity for generation of needed local revenue 
 Clear understanding at each level of rights, expected standards, roles and 
responsibilities  
 Good working relationship between central and sub-national levels 
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 Provision of capacity building to sub-national levels including management 
capacity to facilitate wise decisions 
 Clear structures and channels for all community members to participate in the 
priority-setting process to share their needs and demands (not just local elite) 
 Strong accountability mechanisms between sub-national, community and central 
levels which compel decision-makers to respond to the demands of communities 
 Laws, regulations and decentralisation objectives are clear and well-understood  
 Decision-makers at sub-national level demonstrate transparency with 
motivations aligned to decentralisation objectives. 
Some of the threats to wise decision-making and decentralisation include [36]: 
 Setting of priorities which favour the elite rather than the most vulnerable 
 Resistance to decentralisation  by central government, leading to ineffective 
implementation and failure to ensure adequate capacity building for local 
governments 
 Inability to raise sufficient local revenue  
 Limited administrative and management capacity in local government.  This may 
be a challenge in formerly marginalised areas where decision-makers may have 
had fewer educational opportunities thus deepening inequalities 
 Failure to adequately involve and empower communities, for example 
community members may be unaware of the benefit of preventive health 
interventions such as immunisation and so may prioritise other more visible 
curative interventions instead  
 Lack of transparency on decision-maker motivations may result in transfer of 
corruption, increasing tribalism or nepotism associated with political affiliation 
 Loss of economies of scale leading to reduced cost-effectiveness. 
It is important to understand both the formal and informal influences and the impact 
these have on decision space and health system performance at sub-national level.  
Once these are known and understood central authorities are better placed to 
introduce positive incentives and sanctions, to encourage sub-national levels to set 
priorities which align with decentralisation objectives. 
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2.1.8 Health system performance following decentralisation  
Decentralisation of health services typically occurs as part of broader political, 
economic and technical reforms within a country, rather than in isolation [29].  
Despite the wide application of decentralisation (by 2000 the World Bank estimated 
that between 80-100% of the world’s countries were experimenting with it [39]), 
there is still limited evidence for what type of decentralisation should be 
recommended to achieve better health outcomes for performance or impact on 
population health outcomes  [35].   
Two recent systematic reviews by Sales et al. (2016 unpublished) and Cobos-Munoz 
et al. (2016) studying whether decentralisation improves health system 
performance, revealed mixed findings [30], [64].  Under decentralisation there was 
mixed impact for health service coverage, with increased use of decentralised health 
services in many countries, while in a minority decentralisation reforms led to 
reduced use [30], [64].  In a re-analysis of multi-country data by  Khaleghian (2004) 
coverage of immunisation was found to vary according to low or middle-income 
country status, with higher coverage rates in decentralised low income countries, 
compared with centralised countries and lower coverage in middle-income 
decentralised countries compared with centralised countries [31].  Exploring 
potential reasons for these differences the authors propose some of the factors 
highlighted in section 2.1.7, as facilitators or threats to priority-setting [31].   
Other performance outcomes assessed in the review by Sales et al. (2016 
unpublished) included mixed impact on geographic access to health services; and 
increased inequity in distribution of human resources with more rural areas found to 
struggle to recruit and retain skilled health workers [30].  Responsiveness of the 
priority-setting processes following decentralisation, as assessed by user satisfaction, 
provider perspective and community participation found that good management 
practices and community participation were shown to improve user satisfaction with 
the quality of services.  However, provider perspectives were mixed.  Findings 
relating to quality of care were unclear, with challenges in attribution of quality 
changes to decentralisation.  Performance was felt to be related to the extent of 
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decision-making space, including the degree of sub-national authority in making 
decisions and the capacity (technical or financial) to respond, with limited sub-
national authority over human resource functions leading to poor human resources 
for health management with resultant staff attrition [30].  Meanwhile, Cobos-Munoz 
et al. (2016) found that while quantitative data tended to show positive effects, data 
from qualitative studies painted a more nuanced picture, highlighting the challenges 
with decentralisation for drug supply chain and human resource management [64].  
As these findings indicate, better health systems performance is likely to depend on 
a combination of contextual factors surrounding governance and economic systems, 
accountability mechanisms, rules of decision space and institutional and personal 
capacity for decision-makers [57].   
2.1.9 Decentralisation and health equity 
Changes to fiscal responsibilities often form a central component of decentralisation 
reforms.  If sub-national governments are to carry out their functions appropriately 
they must have the needed revenue and authority to make decisions about its use.  
This revenue can either be raised locally or transferred by central government [65].  
Differing models of decentralisation and their means of revenue generation and 
resource allocation are likely to have differing impacts on equity [66].   
Two recent systematic reviews examined the impact of decentralisation on health 
equity and found that decentralisation of governance of health systems may enhance 
or exacerbate health inequities [67], [68].  Alves et al. (2013) carried out a review for 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, while 
in the study by Sumah et al. (2016) findings were presented from middle and high 
income countries.  Decentralisation had mixed consequences for inequality in health 
and health care use [68].  It was felt to reduce variation in access to health care in 
Spain.  In Columbia and Chile decentralisation was felt to have led to improved 
resource allocation.  Although utilisation of services was less consistent, it was felt 
that increased funding was associated with increased utilisation [61].  However, 
where financial barriers to access were common, disparities in health utilisation were 
also common.  For example, where sub-national authorities were highly autonomous 
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and independently determined their resource allocation to health, there was a strong 
relationship between regional income and health expenditure leading to large 
differences in spending and high levels of variation in health access between sub-
national levels [67], [68].  In terms of financing health care, substantial central 
government transfers and re-distribution across sub-national authorities were felt to 
minimise inequities in financing health between sub-national authorities [67].  
Central coordination to define goals, a framework within which to achieve these and 
mechanisms to redistribute income to reduce disparity are essential [67]. 
Alves et al. (2013) in OECD countries found a positive relationship between fiscal 
decentralisation and health outcomes (assessed in terms of infant mortality or life 
expectancy).  They suggested that increased competition between sub-national 
levels following decentralisation prompted local decision-makers to increase health 
expenditures with a favourable impact on health, possibly reflecting the people’s 
demand for high quality services and the increased responsiveness of local 
authorities to this.  Decentralisation seemed to incentivise the provision of better, 
more expensive services, although the efficiency consequences of this were 
ambiguous [68]. 
2.2 Priority-setting processes 
Fundamental to the success or failure of decentralisation is how sub-national levels 
use their new decision space to set priorities.  Section 2.1.6 has highlighted how the 
decision space may be used and section 2.1.7 introduced some of the factors which 
may impact how decisions are made and priorities set at sub-national level.  Section 
2.2 now provides an overview of some of the key concepts within priority-setting 
before relating how these can be, and have been, applied following decentralisation. 
2.2.1 What is priority-setting? 
Priority-setting arises as a consequence of the needs and demand for healthcare 
resources (such as budget, staff time, equipment and facilities) exceeding the 
resources available [69], [70], [71].  As a result, some means of choosing between 
competing demands is required [71].  Priority-setting then is the process for 
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“determining the priority to be assigned to a service, a service development or an 
individual patient at a given point in time” (page 15 [70]).  Within the health system, 
priority-setting includes allocation of resources for all of the health systems building 
blocks, including both preventive and curative services.  Decisions must be made 
about whether interventions are selected to maximise the health of the general 
population, or to reduce inequities for vulnerable groups [72].  All health systems 
across all countries set priorities.  However, given the relative scarcity of resources 
available for health it is particularly pertinent in lower and middle-income countries 
[73].   
Priority-setting at the macro level (governments) typically includes the identification 
of priorities through policies and determining which interventions will be financed 
[69].  At the meso level (regional health authorities, hospitals) contextual influence 
may be greater, information and evidence scarcer, processes more unclear and 
capacity for setting priorities lower  [69], [69], [73].  This is particularly the case after 
drastic changes in priority-setting roles, such as decentralisation.     
2.2.2 Theoretical foundations of priority-setting 
Priority-setting may be based on approaches from one or more different disciplines, 
which identifies key values that guide what a good and successful priority-setting 
process should consider, as summarised in Table 1 by Maluka (2011) [74]. 
Table 1 Discipline specific approaches to priority-setting and their key values 
Discipline Key values 
Evidence-based medicine Effectiveness 
Health economics Efficiency and equity 
Philosophical approaches Justice 
Political science approaches Democracy 
Legal approaches Reasonableness 
Evidence-based medicine is often used by health professionals and is mainly 
concerned with the effectiveness of established interventions, drawing from current 
best practices from clinical care research as the basis for clinical decisions [74].  
Health economic evaluation is the comparison of costs and consequences of 
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alternative courses of action and can be defined according to whether technical or 
allocative efficiency is considered to have greater importance [75].  Cost-
effectiveness analysis was introduced based on the assumption that interventions 
should not only be effective, but also worth the cost [75].  Philosophical approaches 
are concerned with meeting health needs justly, within the limited resources 
available, although there can be challenges reaching consensus due to disagreement 
on what ‘justly’ means [75].  Political science approaches focus on the interactions 
and bargaining between different groups in shifting political judgements based on 
changing political forces to produce policy [75].  Legal approaches focus on the duty 
of health providers to meet expected standards of care for their patients and the 
community they are serving  [75].   
Priority-setting is ideally a technical process, which incorporates a comprehensive 
analysis including disease burden, cost-effectiveness and the selection of 
interventions possible within the available budget.  In reality, however, it is a complex 
and difficult process, as political, institutional and managerial factors come into play.   
2.2.3 How should priorities be set? 
There is limited consensus on what constitutes a successful priority-setting process 
[76].  However, a framework for evaluating priority-setting at macro and meso levels 
has recently been developed by Barasa et al. (2015) based on review of the literature 
which provides useful insights into its essential elements [77].  Two main schools of 
thought were identified through the literature, which guide this framework [77]:   
1. Consequential approaches, which prescribe the use of a rational set of rules 
to set priorities and allocate resources, highlighting the importance of allocative 
efficiency and equity. 
2. Procedural measures of priority-setting, which outline a range of conditions 
which ought to be met within the process of setting priorities.   
A common challenge to many of the consequential priority-setting approaches, such 
as  cost-effectiveness analysis, is that priority-setting is complex and value-laden, so 
gaining a common consensus on rational rules can be problematic [77].  At a 
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fundamental level priority-setting involves making decisions about which values or 
principles should dominate [76].  However, there is no simple approach to resolve 
disagreements, so decision-makers must discuss and try to reach an agreement 
specific to the context.  This process is complex - selecting between competing 
values, with varying disciplines or decision-makers having their own perspectives, for 
example economists’ may value efficiency; clinicians’ effectiveness; and politicians’ a 
legitimate process [76].   
In contrast to the consequential approach, procedural measures typically aim at 
achieving fair process for priority-setting and emphasise the importance of 
deliberation within decision-making.  One of the most prominent procedural 
frameworks which has had more extensive application at meso level in LMIC 
countries is the accountability for reasonableness framework [78], [79].  It recognises 
that establishing a fair process for priority-setting is easier than agreeing on 
principles or values and makes it possible for all stakeholders to learn about the 
process [80].  The approach seeks to establish a fair and legitimate process for 
priority-setting rather than reaching common agreement on principles [80].  Four key 
criteria are identified which are deemed to contribute to ‘fair process’.  These are 
relevance, publicity, appeals and revision and enforcement/ leadership and public 
regulation [81], [82].  By ensuring the fulfilment of all criteria the approach seeks to 
provide an idea of what is required for the process, but does not provide details on 
the ways in which these four conditions should be applied [83].  
Through review of the literature Barasa et al. (2015) identify seven process measures 
of priority-setting, which provide further details of the features which contribute to 
successful priority-setting, including:  
 Stakeholder involvement, when the relevant range of actors participate in 
decision-making 
 Stakeholder empowerment, mechanisms in place to ensure that power 
differences between actors are minimised.  This may include setting clear 
priority-setting rules, selecting and presenting information in a way which is 
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understandable by all actors, clearly defining and communicating role for each 
actor, ongoing engagement over time 
 Transparency, procedures, decisions, reasons for decisions to be accessible and 
communicated to all actors 
 Revisions, process to allow for revision by providing opportunity for appeal 
 Use of evidence, use of quality information to inform decisions 
 Enforcement, mechanisms to ensure previous steps are followed 
 Incorporation of community values, provide process for gaining citizen views 
about priority-setting which are then used to guide decision-making. 
Six key outcomes should be attained following priority-setting, namely:  Efficiency, 
equity, stakeholder understanding, shifted/ reallocation of resources and 
implementation of decisions [77].     
2.2.4 Priority-setting following decentralisation 
Within a decentralised context there will naturally be overlap between the use of 
decision space available at sub-national level (innovation, no change or directed 
change) and priority-setting (see section 2.1.6).  Traditionally priorities were set using 
historical allocation, basing decisions on what has previously been funded [71].  In 
the decentralised context, this compares with no change in decision-making 
patterns, despite availability of wider decision space.  Historical allocation tends to 
be more implicit in nature, characterised by a lack of clarity with failure to determine 
criteria for priority-setting and inadequate public accountability for decisions [84].  
One of the objectives for decentralisation is often to ‘shake up’ priority-setting 
processes, in order to ensure greater community participation with priorities set 
being more suited to the local context as a consequence of the greater role for local 
decision-makers in the process.  This compares with innovation for decision-making 
following decentralisation.  Explicit priority-setting seeks to set clear priorities, with 
a transparent rationale and resource allocation based on agreed upon priorities [84].  
It is typically guided by a range of values, such as need; effectiveness; cost-
effectiveness; justice and solidarity [84].  Many of these values overlap with common 
expectations for the performance of health systems.   
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2.2.5 Experiences with application of priority-setting tools  
Existing tools not fit for purpose:  Despite the wide range of priority-setting 
frameworks available, a recent systematic review found that “even in high-income 
settings where participatory, accountable and rational approaches to health priority-
setting should be achievable, the process and outcomes of such exercises have been 
unsatisfactory”  (page 192 [69]).  This was felt to be a consequence of problems with 
the process used being overly vague and highlighted the need for clearer processes, 
criteria and goals [69], [84]. 
In LMIC a range of potential threats to successful priority-setting have been identified 
through a recent review carried out by Glassman et al. (2012).  These overlap 
significantly with the threats to decentralisation (see section 2.1.7) and include [85]:   
 Urgent demands and short timeframe for priority-setting  
 Limited capacity to carry out the needed evaluations for effectiveness and cost-
effectiveness  
 Lack of clarity regarding who is responsible for which aspects  
 Limited legitimacy in the context of weak governance and corruption  
 Lack of quality data and costings upon which to base decisions.   
As a consequence priority-setting and decentralisation reforms are viewed in this 
thesis as two sides to the same coin.  Thereby a potential threat to priority-setting 
will also be a threat to decentralisation.  The success (or failure) of both priority-
setting and decentralisation are heavily dependent on the context within which 
decisions are made, which can largely be considered more important than the official 
process which is followed (or not followed), depending on the context [69].   
2.3 Health Equity 
Health equity can at times be ill-defined and the pathway to its attainment unclear. 
Before genuine health equity is achieved underlying power imbalances need to be 
addressed to ensure that “everyone should have a fair opportunity to attain their full 
health potential and, more pragmatically, that no one should be disadvantaged from 
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achieving this potential if it can be avoided” (page9 [1]).  Community health workers 
can play a vital role in achieving health equity by extending health services to reach 
traditionally ‘marginalised groups’ [9], [86].  This section of the literature review will 
define health equity, which is considered central to both successful decentralisation 
and successful priority-setting.  Potential pathways to achieving greater health equity 
via universal health coverage will be identified, including community health 
approaches.  The results from a systematic review of the literature (published 
elsewhere) for the extent of equity within CHW programmes and factors which 
influence this level of equity will be discussed [9].  Finally, equity does not just relate 
to health, but instead relates to the changing power dynamics experienced by and 
between individuals and communities over time.  This includes how aspects of social 
location intersect to influence and impact power within these relationships.  An 
overview of intersectionality is provided and how it can be used to frame analysis of 
equity-related data. 
2.3.1 What is health equity? 
Equity is an ethical concept, meaning fairness or social justice and grounded in the 
principles of distributive justice.  It is the absence of systematic disparities of health 
between different social groups, who have different levels of underlying social 
advantage/ disadvantage [87].   This definition reflects some of the social power 
relationships which are at play and the extent to which groups have power to be able 
to claim and use their rights and opportunities [88].   
For the purposes of this thesis health equity is defined as “health services which 
contribute towards eliminating unnecessary and avoidable differences in health, 
where the whole population has equal access to community-based health services 
according to need, with equal access to health facility level service(s) according to 
need, utilisation of health services according to need and equal quality of health 
services for all, contributing towards community empowerment to tackle underlying 
social determinants of health, so that everyone can attain their full health potential”  
(modified [1]). 
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Just as the concept of equity is value-based, and an ethical concept, equality is not 
necessarily so, with some inequalities occurring due to natural biological variation, 
not simply as a consequence of unfair processes in the distribution of resources and 
conditions [1], [87].  By contrast, inequities in health systematically put certain 
groups of people who are already socially disadvantaged (e.g. poor, female, living in 
remote location) at a further disadvantage with respect to their health [87].   Unequal 
distribution of power, income, goods and services leads to unfair circumstances of 
peoples’ lives, which in turn influences their opportunity to lead a prosperous life [4].  
Structural forces which include socioeconomic and political context, governance, 
policy and cultural and societal values and norms, influence a person’s 
socioeconomic position within their household, community and the health system 
[4].  This position is determined according to the distribution of power, income, 
goods and services.  It is influenced by a number of domains, some of which can be 
summarised by the acronym PROGRESS plus (place of residence; race; occupation; 
gender; religion; education; socioeconomic position; social capital; plus – disability; 
age; sexual orientation) [89].  By influencing a person’s material circumstances, social 
connectedness, psychosocial factors and behaviours, these domains can influence 
their exposure and vulnerability to ‘health affecting factors’ known as the social 
determinants of health [90].  Together this can give rise to inequitable distribution of 
health, wellbeing and disease across social groups.  In addition to the distribution of 
disease the provision of health services and social determinants of health can also 
influence an individual's ability to access and use effective health services.  
2.3.2 What are recommended pathways to achieving universal health coverage? 
Health equity and universal health coverage are fundamentally about fairness and 
justice [90], [91].  The World Health Assembly Resolution 58.33 defines universal 
coverage as “access to key promotive, preventive, curative and rehabilitative health 
interventions for all at an affordable cost, thereby achieving equity in access” [92].  
While equity is implicit in universal health coverage, there is still a risk that poorer, 
less advantaged groups may be left behind, unless health systems maintain an 
adequate focus on the measurement of equity [93], [94].   
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Access according to need is about providing clients with the opportunity to use 
services.  This is challenging to monitor and as a result utilisation is often used as a 
proxy for access, although it does not reveal the true nature of the degree of fit 
between the client and the health system [88], [95].  Penchansky and Thomas (1981) 
identified five dimensions which must be met before access is achieved, namely 
affordability; availability; accessibility; accommodation and acceptability [95].  
Ultimately access to services can be no stronger than the weakest of these five links 
in the chain [96].  In order to meet these dimensions consideration for both supply 
and demand for health services must first be met.  Supply factors (aspects of health 
systems that hinder or promote service uptake) include: geographic location, 
availability of drugs, commodities and human resources for health, cost and 
appropriateness of services, such as the gender and attitudes of health workers.  
Demand factors (factors at individual, household or community level which influence 
the ability to use health services) include: vulnerability, livelihood assets, degree of 
empowerment (which relates with poverty, age, gender, (dis)ability or location and 
how they intersect), burden of disease and knowledge, attitudes and care-seeking 
practices [12], [88], [96], [97].    
When making fair choices towards universal health coverage the World Health 
Report (2010) identifies inter-connected dimensions as identified in Figure 4 (Source 
page xv [7]).   
Figure 4 Three dimensions to consider when moving towards universal coverage.   
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The Report highlights a strategy for adoption by countries seeking to realise UHC that 
recommends [7]: 
1. Categorise services into priority classes, considering cost-effectiveness, priority 
for most vulnerable and financial risk protection. 
2. First expand coverage for high-priority services for everyone. 
3. Ensure that vulnerable and disadvantaged groups are not left behind. 
Universal health coverage includes quality curative services, as well as public health 
and population measures, and promotive, preventive and rehabilitative services [7].  
A simple classification of services as high, medium and low priority is recommended, 
with countries not yet having universal coverage for all high-priority services 
recommended to first expand those, waiting to expand low or medium priority 
services until there is already near universal coverage for all high-priority services [7].   
Coverage for services varies considerably across services and across countries.  While 
there have been substantial global reductions in child and maternal mortality over 
the past two decades, dramatic differences in mortality and life expectancy exist 
between and within countries [13], [4], [5].  Evidence has consistently shown that 
disadvantaged groups have poorer survival chances and lower use of facility-based 
services [2], [4], [5].  As the World Health Organization ‘Closing the Gap in a 
Generation’ report (2008) describes “gender, education, occupation, income, 
ethnicity and place of residence are all closely linked to people’s access to, 
experiences of, and benefits from health care” (page 8 [4]).     
The World Health Organisation and the World Bank have developed a framework 
within which to evaluate progress towards UHC [98].  Many of the promotive, 
preventive and curative services identified within this framework can be provided 
and/ or promoted by appropriately trained and supervised CHWs.  For example, 
family planning can be provided by CHWs at household level, while CHWs can also 
encourage and refer clients to attend for antenatal/ pregnancy care with a skilled 
health worker at the local health facility.   
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In order to fully appreciate the impact of health interventions, (such as CHW 
programming) or health reforms (such as devolution) on equity and universal health 
coverage it is helpful to consider Tanahashi’s concept of effective coverage. This is 
defined as “expressing the extent of interaction between the service and the people 
for whom it is intended, this interaction not being limited to a particular aspect of 
service provision but ranging over the whole process from resource allocation to 
achievement of the desired objective” (page295 [99]).  At each coverage level, 
various factors within the health system work together and interact to influence who 
has access, with the potential to lose people from the care seeking pathway at each 
stage.  The levels of coverage are  [88], [99], [100]: 
 Availability coverage – The availability of resources such as health workers, health 
facilities, drugs determines the extent to which a service can be provided.  
 Accessibility coverage – Defines the population who can use or access the service. 
A service has to be geographically accessible, located within reasonable reach of 
people who need it and financially affordable.  
 Acceptability coverage – This domain defines the people who can access the 
service, are willing to use it and finds it acceptable for example in terms of costs, 
waiting time, beliefs. 
 Contact coverage – These are people who have been in contact with the service 
provider and have utilised the service. 
 Effectiveness coverage – The proportion of the population in need of an 
intervention that receive an effective intervention. 
Figure 5 (based on authors interpretation of [3], [4], [28], [37], [53], [77], [88], [99], 
[101]) seeks to link together how the socio-economic and political context impacts 
the social determinants of health, as well as the priority-setting process, the 
performance of the health system and the power held (or not) by individuals/groups 
within a community.  These factors combine to influence the availability of health 
services, along with an individual’s ability to access (geographically and financially), 
accept and use these services and the effectiveness of services provided, drawing 
from Tanahashi’s framework (1978).  Any bottleneck or break at any level will result 
in a person’s exclusion from achieving effective coverage.  Figure 5 will be referred 
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to throughout the thesis when seeking to highlight how priority-setting following 
devolution has influenced the health system performance, power dynamics and 
equity.   
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 Figure 5 Conceptual framework:  Health equity implications of priority-setting and decision-space after devolution  
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2.3.3 What are the pathways to UHC? 
Ensuring access:  Two recent reviews (published in a single paper) studied barriers to 
access and utilisation of maternal, newborn and child health services in Ghana, 
Bangladesh, Rwanda and Vietnam [8].  These reviews identified demand-side barriers 
as ethnicity (particularly in Asian countries); religion; physical accessibility; decision-
making; gender autonomy and knowledge, information and education.  Of these 
barriers, religion, ethnicity and autonomy related to the acceptability of services, 
which is often the dimension given the least attention [102].  Attention by policy 
makers is frequently focused on addressing supply-side barriers i.e. the availability of 
health infrastructure, health workers or drug availability [8].  The review also 
revealed sub-national variations in barriers to demand [8].  Decentralisation requires 
new ways of collecting data and tracking sub-national trends, expanding analysis to 
include the factors which create local barriers and presents an opportunity for 
tailored responses [8].   
A recent review of universal health coverage and health systems reforms in Latin 
America found that the countries studied introduced both supply-side interventions, 
such as expanding insurance coverage or tax-based health systems with demand-side 
interventions aimed at addressing the social determinants of health and improving 
access among the most disadvantaged [103]. Redistributive policies, intersectoral 
action and social sector reforms were introduced with positive effects [44].  
Comprehensive community-based primary care that incorporated public health 
interventions and emphasised a rights-based approach, citizen participation and 
empowerment, was positioned as the platform for achieving equity and universal 
health coverage [103].  Not only did the countries studied expand coverage of 
primary health care services, but they prioritised poorer population segments using 
both supply (expanded coverage) and demand-side (conditional cash transfer) 
interventions.  In Brazil, Columbia, Mexico and Peru antenatal coverage increased for 
the poorest groups and the difference between the richest and poorest narrowed 
[103]. However, inequalities in non-communicable diseases (NCDs), urbanisation, 
road traffic accidents, violent deaths and illicit drug use - problems rooted in social 
determinants of health - grew [44]. 
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Intersectoral policies and actions have been introduced in Brazil, Chile, Colombia and 
Cuba with the shared objective of reducing health inequities through intersectoral 
action towards the social determinants of health.  Actions introduced included 
support for community participation, particularly engagement with more 
disadvantaged populations through formal mechanisms [44].  While meaningful 
cooperation between sectors exists, actions have been hindered by institutional and 
managerial constraints, such as rigid budgets and limited capacity.  
2.3.4 Which aspects of the health system address the social determinants of 
health? 
Four main features of health systems which are oriented towards health equity have 
been identified by the Health Systems Knowledge Network as part of the Commission 
on Social Determinants of Health [104].  These include (page9 [104]): 
 “Leadership, processes and mechanisms that leverage intersectoral action across 
government departments to promote population health; 
 Organisational arrangements and practices that involve population groups and 
civil society organisations (particularly those working with socially disadvantaged 
and marginalized groups) in decisions and actions that identify, address and 
allocate resources to health needs; 
 Health care financing and provision arrangements that aim at universal coverage 
and redistribute resources towards poorer groups with greater health needs; 
 The revitalization of the comprehensive primary health care approach as a 
strategy that reinforces and integrates other health equity-promoting features.”  
Chopra et al. (2012) conducted a meta-review of strategies designed to overcome 
supply and demand bottlenecks to effective coverage of interventions to improve 
child survival, health and nutrition [13].  A range of common bottlenecks were 
identified for each of the dimensions (availability, accessibility, utilisation, continuity 
and effective coverage).  Findings revealed that coverage, and in some cases health 
outcomes, can be improved by addressing health systems bottlenecks and increasing 
human resources for health, improving geographical access though CHWs or 
outreach and reducing financial barriers [13].  A re-analysis of national surveys from 
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54 countries revealed that community-based maternal, newborn and child health 
interventions were more equally distributed than those delivered in health facilities 
[105].  Another review by Yuan et al. (2014) concurred that interventions which 
reduced inequities in maternal and child health included home visits by a CHW to 
overcome barriers faced by disadvantaged groups in accessing health services [106].  
The unique interface CHWs have with communities enables them to address social 
determinants of health and the next section 2.3.5 details available evidence on CHW 
programmes and their potential to increase equity.   
2.3.5 Equity of community health worker programmes  
CHWs can improve equitable child survival, health and nutrition  by bringing services 
closer to the homes of hard-to-reach and underserved populations through their 
unique position as embedded community members who can forge a link between 
their community and the formal health system, taking into account social and 
environmental determinants for health [13], [14], [10]–[12], [107].  Given the 
evidence for the effectiveness of using CHWs to reduce maternal and child morbidity 
and mortality, policy makers need to interpret these findings in light of variations in 
context, stakeholder coordination, programme design and quality to realise universal 
health coverage [107]–[110].  
Those making decisions about CHW programmes need to ensure effective coverage 
by taking into consideration [88], [99], [10], [109], [111]: Differential health needs of 
the target population as community, economic, socio-cultural factors and education 
status of the target group have been demonstrated to influence CHW performance 
and service coverage; availability of trained, motivated, supervised and equipped 
CHWs working with a balanced workload and geographic accessibility to reach their 
catchment population; adequate community ownership to ensure acceptability; 
utilisation of the services  and use of relevant local data to promote evidence-based 
effective service coverage.   
New health interventions typically reach those with higher wealth first, only 
benefiting the poor later, in what is known as the ‘inverse equity hypothesis’ and so 
introducing CHWs within a health system should not be assumed to automatically 
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result in equitable effective coverage of health services [105], [112].  In order to 
assess the equity of community health programmes I conducted a systematic review.  
The conceptual framework, protocol and results of which are published elsewhere 
[9], [113].  The review followed Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews 
and Meta-Analysis Equity (PRISMA-E) guidelines [114].  We set out to respond to two 
research questions: 
1. What evidence is there of (in)equity in CHW programmes? 
2. What influences how equitable CHW programmes are in terms of access, 
utilisation, quality and community empowerment? 
Despite 4945 titles and 328 full text papers, few studies assessed the level of equity 
of universal3 CHW programmes (34 papers included, from 32 studies).  Of these 11 
provided an equity analysis of the accessibility of services, 29 of the utilisation of 
services, five provided an analysis of the quality of services and five considered 
community empowerment.  There was a notable difference in the content of 
intervention packages between continents.  Studies from the Americas (3 papers) 
presented findings from comprehensive family health programmes; studies from 
Asia (10 papers) focused on a particular population group, for example maternal and 
newborn health and studies from Africa tended to have a more disease specific focus, 
such as malaria or HIV (21 papers).  This difference in the comprehensiveness of CHW 
programmes raises equity questions, particularly within the African context.   
Our findings reveal that CHW interventions adopting a universal approach can result 
in improved equity for CHW service access and use as reported in 11 included studies 
[6], [11], [115]–[123]. CHW services were found to reduce inequities relating to 
access for place of residence and wealth. 
Acceptance and use of community health services provided by CHWs either within 
the home or local village health post was reported in 26 studies in the review [115], 
[119], [121]–[144].  In some studies, CHW services reduced inequities according to 
place of residence, gender, education, wealth, age, religion, occupation and marital 
                                                          
3 Universal approach refers to services provided for entire population. 
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status for community level services.  CHW programmes also have the potential to 
contribute to more equitable uptake of referrals to health facilities by reducing 
barriers due to wealth, language and risk identified through six studies [6], [116], 
[123], [126], [139], [145]. 
Quality was less frequently described despite being an important dimension of 
equity, with only five studies reporting findings for quality.  Studies mainly assessed 
quality in terms of satisfaction from the patient’s perspective.  Findings for quality 
tended to be negative, with no clear evidence for fair quality of CHW services, with 
lower reported satisfaction with CHW services among those considered more 
vulnerable, compared with rest of the population [118], [120], [121], [142], [146]. 
Findings from five studies indicate that CHW programmes can generate some degree 
of community empowerment by utilising existing social capital and addressing 
knowledge gaps according to wealth [6], [116], [118], [122], [142].    
Our systematic review found that CHWs are able to address both supply-side barriers 
and demand-side barriers (see Figure 6).  However, it is important that policy makers 
consider these in design of programmes.  These include supply-side barriers such as 
low numbers of health workers (including CHWs), time to reach service, cost of 
services [12], [147] and the multiple demand-side barriers to both CHW services and 
uptake of health facility services [12], [148]. 
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Figure 6 Key intervention features promoting or threatening equity of CHW service 
access, use, quality and community empowerment 
 
The quality of CHW services for differing socio-demographic groups and the role of 
CHWs in empowering communities to address underlying social determinants for 
health are key gaps in the current CHW evidence base.  It is vital that equity indicators 
are included within routine CHW monitoring and incorporated within quality 
improvement approaches to ensure that the pro-equity statements in CHW policies 
do not evaporate in practice.   
2.3.6 Applying intersectionality approaches to understand power and vulnerability 
at community and household level 
Health equity goes far beyond health, a consequence of privilege and disadvantage 
which exist within health systems and which intersect with the many aspects of a 
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person’s social location to affect health [3].  An individual’s health and ability to 
engage with and use health services is the result of multiple complex interactions 
occurring as a consequence of biological and social determinants of health (see 
section 2.3.3 and 2.3.4).  Intersectionality approaches have recently been gaining 
leverage in international health as a way to analyse and address the interplays 
between different vulnerabilities by trying to uncover underlying power structures 
that create them [3].  These approaches also provide opportunity to re-frame gender 
mainstreaming as ‘diversity mainstreaming’ by acknowledging the intersection of 
gender with a wide range of other structural inequities, dimensions and ‘social axes 
of power’ [149].  However, there has been limited empirical analysis within health 
systems in LMIC contexts to date [3].   
Intersectionality theory was informed by activism thinkers and human rights 
movements during the 1970s and 1980s which sought to breakdown hierarchies 
which create inequalities, such as patriarchy and capitalism [150].  The term emerged 
from work by Crenshaw (1989) as a response to the exclusion of black women from 
feminist theory.  Since that time it has come to be applied more widely within public 
health in seeking to “understand and respond to the ‘foundational’ causes of illness 
and disease, which the health determinants perspective seeks to identify and 
address” (page271 [151]).    
The oppressions in society which contribute to inequities do not operate 
independently within specific contexts.  Nor are they additive, instead they intersect 
in complex patterns according to varying levels of power and privilege held by the 
actors involved [152].  Intersectionality seeks to understand what happens when two 
or more dimensions of social inequality intersect [151].  By recognising the 
importance of multiple dimensions of social inequality, no dimension is considered 
more important than another since multiple dimensions interact and impact on 
health [151].  Feminist intersectionality theory interrogates power in society, in order 
to uncover the convergence of experiences and structural precursors for these 
dimensions [151], [152].  The intersectionality wheel (Figure 7) demonstrates how a 
person’s unique circumstances interact with aspects of their identity, which interact 
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with different types of discrimination, which interact with larger forces and 
structures within society reinforcing exclusion and disadvantage (page5 [150]). 
Figure 7 Intersectionality wheel   
 
In keeping with political and policy analysis frameworks [53] (introduced in section 
2.1.4), it is important to consider the larger forces and structures, the types of 
discrimination and how these influence policy change [150].  Power dynamics (see 
section 2.1.4), which both maintain and are impacted by the structures and larger 
forces, are crucial when examining the effects of policy decisions such as devolution 
on a range of citizens with varying levels of (dis)advantage within society.  
Intersectionality analysis examines the link between how a person’s unique 
circumstances intersect to influence their power (or lack of power); how power can 
change following decentralisation and how these reforms play out in the lives of 
those considered most disadvantaged.    
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Intersectionality thus embraces the complexities essential to understanding the 
social inequities which in turn lead to health inequities [151], by emphasising that 
people’s lives are multi-dimensional and complex, shaped by many varied factors and 
social dynamics operating together [153].  By examining how different dimensions of 
social inequality interact, how relationships and power dynamics between these 
dimensions are linked and can change over time, intersectionality approaches 
attempt to link individuals’ and groups’ experiences with broader structures and 
systems to reveal how power relations are shaped and experienced [153], [154]. 
Previous applications of intersectionality approaches have sought to investigate 
interactions between HIV stigma and masculinity and its impact on use of services 
[155]; experiences of disability and HIV [156]; black lesbian women and social identity 
[157] and how drug violence impacts families, with a focus on intersections of gender 
and social class [158].  While intersectionality studies require intentional approaches 
to questioning which were not applied when developing questions for this study, it 
is nonetheless useful to apply an intersectionality lens in approaching analysis and 
interpretation of data.  Given the changing structures and systems which have 
occurred following devolution, intersectionality approaches can help us learn more 
about how the intersections between dimensions of social inequality (such as 
gender, place of residence and ethnicity) among individuals and groups interact 
within the changing power relations following devolution and the role of CHWs 
within this.  This can provide greater depth of understanding, rather than simply 
explaining differences by a single circumstance or dimension of social inequality 
[157].  The thesis returns to this topic in the discussion chapter 5.   
2.4 Health in Kenya 
This section provides an overview of the Kenya context where the research was 
undertaken.  It describes the health system, a history of decentralisation and health 
reforms in Kenya, existing evidence for priority-setting approaches and trends in 
mortality and health equity.   
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2.4.1 Health morbidity and mortality in Kenya 
Kenya, a newly lower middle-income country situated in East Africa, has an estimated 
population of 46.05 million (2015 estimates) [159].  Since 2013 it operates with a 
devolved system of governance with 47 sub-national authorities known as counties.  
Each county is responsible for providing and delivering health services to its citizens 
[18].  Population for the counties varies from around 101,000 (Lamu County) to 
3,138,000 (Nairobi County) [160].  Kenya has made good progress towards reducing 
child mortality, with under-five mortality rates having reduced from 115 deaths per 
1000 live births in 2003 to 52 deaths per 1000 live births in 2014 [161].  However 
urban child survival gaps have doubled between the richest and poorest children in 
recent years and there has been no significant change in maternal mortality ratio, 
currently 362 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births [20], [161]. 
Kenya has an Eastern coastal border with the Indian Ocean and shares land borders 
with Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda [162].  The climate varies 
from tropical along the coast to arid in Northern Kenya, with implications for the 
distribution of disease burden.  Malaria is more common along the coast (27.2% of 
children under-five had fever in two weeks before DHS survey 2014) and in Western 
(36.1%) and Nyanza (37.4%) regions compared with North Eastern region (8.7%) 
[161].  The arid climate in Northern Eastern Kenya has implications for nutrition, with 
higher levels of under-nutrition (13.3% children under-five had moderate acute 
malnutrition compared with 1.9% in Western region [161]).   
English and Kiswahili are the two official languages, but there are also numerous 
unofficial indigenous languages spoken.  The country is predominantly Christian 
(83%) and Muslim (11.2%).  There are over 40 tribes in Kenya, with certain practices 
occurring more commonly among some tribes than others, for example female 
genital mutilation is widespread among Somali Kenyans (93.6% of women 15-49 
years have been circumcised), but almost non-existent among Luo Kenyans (0.2%) 
[161].   
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Kenya’s population is young, with over 40% aged 0-14 years [162].  The total life 
expectancy at birth is increasing (currently 64 years (62.6 male, 65.5 female) [162]) 
and total fertility rate declining (4.9 to 3.9 births per woman over the last decade 
[161]).  The majority of households (71%) in Kenya now have access to an improved 
source of drinking water [161].  However, only 23% of households have an improved 
toilet facility not shared with other households.  Literacy levels are also improving, 
although gender disparities persist.  Based on 2014 statistics 7% women and 3% men 
have no education, with 88% women and 92% men considered literate.  Meanwhile 
86% of households own a mobile phone [161].   
25.6% of Kenyans live in urban areas, with 74.4% in rural areas.  Agriculture remains 
the backbone of the economy, with approximately 75% of the population thought to 
be employed in the agricultural sector (including pastoral activities) [162].  Per capita 
gross national income (GNI) is $1340 (based on 2015 estimates) [159], but 43.4% of 
the population are thought to live below the poverty line (2012 estimates) [162], with 
wide disparities between geographical areas.  According to the latest Kenya Health 
Policy (2012-2030), communicable diseases still make up the leading causes of death, 
with HIV and AIDS the leading cause of death in Kenya (29.3% total deaths, with HIV 
adult prevalence 5.91% based on 2015 estimates [162]), followed by conditions 
arising during the perinatal period (9.0%), lower respiratory tract infection (8.1%), 
tuberculosis (6.3%), diarrhoea (6.0%) and malaria (5.8%).  However, NCDs are 
creating an increasing burden on the health system, with 50-70% of all hospital 
admissions related to NCDs.  Cerebrovascular disease and ischaemic heart disease 
are currently the 7th and 8th leading causes of death [22].   
2.4.2 Health financing in Kenya  
Total health spending in Kenya has been increasing over recent years from 5.4% of 
gross domestic product (GDP) in 2009/2010 to 6.8% in 2012/2013 (year before 
devolution), with government spending on health increasing as a percentage of total 
government expenditure, from 4.6% in 2009/10 to 6.1% in 2012/2013 [163].  
Revenue sources for health spending come from government (34%), private sector 
(40%) and development partners (26%) [163].  Household out-of-pocket 
expenditures (excluding cost-sharing) and non-profit institutions serving households 
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financing schemes make up 27% of total health expenditure [163].  Since devolution, 
there seems to have been an increasing amount allocated to the health sector by 
government between 2014/2015 and 2015/2016 [164].  This increased health 
allocation is felt to be driven by counties choosing to allocate a larger amount to 
health than was formerly allocated by national government [165].   
Figure 8 shows that households with catastrophic expenditure for health (over 10% 
of total expenditure or over 40% of non-food expenditure) varied over the last 
decade, peaking in 2007 and reducing somewhat in 2013 (although still remaining 
higher than 2003 levels (page 48 [166]).  Catastrophic expenditure for health is more 
common among the poorest (8.7%) compared with the richest (3.8%) [166]. 
Figure 8 Catastrophic health spending over time  
 
Health insurance coverage in Kenya grew considerably between 2007 and 2013, with 
coverage increasing from 10% in 2007 to 17.1% in 2013 as a consequence of efforts 
by the National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) to cover the informal sector on a 
voluntary basis.  However, despite these improvements it is the richest who benefit 
most from health insurance coverage with only 2.9% of the poorest (and most at risk 
of catastrophic expenditure) being covered, compared with 41.5% of the richest 
[166]. 
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2.4.3 Changed health system structure in Kenya 
The following section will provide an overview of the changes within the health 
system in Kenya following devolution, according to:  
1. Changes in responsibilities pre and post-devolution 
2. Kenya development documents 
3. Health service delivery structures (post-devolution) 
4. Kenya health policy and strategy.  
Changing responsibilities:  Following devolution there are two recognised levels of 
government outlined in the Constitution (2010)– the central national level and the 
sub-national county level [26].  This contrasts with the former de-concentrated 
health system which was coordinated through national, provincial and district levels 
[167].  The county level is now responsible for providing services which fall within the 
first three layers (community, primary and county referral services) and national level 
is responsible for national referral services and guideline/ policy development.  The 
main changes in roles and responsibilities are outlined in Table 2, changed roles are 
indicated in italics, unchanged roles in plain text. 
Table 2 Main roles and responsibilities for national and sub-national structures 
before and after devolution 
  Pre-devolution [167] Post devolution [168] 
National 
Health policy 
National referral health facilities 
Quality assurance and standards 
Major disease control (TB, HIV, 
immunisation) 
Ports and borders 
Disaster management 
Training health staff  
 
Coordinating with all partners 
Budgeting & allocating resources 
Recruitment and management of 
workforce 
Health policy 
National referral health facilities 
Quality assurance and standards 
Major disease control (TB, HIV, 
immunisation) 
Ports and borders 
Disaster management 
Capacity building and technical 
assistance for counties  
No longer coordinating partners, 
budgeting or recruiting 
Province 
Direct link with national 
Guiding annual planning at district level 
Supervision 
 
Does not exist 
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  Pre-devolution [167] Post devolution [168] 
County 
 
 
 
 
Did not exist 
County Integrated Development Plan 
development 
Budgeting and allocating resources 
Recruitment and management of 
workforce 
County health service delivery for public 
health, disease surveillance, ambulance, 
community health services, primary 
health services, county hospital services 
Coordinating with partners 
Disaster management 
District/ 
sub-
county 
Annual planning and budgeting 
Control of district budget 
Implementation of public health, disease 
surveillance, ambulance, community 
health services, primary health services, 
district hospital services 
Annual planning and budgeting 
No longer controlling budgets 
Implementation of public health, disease 
surveillance, ambulance, community 
health services, primary health services, 
county hospital services 
 
 
Kenya development documents:  Kenya orients to an overarching development 
document known as Vision 2030, which expresses the country’s vision for a globally 
competitive and prosperous nation with a high quality of life by 2030 [169].  Within 
this vision, the country aims to provide an efficient and high quality health care 
system with the best standards through devolution and by shifting the focus from 
curative to preventive care [169].  The shorter five-year medium term plan for the 
duration of the Jubilee government’s current term (2013 – 2017) identifies policy 
actions, reforms, programmes and projects which the government will implement 
within this period, including for health.  This emphasises universal access to health 
care, with community health identified as a flagship project [170]. 
Kenya health service delivery structures:  Health service delivery level is organised 
around the new Kenya Essential Package for Health (KEPH) [22], according to a four 
level system as described in the current Health Policy and operationalised in the 
shorter five year Kenya Health Sector Strategic and Investment Plan (2014 – 2018) 
[168] (see Figure 9).  Those structures in green in the figure are directly implemented 
by national level, while those in blue are under the responsibility of the county 
government.  
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Figure 9 Author’s interpretation of Kenya health system levels, actors and governance structures 
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Kenya health policy and strategy:  Kenya’s health policy goal is ‘‘attaining the highest 
possible standard of health in a manner responsive to the needs of the population” 
to be achieved through six policy objectives (eliminate communicable disease, 
halt/reverse NCDs, reduce violence and injuries, provide essential health care, 
minimise risk factor exposure, strengthen cross-sectoral collaboration) as outlined in 
the Kenya Health Policy (2012 – 2030) [22].   
The Kenya Essential Package for Health (KEPH) indicates Kenya’s commitment to 
universal health coverage.  According to the Kenya Health Sector Strategic and 
Investment Plan (2014 – 2018) Kenya aims to move towards the three objectives of 
UHC by: 
1. Introducing KEPH interventions to populations as and where needed 
2. Scaling up utilization of KEPH interventions for populations with access to these  
3. Reducing potential for catastrophic health expenditures for clients [168]. 
In order to fulfil these objectives there are a number of essential KEPH services 
outlined in the Kenya Health Sector Strategic and Investment Plan 2014 – 2018.  
Many of the services are intended to be delivered at level 1 (community level) such 
as health promotion. The Kenya Health Sector Strategic and Investment Plan outlines 
three primary outputs – improved access, quality of care and demand for KEPH 
services.  In order to achieve this Kenya aims to improve: physical access to primary 
health services (within 5km) and public health services (within 2.5km); financial 
access though removal of user-fees and socio-cultural access through investment in 
health [168].  Demand for services is to be increased by improving awareness of 
health problems and services available and improving health seeking behaviours.  
Finally, quality of care is to be improved by ensuring better client experience; 
assuring patient safety and ensuring effectiveness of care by developing a health 
quality policy, establishing national accreditation, institutionalising continuous 
quality improvement and conducting regular audits [168].   
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2.4.4 Community health services in Kenya 
According to all major health policies and strategies in Kenya, county authorities have 
a legal mandate to provide community health services as the first tier in the health 
system.  Community health services in Kenya are centred on community units 
(described as 'level 1 units').  According to the revised strategy each unit consists of 
5000 people including five salaried community health extension workers (CHEWs) 
who will carry out promotive, preventive and curative tasks, supported by ten 
volunteer community health volunteers (CHVs) (two for each CHEW) who will act as 
mobilisers, ensuring linkage between community and CHEWs for health related 
activities in every community unit [171].  In addition, a community health committee, 
consisting of voluntary community representatives conducts supervision and 
governance of CHVs and encourages community participation in health-related 
activities  [24], [172].  
Level 1 community services link with level 2 primary care services through referral of 
patients by CHVs or CHEWs to the link primary care facility for a range of services, 
from preventive (e.g. immunisation and antenatal services) to curative (e.g. 
management of childhood illnesses).  CHV roles and responsibilities are highlighted 
by photos in Photo 1 (source author’s own photographs) and supervision structures 
are demonstrated in Figure 10 (source [173]), as reported by respondents and 
observed during visits.   
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Photo 1 Showing common CHV tasks and activities   
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Kenya’s Vision 2030 views community health approaches and community 
empowerment as important aspects for progressing towards the vision by clustering 
health within the social pillar, emphasising the need to address social determinants 
of health.  It highlights a two-pronged approach to ensuring an efficient and high 
quality health care system:  1) Devolution of funds and management of health care 
to communities and district medical officers and 2) shifting from curative to 
preventive care, with revitalised community health centres [169].     
In 2014 (following devolution) national government revised the existing community 
health strategy in an attempt to create a more acceptable and sustainable 
community health strategy for county governments [26].  A qualitative study 
conducted in 2013 (around the start of devolution), revealed appreciation for 
community health, but uneven coverage; highlighting that equity of services needed 
Figure 10 Community health actors and relationships 
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strengthening [24].  Lack of funds for CHV stipends was felt to have led to high 
attrition and lack of accountability among volunteers [24], [174].  Combined with high 
CHEW workload these were seen as major drivers for strategy change.  Figure 11 
shows the community health structure under the former and revised new strategy, 
which includes a proposed increase in the number of CHEWs nationally from 2,100 
to 25,000 by 2017, although there is no national community health specific funding 
or earmarking to guide county spending.  The need for adequate engagement with 
all community health actors about the strategy revision, with clear planning for 
change (including a quality focus) and consideration of potential risks to  roll-out, 
such as county prioritisation of other activities were highlighted by the study [24].   
 
Implications of devolution for planning community health services:  Opportunities 
afforded by devolution include the ability to prioritise community health services 
within the county for more equitable coverage, addressing county specific health 
burdens, strengthening coordination between actors involved in community health, 
context-specific task-shifting, training and motivational strategies for CHVs and 
opportunity for stronger community participation [175].  Potential threats for 
community health activities associated with devolution include: delays in 
implementing the revised strategy; the potential for conflict between the national 
Figure 11 Former (left) and revised new (right) community health strategies 
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community health and development unit and county governments and possible 
resistance to the revised strategy due to the need to budget for recurring salary costs 
associated with the greater numbers of CHEWs in the new community health 
strategy [26] (see enablers and threats to use of decision space following 
decentralisation in section 2.1.7).   The revision of the community health strategy 
took place in 2014 and aligned closely with the ideal of Vision 2030 to shift towards 
preventive rather than curative care.  However, the strategy revision occurred during 
the first full year following devolution, before communication channels between 
national and county governments were clear and while power dynamics were still in 
flux.  Perhaps as a consequence of this there has been uneven uptake of the revised 
strategy, and its contents, across counties.    
2.4.5 History of decentralisation in Kenya 
Decentralisation, user-fees and policy change:  Trends in practice and equity  
Kenya has described the need to promote equity within its health policies since 
gaining independence in 1963.  Multiple policy documents identify equity as a 
priority, beginning with the Independence Development Blueprint, Sessional Paper 
No. 10 in 1965 [17].  Various policies and strategies were subsequently introduced 
but despite the presence of equity within policy the gap between regions actually 
widened [176].  User-fees and policies around payment have had an important 
impact on health over time and Figure 12 (source 1989 - 2014 DHS4 data) provides an 
historical perspective of some of the main health fee changes introduced in Kenya 
alongside trends in under-five and infant mortality rates.  
                                                          
4 Note data from 2003 and later are nationally representative, while data before 2003 
excludes Northern Kenya. 
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Figure 12 Mortality rate trends and health fee changes  
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1960s-1970s:  Under colonial administration in Kenya, imagined cultural boundaries 
were aligned to administrative boundaries [177].  These boundaries, known as the 
former provinces, remained in place after independence in 1963, and were 
subsequently used by the three Kenyan Presidents (1963 – 2013) to maintain power 
and control [178].  At the time of Kenya’s independence, the Constitution (known as 
Majimbo Constitution) provided for devolution to regional assemblies, with the 
purpose of securing the rights of ethnic minorities [27].  However, by 1964 devolution 
stagnated and was replaced with a centralised system which did not allow for dissent, 
with excluded tribes unable to access resources [179].  Previously decentralised 
functions, including health services, were recentralised.  In 1965 user-fees were 
removed at all public health facilities and a range of other social changes occurred, 
following which under-five mortality rates reduced.  However, under the highly 
centralised government, service delivery deteriorated during this period with 
deepening regional disparities in the distribution of services, resource allocations and 
access to quality health services. Resultant regional variations in health indicators 
persist today [27], [180].   
1980s-1990s:  A number of limited decentralisation measures were introduced by 
the early 1980s with the creation of districts [181].  Officially these measures had the 
purpose of bringing services closer to the people [27].  However, decentralisation 
was reportedly about national government ‘earning loyalty to ethnic chiefs’, with 
political class and economic patronage working hand-in-hand to sustain corruption 
and mis-governance (page17 [177]).  This led to increasingly ineffective service 
delivery, delayed audits and lack of sanctions for indiscretions, which encouraged 
malpractice within the civil service, undermining the capacity of government to 
generate or spend revenue [27].  This in turn resulted in increased donor reliance, 
leading to introduction of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund-designed 
structural adjustment reforms.  User-fees were adopted in 1989 [182], characterised 
by marked differences in people’s abilities to pay and decreased service utilisation.  
They were temporarily suspended in 1990 and exemptions put in place in an attempt 
to protect the poor [182].  User-fees were again re-introduced in 1991, but 
exemptions for the vulnerable were poorly implemented, creating a major barrier to 
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access during this period (1991 – 2003).  Mortality rates were seen to rise again 
throughout the 1990s as shown by the increasing trend in Figure 12.  During this 
period there was a concurrent increase in HIV prevalence within Kenya.   
1994 saw the development of Kenya’s Health Policy which guided the direction for 
health until 2010.  It aimed to decentralise health decision-making by establishing 
local district health management boards and district health management teams who 
held responsibility for running facilities and services within their control, including 
funds, annual work and procurement plans from early 2000s (see Table 2) [180], 
[181], [183].  User-fees were maintained throughout this period and limited capacity 
to implement priorities meant that equity-oriented policy did not lead to equitable 
access to curative and preventative services  [22].  Resource allocation from national 
to district level was unclear, with use of historical allocation (where budgeting 
decisions are based on what has traditionally been funded, plus incremental changes, 
see section 2.2.3) despite the presence of resource allocation formulae [182].  An 
evaluation of these decentralisation reforms by Ndavi et al. (2009) found that while 
most DHMTs had plans in place, less than a quarter implemented those plans on 
time, with lack of funds and transport being cited as common reasons for failure 
[180]. 
2000 – 2010:  In response to growing health inequities, user-fees were reduced in 
2004, with introduction of the ‘10/20 policy’, which reduced fees to 10 and 20 Kenyan 
shillings (approximately 0.10 US dollars and 0.20 US dollars) in dispensaries and 
health centres respectively, with exemptions for selected population groups and 
services [182].  Policy evaluation found increased per capita out-patient visits from 
1.7 to 3.1 during the period 2003-2013 and declining mortality rates as indicated in 
Figure 12 [166].  However, there were challenges with implementation such as 
inadequate patient knowledge about recommended charges and failure of central 
funds to reach the health facilities due to bureaucracy.  As a coping mechanism many 
health facilities continued to charge user-fees [184].  Study showed that the policy 
was not well adhered to by service providers, with continued charging of registration 
fees and drug shortages, leading to negative implications for service delivery [185]. 
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Wider health systems challenges during the period 2005-2010 of the National Health 
Sector Strategic Plan II (which introduced the Kenya Essential Package for Health) 
included: non-functional health facilities; inequitable distribution of resources; right 
to health not operationalised; contextual health determinants not given adequate 
attention and most resources directed towards curative/ hospital care rather than 
prevention or rural/ hard-to-reach areas  [174].  Fees for deliveries were abolished in 
2007, but it was not until mid-2013 that free maternal health services at public health 
facilities became a reality, with many facilities operating at a loss or needing to 
charge as a result of delayed reimbursement [186]. 
2007 saw the controversial general elections which led to outbreaks of violence 
including episodes of politically instigated violence [177], multiple deaths and 
internal displacement of large numbers of people.  In response, the National Peace 
Accord (2008) provided for a Constitutional grand coalition supported by 
international pressure to ensure finalisation of the new Constitution with devolution 
to 47 counties.   
2010-present:  Health sector services fund was rolled out in Kenya in 2010 – 2012.  It 
continues today as a way to improve adherence to user-fee reduction policies and to 
improve quality and equity of access to health care [184].  They provide central 
funding to cover operational expenses such as maintenance and refurbishment, 
support staff, allowances, communications, non-drug supplies, fuel and community 
based activities [184].  Prior to devolution the national Ministry of Health were 
responsible for providing infrastructure, trained health workers, drugs and medical 
supplies.  Funds from central government were transferred on a quarterly basis to a 
health facility’s bank account.  Funds could then be managed by the health facility 
management committee (a governance structure which includes both health facility 
staff and community representatives)  [184].  A recent evaluation (carried out prior 
to devolution) found that funds reached health facilities and were managed in a clear 
and transparent manner with good community involvement leading to reported 
increased health worker motivation and patient satisfaction.  However, challenges 
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with implementation included lengthy reporting requirements, continued user-fee 
charging and lack of involvement by district treasury [184]. 
The second Health Policy (2012 -2030) was developed to align to Vision 2030 and the 
Constitution (2010), within a changing national and global context (see section 2.4.3) 
[22].  It is operationalised through the Kenya Health Sector Strategic and Investment 
Plan (KHSSP) (2013 – 2030)  [168]. Equity orients the strategy, which identifies key 
populations to receive 100% coverage of the Kenya Essential Package for Health 
(KEPH) Services[168].  It acknowledges challenges for ensuring access to KEPH and 
identifies potential remedies to address geographical, financial and socio-cultural 
barriers.  The need for further reduction of the burden of pre-payment for health 
services to improve financial access is noted, but, there is little detail regarding how 
to tackle causes of inequity.   
The new Constitution (of which devolution forms a central aspect) was endorsed by 
67% of the population via a referendum held in August 2010 [27].  This move was 
ultimately the choice of the population, enforced by the international community, 
rather than a decision driven by national leaders and politicians.   
2.4.6 Devolution in Kenya 
As stated in the introduction to the thesis, Kenya’s devolution has been described as 
“among the most ambitious in the world, transferring key functions and financing to 
an entirely new level of sub-national government” [33].  Presented as the remedy to 
the pathologies of Kenyan politics, including: “the over-centralization of the state 
that allowed certain ethnic groups to dominate leading to inequitable resource 
distribution, politicized ethnicity in ways that fuelled violence, and stimulated a 
political culture of “our turn to eat”” (page 247 [179]).  Devolution reform objectives 
seek to “tackle long- term, deeply entrenched disparities between regions; increase 
the responsiveness and accountability of government to citizens; allow greater 
autonomy to different regions and groups, and re-balance power away from a 
historically strong central government” (page2 [187]).  Devolution has reportedly led 
to increased access to resources for the majority of the population [179]. 
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Chapter 11 of the 2010 Constitution outlines the devolution of functions and 
transfers authority for decision-making, finance and management of public services, 
including health, to the 47 county governments [26], [178], [34], [187].  Elections for 
new county governors and assemblies held in March 2013 marked the official launch 
of devolution, following which they started to set up the new institutions within the 
county [188].  Since then, the transfer of funds and functions from central to the sub-
national county level rolled out rapidly [187], due to political pressure from the 
Council of Governors (a forum for Governors from all 47 counties) for transfer of 
functions ahead of schedule [179].  This contrasted with the three year transition 
period previously anticipated [186].  The rapid transfer of powers led to responsibility 
for human resource management for health being devolved before the required 
structures, systems and senior positions had been put in place.  This led to salary 
delays and anxiety among health staff across levels [186].   
A previous study indicated that politicians in Kenya have long encouraged their 
constituents to evaluate their politician by his/her ability to funnel resources to 
certain groups within local communities through use of Harambee/ local self- help 
projects and the formalised Constituency Development Funds in return for political 
support [179].  Early studies of devolution suggest that rather than eradicating the 
corruption which in part fuelled the transition to devolution, it has instead 
entrenched local-level negative practices such as rent seeking5 by politicians and 
ethnic patronage6 politics [179].  In keeping with this, during the 2013 elections 
voters demanded private goods and promises of goods for select ethnic groups, 
suggesting no substantial change to how politics operate in Kenya, with patronage 
networks still playing a crucial role [179].  As a consequence minority ethnic groups 
within counties are generally less able to lay claim to the goods and patronage 
opportunities enjoyed by ethnic counterparts of the winning candidate (typically of 
the majority tribe within a county) [179].    
                                                          
5 Rent seeking refers to the use of public resources to buy private goods that only 
benefit the office holder. 
6 Patronage refers to exchange of public goods, such as jobs in return for political 
support. 
80 | P a g e  
 
To date there have been limited studies which have assessed the impact of 
devolution for health services.  One recent study by Nyikrui et al. (2015) explored the 
felt impact of devolution for health facility in-charges and is worth discussion in-
detail.  This qualitative study conducted in one county found a lack of clarity by in-
charges regarding roles and responsibilities for county and sub-county health 
management teams following devolution [186].  Considerable financial challenges 
emerged at health facility and dispensary level, with loss of funds as a consequence 
of disagreement surrounding the continued direct funding of health sector service 
fund (HSSF) to health facilities following devolution, along with removal of all user-
fees from facilities [186].  This was reported to have led to inability to pay utility bills 
or casual workers, along with an inability to provide free services demanded by the 
community [186].  Out of necessity facility in-charges developed a range of coping 
strategies to ensure facilities remained open, including the re-introduction of user-
fees.  After some time HSSF funds and user-fee compensation funds were transferred 
to facility accounts but there were further challenges surrounding allocation criteria 
and reporting requirements.  There was also felt to have been a deterioration in the 
availability of drugs, with late payment for drugs by the county resulting in delayed 
delivery from Kenya Medical Supply Agency (KEMSA).  Salary delay for health workers 
by the county government was felt to result in relationship tensions and staff 
shortages [186].  Sub-county health managers were argued to have played a key role 
in supporting in-charges throughout the transition period for devolution. 
Following devolution, a range of sources of revenue are available to county 
governments to fund devolved functions (including health).  These include the 
equitable share from national level (minimum 15%) (article 203 [26]).  This is based 
on a formula from the Commission on Revenue allocation which takes into 
consideration population (45%); basic equal share (25%); poverty (20%); land area 
(8%) and fiscal responsibility (2%) [189], [190].  This formula has since been slightly 
modified, to introduce a new development factor (1%); increase basic equal share to 
26% and reduce poverty share to 18%, with other factors remaining unchanged 
[190].  Due to the disproportionate weighting towards poorer counties the formula 
is likely to benefit the poor [165].  Since devolution the equitable share allocated 
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from national to county level has always been over twice the minimum 
recommendation [187]).  The other funding sources (for health and other services) 
available to county governments include: locally generated revenue; donor funding; 
conditional grants and an equalisation fund for fourteen previously marginalised 
counties (Turkana, Mandera, Wajir, Marsabit, Samburu, Tana River, Narok, Kwale, 
Garissa, Kilifi, Taita Taveta, Isiolo and Lamu County [191]), equivalent to 0.5% of 
national funds (Chapter 12 [26]). 
2.4.7 Priority-setting for health in Kenya 
Priority-setting for health before devolution was beset with a range of challenges, 
including: a lack of clarity about roles and responsibilities by decision-making actors; 
low knowledge about guidelines; community views not being included in final 
priorities set; distortion of power leading to limited accountability by some actors 
and limited relationship between planned activities and budget received.  Devolution 
led to extensive changes for priority-setting at county level.  While limited studies 
have been carried out since devolution, there is some evidence that pre-devolution 
challenges with priority-setting are recurring in the post-devolution setting.    
Priority-setting pre-devolution 
Sub-national level planning:  There have been limited studies conducted of priority-
setting processes in Kenya. A study conducted in one district (Malindi) prior to 
devolution found that key health indicators were used to identify main health 
problems before selection of cost-effective interventions, along with setting targets 
and preparing a district plan and budget for the district health management board 
approval [192].  Most respondents were unclear about the presence of national 
guidelines.  The process involved the technical DHMT and the district health 
management board who played a governance role.  Hospital and health facility 
management teams carried out similar tasks when developing their annual work 
plans before these were collated by the DHMT [192].  While documents identified 
that priorities should be guided by the importance of problem, availability of funds, 
cost-effectiveness, cost-sharing measures and core activities, in practice health 
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indicators and resources played a role in determining the priorities set [192].  Strict 
national guidelines during this period left little scope for making decisions at the 
district level and this was exacerbated by  limited capacity of district decision-makers 
[192].  Likewise, another study of district priority-setting in Kilifi district, Kenya found 
that community engagement in the decision-making process was insightful and 
raised new issues [193].  Strong emphasis on national indicators, however, resulted 
in many of the community priorities (including a range of public health priorities, such 
as health education, sanitation and clean water) remaining unaddressed in the final 
plan [193].  Health facility staff priorities tended to focus more on health service 
delivery at the facility and emphasised the importance of immunisation, which was 
rarely mentioned by committees.  In terms of funding allocation based on the facility 
workplans, the intention according to policy was that funds would be released 
directly to facilities to support their work plans, but the funds within which they 
budgeted, were never distributed and there was “little evidence that financial 
allocations from the national level to each district for the year were influenced by 
the facility level planning activities”  (page241 [193]).  The accountability for 
reasonableness framework (see section 2.2.3) was piloted in one district between 
2006 and 2010.  It was found to be acceptable to decision-makers, who reported 
adoption of some concepts within priority-setting approaches [78].   
A study of the relationship between budget allocation and actual expenditure 
conducted in 2005/2006 in Kenya revealed a mismatch between policy, which 
prioritised primary health care and allocation which remained skewed in favour of 
tertiary and secondary care [194].  There was also an inability of both central level 
and districts to spend funds due to the limited planning and capacity at each level of 
the system [194].   
National level planning:  Annual operational plans have also been fraught with 
challenges.  From 2000/2001 the medium term expenditure framework was 
introduced as a tool to align planning and budgeting with annual operational plans 
introduced later in 2005 [195].  A study of national level annual operational planning 
and budgeting processes conducted in 2012 revealed the processes run 
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independently of each other, with the health sector having a budget but no annual 
operational plan by the start of the new financial year [195].  In agreement with 
earlier studies the annual operational planning process was felt to be top-down 
driven, with no link between the availability of resources and the setting of targets.  
Significant challenges with stewardship of the processes were also noted [195].  The 
changing context with the revision of the KEPH was felt to have added challenges and 
a lack of quality data with which to set targets for indicators was another gap in 
planning, resulting in a lack of evidence-based decision-making and use of ‘gut 
feeling’ within planning and a top down approach.  Some key stakeholders held 
inflated levels of power compared with that described on paper contributing to 
minimal accountability.  The study highlighted the difference between the bottom-
up process for annual operational planning identified on paper and the top-down 
process which occurred in practice, suggestive of reluctance on the part of central 
policy makers to decentralise decision-making [195]. 
Priority-setting post-devolution 
Given the extensive decentralisation to the county governments county decision-
makers now have responsibility for some previously national macro priority-setting 
roles such as human resource management (see Table 2).  This is in addition to the 
more traditional meso level aspects of priority-setting such as determining the mix 
of programmes, resources and strategies for delivering interventions [69].  Some 
priority-setting functions, such as the setting of broad priorities (e.g. introduction of 
free maternal health care) and revision of the community health strategy are 
retained at national level, creating an innate tension.   
According to the Kenya Health Sector Strategic and Investment Plan, county 
management teams should determine priorities for investment across the different 
investment areas (organisation of service delivery; health leadership; human 
resources for health; health infrastructure; health products and technologies; health 
information; health financing  and research and development) [168].  There ought to 
be prioritisation based on a Resource Allocation Criteria that “considers the health 
sector principles: equity and gender; participation; people centredness; efficiency; 
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social accountability; and multi sectoral focus” (page 75 [168]).  There is no further 
information provided, however, regarding these criteria or how these should be 
developed.   
Devolution has changed existing power structures for decision-making around health 
planning and budgeting, changing incentive structures for those involved with 
priority-setting.  A recent study by Lipsky et al. (2015) assessed the factors which 
drive political will for devolution and the processes used to make decisions in the 
Kenyan health sector at county level [196].  Across three study counties there were 
a range of methods used for identifying priorities, none of which sought input from 
citizens or civil society structures.  Involvement of other stakeholders varied, with 
only one county described as seeking advice from technical staff.  Political influence 
and visibility of county spending on health were critical in one county, leading to 
counties spending most development resources on construction, without the 
funding needed for human resources, supplies or maintenance to ensure they 
become operational [196].  CHMTs were felt to be constrained in their ability to 
respond to needs, due to their inability to incur expenditures with funds controlled 
by county treasuries [196].  Study of progress towards universal health coverage 
following devolution in two counties by the Overseas Development Institute (2016) 
revealed that health planning and spending at county level was heavily influenced by 
politics [165].  This may have contributed to imbalance between preventive and 
curative spending. 
Post-devolution Kenyan hospitals complete an annual work plan and quarterly 
budget to outline allocation of resources to the priorities present in the workplan, 
which should be linked and follow the government fiscal year.  A recent post-
devolution study on priority-setting in two Kenyan hospitals had similar findings to 
those described in the study done at national level pre-devolution [195] on annual 
operational planning. The budgeting and planning processes at the hospital level are 
not closely linked, with budgets (especially the first quarter) often developed in the 
absence of an annual workplan [197].  Historical allocation was frequently described 
among hospital departments receiving a similar allocation compared with previous 
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years [197].  Formal criteria used within hospitals in this study included:  ability to 
generate revenue; hospital caseload; international and national priorities; feasibility 
and affordability.  Informal criteria, such as the ability of department managers to 
lobby and bargain and interpersonal relationships between managers at different 
levels in the hospital also played a considerable role in influencing priorities [197].  
Cost-effectiveness analysis was rarely used and equity was neglected with a 
preference for priorities with ability to generate revenue.  Barasa et al. (2016) found 
that stakeholder understanding and participation in the process differed between 
the two hospitals studied, as did transparency.  There was little opportunity for 
reallocation of resources in either study hospital.  Use of evidence for decision-
making was limited, implementation was poor and there was no involvement of the 
community [197]. 
2.4.8 Health Equity Trends and Current Status 
While Kenya has made considerable progress towards improving coverage of health 
services and has reduced mortality rates (see Figure 12), equity gaps have persisted 
as highlighted in section 2.4.5.  Trends in health outcomes (under-five, infant and 
neonatal mortality rates) and coverage with key health services are indicated in 
Figure 13.  These graphs when viewed together reveal how mortality rates rose from 
the survey conducted in 1993 – 2003, alongside a corresponding reduction in delivery 
of services when user-fees were established, over the same period.  From 2003 to 
2014 mortality rates have dropped and service coverage has risen. 
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Figure 13 Trends for mortality and coverage with key services between 1989 and 2014 
    
There are drastic differences in poverty levels across Kenya, with 88% of the 
population in Turkana living below the poverty line (based on national poverty 
thresholds), compared with 22% in Nairobi [198].  In addition, Kenya continues to 
experience wide inequities in service coverage between regions and socio-economic 
groups.  According to a study conducted by Noor et al. (2006) just 63% of Kenyans 
have access to government health services within an hour of their homes.  Feikin et 
al. (2009) demonstrated that clinic visitation in Kenya decreased linearly from 0.5km 
to 4km (at which point the rate stabilised) [199].  After controlling for other socio-
economic factors such as wealth and maternal education, the rate of clinic visits 
decreased by 34% for every additional 1km from residence to a clinic [199].  
Accessibility to a private or public health facility varies dramatically between 
counties, with a facility density of 3.5 per 10,000 population in Mombasa County and 
less than 1 facility per 10,000 population in Bungoma County [21].  In keeping with 
these findings, regional differences in utilisation rates for outpatient services remain 
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as substantial causes of inequity with variation in annual outpatient visits per capita 
per county varying from 1.25 per annum in Marsabit County to 4.80 per annum in 
Migori County [166].  Wide inequities in service coverage between regions and socio-
economic groups persist in the recent DHS (2014), with differences in use of health 
services based on a person’s location, wealth, education level, gender and age [161].   
Despite overall increased utilisation of outpatient services between 2003 to 2013 
there remains a utilisation gap between wealth quintiles, although the gap between 
richest and poorest has reduced over time  [166].  The gap has however widened for 
inpatient services with average annual admission rate 28/1000 for poorest and 
56/1000 for richest quintile compared to average annual admission rate 14/1000 for 
poorest and 20/1000 for richest quintile in 2003 [166].   
2.4.9 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has highlighted key concepts, with global and Kenyan experiences 
relating to decentralisation, priority-setting and health equity.  Leading frameworks 
and approaches summarised have included: 
 Decentralisation and policy reform – Walt and Gilson (1994) policy analysis 
framework and Bossert (1998) decision space mapping.  
 Priority-setting – Accountability for reasonableness and Barasa et al. (2015).   
 Health Equity – Tanahashi (1978) framework and intersectionality approach. 
Community empowerment and engagement has been a common thread within all 
areas of the literature review.  It has been identified as critical to a governance 
perspective to decentralisation [37]; is fundamental to priority-setting processes [77] 
and forms a means of extending health service coverage and improving the equity of 
access, use and quality through CHWs [9].  Intersectionality approaches can guide 
learning about how the intersections between dimensions of social inequality 
interact within changing power relations after health reforms, and the role of 
community empowerment and CHWs within this [151].  
Given the recent devolution reforms there are a number of gaps in post-devolution 
literature within Kenya including: an in-depth analysis of the changing power 
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dynamics and process for priority-setting at county level; an analysis of the felt 
impact of devolution for health service delivery as experienced by health workers, 
CTC providers and community members.  In addition, to date there has been limited 
application of intersectionality analysis for reviewing health reforms and no known 
application of this to understand Kenyan priority-setting following devolution, having 
been recognised as a research gap [200].    
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Chapter 3:  Methodology 
The aim of this study is to understand the process, power and politics for decision-
making and priority-setting for community health and equity following devolution of 
health services in Kenya.  To achieve this aim, I designed a multi-method exploratory 
qualitative study with a photovoice participatory research component.  Key 
informant and in-depth interviews were used to understand priority-setting 
processes at county level (thereby responding to objectives 1, 2 and 3, see section 
1.2).  Focus group discussions and in-depth interviews explored perceptions at 
community level (responding to objectives 2 and 3). The photovoice participatory 
research provided a platform to allow youth living in an informal settlement to tell 
their own story of health and barriers to well-being and service uptake (responding 
to objective 3).  This chapter will provide:  
 An overview of my position and the links of the research with REACHOUT 
consortium  
 Justification of the selection of research design and methods for each objective 
 Description of data collection and analysis 
 Documentation of quality assurance mechanisms, including reflection on my 
position 
 Description of leading ethical considerations  
 Explanation of the limitations of the methods.   
Details of how each selected method was used are given in section 3.3 below.  Table 
3 and Figure 14 show how the methods selected sought to answer to the research 
questions and meet the study objectives.  The relationship between the research 
methods and study findings is identified in Figure 14.   
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Table 3 Research methods adopted to answer to research questions and objectives 
Research 
Question 
Objective Method 
1. How do 
county 
decision-
makers set 
priorities for 
health? 
Objective 1:  
Understand 
how process, 
power and 
politics effect 
equitable 
county level 
priority-
setting 
processes 
(red box 
Figure 14) 
In-depth interview with county level decision-makers for 
health across ten counties. 
In-depth interview with county and sub-county level 
decision-makers, health workers at community, dispensary, 
health centre and sub-county, county hospital level in three 
counties. 
Key informant interview with stakeholders at national level. 
Observation of policy writing workshop including county 
collaboration (one meeting four counties represented). 
National advocacy workshop with county decision-makers.  
2. What 
influence 
has 
devolution 
had on 
health 
systems 
building 
blocks and 
community 
health?   
 
Objective 2:  
Explore felt 
impact of 
devolution for 
the health 
system, 
particularly 
delivery of 
community 
health 
services 
(green box 
Figure 14) 
 
In-depth interview with county level decision-makers for 
health across ten counties. 
In-depth interview with county and sub-county level 
decision-makers, health workers at community, dispensary, 
health centre and sub-county, county hospital level in three 
counties. 
Key informant interview with stakeholders at national level. 
REACHOUT in-depth interviews with sub-county level 
decision-makers, facility in-charges, community health 
extension workers, community health volunteers and 
community leaders at community level in two counties. 
REACHOUT focus group discussions with community 
members in two counties. 
3. How is 
equity 
understood? 
What 
influence 
has 
devolution 
had on 
health 
equity? 
 
Objective 3:  
Identify early 
successes and 
challenges for 
equity of 
health from 
community to 
national level 
following 
devolution 
(blue box 
Figure 14) 
In-depth interview with county level decision-makers for 
health across ten counties. 
In-depth interview with county and sub-county level 
decision-makers, health workers at community, dispensary, 
health centre and sub-county, county hospital level in three 
counties. 
Key informant interview with stakeholders at national level. 
REACHOUT in-depth interviews with sub-county level 
decision-makers, facility in-charges, community health 
extension workers, community health volunteers and 
community leaders at community level in two counties. 
REACHOUT focus group discussions with community 
members in two counties. 
Photovoice participatory research with youth in informal 
settlement in one county.   
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3.1 My position as a researcher within REACHOUT and LVCT Health  
REACHOUT is an ambitious 5-year international research consortium aiming to 
generate knowledge to strengthen the performance of CHWs and other CTC 
providers in promotional, preventive and curative primary health services in six low- 
and middle-income countries in rural and urban areas in Africa and Asia (Bangladesh, 
Ethiopia, Indonesia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique).  REACHOUT consists of three 
main research phases: an initial context analysis; a first quality improvement (QI) 
cycle aiming to improve CHW performance and a second QI cycle which seeks to 
embed QI approaches.  The relationship of this thesis with REACHOUT is summarised 
in Figure 15 and explained below. 
Figure 14 Relationship between research method and study findings 
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Figure 15 Thesis data relationship to REACHOUT 
 
Prior to collecting data in Kenya I spent time working within the REACHOUT team 
while based in Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine.  During this time, I drafted the 
REACHOUT ethics application, conducted a scoping study for quality improvement 
approaches and drafted the REACHOUT generic qualitative topic guides for use 
during QI cycle 1 baseline data collection, see Figure 15.  I attended REACHOUT 
consortium meetings in Liverpool and Amsterdam where draft topic guides were 
presented to REACHOUT team members from all six implementing countries for 
feedback.  These topic guides were used to collect REACHOUT equity data included 
in chapter 4.   
Throughout this research I have collaborated closely with colleagues from the 
REACHOUT Kenya team at LVCT Health7.  LVCT Health is a national Kenyan non-
governmental organisation with experience in HIV service delivery and HIV and 
community health systems research.  LVCT Health started as a research project in 
                                                          
7 http://www.lvcthealth.org/  
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1998 and registered as a non-government not-for-profit organisation in 2001.  They 
are one of the largest non-government providers of HIV testing and counselling in 
Kenya and support government and partners to scale up access, quality and coverage 
of HIV, sexual and reproductive health related services and programmes.  LVCT 
Health has significant research experience along three key thematic objectives: to 
strengthen community and facility based health systems; to improve equity of HIV 
services, and to reduce sexual and gender-based violence through evidence-based 
interventions.  
I first visited Kenya and LVCT Health in 2013 where we collaborated in writing the 
first draft of the Kenya context analysis report for REACHOUT.  Data collected by LVCT 
Health during the REACHOUT context analysis is referenced in section 2.4.4, 
providing insight and understanding of the Kenya community health context and 
informing the subsequent development and design of this study.  Emerging from this 
data we drafted a paper which considered the implications of policy revision for 
community health [26] and drafted two further papers regarding the opportunity for 
integration of HIV following devolution [173] and gaps in community health 
supervision.  I visited REACHOUT Kenya again in October 2014 for several weeks, 
during which time I continued to build relationships with the LVCT Health team; and 
through their multiple links was introduced to national community health 
stakeholders and finalised applications for research permits and ethics application.   
The LVCT Health team conducted research assistant training, modified and pilot 
tested the generic REACHOUT QI1 topic guides in January 2014.  I returned to Kenya 
in February 2014 and joined LVCT Health colleagues by assisting with supervision of 
data collection within Kitui County.  This was led by Maryline Mireku and involved a 
team of eight research assistants.  A separate team of similar size conducted research 
in Nairobi County.  Following completion of data collection we (LVCT Health research 
manager, Robinson Karuga and two research assistants - Maryline Mireku and Nelly 
Muturi) modified the generic REACHOUT QI 1 coding framework for application with 
the Kenyan data during a two day workshop.  Following this we coded QI1 baseline 
data; some of these results are included in Chapter 4.   
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Findings from the Kenya context analysis and QI baseline studies highlighted the 
changing landscape for health, and community health in particular as counties 
shaped their own agenda and assigned budget accordingly.  This helped inform the 
subsequent collection of data from county decision-makers and across multiple 
health systems levels, exploring the implications of priority-setting for community 
health and equity.  This research was facilitated by introductions to one (or more) 
decision-makers at the county level by a member of the LVCT Health team in advance 
of my arrival.  In several counties the LVCT Health team member also accompanied 
me on the first day of data collection for introductions.  All data collection tools were 
drafted after having sought feedback from LVCT Health colleagues and supervisors, 
who were also part of the wider REACHOUT study.  Preliminary findings were 
presented and discussed with LVCT Health research manager and two REACHOUT 
research assistants before leaving Kenya in April 2016, providing opportunity for 
reflection and preliminary engagement of the team within the analytical process, see 
section 3.6.2.   
The context analysis and baseline findings were also used to inform the photovoice 
study by identifying youth as underserved users of community health services.  In 
order to promote openness in discussion the research was conducted by one LVCT 
Health staff member (Lydia Kitone) already working within Korogocho and one 
children’s officer (Christine Oyumba) who has previously supported LVCT Health 
activities, following a two-day training conducted by myself.  Lydia and Christine 
negotiated access and permission to conduct the study within Korogocho by 
engaging in discussions with community elders and leaders, who were already 
familiar with them and the work of LVCT Health in their community.  During the final 
photovoice celebration and exhibition the LVCT Health Nairobi manager (Jane 
Thiomi) facilitated the day’s events.   Following the end of the photovoice study, 
female youth continued to engage with LVCT Health through a different ongoing 
project within Korogocho. 
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3.2 Research design and methodological justification 
A naturalistic research paradigm was adopted, using non-experimental research to 
observe the changes to priority-setting processes, power dynamics and implications 
for community health and equity following devolution as they occurred [201].  The 
study did not seek to influence priority-setting, in accordance with the principles of 
naturalistic inquiry outlined by Guba (1981).  Rather use of a range of study methods 
(key-informant interviews, in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, 
observation), with a variety of respondents from national to community level were 
selected in order to try to recognise the differing realities which exist between 
respondents regarding the priority-setting process and implications of this for health 
equity and community health service delivery, following devolution.   
Acknowledging constructivism and the belief that the reality perceived is based on 
social, historical and individual contexts, aligns closely with intersectionality 
approaches and was important in guiding the selection of qualitative methods.  This 
was in order to better understand the  political, technical, ethical, contextual aspects 
crucial to analysing devolution reforms, which could not be fully understood through 
a quantitative approach [202].  An intersectionality approach was adopted towards 
analysis in keeping with the naturalistic paradigm, in acknowledgement of the 
intersections of the drivers of inequity in the lives of study respondents, the inter-
relation between researcher and participant and the changing nature of the 
implications of devolution for groups and individuals over time [191], [192].       
The research design is an exploratory multi-method qualitative study with a 
photovoice participatory photography research component.  The qualitative 
research methodology was adopted to explore inductively, the complex area of 
decision-making, through generation of rich data by seeking to understand the ‘why’ 
and ‘how’ questions about devolution [202], [203].  This methodology gives “due 
emphasis to the meanings, experiences, and views of all the participants” (page 43 
[203]), to develop possible explanations and theories surrounding decision-making 
at multiple levels  [204].   
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“Photovoice is a process by which people can identify, represent, and enhance their 
community through a specific photographic technique”  (page 369 [205]).  Its origins 
lie in critical consciousness, feminist theory and documentary photography, with 
foundations on the work of Paulo Freire, including problem-posing education, by 
enabling people to think critically about their community with use of visual images, 
potentially stimulating social action [205].  It aims to enable people to record and 
reflect on their community’s strengths and their concerns, to promote critical 
dialogue and knowledge and to reach policymakers [205].     
Photovoice research is consistent with the principles of community-based 
participatory research, by maintaining a focus on the social, structural and 
environmental inequities through active involvement of community members and 
researchers.  This active involvement ideally involves all aspects of the research 
process and seeks to affect the location of power towards those affected by the 
problem, with knowledge produced by the participants by taking action, including 
tackling social injustice [206], [207].  Given the focus on equity and community voice, 
photovoice research  was selected in order to produce evidence that may otherwise 
be difficult to obtain by learning from those not normally involved in priority-setting, 
in keeping with the principles of intersectionality analysis [208], [207].  It has 
previously been applied across a range of contexts, with a variety of respondents, 
including youth [209]–[212].     
In-depth and key informant interviews, were guided by a series of topics and 
potential questions focussed on decision-making, changes in the health system since 
devolution, including community health and health equity, while encouraging the 
respondent to guide the direction of the interview within these issues [203].   
Observation of meetings was used to develop greater understanding by the 
researcher and  provide further insights into guidance provided by national staff to 
county level community health decision-makers by watching behaviour and 
discussions in the natural setting [203].  Findings helped to triangulate and 
consolidate my understanding of these areas, but are not included explicitly in the 
results.   
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Photovoice research method was selected due to its community based participatory 
approach [210], which seeks to involve participants in the research process, 
recognising the unique strengths each participants brings [210].  Focus group 
discussions were used at community level within REACHOUT and as part of the 
photovoice sub-study (there was also one FGD with decision-makers) in order to 
exploit group interactions to generate greater depth of data [203].  
3.3 Study Methods and Sites 
Four main methodological components were adopted to collect the needed data, as 
identified in Figure 16 below. 
Figure 16 Study method chart for data collection 
 
 
Research data was collected across ten counties for county decision-maker data, with 
data collected from three of the ten counties for multi-level data.  REACHOUT data 
was collected from two counties (Nairobi and Kitui).  Both these counties were 
included in the county level and multi-level data collection (Nairobi, Kitui and 
Marsabit).  Relationship between study counties is highlighted in Figure 17 below.  
Data was first collected through REACHOUT in two counties, which informed the 
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subsequent data collection collected at county level and later at multi-level, national 
level and photovoice participatory photography research.   
Figure 17 Study county relationship 
 
3.3.1 County decision-maker in-depth interviews 
County selection:  Qualitative data was collected across ten counties in Kenya.  Ten 
is a relatively large number of counties to visit and conduct research.  Given the 
diversity between counties and the large number (47) of counties in Kenya’s 
devolved government, it was felt that a study of this scale was merited and required, 
in order to reach saturation and adequately understand decision-making processes 
within Kenya.   
To ensure diversity of counties selected a series of criteria were applied in order to 
select at least one county from seven of the eight former provinces (former North 
Eastern Province was excluded due to insecurity).  In addition to former province, 
another selection criterion was to ensure inclusion of rural agrarian (6), rural nomadic 
(3) and urban (1) counties.  Figure 18 indicates selected counties with a red dot.  
County 
decision-maker 
interviews in 
ten counties
Multi-level 
interviews in 
three counties
REACHOUT 
data collection 
in two counties
Photovoice 
participatory 
research in one 
county
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Figure 18: Map indicating selected counties and related study method for county data 
  
As well as ensuring diversity for poverty incidence and for key community and health 
indicators (% community unit coverage, live births in previous 5 years % delivered by 
skilled provider, % children age 12-23 months fully vaccinated, service readiness 
index).  In Table 4 indicators above national average are highlighted in green, while 
those below average are in red.  
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Table 4 Selection criteria for study counties 
County Rural/urban Province Population 
size8 
Community 
unit 
coverage9 
Live births in 
previous 5 
years % 
delivered by 
skilled 
provider [18] 
% children 
age 12-23 
months who 
are fully 
vaccinated 
[18] 
Service 
readiness 
index10 
[21] 
Poverty 
incidence 
(Headcount 
ratio) [213] 
National 
average 
   35% 61.8% 67.5% 57% 45.2% 
Homa 
Bay 
Rural agrarian Nyanza 1,025,668 103% 60.4% 53.7% 60% 48.4% 
Kajiado Rural 
nomadic 
Rift 
Valley 
731,436 38% 63.2% 48.9% 62% 38% 
Kitui Rural agrarian Eastern 1,077,723 27% 46.2% 52.7% 57% 60.4% 
Kwale Rural agrarian Coast 691,656 48% 50.1% 82.0% 65% 70.7% 
Marsabit Rural 
nomadic 
Eastern 309,858 5% 25.8% 66.6% 56% 75.8% 
Meru Rural agrarian Eastern 1,443,374 21% 82.8% 78.3% 56% 31.0% 
Nairobi Urban Nairobi 3,339,848 20% 89.1% 60.4% 48% 21.8% 
Nyeri Rural agrarian Central 738,083 28% 88.1% 77.8% 59% 27.6% 
Turkana Rural 
nomadic 
Rift 
Valley 
910,314 19% 22.8% 56.7% 48% 87.5% 
Vihiga Rural agrarian Western 590,228 29% 50.3% 90.9% 63% 38.9% 
                                                          
8 www.ehealth.or.ke/mcul 
9 www.ehealth.or.ke/mcul 
10 Service Readiness refers to the capacity of the health facilities (public and private) to provide health services. The readiness in this 
aspect showed the basic requirements to provide services such as infrastructure, amenities, basic equipment, standard precautions for 
infection control, diagnostic tests, medicines and commodities. 
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County participant selection:  Within each county participants were selected who 
could provide information about the decision-making processes.  Purposive sampling 
was applied, where respondents were chosen with ‘a purpose’.  This followed 
discussions with Kenyan colleagues to identify respondents who were known to hold 
decision-making roles at the county level, thereby meeting the requirements of 
‘symbolic representation’ for qualitative sampling [204].  This led to the identification 
of ‘technical’ respondents including: County Executive Committee Member for 
Health, Chief Officer for Health and members of the County Health Management 
Team (Director for Health, County Community Health Strategy Coordinator, County 
Public Health Officer) and ‘legislative’ respondents from the County Assembly 
(Chairperson for Health Committee).  In order to ensure diversity, I also included 
respondents who did not necessarily play known key decision-making roles for health 
but who had in-depth knowledge and understanding of health-related fields, such as 
gender and children’s issues.  This selection was a combination of convenience and 
purposive sampling, which endeavoured to deliberately include voice and experience 
for those not typically deemed powerful in decision-making (women and children), 
within the study restrictions of English language interviewer and short time-frame in 
each county, which led to selection of gender and children’s office representatives. 
The selection of representatives on behalf of women and children was a limitation, 
as it reduced the opportunity for members of these groups to tell of their own 
experiences first hand.  Early review of the findings revealed the emergence of 
budgeting as a key theme and so a flexible and iterative approach to sampling was 
adopted.  The sampling frame was expanded to include the chairperson for the 
budget committee within the county assembly and a representative from the county 
treasury.     
Given the elite social status of some of the respondents there were issues 
surrounding negotiation before gaining access to meet [214].  Colleagues within LVCT 
Health introduced me to either the Director of Health or County Executive 
Committee Member for Health within the ten counties.  I then followed this up with 
email and/or phone call to seek permission to visit the county and requested their 
assistance with further introductions to other potential respondents within the 
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county health management team (CHMT).  I also shared copies of letter of 
introduction from LVCT Health, research permits and ethical approval letters with 
respondents.  Once I arrived within the county, negotiations began to gain access to 
meet with the members of county assembly (MCA).  In some instances, a member of 
the CHMT would assist by providing these introductions.  However, in most counties 
the MCAs were hard-to-reach and so I would need to pass through the clerk for the 
county assembly who played a ‘gatekeeper’ role in permitting or denying access to 
meet with the MCAs [214].  Demographics for county level respondents interviewed 
are shown in Table 5 and Table 6.  
Table 5 County level demographics  
 County 
Sex Health/Non-health # 
respondents Female Male Health Non-health  
Homa Bay 1 10 7 4 11 
Kajiado  5 8 6 711 13 
Kitui 2 8 5 5 10 
Kwale 3 9 6 6 12 
Marsabit 1 11 7 5 12 
Meru 2 10 8 4 12 
Nairobi 6 6 7 5 12 
Nyeri 5 7 8 4 12 
Turkana 4 10 9 5 14 
Vihiga 6 6 7 5 12 
Total 35 85 70 50 120 
Table 6 County demographic breakdown for job title 
Job title Male Female #respondents 
County executive committee member for health 6 3 9 
Chief officer for health 7 3 10 
Director/deputy director for health 17 2 19 
CHMT member 19 13 32 
Total county level health respondents 49 21 70 
Children’s office representative 7 3 10 
Gender representative 6 4 10 
Member of county assembly (or representative) 15 5 20 
County treasury representative 6 0 6 
Other county informants 3 1 4 
Total county level non-health respondents 37 13 50 
                                                          
11 In Kajiado 4 respondents were interviewed together in a small FGD. 
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Data collection tool:  A formative research stage allowed for the opportunity to 
identify the range of issues to be included within the data collection tool (see 
Appendix 1).  I conducted several information gathering interviews with stakeholders 
at national level to inform development of this tool.  In addition, in order to provide 
a framework within which to examine priority-setting I selected the accountability 
for reasonableness framework (see section 2.2.3), drawing on previous use of the 
framework for guiding topic guide development [215].  The draft tool was guided by 
these interviews, informed by literature review, reviewed by supervisors and Kenyan 
colleagues who provided feedback and advice.  Several interviews were conducted 
in the first county, followed by a period of reflection which allowed opportunity to 
review and amend the data collection guide to ensure that questions elicited the 
responses required. 
3.3.2 National, County and CHV Observation  
While at health facility or during time spent with CHVs I requested verbal consent 
from respondents to take photographs as part of the research, which reflected the 
stories described, such as overcrowded store or remote setting of health facility.  
Taking photographs raises questions around who has the right to take and display 
images and for what purposes [216].  Photographs from observations at health 
facilities have been included in Chapter 4 to highlight issues visually.   Photos included 
within the thesis have been selected to reflect qualitative findings, with the purpose 
of raising awareness of the health system realities and public health priorities.  
Where there is person photographed, the photos attempt to represent the subjects 
respectfully in a manner which does not further marginalise or stigmatise them 
personally [216].     
I conducted observation during a number of community health related workshops 
and meetings, including: a national community health policy writing workshop; a 
county policy collaboration meeting; a national advocacy workshop attended by 
representatives from four counties; national community health annual planning 
workshops and several community health operational research technical working 
groups.  At times I took on a participant observer role, where I as the researcher also 
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occupied a role in addition to observation [201], in this situation when contributing 
to discussion and at other times I simply observed.  Observation provided 
opportunity for “systematic watching of behaviour and talk in natural settings” (page 
42 [201]) and  was used to gain an understanding through observing people, places, 
processes, actions and interactions that occur naturally [217].  In addition, I visited 
health facilities where many of the health worker respondents worked and spent 
time with community health volunteer(s) in many of the counties visited, in order to 
gain greater understanding of their work, including benefits and challenges faced.  
These findings provided context and background in helping me understand and 
triangulate research findings, but were not used to gather data and hence data from 
these observations are not presented within the research findings.  I documented 
reflective notes shortly after each meeting or period of observation.   
3.3.3 In-depth interview across health systems level 
After completing data collection with decision-makers at county level in ten counties 
the understanding of the priority-setting process developed was one-dimensional 
and there was need to triangulate and study the process with other stakeholders 
within the county.  Three counties were selected to study the felt impact of 
devolution across the health system, with one urban (Nairobi), one rural agrarian 
(Kitui) and one rural nomadic county (Marsabit) selected as these are the three 
broadest divisions for populations in Kenya.  This aspect of the study was limited to 
three counties due to time and resource constraints.  Counties were selected in order 
to align with the two pre-existing REACHOUT counties (Nairobi and Kitui), with one 
rural nomadic county (Marsabit) added to ensure representation from the three 
main population groups.  Marsabit County was selected pragmatically, due to strong 
pre-existing relationship within the county and the availability of strong logistical 
support to facilitate field work.  Counties selected are shown in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19 Map indicating selected counties and related study method for multi-level 
data 
  
 
Within Marsabit County, where no previous REACHOUT work had been conducted 
two sub-counties were selected one where the county headquarters were located, 
and a remote sub-county.  Respondents were selected purposively and 
pragmatically, selecting respondents who worked across health systems levels and 
who spoke English.  Unfortunately, this led to CHEWs being selected from community 
level, with CHW voices not represented.  Within each sub-county I spoke with the 
sub-county Medical Officer for Health and the sub-county Community Health 
Strategy focal person.  I then selected the health facilities within each sub-county to 
include county/ sub-county hospital and minimum one health centre and one 
dispensary.  At each facility visited I spoke with the in-charge or acting in-charge and 
the community health extension worker (if there was one available).   
Within the pre-existing REACHOUT counties I spoke with the in-charge and CHEW (if 
there was one) at seven/eight facilities originally selected for REACHOUT research 
(three/four in Kitui and four in Nairobi).  It was not possible to reach one of the more 
remote dispensaries in Kitui due to heavy rains having made the road impassable and 
so this was replaced with another dispensary.  In addition, I spoke with sub-county 
and hospital personnel as already described for Marsabit County (Table 7 describes 
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respondent demographics).  Data collection tools used a modified and briefer version 
of the tool used with county decision-makers (see Appendix 2). 
Table 7 Multi level respondent demographics 
Job title Male Female #respondents 
Community health extension worker/ community health 
volunteer 
6 6 12 
Health facility in-charge 8 9 17 
Hospital in-charge 6 0 6 
NGO coordinator based at county level 1 0 1 
Sub-county community health focal person 5 2 7 
Sub-county medical officer  5 1 6 
Total multi-level respondents 32 17 49 
 
3.3.4 Study Methods:  National level key informant interviews  
14 key informant interviews were carried out with national government 
stakeholders, members of non-governmental partners supporting community health 
and others with key roles relating to community health or evidence-based decision-
making at national level.  Initial respondents were identified following discussions 
with colleagues in Kenya.  LVCT health form part of the technical working group for 
community health and I was able to attend a number of meetings and build-up a 
relationship with members of the national Unit for Community Health and 
Development and invite members to participate in interviews.  Following these initial 
meetings, a snowball approach was utilised to identify other suitable respondents 
(see Table 8 for respondent demographics).  The data collection tool used to guide 
interviews was a modified version of the county decision-maker tool (see Appendix 
3).   
Table 8 National respondent demographics 
  Male Female #respondents  
County representative for county executive committee forum 
at national level 
1 0 1 
National Ministry of health 6 1 7 
NGO/research institute/ donor 4 2 6 
Total national respondents 11 3 14 
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3.3.5 Study Methods:  REACHOUT data collection 
REACHOUT Kenya conducted a quality improvement (QI) cycle during the period that 
the data for this thesis were collected.  This QI cycle sought to strengthen supervision 
of CTC providers (CHVs and CHEWs).  As part of this research cycle a baseline study 
was conducted.  Findings from this baseline study, which explore health worker and 
community perceptions around health equity, will be presented within this thesis.  
Two counties were selected by REACHOUT Kenya for inclusion: Kitui and Nairobi, with 
two sub-counties (one remote and one more easily accessible) selected in each 
county and two community units identified in each sub-county.  See Figure 20 for 
study counties selected. 
Figure 20 Map indicating selected REACHOUT counties and related study method  
  
Data collection tools were prepared by the REACHOUT team (see Appendix 4 and 
Appendix 5).  These were then reviewed, adapted to the Kenyan context and piloted 
in Ruaraka (non-study site) in Nairobi.  Study participants for inclusion were identified 
including sub-county focal person, link facility in-charge, CHEW, CHV, community key 
informants, CHC members, community members (see Table 9 for study 
demographics).  Participants from community to county level for all study 
components were offered a cash token in lieu of refreshment in appreciation of their 
time, in accordance with LVCT Health guidance.     
108 | P a g e  
 
Table 9 Demographics for respondents interviewed through REACHOUT 
In-depth interviews 
  Male Female # respondents  
Community health volunteer 12 12 24 
Community health extension worker 4 2 712 
Community health committee member 8 6 14 
CHV team leader 4 9 13 
Health facility in-charge 4 3 7 
Sub-county community health focal person 3 1 4 
Community key informants 11 6 17 
Total IDI respondents 46 39 86 
FGDs 
FGDs 7 7 14 
3.3.6 Study Methods:  Photovoice research 
Photovoice is increasingly used within international health research as a process 
through which people (usually those with limited power due to poverty, gender, class, 
ethnicity or other reasons), use photo images to capture aspects of their environment 
and experiences and share these with others [218].  In this study photovoice was used 
as a research method to aid in exploring power, equity and intersectionality.  This study 
component sought to generate knowledge and understanding about health hazards 
and behaviours for youth in Korogocho informal settlement through photography 
and to increase their involvement in local decision-making by identifying responsive 
actions which can be taken within their community [218], [219].   
Youth were identified as photovoice participants based on findings from the context 
analysis and the baseline for the REACHOUT quality improvement cycle, which 
identified youth and adolescents as often not engaging fully with existing community 
health services.   
Discussions were held with colleagues within LVCT health who identified Korogocho as 
a suitable location to conduct the research, due to ongoing LVCT Health project 
activities within this community, with strong links and relationships with youth, village 
leaders and children’s officers.  Later discussions were conducted with LVCT health 
                                                          
12 Unrecorded gender one respondent. 
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staff based in Korogocho, to discuss the research objectives and identify suitable 
participants.  As part of these discussions we considered the potential limitation and 
risks associated with conducting photovoice research, including who used the camera, 
what the user photographed and what the photographer did not photograph.  In 
response to these issues a number of measures were adopted to ensure safety of the 
participants.  This included conducting photography with a facilitator and local security 
staff present, not taking photographs in areas deemed particularly insecure and 
ensuring that photographers seek consent prior to taking photographs.  However, 
these safety restrictions, as well as the money for supporting activities being in the 
hands of the facilitators, rather than the participants, may have influenced the 
photographs taken.  In the early sessions participants focused predominantly on 
negative features, such as rubbish heaps and blocked drainage channels.  After 
discussion with the facilitators, we encouraged the youth to consider other issues 
which influence health.  This led to fuller discussions and youth captured a range of 
photographs which included positive aspects, as well as a more comprehensive range 
of concerns, including high prevalence of rape, drug and alcohol misuse.   
Following discussions with the facilitators, we determined to identify nine youth (one 
from each of the nine villages in Korogocho) aged 16-18 years, of these five were to be 
female and four male. Youth were to be school drop-outs who do not typically engage 
with health services.  We discussed the possibility of recruiting youth from a local 
rubbish dump as many youth work at the dump site collecting rubbish.  Figure 21 
identifies location and related study method for photovoice research. 
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Figure 21 Map indicating county and related study method for photovoice research 
  
A community entry meeting was held with community chief, elders, health worker and 
other key parties to introduce the research concept, seek advice and inputs from these 
community leaders and respond to their questions.  Following this initial community 
entry meeting, it was determined not to recruit youth from the dumpsite, as youth 
from across the city travel to work there.  Therefore, the nine youth were selected in 
a collaboration between the two facilitators and village elders, according to the 
remaining criteria.   
Prior to commencing the research, I had participated in a three-day photovoice 
training.  I subsequently conducted a two-day training with two research assistants 
(one LVCT Health staff and one children’s officer as identified in section 3.1, see Photo 
2) who facilitated the photovoice research.  These two experienced research assistants 
already worked within Korogocho (one was a Korogocho resident) and were therefore 
familiar to youth selected to participate.  This training covered introduction to 
photovoice, consent, how to use camera, confidentiality and facilitation.   
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Photo 2 Youth photographers with facilitators and one security staff 
 
Six full-day sessions were held with participants during which we carried out initial 
introduction to photovoice, discussed group confidentiality, how to use cameras and 
consent.  We also introduced the topic of health and discussed with youth what issues 
they wanted to explore relating to health through their photos.  In accordance with the 
participatory nature of photovoice research, the participants determined to expand 
issues to include life hazards in addition to health, due to the strong linkages between 
life hazards and health.  During sessions the youth went to the community to take 
photos.  Following return from taking photos, the youth identified photos for 
discussion, these were then printed and discussed together during the next session.  
This discussion included questions such as ‘Describe your photo? What is happening in 
the photo? Why did you take this photo?  How does this affect us?  What can we do 
about it?’  These questions are in keeping with those commonly used during previous 
photovoice studies as identified in two recent systematic reviews [220], [221].  In 
addition, discussions with youth co-identified the next topic they wanted to 
photograph.  During the final session held one week later, a professional filmmaker 
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produced a short documentary13 with the youth who shared their experiences with 
photovoice and the photos which they wanted to share.  Youth identified actions which 
they would like to see happening within the community, based on the issues raised in 
their photos.  With the support of the research assistants, youth discussed and 
identified community leaders and key stakeholders who they felt held the power to 
change issues arising from the photos.  These stakeholders were invited to a film 
screening and photo exhibition during which youth photographers highlighted the 
subject they had previously selected of ‘life hazards and health behaviours’ through 
their photos with identified actions.  The youth retained editorial control by selecting 
the photos printed for display.  Figure 22 shows the main activities carried out as part 
of photovoice research. 
Figure 22 Photovoice activities 
       
Throughout the results section I have sought to include photographs taken by youth 
through the photovoice study (in addition to those taken by myself as identified in 
section 3.3.2), to provide the reader with a visual picture for some of the findings 
from the photovoice research.  The photovoice youth photographers gave assent and 
parental consent for use of the photographs with captions including the 
                                                          
13 http://www.reachoutconsortium.org/news/co-constructing-knowledge-about-
health-with-the-young-people-of-korogocho-informal-settlement/  
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photographer’s name included, where appropriate.  Verbal consent was sought from 
any model prior to taking the photograph, with written consent sought from the 
model in any photograph where the person is identifiable.   
3.4 Data management all study components 
Where consent was provided, interviews were recorded and later transcribed.  A 
small minority of participants (five) declined recording of the interview.  For these 
interviews extensive notes were taken by myself and typed up immediately after the 
interview.  I conducted all county level, health systems and national level interviews 
in English.  REACHOUT interviews and focus group discussions were carried out by 
the trained LVCT Health research team, involving eight research assistants in Kitui 
County and eight in Nairobi County, coordinated by Maryline Mireku.  Some of these 
interviews and FGDs and all photovoice workshops were conducted in Kiswahili or 
Kikamba (local language in Kitui).  Transcripts were translated into English, with a 
small minority checked for consistency and meaning in translation.  A selection of all 
transcripts were checked against the original recording for accuracy.  In addition to 
digital recording I took notes throughout all interviews, documenting key discussion 
points and additional features about the interview.   
3.5 Data analysis 
I used a thematic framework approach to analysis, in order to classify and organise 
data according to the key themes, concepts and emerging categories [204].  This 
included  an inductive aspect, which allowed meaning to emerge from the data [202].  
This consisted of familiarising myself with the data by reading and re-reading through 
transcripts.  Due to the long data collection period (April 2015 –April 2016), I 
familiarised myself with the data after receiving transcripts from the first three 
counties.  Following this I identified a thematic framework which drew on my 
understanding of the literature, the objectives of the interview, the themes within 
the data collection tool and issues raised by the respondents themselves during 
interviews.  This initial coding framework was piloted and subsequently refined as 
coding progressed. Since I coded all data myself, any changes to the coding 
framework could be incorporated consistently as data coding continued (see 
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Appendix 6).   The framework developed from the county level interviews was also 
applied for the multi-level and national level data.  Nvivo 10 software was utilised to 
manage and code data.  Following coding I conducted charting of the data in order 
to summarise data, while still retaining its context and essence [204], based on data 
from all ten counties.  I then analysed the findings collectively, highlighting 
differences between counties or types of respondent where appropriate. 
For data collected as part of REACHOUT QI cycle 1 baseline research, a generic 
REACHOUT coding framework was collaboratively developed by Liverpool School of 
Tropical Medicine and sent to partner countries for adaptation (see Appendix 7). In 
Kenya, a two-day data workshop was held with the REACHOUT team, to develop a 
modified Kenyan coding framework, using similar methods as described above.  All 
researchers who conducted coding were involved in adaptation of the framework, to 
ensure common understanding and application of codes.  All QI1 baseline transcripts 
were subsequently coded using the agreed coding framework (double coding where 
appropriate) in Nvivo10. 
Data analysis occurred alongside the photovoice study with participants identifying 
the research findings which they wanted to present to community leaders and 
identifying captions to explain their photos as part of the process.  Following 
completion of the study, data from the transcripts of the group discussions were 
coded following creation of a separate coding framework.  As I had already left Kenya 
when transcripts were received this was developed independently, without 
collaboration from my colleagues with whom the photovoice study had been carried 
out.   
The study adopts an intersectionality lens to analysis, by seeking to explore how 
power relationships have changed over time since devolution and to understand the 
implications of this for priority-setting at county level; the health systems 
performance; the availability, accessibility, acceptability, use and effective coverage 
of services as experienced by different individuals at the community level as a result 
of intersecting dimensions of social inequality.  Data was analysed in light of four 
main frameworks (Walt and Gilson (1994); Barasa et al. (2015); Bossert (1998) and 
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Tanahashi (1978)), with overall application of the intersectionality lens.  These 
frameworks are drawn together in the conceptual framework for the study 
highlighted in Figure 5. 
3.6 Quality assurance  
3.6.1 Trustworthiness  
Trustworthiness of research has four main aspects according to Guba (1981):  
credibility; transferability; dependability and confirmability [222].  In order to 
strengthen the trustworthiness and to assure quality of the data collected, I 
employed a series of techniques.   
A range of qualitative methods were adopted with respondents across health 
systems levels, in order to explore with respondents their reasons and motivations 
for priority-setting and to seek to understand the intricacies of power dynamics and 
relationships at play.  This is in keeping with intersectionality principles, including a 
multi-level analysis; attention to power and inclusion of diverse knowledge, to learn 
from those not typically included in priority-setting  [223].  Other mechanisms which 
sought to strengthen trustworthiness include: 
 Data were collected at county level across ten counties which were sampled to 
reflect diversity of contexts, with a series of criteria.   
 Respondents were purposively selected to choose those with most 
understanding of the topic.   
 Continued sampling was done until saturation was reached, where no new 
insights would be obtained by further widening the sample [204].   
 Triangulation of methods (in-depth interviews, key informant interviews, focus 
group discussions and photovoice participatory photography research) and 
sources both at county level (with gender and children’s office representatives, 
technical decision-makers, politicians and representatives of county treasury) 
and across levels of the health system (national, county, sub-county, health 
facility and community) allowed for cross-checking the integrity of the data, by 
bringing forward different viewpoints and breadth to the analysis, thereby 
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accommodating a fuller picture to emerge [204].  This triangulation also sought 
to build up a multi-faceted picture of the intersecting power relationships at play 
and how they can influence health equity. 
 Reflection on the research tool and emerging findings after several interviews in 
the first county and discussion of these with colleagues and supervisors allowed 
for some simple but effective modifications, to ensure that questions were 
phrased more appropriately to elicit meaningful responses.   
 Presenting preliminary findings to fellow researchers engaged in health systems 
research in Kenya at an early stage in the data collection process allowed the 
opportunity to uncover gaps in my data collection at this early stage (it was after 
this meeting that participants with a stronger understanding of the budgeting 
process were included).  Further presentation of findings with LVCT Health 
colleagues and with researchers from Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine 
provided opportunities to critique and refine the analysis.   
 Prolonged engagement through ongoing role within REACHOUT, with continued 
interaction with LVCT Health colleagues through this. 
3.6.2 Reflexivity 
Reflexivity is crucial to qualitative research, particularly when using intersectionality 
approaches, by recognising my influence as a researcher on the choices and decisions 
I have made about the methods selected, data collected and analysis conducted as a 
result of my gender, ethnic background, profession, religion and social status [202].  
In keeping with principles of intersectionality described by Hankivsky (2012) I will 
endeavour to be reflexive to my role as a researcher, acknowledging the influence of 
power and relationships I bring to the study.  Having worked in clinical settings both 
within the United Kingdom and in low-income setting and from time spent working 
with CHWs in multiple countries, I have been interested and intrigued by the 
processes at play behind how and why decisions are made for delivery of health 
services, particularly community health care.  Through the process of conducting a 
systematic review of the (in)equity of CHWs, I developed an interest in understanding 
how CHWs can increase access and use of quality health care for hard-to-reach 
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groups of people.  I also came to appreciate more the potential role which they can 
play towards stimulating community empowerment to address underlying social 
determinants of health.  However, despite evidence for their effectiveness and role 
in promoting equity I recognise that CHW programmes are often fragmented, NGO 
driven, with a disease-specific focus and limited integration into the formal health 
system [224].  This prompted my interest to understand more about the potential for 
change which a dramatically devolved health system would bring for health in 
general and more specifically community health.   
From the outset this study sought to explore equity and fairness.  This orientation 
towards equity has influenced the selection of methods and participants, for example 
the decision to use photovoice participatory research with youth living in an informal 
settlement and to approach analysis using an intersectionality lens.  Researchers, 
policy makers, activists and others are motivated towards studying and influencing 
equity and social justice for a multitude of unique and personal reasons.  My 
motivation comes in a large part as a response to my Christian faith.  My experience 
of the grace of Jesus Christ, motivates and informs my belief that social justice, and 
within this, challenging and transforming the underlying structures of power which 
create inequities, is a fundamental aspect of our purpose in life [225].  Some people 
have the opinion that the church itself is one of the structures of power which creates 
inequity, and unfortunately this has been and remains true in many instances.  In the 
Bible we learn that God has always cared for people who are the most vulnerable.  
This motivates me to study equity and undoubtedly influenced my decisions about 
data collection and how I have presented and interpreted findings.   
As a trained medical doctor who has previously worked with CHWs I shared some 
degree of commonality with some respondents regarding our profession.  Due to my 
embedded position with LVCT Health, some respondents may have considered me 
closely associated with them, which may have influenced our conversation to some 
degree.  In several counties (particularly Kitui County, where REACHOUT was carried 
out and I had made multiple visits with LVCT Health colleagues as part of REACHOUT 
data collection), respondents would frequently refer to LVCT Health during 
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interviews.  In other counties, where REACHOUT was not ongoing and my role within 
LVCT Health was not widely known, this was less of an issue and respondents 
infrequently referred to LVCT Health during discussions.  Overall most respondents 
viewed me as an ‘outsider’ as a white female, trained in the UK and having recently 
moved to live in Kenya.  Male participants (who formed the majority of respondents), 
would from time to time refer to my outsider status by questioning my ability to 
understand the situation given my recent transition to living and researching in 
Kenya.  Despite this lack of commonality with respondents in some respects, I did not 
feel my outsider position to be a major disadvantage.  While some respondents may 
not have opened up fully due to my outsider status,  I believe that in other interviews 
I was able to ask blunt questions as a consequence of my ‘informed outsider’ 
position, since many respondents did not perceive me as a threat to their status or 
position and so perhaps felt able to open up more during our discussions [214]. 
As an outsider I was able to approach the research with limited prior assumptions 
and no loyalty for or against devolution.  Over the 14 month period spent living and 
researching in Kenya and as a result of research, observation of meetings and 
workshops, building up relationships with some national respondents through 
ongoing attendance at meetings, discussions with friends and colleagues, reading of 
literature and media, I felt that my position transitioned from that of a full outsider 
to an ‘informed outsider’ allowing for deeper knowledge [226].   
3.7 Ethical Considerations and Approval 
Consent was sought from all participants, with full copies of all consent forms, 
including respondent information, included in ethics applications to LSTM and 
KEMRI.  All respondents who participated in KII, IDI or FGD gave informed written 
consent.  For the county and health systems IDIs consent was in English, for some of 
the REACHOUT FGDs and IDIs the consent was translated into Kiswahili and Kikamba 
(local language in Kitui).  REACHOUT research assistants (eight in Kitui and eight in 
Nairobi) were trained by my LVCT Health colleague (Maryline Mireku) in how to 
conduct informed consent prior to carrying out the research.  During the consent 
process the consent form provided the participant with information, explaining that 
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participation was voluntary, that the participant could decline or terminate 
participation at any time.  Consent was also sought to record the interview, issues of 
confidentiality and anonymity were discussed.  Written consent forms were stored 
separately from data collected and there were no codes on the consent forms which 
could link the consent to an individual’s transcript.   
For the photovoice research, because the participants were aged 16-18 years, 
informed proxy consent was obtained from the parent or guardian, with assent from 
each youth who participated.  Consent was translated into Kiswahili and translation 
quality checked for meaning.  Consent carried out with youth and their parent/ 
guardian prior to commencing the research included giving consent to recording of 
discussions.  We also conducted training with the youth about the need to seek 
verbal consent from any photo subjects, explaining who they were, what they were 
doing, why they wanted to take the photo and how it would be used, before taking 
a photo of the person or their property.  In any images where the photo subject was 
identifiable, informed written consent was sought from the subject.  This was carried 
out by the research facilitator and was translated to Kiswahili.  Following the photo 
exhibition, some local leaders made follow up to shut down places where illegal 
alcohol was brewed.  No identifiable photos were included, in order to ensure the 
safety of the participants.  In addition, follow up with youth beyond the end of the 
photovoice study continued with the female youth participating in an ongoing 
project led by LVCT Health.  Photovoice research participants also gave informed 
consent to participate in the production of the film and consented to allow ten 
photos each to be used by Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine and LVCT health.   
For both REACHOUT and photovoice FGDs it was explained during the consent 
process that while members of the research team commit to keeping confidential 
what is disclosed, other members of the FGD may disclose matters discussed.  We 
encouraged participants to maintain confidentiality about what was discussed within 
the group, but also advised participants that they should not disclose anything which 
they are not comfortable sharing within the group.  Transcripts were anonymised 
using a unique code, with removal of any names from transcripts.   
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The research proposal was approved by Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine 
(Research Protocol 14.007 and Research Protocol 14.044) and Kenya Medical 
Research Institute (KEMRI) (Non-SSC Protocol 469).  In addition, the researcher 
received approval from the National Council for Science and Technology (NACOSTI) 
(NACOSTI/15/2058/4010).  Upon arrival in each county I provided letter of 
introduction and sought approval from the County Commissioner’s office, prior to 
commencing data collection within that county.  Within Nairobi County a further 
research permit was required from Nairobi City County, in addition to the above 
permits and approvals.  Permission was also sought from either the County Director 
for Health or the County Executive Member for Health prior to commencing data 
collection in each county.   
During observation of meetings I introduced myself as a research student from 
Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine and linked with LVCT Health.  I did not explicitly 
explain that I was observing meetings for the purposes of including data based on 
these observations within research results.  As a result, these observations were used 
by me to triangulate with other study findings and to improve understanding of the 
context within which the findings are positioned.  However, data from observations 
were not explicitly documented in the results, in keeping with principles of informed 
consent, which was not expressly sought.   
3.8 Limitations 
In some of the counties visited my host organisation had well-established working 
relationships with many members of the County Health Management Team, which 
allowed for a smoother process of introduction.  However, in other counties the 
relationship was newer, which at times resulted in challenges establishing initial 
contact and permission to visit.  In some instances, I felt that respondents disclosed 
more during discussions where there was a stronger pre-existing relationship with 
my host organisation, compared with counties with limited prior engagement.   
A limitation with the study was the limited extent to which community voices from 
CHVs and community members were captured regarding their role in priority-setting 
following devolution.  This occurred as a consequence of community data included 
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in the findings having been collected as part of the REACHOUT study on quality 
improvement and so the need for questions to explore the community role in 
priority-setting had not been identified at the time this data was collected.   
A limitation with the photovoice research was that it was conducted in only one 
county (Nairobi), due to time and resource constraints.  This may have led to 
distortion of presentation of community level findings from within an urban informal 
settlement, compared with other contexts.  I felt however, that the merits and 
benefits gained from data collected through photovoice, by nature of the critical 
analysis skills developed with typically unheard voices, outweighed this limitation.  In 
addition, many of the findings from the photovoice study reflected and triangulated 
findings raised by participants from other settings, e.g. lack of drugs and long queues.  
Where photovoice findings differed from other contexts I have sought to highlight 
these as context-specific to the informal settlement urban setting.  Another 
limitation was the short engagement period (six sessions held over a six week period) 
and limited continued engagement beyond the duration of the study period, which 
may have undermined efforts initiated during the study to implement actions 
identified by participants.  This is in keeping with previous studies, which tended to 
limit community participation to photographic data collection and photo-elicited 
interviews [220].  Other limitations are discussed further in section 5.5.  
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Chapter 4 Results:  Priority-setting process and implications for health equity and 
community health 
This chapter will provide an overview of how priorities are set at county level and the 
effect on implementation of these priorities and implications for community health 
and health equity.  It relates these findings back to Figure 5 (the conceptual 
framework presented in section 2.3.2). 
The findings reveal high levels of variation between counties for priority-setting 
processes and implementation of health services following devolution.  These 
variations are due to the complex adaptive nature of decision-making, involving 
multiple decision-makers, with varying and evolving levels of power holding influence 
over the process and outcomes (green box Figure 5).  This contributes to the 
performance of the health system, to provide services which are accessible, 
acceptable and effective (blue box Figure 5) and the extent to which the priority-
setting process empowers the community to demand for and use those services 
(yellow box Figure 5).  Combined together these factors will influence the level of 
progress made towards (or against) universal health coverage (red box Figure 5).  
Devolution has transferred decision-making and budgeting authority from the 
national to the county level, which should beneficially allow county decision-makers 
flexibility to select the most context appropriate priorities.  Thus, in the absence of 
clear roles and responsibilities for decision-makers and with limited technical 
guidance provided from national level, a vacuum has emerged which provides room 
for political power plays and potential manipulation.  
The chapter is structured to provide a general overview of health in Kenya prior to 
and following devolution (section 4.1), introducing the key players for priority-setting 
(section 4.2), before summarising the current priority-setting process (section 4.2.6) 
and its influencing factors (section 4.3).  A political lens is applied to probe the nature 
of power relationships within the priority-setting process (section 4.3.2) in response 
to objective 1 Understand how process, power and politics effect equitable county 
level priority-setting processes.  Implications for health systems performance and 
community health as perceived by national, county, sub-county respondents, health 
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workers and community members are explored (section 4.4), in response to 
objective 2 Explore felt impact of devolution for the health system, particularly 
delivery of community health services.  Finally, equity implications are explored 
combining findings from all sources (section 4.5) in response to objective 3 Identify 
early successes and challenges for equity of health from community to national level 
following devolution (see Figure 14). 
4.1 Setting the scene 
4.1.1 Context for health and equity prior to devolution  
Pre-devolution health system:  Kenya’s health system before devolution held deeply 
ingrained inequities in health service availability, accessibility and effective coverage.  
Earlier donor driven de-concentration health reforms in the early 2000s had not 
adequately addressed these challenges.  Districts (sub-national structures) were to 
coordinate primary health care, manage recurrent resources at a more local level and 
implement health activities.  These decentralised activities, including setting 
priorities, developing workplans and allocating budgets, were carried out by a district 
health management team, led by the district medical officer, in conjunction with a 
district health management board which included community representatives who 
played a governance and oversight role.   
“Health sector was probably one of the most decentralized sectors before 
devolution in terms of structures and arrangement and conduct of business.” 
National Respondent, Male11 
These activities were carried out under the authority of the provincial level (which 
ceased to exist following devolution) before being forwarded to national level for 
approval (see section 2.4.5).  National level maintained close links to these 
operations through the provincial medical officer and retained control of budget for 
development activities (such as infrastructure and equipment); human resources for 
health management (including recruitment, staff transfers, payment of staff salaries 
and supervision); drug and supplies procurement.  However, the district retained 
funds for management of day-to-day expenses under the control of the district 
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medical officer, with hospitals able to use income generated from user-fees and to 
manage funds transferred directly from national to a district level office. 
“Before devolution, hospitals at the sub-counties [which] were districts then, 
and they were able to manage their own resources.”  County Health 
Respondent, Female69  
In addition, a health sector services fund, commonly referred to as HSSF, was 
introduced in 2010, to improve quality of services within the health facility.  These 
funds were transferred directly from national government to each health facility’s 
account.  Once received the health facility would determine how best to use these 
funds, in consultation with the health facility management board.  Health workers 
described that funds were typically used to pay casual labour staff, to carry out minor 
repairs, photocopy materials, conduct outreach and maintenance and to fill gaps for 
essential drugs.   
“Before [devolution] every quarter we used to have; money is there in the 
bank, the AIE (authority to incur expenditure) has been brought, it was good. 
Money has been helping, even if we had small things to be done; we cannot 
do so much, but the small things that can be done, we do.” Health Worker, 
Female20 
However, many county technical decision-makers felt that community health had 
been largely neglected by national government, with community health 
interventions largely being donor driven with little government investment. 
“These [CHVs] were neglected people during the national [government].  They 
were too low in the system.”   County Health Respondent, Male22 
Inequities persisted prior to devolution with resource allocation felt to be due to the 
strength of local politicians’ ability to influence powerful central government officials 
(see section 4.5.5).  As a consequence, areas with well-connected politicians received 
a high concentration of investment.  Meanwhile entire regions within the country, 
where there was little central government interest, received extremely limited 
resources (infrastructure, funding or human resources) and became known as 
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‘discipline areas’ where poorly performing staff were relocated. As a consequence, 
service availability and coverage was minimal and quality of services deteriorated 
within these areas.    
“Equity …in fact that is one of the things why devolution was formed in Kenya, 
because there was a lot of concentration of resources or even health care 
facilities in some areas more than the others.”  County Health Respondent, 
Male20 
Respondents across counties identified a number of common drivers for devolution 
of health services including the need to improve: equity; accountability; community 
participation; quality services and to increase the responsiveness to community 
needs.   
4.1.2 Changing distribution of power between national and sub-national levels 
Devolution led to a re-distribution of power for planning, budgeting and 
implementing health services, which resulted in changes at national, provincial, 
county and district levels (see Table 2).  Considerable restructuring occurred 
simultaneously across the country, which resulted in recognition of two levels of 
government (national and county), with removal of the provincial level, which some 
respondents felt had resulted in confusion regarding communication between 
national and county levels.  There was the new creation of the county level, including 
county executive committee (executive government) and county assembly (political 
government), with community insights now gained through public participation and 
county level stakeholder meetings, which include community representatives (fully 
explained in section 4.2).   
“Decentralization has only recognized two layers of government; the national 
level and the county level, so now resources are only allocated to counties.” 
National Respondent, Male11 
Many technical decision-makers perceived that within this new county government 
structure, decision-making power had shifted out of their hands and into the hands 
of policy makers.   
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“The issue of health care in my view is no more in the hands of the health care 
providers, but rather in the [hands of] policy makers.”  County Health 
Respondent, Male24 
The national role transitioned to one of providing policy guidance; capacity building 
and maintaining standards as outlined in the Constitution.  In accordance with this, 
the national unit for community health and development re-structured around four 
sub-units: advocacy; monitoring and evaluation; capacity building and operational 
research in order to better fulfil its role.   
“When you look at the 4th schedule of the Constitution it spells among other 
functions, that national government is responsible for capacity building and 
of course for setting policies.”  National Respondent, Male05 
With creation of the county health management team (CHMT) came the need for 
new county organogram structures, outlining the key players in the technical 
decision-making team for health. This is presented visually in Figure 23 and described 
in detail in the text.  The former district level has been re-structured to the sub-
county level, with sub-county health management teams co-ordinating activities at 
this level.  In most counties while workplans are made at sub-county level, the 
priority-setting and budgeting now occurs at the county level, with limited/ no 
budget control at sub-county level post-devolution (see 4.4.1).  Structural changes 
are indicated in Figure 23, based on respondents’ descriptions, where green arrows 
indicate governance, black lines indicate supervision pathways, red arrows indicate 
flow of funding.  The black dotted line between national and county indicates the 
new relationship between national and county governments.  Red box surrounding 
some boxes indicates structures which receive funding directly from national level.  
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Figure 23 Pre (blue) and Post (yellow) devolution health structures 
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The transition from national to county government was originally anticipated to 
occur gradually over a number of years, but instead occurred rapidly in a matter of 
months.  According to one national respondent, this was felt to be due to the county 
level’s demand for more power and resources. 
“The county [drove rapid devolution], not the people themselves but the 
county management … and the demand was just basically so they could have 
more power and more resources.”  National Respondent, Male01 
Perhaps as a consequence of this rapid transition and/or due to reluctance to hand 
over power, national level was perceived by national and county level respondents 
not to have provided the support which counties required, particularly in supporting 
and ensuring the quality of health services throughout the transition.   
“The fact that we devolved very quickly even the national government was not 
really prepared in terms of how it was going to influence that process and how 
it could assure some of the critical issues in health did not suffer, like quality 
for instance.”  National Respondent, Male01  
Budget management shifted from predominantly national (with some district) 
control to county control.  In an attempt to prevent deepening inequalities, national 
government distribute funds to counties based on principles of fiscal need, using a 
combination of equality and equity within the allocation formula.  National 
government have committed to sharing at least 15% of national funds with counties 
through these equitable funds based on the commission for revenue allocation 
formula (see section 2.4.6).  Once funding reaches the county, decision-makers at 
that level are able to determine how those funds are allocated between departments 
and what percentage is allocated to health.   
“Now when money goes to the counties we say it has no colour, so you 
actually don’t know how much will go into health and so decisions are made 
at the county level to decide what money goes to health.” National 
Respondent, Male05 
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In addition to the equitable share, the 14 most marginalised counties receive an 
equalisation fund from national government.  Although, at the time of this study 
almost three years post devolution the fund had not as yet been received by the 
counties (see 2.4.6).  Counties can also apply to national government for further 
additional conditional grants (for carrying out pre-determined and agreed activities, 
such as support for level five hospitals).  In addition to the funds provided from 
national level, counties have locally generated revenue from taxes, user-fees, donor 
funding etc.  The amount of locally generated revenue varies considerably between 
counties.  In some counties, there were extremely limited locally generated funds, 
with the result that any delay in funding from national level created considerable 
knock-on delays within the county.  However, in other counties, particularly Nairobi, 
the locally generated funds were described as exceeding those received from 
national level and so any delays in receiving national funding could be buffered by 
use of the locally generated revenue.  Findings on the changes in the district (sub-
county level) following devolution are explained more in section 4.4.1.  
4.2 Who are the actors that set health priorities within a county?  
Respondents identified five main actors who should play a role in setting priorities 
and making decisions for health at county level.  Some of these actors play a decision-
making role for non-health responsibilities as well, but health is considered an 
important piece of their decision-making role.  The level of influence of each of these 
five groups varied widely between counties, relating to the differing degrees of 
power held and ability to influence decisions (see section 4.3.2).  These five groups 
of actors and their interconnected relationships are built up in a step-by-step process 
as indicated in Figure 24 to Figure 27 and are colour coded as follows: Technical 
decision-makers (green); governor and county executive committee (CEC) (blue); 
members of county assembly (red); other county stakeholders such as NGOs, 
selected community representatives and other line ministries (yellow) and any 
community members (purple).  Colour of arrows correspond to actions carried out 
by the corresponding colour of actor, i.e. green arrows indicate actions carried out 
by technical decision-makers. 
130 | P a g e  
 
Figure 24 Key players in decision-making process1 
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4.2.1 Technical decision-makers 
Technical decision-makers at county level (green boxes in Figure 24) were guided by 
national health policy, strategies and the Constitution formulated by national 
Ministry of Health staff and national law makers.  The main technical decision-makers 
at the county level typically described by county level respondents included members 
of the county health management team (CHMT), including:  director(s); deputy 
director(s); other CHMT members such as heads of health departments and other 
non-CHMT health workers in the county14.  In some counties, county executive 
committee member and chief officer for health were also considered technical 
decision-makers, particularly if they had health-related background prior to working 
in these positions.  However, CHMT members from other counties viewed them more 
in terms of their political negotiation role within the county executive committee 
(blue box in Figure 25).  Each of these key positions will be described in more detail.  
The establishment of a team of technical decision-makers at county level to guide 
priority-setting processes occurred after devolution.  Delays in recruiting key 
technical decision-makers were described by respondents at both national and 
county level, which hindered ability to fulfil responsibilities as intended.  In some 
cases, there was a lack of clarity regarding roles and responsibilities for those in key 
positions.  
County executive committee member for health:  The county executive committee 
member for health plays a political role negotiating between the health team (green, 
see Figure 25) and the county executive committee (blue, see Figure 25).  In addition, 
he/she is responsible for coordinating development of the annual workplan and 
budget for health, in collaboration with the county health management team in eight 
out of ten counties.  In two counties (where there had been a relatively recent change 
in the county executive committee member for health and the chief officer for 
health) respondents identified the director for health as leading the planning 
process.   
                                                          
14 The members of the CHMT varied between counties and not all counties had all 
respondents described here. 
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Chief officer for health:  The chief officer was typically described as the main 
accounting officer for health, responsible for supporting development of the budget, 
including appropriate costing of planned activities.  He/she supports the CHMT with 
budgeting (green box in Figure 24), and may be invited to join the county executive 
committee for meetings and discussions although he/she is not a member of this 
committee.   
Director for health:  The director for health is a member of the county health 
management team (green box in Figure 24) who provides technical insights to guide 
the health team while setting priorities.  He/she was often supported by one or more 
deputy directors and a health administrator (although these roles were not present 
in all counties, where department heads reported directly to the director rather than 
a deputy).   
County Health Management Team:  The county health management team (CHMT) 
is composed of the various department heads and experts within health who provide 
guidance to the person leading the process (typically the county executive member 
for health). 
“There is something called county health committee management team… in 
charge of the entire county. It’s a group of different experts in the health 
sector with many representatives from malaria, HIV, public health, nursing 
officer in-charge, maternity department, almost every area. … who sit down 
and they inform you that this is the way to go.” County Health Respondent, 
Female60 
Sub-county, health facility and community level health workers:  The rest of the 
technical decision-makers included health workers at sub-county, health facility and 
community level who developed annual workplans for their respective sub-county, 
health facility or community unit. These respondents frequently described feeling 
excluded from the decision-making process at county level, regularly highlighting 
more limited participation than county level respondents.  
 “So in a way we are feeling there is a gap.  It [decision-making] is happening 
at the county level but they are not involving the most important people... We 
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are not involved in decision-making nowadays in the name of system of the 
county government.” CHEW, Male07 
Officially, priority-setting for annual workplans and budgets for the health facility was 
guided by a template provided by the county and typically carried out during 
quarterly review meetings.  These meetings were led by the in-charge and attended 
by the health facility management committee.  The committee played a governance 
role (similar to the role held prior to devolution), providing guidance about 
community problems, assistance in problem-solving and oversight of budgeting and 
follow-up of planned activities.  At community level, the community health extension 
worker (CHEW) was described as being responsible for setting priorities for 
community health activities along with the community health committee (CHC) and 
community health volunteers (CHVs).  This was then shared with the health facility 
in-charge, who should include community health activities within the health facility 
plan and budget, following consultation with the health facility management 
committee.  Once drafted the annual workplans for health facilities should be 
harmonised at sub-county and county level. 
“They (county level) normally give us a template whereby we involve the 
healthcare workers in the health facilities and the sub-county health 
management team in various departments to make the annual 
workplan.…We involve the in-charges; we involve them in making the annual 
workplan and then we consolidate for the sub-county.” Sub-county Health 
Respondent, Male07 
However, it was unclear the extent to which plans from lower levels were retained 
within the county workplan and budget.  Respondents from these lower levels 
frequently described that the funds received did not match the budget which they 
had submitted, which created challenges for implementation of health priorities at 
community and facility levels and led to feelings of exclusion from decision-making 
processes (see section 4.4.1).  This led to recommendations for decentralisation of 
annual planning and budgeting to lower levels. 
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“I think maybe in terms of decision-making in terms of the annual workplan 
and budgeting …I think probably we just don’t centralize and bring it nearby.”  
Health Worker, Male13 
4.2.2 Other county stakeholders such as NGOs, private providers and members of 
other departments 
Technical decision-makers across multiple counties described calling together 
stakeholders for review and needs assessment (see yellow box in Figure 25).  Typical 
invited stakeholders to these meetings were: Heads of divisions within health; NGO 
partners; private providers; heads of related line ministries in the county and 
community representatives.  In some counties members of the county assembly who 
sat within the health committee for the county assembly were involved in 
stakeholder meetings.  Most technical decision-makers within the counties described 
holding meetings on a regular basis (usually quarterly, although in some counties the 
frequency of these meetings has reportedly declined considerably since devolution). 
In contrast to the technical decision-makers’ descriptions of regular stakeholder 
meetings, gender and children’s office representatives across counties, frequently 
described far fewer interactions with the health team around decision-making post-
devolution compared with pre-devolution.  In some counties the gender and 
children’s office representatives described having been invited to participate during 
the development of the County Integrated Development Plan or strategic plan, but 
were often not invited on an annual or quarterly basis.  The majority highlighted the 
need for strengthened collaboration.   
4.2.3 Community members  
The community were described by respondents from county and sub-county levels 
as playing a vital role in priority-setting in every county (represented by purple box 
in Figure 25).  However, community members themselves did not commonly describe 
a priority-setting role when asked to describe their responsibilities relating to health.  
Mechanisms described to collect community inputs and public feedback included: 
routine community health activities such as community dialogue days; findings from 
routine supervision activities (although not all counties mentioned this as a means of 
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identifying priorities) and traditional barazas, where chiefs played a key role in 
mobilising attendance.  Community representation in community health committees 
and health facility management committees was commonly described especially by 
technical health decision-makers (particularly facility level), with these committees 
playing a governance role in overseeing health facility finances and creating a bridge 
between communities and health facility staff (see 4.2.3).   
“Basically their (health facility management committee) issues are one; 
arbitration between either the technical and the community, if there are 
issues they should look into and see how to solve them, they also look in the 
financial matters of the facility, they are also involved in the development 
matters of the facility.” Sub-County Health Respondent, Male09 
However, community health committees were not functional across all community 
units, as two out of eight of the community units where REACHOUT data was 
collected, did not have a functioning community unit at the time the QI baseline was 
conducted.  Other forms of community participation described by county level 
respondents such as dialogue and action days, were reported by CHEWs and CHVs to 
have low community involvement or to have stopped completely.   
Public participation meetings held by the county executive committee and county 
assembly as part of the annual planning and budgeting process were critical avenues 
for learning community needs and priorities.  There were a wide range of benefits 
and challenges associated with the public participation process which will be more 
fully described in section 4.3.5. 
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Figure 25 Key players in decision-making process 2 
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4.2.4 Governor and county executive committee (CEC) 
The county executive committee (also referred to as the county cabinet), meet 
frequently to identify leading priorities for the county (they are indicated by blue in 
Figure 25).  This committee is headed by the governor, deputised by the deputy 
governor and includes the county executive committee members for ten 
departments within the county, including health.  The chief officer for health may 
also be invited to attend, although he/she is not a member of the committee.   
The county executive committee is guided by the priorities identified in the county 
integrated development plan (CIDP), a five-year plan which outlines the vision and 
goals for the county, along with planned activities needed to achieve these goals.  
The county executive committee members for all ten departments, along with the 
governor (all governors at the time of the study were male) and his deputy, identify 
the leading priorities for the county for the forthcoming year.  This follows 
presentation and justification of priorities and budget by the respective county 
executive committee members (including health) to the rest of the county executive 
committee.  Based on these negotiations, the ratio for allocation of funds is identified 
between departments.  The amount of funds allocated and the approval of priorities 
largely depends on the negotiation skills of the county executive committee member 
in presenting their case to the other committee cabinet members. 
“Yes a lot depends on the CEC and the chief officer in charge … for example 
we added more money to health after they (CEC and chief officer) argued their 
case that this amount is not going to be enough because of ABCD and then 
the governor was saying ‘fine we understand, we want to move away from 
this to this, so can we look for money from other departments’.”  County Non-
Health Respondent, Male45 
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Figure 26 Key players in decision-making process 3 
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The county executive committee member for finance was described as a critical 
member within the county executive committee, who estimated fund allocation from 
national level based upon previous trends.  The county treasury also provides 
guidance and assistance to the departments in developing budgets.  County treasury, 
along with other county executive committee members, were described as 
responsible for carrying out two public participation meetings with community 
members to report the previous year’s progress and to identify community needs 
and priorities for the future year (see Figure 26).   
4.2.5 Members of county assembly 
The members of county assembly, known as MCAs are locally elected politicians, 
each responsible for representing a ward (approximately 20,000 to 100,000 people) 
(indicated in red in Figure 27).  Members of county assembly were termed as 
legislators and described three key governance roles associated with their position: 
legislation, oversight and representation. 
“My role within the county as the member of the county assembly, I do 
legislature.  That is making bills and policies which are suitable for our county 
and our people. I also do oversight to make sure that the money given to the 
executive is well used. There is no mismanagement of funds so that it’s going 
to the normal citizen …to do the job it’s supposed to do. I also represent my 
people who have elected me because they cannot all come here to see the 
governor and to see the executive, so I normally tend to what belongs to my 
people in the ward and in this County so that we legislate what the people 
want. So I do the representation of the people, those are the three main roles.”  
County Non-Health Respondent, Female46 
There are a number of committees within the county assembly, each with a differing 
area of oversight.  Regarding health, the health committee and budgeting committee 
were most commonly described as playing a health-related role for priority-setting.  
The health committee play an oversight role by visiting health facilities to monitor 
health activities on the ground.  Although somewhat unclear, this generally includes 
visiting the health facility to check conditions and to ensure staff are in attendance 
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and identify challenges, such as drug stock-out.  Some health workers felt these 
monitoring visits were problematic as some members of county assembly attempted 
to technically supervise health workers, who described feeling frustrated that 
members of county assembly without clinical knowledge were telling them how to 
do their job.  Budget committees were involved in reviewing the health budget and 
conducting public participation to validate what was included within the county plan 
and budget.  There were a wide range of challenges raised surrounding the influence 
of politics on the priority-setting process which will be identified further in section 
4.3.2. 
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Figure 27 Key players in decision-making processes 4 
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4.2.6 What are the processes for identifying priorities at county level? 
The priority-setting process now happens at the newly created county level and is 
centred around the annual budget calendar, which starts on 1st July and ends on 30th 
June each year.  This official process is carried out by the actors (identified in section 
4.2), with health being one of ten departments included within the process.  The 
available budget for counties to use is based on the equitable fund received from 
national level, locally generated revenue and equalisation fund (where applicable).  
Conditional grants and vertically funded donor activities are not included in the 
general budget-making process, due to pre-conditions associated with use of these 
funds.  Respondents described twelve steps relating to development of the health 
plan and budget as they should be carried out. These are highlighted in Figure 28 and 
explained below (yellow boxes highlight the three public participation meetings 
which occur as part of this process).   
1. Following issuing of guiding national and county budget circulars, the sectoral 
working group for health (includes members of the county health management 
team (CHMT), community and partner representatives) meet to conduct a needs 
assessment and develop an annual development plan (12 month abstract from 
the county integrated development plan (CIDP) - a five year plan which outlines 
the overall vision and strategy for the county) and a sector working group report, 
which assesses progress made for health, including successes and challenges, 
during the previous 12 months.   
2. The annual development plan and budget is shared with county assembly, who 
review it to confirm whether it is in agreement with the CIDP.   
3. The county treasury generate the county budget review (for the past year) and 
outlook paper (for the next year).  The outlook paper includes activities planned 
within the comprehensive five year CIDP vision and plan for the upcoming year 
and also carries forward those activities planned and budgeted, but not yet 
completed during the previous year.  The county treasury shares this document 
with the county executive committee cabinet and then with the county assembly.   
4. County treasury and other departments (including health) share the county 
budget review and outlook paper and the sector working group (SWG) report 
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with the community through public participation to gain feedback on proposed 
outlook.   
5. During February the budget steering committee and county executive committee 
cabinet meet to set the budget ceilings based on expected non-conditional funds 
and allocate the percentage of the county budget to each department.  This is 
used to generate the county fiscal strategy paper. 
6. County fiscal strategy paper shared with the community during a second public 
participation process, by the county treasury.   
7. Following this the health department review their budget to re-align it with these 
ceilings, before it is consolidated by the county treasury in the county budget by 
30th April.   
8. The county budget is shared with the county assembly who typically divide the 
budget based on the department, with the health committee in the county 
assembly reviewing the plan and budget for health department.  The health 
committee submit a report of their review to the budget committee. 
9. The county assembly budget committee conduct a third public participation with 
the community, with the purpose of validating the plan and budget and 
identifying any community priorities which are not reflected in the budget.  
10. Any disagreements regarding the plan and budget are resolved through meetings 
between the county assembly health committee, budget committee and the 
county executive member for health.  Budget is shared and discussed by the full 
county assembly.   
11. An amended budget is shared by the county assembly with the county executive 
committee.  Once it has been approved by both the county assembly and the 
county executive committee, it is finalised as the appropriation budget for the 
following financial year.  Ideally this should be completed by 30th June (the close 
of the financial year).   
12. (Optional) In the event that the budget has not been approved by all parties by 
the end of the financial year, it is necessary to conduct a ‘vote on account’ with 
the purpose of ensuring that essential services can continue, while budget 
negotiations continue.    
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Figure 28 Annual budget calendar 
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4.3 What influences the selection of priorities? 
County decision-making (Figure 29) is bounded by the national Constitution and 
county integrated development plan (orange), within the limits of the budget ceiling 
determined at county level and resources available (purple), provided minimum of 
30% of funds are development focused, with use of conditional grants being used by 
the national level to encourage suitable investment in health priorities.  Priority-
setting should be guided by county leaders (pink), with priorities made based on local 
evidence generated through routine data, discussions with health workers, cost-
effectiveness analyses to plan priorities which ensure the achievement of health 
targets within the county health strategy document (green).  Public participation 
meetings have been introduced to seek citizen’s opinions and priorities (blue) and 
accountability mechanisms established (yellow).   
Figure 29 Factors which should influence selection of county priorities 
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However, there was a common acknowledgement that priorities were influenced by 
factors other than those described in the official process. 
“…as technical people we always imagine that technical reasons would be so 
compelling to drive investment reasons, but that is not really the case.  You 
know when you do your political economy analysis, it really tells you a 
different story, that there are different incentives for investing in health.” 
National Respondent, Male05 
Power and politics were discussed widely and animatedly during interviews, across 
counties and across health systems levels and were commonly acknowledged to 
influence priority-setting and budget allocation.  Priorities need to be both politically 
and technically acceptable.   
“Every decision you are making must meet the technical [point of view] and it 
has also to meet the political point of view.” County Health Respondent, 
Female54 
Priority-setting in Kenya takes place across contexts where graft and corruption may 
have become commonplace; where community opinions have been neglected for so 
long that citizens no longer feel participating in discussions will change anything; 
where leaders have been elected through patronage, leading to expectations of 
advantage for those politically affiliated with the successful leader.  The new county 
authorities have differing values and levels of capacity, both within and between 
counties.  There has been a lack of clear and transparent guidance and criteria from 
national level to guide the priority-setting process; a lack of clarity surrounding roles 
and responsibilities; unclear process for how priorities are weighed and compared; 
differing approaches to priority-setting and to managing the politics surrounding this; 
failure to provide communities with easily interpretable information about the 
benefits and challenges of potential choices; manipulation of the process by 
opportunistic actors and disregard for accountability mechanisms.  As a result, power 
and politics can become more influential than technical knowledge and evidence, 
which adds to the complexity within the priority-setting process (Figure 30), leading 
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to selection of ‘high-vote’ priorities with misalignment of distribution of 
interventions in line with tribal and political affiliations (red) (Figure 30).  Lines of 
accountability can become blurred and opportunities for manipulation increased.  In 
some cases, this has led to limited support for health promotion and disease 
prevention at the community level, with distortion of the provision of health services 
along political or tribal lines.  As a result, health promotion and public health benefits 
associated with community health are not fully realised, with the consequence that 
priorities are distorted and communities have not benefitted optimally from 
devolution.  Seven key themes were identified by respondents, which influenced the 
selection of priorities (key documents and national influence, county leadership 
values and skill, use of targets, evidence and context, resource availability, 
community voice and sharing information, power dynamics and accountability 
mechanisms) which will now be outlined in more detail.     
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Figure 30 Factors which influence selection of county priorities in practice 
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The governor holds overall responsibility for achievement of targets in the county 
integrated development plan, with the county executive committee member for 
health responsible to deliver health targets according to the health performance 
contract (see section 4.3.3).  Many of the respondents described the process for 
development of the county integrated development plan and strategic plan for 
health as having been participatory in nature, involving community participation and 
involvement of stakeholders from other ministries within the county and partner 
organisations.  Partner support for activities and vertical programmes was included 
within the county integrated development plan, with planned activities included in 
annual workplans, but excluded from general county budgets.  Partner funding for 
vertical programming was typically tied to pre-specified activities, rather than 
entering the general county treasury budget for determination and allocation as 
identified by county authorities.  By contrast to county level respondents, few 
respondents at sub-county and lower levels described using guidance documents to 
guide them in developing their annual workplan, although use of these documents 
was not explicitly probed.  A number of respondents at these levels described using 
templates provided by county level to guide them. 
National authority’s ability to influence:  National government’s ability to influence 
decisions made regarding health services has shrunk considerably post-devolution.  
As one national respondent identified, their influence must now be mediated 
through financial means, such as encouraging investment in selected activities 
through conditional grants (which are designed to support national priorities and 
may act as a pooling mechanism for donor funding). 
“Decision-making has been devolved to the 47 semi-autonomous county 
governments. So, in a sense the role of the national government has really 
been reduced to providing policy guidance on health… Now the national 
government cannot really influence so much what the counties do with that 
money. They can only influence if they have a separate pot of money and say 
ah ‘we have this pot of money that is extra can you use this specific pot of 
money to influence this particular health outcomes?’ And so it’s been able to 
do that through the conditional grants.”  National Respondent, Male05 
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Communication channels between the two layers of government were felt to be 
unclear following the restructuring of the health system, by some respondents at 
both national and county levels.  For community health the confusion which followed 
devolution was felt to have led to loss of earlier progress.   
“... national level priorities and sub-national priorities. Getting that in sync is 
usually a challenge.”  National Respondent, Male05 
National level’s loss of ability to influence county government was identified as a 
challenge for community health following the recent development of a new scheme 
of service for community health extension workers, along with a revised community 
health strategy (see section 2.4.4).  Many technical county level respondents 
described having introduced parts of the strategy, such as reducing the number of 
CHVs from 50 to 10 per community unit, as this was felt to be a much more 
manageable number to provide with stipends from county government budgets.   
 “As it was one community unit has fifty community health volunteers but as 
it is now it is being restructured such that one community unit can have ten 
community health volunteers with the purpose of the county government be 
able to give them monthly stipend.” County Health Respondent, Male52 
However, while reductions to the number of CHVs were made, no respondent from 
any of the counties described having increased the number of CHEWs from two to 
five per community unit.  The high costs for CHEW salaries was highlighted as 
problematic by national and county respondents.  Reducing the number of CHVs, 
without a concurrent increase in the number of CHEWs, may have a detrimental 
effect on the quality of community health services.   
“HRH has become a very big issue, while the standards before were two 
community health extension worker; one between the facility, one between 
the community, that was hardly the case because counties don’t have the 
salary to pay that. So it might become more challenging as we are moving to 
five.” National Respondent, Female08 
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One area of uncertainty following devolution, regards the difference between 
adapting the strategy to the local context or abandoning the same. The degree to 
which counties must/ must not implement community health according to the 
national strategy remains unclear.  Some counties have chosen to make extensive 
revisions which, while based on the community health strategy, also include changes 
to its fundamental structure, such as removal of the community health committee.  
In order to understand this more fully a case study (case study 1) will present findings 
regarding how one county has chosen to modify and introduce a new approach to 
community health. 
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Case study 1:  A new approach to community health post devolution 
County context: A rural agrarian county, with high levels of 
malnutrition, relatively low coverage of skilled delivery and 
immunisation compared with the national averages and higher than 
average poverty incidence.   
Analysis:  Following devolution, the county reviewed implementation of 
the community health strategy to date and found uneven coverage 
centred around urban areas, as a consequence of partner NGO 
preference.  There was high attrition of CHVs following sudden partner 
withdrawal.  In response, the county determined to develop a new 
approach which will seek to address these challenges. 
New approach:  This new strategy will seek to extend health service 
coverage, by ensuring that CHVs will be recruited from all villages, 
including the most remote areas.  A multi-sectoral community level 
approach is planned involving a range of ministries.  Stronger 
sustainability is expected through provision of stipends for CHVs. There 
are expectations that the new approach will bring improvements in 
services for vulnerable groups, through provision of funds to be 
managed by the CHV to ensure provision of necessary resources, such 
as wheelchairs etc. to those within the CHV’s community. 
Potential challenges:  Some respondents from county level and almost 
all at lower levels felt excluded from the decision-making process, with 
no opportunity to raise concerns or seek clarification.  Existing CHVs 
have become disillusioned, after promises of a stipend have remained 
unfulfilled.  Potential future overwork for CHVs following reduction in 
the number of CHVs from 50 to ten (or less) per 5000 population.  
Recruitment of CHVs will be carried out by the public service board, not 
through community selection.  This will mean that current CHVs may 
not be recruited as CHVs in the new approach, which has led to 
discontent among former CHVs who have devoted many hours to 
working as CHVs over the past years.  Communities may have concerns 
about dismissal of CHVs they have previously selected. 
Departure from national guidance:  According to national guidance, a 
functional community unit must include CHEWs, community health 
committee and CHVs.  However, respondents from sub-county level 
who hold responsibility for roll-out of the new approach expressed 
uncertainty about what (if any) role there will be for CHEWs under the 
new approach, whether those currently working as CHVs will be 
retained following introduction of the new approach and whether there 
will be any role for community health committee governance structure 
within the new approach.    
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National government’s fulfilment of its role:  The national level within Ministry of 
Health now have responsibility for capacity building, as mandated by the 
Constitution.  However, several national level non-government respondents 
described inadequate provision of capacity building in decision-making by the 
national level, along with hostility to accept this at county level, who may not deem 
it a priority.   
“…national government is responsible for capacity building and of course for 
setting policies, but you will see as we transitioned initially there was a lot of 
mistrust between the two levels of government [national and county], and I 
think what happened …I think national government took a back seat … So 
they’ve not done a great job, because they, by and large are supposed to 
provide guidance and some of this guidance would actually help in the 
decision-making process, and I think there are reasons for that.  I think one, 
there are capacity issues at the national level itself …So I have not seen an 
organized way in which national government wants to engage the counties to 
build their capacity.” National Respondent, Male05 
At the time of devolution national level community health respondents felt they did 
not have the needed capacity to advocate for community health approaches with 
county authorities.  Needed community health specific policy and guidance 
documents either did not exist or were outdated at the time of devolution.  However, 
in the years since devolution, respondents from national level felt their capacity has 
been built since attending training and new policy/ guidance has been developed.  
The national community health unit have conducted advocacy meetings with county 
technical decision-makers from almost all counties, to encourage counties to plan 
and budget for community health activities.  Ultimately it is the county’s decision 
whether they choose to invest in community health, which may relate to their level 
of capacity and level of political interest. 
“So we expect the counties to actually take up this [community health] 
approach… [but] they are independent, you can’t force them.”  National 
Respondent, Male02 
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Perhaps in response to the delayed advocacy for community health from national 
structures, the county executive committee forum, a platform for county executive 
committee members from all counties to meet together has provided an opportunity 
for county executive committee members with an interest in community health 
approaches to promote awareness with their counterparts around community 
health, with one respondent having perceived an increasing investment in 
community health in more recent times. 
“We also have this community strategy as one of our priorities areas that we 
discuss every time we meet within the [CEC] forum.” National Respondent, 
Male10 
Opportunity for improvement:  A new loan provided by Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA) through national government may provide a potential 
solution to expanding community-based primary health services.  It plans to use 
results based financing to encourage health workers to allocate funds to supporting 
CHV activities, which encourage uptake of key services such as immunisation and 
skilled delivery at the health facility. 
“..facilities began to realize… they cannot perform against those indicators, if 
they exclude the community health workers. So they began to put a portion of 
their monies into support activities.” National Respondent, Male07 
4.3.2 Priority-setting, power, values and leadership capacity 
The county government is an entirely new structure, created following devolution.  
As a result, authorities (county executive committee, county assembly and county 
health management team) within the county are largely operating in new territory.  
To further complicate this there is lack of clarity about roles and responsibilities for 
priority-setting.    
Leaders therefore need to negotiate for power alongside the roll-out and 
enforcement of priority-setting and service implementation.  Power to influence 
priorities was typically viewed as remaining in the grasp of a few key decision-makers 
– the governor, the county executive committee members, the chief officers, the 
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members of the county assembly and to varying degrees technical decision-makers 
at county level.   In order to better consider how power was displayed within county 
priority-setting for health, Veneklasen et al. (2002) expressions of power was used as 
a framework to guide analysis of power for priority-setting at county level following 
devolution (Table 10). 
Table 10 Forms of power and their expression in Kenya 
Form of 
power 
Definition Expression in Kenya 
Power 
over 
 
Power is viewed 
as ‘zero-sum’ 
where the more 
power one 
person has, then 
the less the other 
has.  Having 
power involves 
taking it from 
someone else and 
then using it to 
dominate and 
prevent others 
from gaining it.     
Power over was typically exerted by those at the top of the 
institutional hierarchy within the county, by the governor, the 
county executive committee member for health and the 
members of county assembly, with some county executive 
committee members for health adopting an authoritarian 
approach, limiting sharing of knowledge and information.   
Their sources of power included holding a position of authority, 
information and control over budgets forming a visible form of 
control of power.   
Patronage norms led to misuse of power in some settings, with 
resources channelled to voters/ citizens from similar tribe to the 
more ‘powerful’ leaders. 
Health workers and actors at sub-county level were often not 
invited to attend priority-setting meetings and access to 
knowledge was often limited as health workers were unaware 
of how the work plans and budgets submitted were received by 
county level and how differences in budget (submitted versus 
received) occurred.   
Community members were not informed of all the choices 
available to them, or of the benefits and disadvantages of those 
choices, due to limited access to knowledge.   
Hidden forms of power were exerted in some instances, e.g. in 
one county the county executive committee for health held 
public participation meetings at short notice in order to limit 
participation of actors and who is involved in making decisions 
(according to the perception of member of county assembly). 
Power 
with 
 
Based on mutual 
support and 
collaboration to 
build collective 
strength.  It helps 
build bridges and 
promote more 
equitable 
relations 
Mechanisms for power with have been introduced according to 
the Constitution, e.g. public participation meetings.  However, 
failure to address norms which limit power within e.g. 
patriarchal norms, have led to limited active participation from 
many citizens, leaving these forums open to elite capture and 
limiting opportunities for power with. 
Overall, most county level actors have made limited attempts to 
share priority-setting power with actors at other levels.  
Exceptions include: one county where county level actors have 
shared power with actors at other levels by creating laws for the 
hospital to maintain control of facility improvement funds, with 
plans for broader decentralisation to lower levels beyond the 
county; in case study two the CEC sought to reduce the power 
imbalance by sharing knowledge with actors from community 
level to county level, finding common ground and 
understanding among the interests of actors from all levels.   
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Form of 
power 
Definition Expression in Kenya 
Power to 
act 
 
Refers to the 
potential of every 
person to shape 
their life.   
Outside of county level technical and political actors, other 
potential decision makers such as health workers, sub-county 
actors and community members appear to have limited power 
to act, with limited meaningful participation.  Particularly for 
sub-county and hospital actors there has been a 
disempowerment with loss of decision-making power at these 
levels.   
Power 
within 
Relates to a 
person’s sense of 
self-worth, values 
and self-
knowledge, 
having the 
capacity to have 
hope and 
affirming dignity 
and fulfilment.   
Power within relates closely with the intersectionality analysis 
(see section 5.3.1) and how forces and structures, such as 
patriarchy and patronage remain unaddressed.  As a 
consequence there has been limited scope for empowerment 
and increasing citizens power within to enable them to fully 
engage with priority-setting (see power with above). 
 
Values:  Priority-setting was guided by the values held by decision-making actors, 
who often mentioned the Constitution as guiding these, perhaps indicating that they 
were in some way moderating their response to align with what they felt was 
expected of them.  The most frequently discussed values by county level respondents 
were equity, efficiency, accountability, transparency, integrity and rights-based 
approach. The members of county assembly tended to emphasise the need for an 
accountable rights-based approach to priority-setting, while the technical decision-
makers emphasised the need for equitable, efficient and evidence-based 
approaches.  To a lesser extent quality was also described as a priority, although it 
was not always considered when setting priorities and was not widely described by 
respondents. 
Technical leadership style:  While leadership styles have always varied, this has 
become more critical post-devolution due to the changing levels of power within the 
new county structures and lack of clarity surrounding roles and responsibilities and 
priority-setting processes.  The county executive committee member for health was 
most frequently described as leading the priority-setting process and playing a key 
role in negotiating between decision-making actors when priorities differed (see 
4.2.1).  As a result, in a county where the county executive committee member for 
health has an authoritarian leadership style, it is likely that the priority-setting 
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process will be less participatory, compared with a leader who recognises the value 
of other actors’ contributions.  In three counties, respondents described a county 
executive committee member for health (either present or recent past) who adopted 
an authoritarian or dictatorial approach to decision-making, with staff feeling 
disrespected and demotivated as a consequence.  In these counties other members 
of the county health management team had limited knowledge about what, how or 
why decisions have been made.  There was little opportunity to question or challenge 
decisions, which in the worst scenario was felt to threaten the very delivery of 
services. 
 “I also think there is the power balance. There [are] also some powerful 
positions …yet the decisions you (the person in power) make are not good, and 
I am below you and I know, we are supposed to do Y, yet you are saying we 
should do X and because of that power relations there is no way I am 
communicating with you without the fear of losing my job, then we make the 
wrong decisions.” County Health Respondent, Female69 
Technical leadership capacity:  Technical leaders within the county need to have an 
understanding of health and appreciation for preventive, promotive, rehabilitative 
and curative services; skills in critical analysis, planning and management, political 
engagement, budget planning and cost-effectiveness analysis.  Lack of capacity in 
these areas was identified as a potential risk to the priority-setting process by 
national and county respondents, with limited capacity felt to lead to selection of 
inappropriate priorities and to threaten accountability.  In general, national level 
respondents were more critical of the capacity and leadership skills available at 
county level, than the county level respondents themselves.  One formerly 
marginalised county self-identified a lack of capacity following devolution and has 
taken a pro-active approach by empowering technical health decision-makers 
through leadership training.  However, this was an isolated example as county level 
respondents from other counties also identified capacity gaps, but limited actions to 
address these were described.  Devolution was felt to have occurred too rapidly, with 
insufficient planning and capacity building by national level to prepare county leaders 
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for their new role, which in some cases was felt to have led to inappropriate priority-
setting.   
“…the health sector which was devolved without any clear strategy or 
thinking; they just woke up and devolved. So decision-making there has been 
influenced in the sense that counties now have these big role of delivering 
health care services which is good, but are they ready? Often they are not 
ready. From what I hear the capacity is not there, their priority is wrong 
sometimes and so decision-making sometimes gets messed up; we are ending 
up with decisions that will not necessarily address the health issues that we 
have.”  National Respondent, Female12 
The level of health experience among key health decision-makers, including county 
executive committee members for health and chief officers for health varied widely, 
from no prior experience, to extensive public health experience, to purely clinical 
experience.  Other technical county level respondents (such as directors and heads 
of health departments) considered prior health experience for the county executive 
committee member for health beneficial, with lack of experience felt to create 
challenges for ensuring technically correct priority-setting.  Even those with a purely 
clinical background were at times perceived not to have adequate public health 
planning skills, leading to neglect of preventive health and overemphasis on curative 
services.  For community health, the focal person and the county executive 
committee member for health were identified as the driving forces behind 
prioritisation (or not) for community health.  However, given that not all county 
executive committee (CEC) members valued public health and/or community health 
approaches, the community health strategy focal person could be facilitated or 
hindered by the degree of support from this more ‘powerful’ decision-maker.   
 “You will find some counties who have very good focal persons.  They really 
want to do work, but the CEC keeps on blocking stuff because maybe they are 
interested in other things.” National Respondent, Female08 
There was a need identified for capacity building those leading the process in critical 
analytical thinking, communication and strategic planning.  In two counties the chief 
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officer, despite being the accounting officer for health, did not have appropriate 
budgeting skills resulting in inadequate budget allocation for recurrent costs.   
“We do not have people who are very good at budgeting and you know in 
budgeting you have to test each and every programme and see … does this 
one give us more value for money than the other one?”  County Non-Health 
Respondent, Male45 
Where budget allocation and cost-effectiveness skills were absent priorities were set 
according to values other than efficiency.  For example, in one county a new dialysis 
unit had recently opened (which would benefit a small number of rich patients who 
could afford to travel to the county headquarters to pay for dialysis).  Meanwhile no 
funds had been allocated for community health activities, which could potentially 
benefit everyone in the county.   
“Basically the budget is basically skewed to favour curative, because in the 
recent past there has been a lot of talk about investing in hospitals, improving 
infrastructure within the hospital facility buying dialysis machine, … and very 
little has happened to preventive.”  County Health Respondent, Male63 
County assembly leadership capacity:  Concerns were raised by national and 
technical county decision-makers, about the seeming mismatch between the limited 
level of education and capacity and the degree of power wielded by members of 
county assembly (red box Figure 27) in some contexts.  On a few occasions it was 
even self-identified by the members of county assembly themselves.  This was felt by 
some to be due to the fact that community members at times selected their 
politicians along tribal lines, rather than based on their capacity.  At the community 
level one key informant acknowledged that at times leaders elected may be selfish 
and not have the needed health knowledge or decision-making skills.   
“Sometimes we can choose somebody who is selfish and we didn’t know when 
we were electing him/ her.” Community Key Informant, Male03 
This was particularly problematic for community health, as county advocacy 
meetings held by national level engaged technical decision-makers (who were 
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typically knowledgeable but may lack power), but excluded local politicians (who may 
lack knowledge but hold power) (see 4.3.1).  In a minority of counties members of 
county assembly were coming to recognise the value of community health strategy.  
However, despite this recognition county assemblies were often unable (perhaps 
unwilling?) to prioritise community health with the required funds to ensure it 
became successfully operationalised, instead favouring other more tangible 
interventions.  
Political preference for ‘high vote’ priority:  Politicians, including the governor and 
the members of county assembly, were perceived by county technical decision-
makers and national key informants to be motivated to a large degree by their own 
political aspirations.  This focused around the desire to secure votes during election, 
or to repay promises made as a result of having used patronage to mobilise support 
during earlier election campaigns. This was felt to have led to preference and over-
investment in visible and popular priorities, such as ambulances and infrastructure, 
over less visible, but often more beneficial priorities such as public health 
interventions or quality improvement.  As a result of the lack of clear guidance for 
how to resolve priority differences between actors and as a consequence of the high 
levels of power wielded by politicians, this often resulted in distortion of priorities 
(see Figure 30).  Some senior politicians at times demanded changes, without 
providing justification or explanation to the public.  As a result of power imbalance 
technical decision-makers in these instances described feeling unable to turn down 
requests, leading to review of budgets and workplans to accommodate the 
unplanned for intervention, threatening accountability (see Figure 30).   
“Well just to be frank with you sometimes it is not easy for us to say no okay 
[to politicians]… my seniors here are politically appointed so at  any time now 
they can change in the cabinet level of the county… sometimes is difficult for 
us to stand up and change this.”  County Health Respondent, Male45 
The influence of political members of county assembly (MCA) on priority-setting was 
viewed as having both positive and negative aspects.  From the positive side, 
politicians advocated for the needs of constituents within their respective ward.  
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However, members of county assembly were often described by technical decision-
makers as unwilling for an intervention to be introduced in an area outside their ward 
(despite underlying difference in level of need) (see 4.5.5).  This opinion was also 
voiced at community level.   
“How finances are distributed say at the County level at times will depends on 
the person who stands for these people …So when it comes to distribution of 
property he/she is biased and does not consider level of poverty or 
programmes in that area.” Community Key Informant, Male03  
As a consequence, some technical decision-makers felt that while political inputs 
were necessary and useful, the technical decision-makers ought to have greater 
power over decision-making.  This was due to their perceived ability to be more 
objective in assessing the needs for the whole county, compared with the member 
of county assembly, who is accountable primarily to his/her constituents.  This was 
summarised by national and county respondents as a political preference for equality 
rather than equity 
“The other thing I have come to realize is the biggest problem in this country 
is politics; political world are not concerned about equity, they want to hear 
about equality.”  National Respondent, Male09 
‘Political interference’ from the governor and/or the members of county assembly in 
relation to the priority-setting process was reported in every county.  Politicians were 
perceived by other respondents at county and national levels, to have a bias towards 
prioritising visible curative interventions (e.g. infrastructure, ambulance, drug 
supply) over longer term public health activities (e.g. behaviour change).  This was 
felt to be part of a drive to win votes, by demonstrating their ability to successfully 
respond to requests from their electorate, who often requested infrastructure as a 
consequence of poorly facilitated or manipulated public participation forums.   
“The decisions might be subjected to a lot of political interference by the 
county, members of the county assembly who might not understand the 
importance of especially the health promotion and public health. Many of 
them see the importance of curative services but they do not see the strength 
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or the importance of the health promotion, public health activities, and 
therefore getting financial allocation to that department has been a 
challenge.  Because …they make decisions based on votes, will this get me 
more votes? So they do not tend to see that when we prevent malaria or 
prevent diarrhoea that you are going to get votes.”  County Health 
Respondent, Male02 
Technical decision-makers at county and national level described that members of 
county assembly would refuse to pass budgets which they felt did not meet their 
needs, thus allowing them to demonstrate power to their electorate.   
 “You will find the MCAs are the group with very limited education. But 
somehow they have so much power; they hold the governor, it’s like the 
governor is at their mercies.”   National Respondent, Female12 
This emerged as an issue in the media in June 2016 when county assemblies across 
multiple counties refused to approve budgets, creating delays to implementation 
(see Photo 315 and Photo 416).   
                                                          
15 Source:  http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000207154/mcas-fail-to-pass-
county-budgets-in-power-play 
16 Source:  http://www.nation.co.ke/counties/nairobi/Crisis-looms-in-Nairobi-as-
MCAs-refuse-to-pass-Budget/-/1954174/3274572/-/dlpjhv/-/index.html  
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Photo 3 Newspaper clipping members of county assembly and county budget 
 
Photo 4 Newspaper clipping members of county assembly refuse to pass budget 
 
 
Corruption and patronage:  Corruption and misuse of power was identified by a 
minority of respondents across health systems levels.  County level respondents 
across several counties identified misuse of power through corruption and 
intimidation as being major challenges to the success of devolution.   
“What most of our leaders have done, they have looted a lot of resources 
through shoddy procurement procedures, there [has] also been a lot of misuse 
of power by some offices harassing others, intimidating them.”  County Health 
Respondent, Male67 
Meanwhile, county level and community respondents described corruption by health 
workers and public health officials relatively commonly, including missing drugs at 
public health facilities, bribing of public health officials/health workers to approve 
butchers’ shops or to receive faster treatment at public health facility.  While a 
minority of community members referred to corruption by county level leaders. 
“Another factor is corruption. … Do the math, even in the county right now we 
don't know what goes on. There are no developments that we know of…  We 
elect them but when they get there they look for their own interests.” Female 
community FGD04 
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Meanwhile in a range of counties equity of services was felt to be threatened as a 
result of power imbalances between members of county assembly, with the more 
powerful members of county assembly accumulating services within their ward (see 
section 4.5.5). 
Community, county, sub-county, health facility and national respondents, described 
that politics were felt to be at play across all levels in the county.  Political affiliations 
and tribal ties of individuals or communities to the governor or county executive 
committee member, were often felt to result in variations in priority-setting and 
service delivery, potentially having equity implications for the availability of services 
according to the conceptual framework, Figure 5.  
 “Of course there are challenges, you realise by nature, the ones in the 
executive position call the shots so sometimes our priorities tend to be 
influenced more by who is in the position of power so if this person comes from 
area x most of the resources are channelled in that direction.” Sub-County 
Health Respondent, Male01 
Patronage was described in various forms across multiple counties and by national 
respondents.  For example, certain county executive committee members were felt 
to have been selected by the governor due to patronage rather than competence, 
skills or experience.   
 “The other thing that came with devolution is the issue of local patronage … 
because I am the governor I come with my cousin or a friend to my friend, or 
somebody who I went to school with, I make them the CEC. There is that 
disorganization of experienced people are pushed out of the management and 
because of patronage, new people who are inexperienced are brought in for 
patronage.”  National Respondent, Male10 
Opportunities to align political and technical priorities  
When technical decision-makers operate ‘politically’, engaging with and aligning 
priorities with those of more powerful decision-makers, this can lead to positive 
effects for implementation as a result of the power exerted by influential actors.  For 
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example, in one county the governor became convinced of the importance of 
community health and requested it receive budget allocation.   
Changing powerful agents’ behaviour for fairer priority-setting:  In order to address 
the uneven power balance, which has resulted in members of county assembly 
holding final power to approve or decline a workplan or budget, the technical 
decision-makers identified a series of measures to incentivise support for technical 
priorities.  These incentives included building stronger relationships with politicians 
by involving them throughout the decision-making and planning process and 
providing regular updates on progress towards achieving indicators.  A number of 
national respondents identified the need for technical decision-makers to learn how 
to engage politically and for politicians to learn more about health. 
“I think, the technical arms have for a long time divorced themselves from 
politics they said ‘no we will do our technical thing’ and then when decisions 
are passed they get very frustrated, ‘you know they didn’t listen to us’.  Yes, 
we’ve built our evidence, I think one of the things to do is really to build 
capacity of the technical arms of government at the county level, on politics.… 
The other one is really building the capacity of the political arm so that they 
can start understanding, why certain health investment decisions need to go 
in a particular way so that these two sort of meet half way.”  National 
Respondent, Male05 
Other county level technical decision-makers described presenting cost-
effectiveness analyses; strategic framing to present politically appealing aspects of 
interventions (such as increased employment resulting from community health 
intervention) or incentivising politicians by including items in the plan and budget, 
which were highly sought after by politicians (e.g. ambulances).  In this way they 
sought to strengthen relationships, so that politicians would look more favourably on 
activities such as community and primary health care.   
“It’s (primary/ community health care) also good politically because you have 
created employment, you have encouraged someone so they show their 
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appreciation where elections come. So politically it's a bonus.” Non-Health 
Respondent, Male32 
Among members of county assembly who formerly worked as CHVs, former CHV 
colleagues may try to hold them to account on a personal level. 
“I have been a community health worker and they (CHVs), they usually call me 
and tell me ‘now you’ve forgotten we were working with you as volunteers.  
What are you doing about it now that you have a chance?  You have a stage 
to talk about it’.” County Non-Health Respondent, Female15 
Changing the institutional rules of the game for fairer priority-setting:  In several 
counties technical decision-makers described having changed the ‘rules of the game’ 
for priority-setting, by working to ensure local county legislation (such as CHV bill) 
was passed for community health or which earmarked selected budget lines at 
county level, such as salaries for health workers and drug procurement, with the 
effect that politicians were not allowed to cut from these lines during budget review.  
In addition, one respondent proposed introducing a longer term framework, to 
ensure that successive governments build on the successes of what has gone before, 
rather than starting from scratch with each new term.   
“The worry is that we might have a vicious circle where things are not 
improving because this leader during his period or so was trying to work out 
systems this way and you know now as a new way of working, five years were 
not long enough and this one is taken away by people and another one comes 
on board and starts a new thing… unless we have a framework; a framework 
which is cast on the same Constitution that this is the way things will be.”  Sub-
County Health Respondent, Male09 
4.3.3 Use of targets, evidence and context 
Counties have set targets as identified in their county integrated development plan 
and county strategic plan for health.  Respondents described the importance of using 
evidence to guide their priorities.  However, in practice there were challenges with 
data quality and confusion about how to apply evidence to guide the priority-setting 
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processes, with respondents identifying the need to strengthen evidence-based 
decision-making through scientific approaches, that take efficiency and effectiveness 
principles into consideration. 
“We need to get to know more of modern and scientific processes of 
identifying the priorities in terms of addressing the effectiveness and also the 
efficiency being used.”  County Health Respondent, Male61 
In keeping with this finding, one national non-government respondent expressed the 
opinion that government is keen to use evidence-based decision-making, but lacks 
the capacity to do so.  In response, a training to capacity build national decision-
makers has been rolled out and there are plans in place to replicate this at county 
level. 
“…the Kenyan government, they’ve bought into the idea that using evidence 
is a good thing in decision-making and they are really keen to use evidence in 
their work to improve their work. For them the issue is not just convincing 
them that using evidence is important, where the gap is right now is really the 
actual use of evidence; are they actually going out to look for evidence and 
appraise it and use it properly?  That is where the gap is.” National 
Respondent, Female12 
Targets:  Health targets are outlined in the performance contract and annual 
workplan, progress against targets should be reviewed by all actors during 
stakeholder and public participation forums.  The CEC member for health signs a 
performance contract with the governor, which sets targets for the department.  
Progress updates for activities conducted should be reviewed during stakeholder 
meetings on a quarterly basis, with an annual review of progress towards targets and 
activities described in the strategic plan.  As part of the annual planning cycle, the 
county executive committee are required to report to the community on progress 
made, challenges experienced and justification for any change/ failure to attain 
planned targets during public participation meetings.  Community members should 
be able to hold the governor and county executive committee to account through 
their elected member of county assembly.  At sub-county and health facility level, 
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respondents described reviewing progress against targets with health facility 
management committees and supervisors, to identify gaps and develop actions when 
developing new workplans.   
 “…now we do our annual workplan and our supervisor follows it up. Before 
making the next annual workplan, in the meetings they inquire ‘which facility 
have met one of their plans? Now where are changes? Which changes are we 
going to make? Mention the changes if there is changes?’” Health Worker, 
Female04 
Use of evidence and knowledge of context:  Technical county decision-makers 
across all counties described being guided by data predominantly from county level 
sources, such as the county health information system or local research regarding 
the main causes of morbidity and mortality.  However, they also used national 
sources where information was not available within county level sources, such as 
demographic health survey and Kenya AIDS indicator survey.  Trends for selected 
diseases were reviewed to assess for improvement or deterioration and guide 
decisions.  Respondents from seven counties identified challenges with use of data 
for identifying priorities due to:  concerns regarding the quality of county data 
available; lack of county level capacity in data use; lack of adequate locally generated 
evidence and research; not enough data officers; lack of capacity for health facility 
staff in collecting data; priority for political or logistical ease rather than evidence-
based priority.  Some measures adopted to try to mitigate these challenges included 
trying to strengthen local research capacity, introduction of computing systems to 
strengthen data collection at facility level and use of partner research and 
surveillance systems.  Members of county assembly typically described being guided 
by citizen’s requests through public barazas and participation meetings (although 
county data and international standards were also described). 
At the county level heads of department (e.g. head of department for maternal 
health) within the CHMT compiled leading priorities and costed activities, based on 
analysis of data and annual workplans developed by health facilities (preferably 
incorporating community activities).  This was carried out under the guidance of the 
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director for health, with the chief officer for health providing budgetary support and 
in some cases, guidance on cost-effectiveness (although this was not frequently 
described).  Once counties identified leading causes of morbidity or mortality or 
deteriorating trends in health service indicators, they frequently described using this 
information to identify underlying causes, with two counties having described using 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) analysis to assist with 
making decisions based on need. Other health systems data such as workload per 
health facility and geographic access to health facility were also considered.  County 
level respondents highlighted that this local knowledge of the context and use of data 
led to counties being able to identify areas failing to attain targets/make progress.  
Decision-makers from some counties use data disaggregated to sub-county level to 
identify gaps in service coverage and high priority areas needing targeted 
interventions, in some cases identifying actions which would try to address the cause 
as well as the effect.  A minority of in-charges from health facilities also described 
using local data and knowledge to identify context specific solutions to improve 
demand for services, for example mobilising CHVs to encourage mothers to attend 
for antenatal care and skilled delivery. 
“We have the data and therefore with the data what we normally do we look 
at the trends.  Are we improving or are we going down and in the case where 
we are not improving, what are the problems?   … Based on the data we have 
been able to do some decisions.”  County Health Respondent, Female51   
4.3.4 Resource availability 
The current availability of resources including budget, availability of infrastructure, 
distance between health facilities, functionality, availability of health workers and 
equipment were considered while identifying priorities.  The funding available set 
the limits within which priorities were set and budget allocated.  The availability of 
resources was perceived differently, according to the level within the health system 
(see section 4.4.1). 
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“There might be many issues but we prioritise according to the funds so that 
we are able to fit into the budgets and then we make a yearly plan.”  County 
Health Respondent, Female37 
Priority-setting within the county was guided by budget guidance from national and 
county level.  Budgets were described as having two main components – recurrent 
expenditure and development.  National government specifies that a minimum of 
30% of the budget must be spent on development activities.  Typically, the recurrent 
budget (used to pay for salaries, supervision, drugs and commodities) was allocated 
by the technical decision-makers. 
There is no prescribed formula to guide counties for allocating funds between sub-
counties or wards.  As a result, a variety of methods have been adopted, each with 
its own merits and challenges.  The manner of allocation of funds within a county 
does not appear to relate to the type of county, with rural agrarian, and rural 
nomadic counties having selected to apply a variation of the national commission for 
revenue allocation formula, based on equitable share.  However, it was felt to restrict 
equity as a result of the formula limiting funding to some marginalised areas, due to 
low population densities.   
“You know as a department we know which area needs what, but because of 
these formula the area that need most of the services they are allocated little 
amount of money. Based on that formula, so most of the service need of that 
place is not met because of the little amount that is given to that place.”  
County Health Respondent, Male47 
While urban, rural agrarian and nomadic counties described having applied a formula 
which includes an equal (and equitable) share, which had its own challenges for those 
wards with high population or large land area. 
“So we are now doing as if we are starting from zero for all the wards which 
might disadvantage other wards which are bigger and all that. So I think it can 
be improved in that if the members of county assembly can actually be able 
to look at the county at large and see, where do we have gaps? Where are 
people contented? So that we focus on the areas that there are many gaps.  
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Rather than spreading to all wards, irrespective of the status.” County Health 
Respondent, Male41 
In all counties, but particularly rural nomadic ones, there was felt to be a preference 
for development activities (such as infrastructure and equipment).  This preference 
was even higher in those counties which were formerly marginalised, reported as a 
consequence of gross under-investment in infrastructure and equipment by the 
former central government prior to devolution.  Ratios of up to 70% for development 
activities were described, which resulted in limited availability of funds for recurrent 
activities and challenges for ensuring that all required routine activities could be 
carried out.  As a result of classification of community health as a recurrent 
expenditure, this created severe challenges to ensure funding for this, as recurrent 
budget had already been spent covering other essentials (salary, drugs etc.).   
At sub-county and lower levels, there were major challenges described surrounding 
the availability of financial resources at sub-county level.  This is described more 
extensively in section 4.4.1.  
4.3.5 Community voice and sharing information 
Community were identified by county level respondents as being involved in 
identifying priorities through community unit activities, such as community health 
committee meetings or dialogue days, representation in health facility management 
committee and stakeholder meetings and public participation meetings, briefly 
described in section 4.2.3.  Although not expressly probed during the community 
FGDs, some community members across two counties (urban and rural agrarian) 
described not having been engaged by county authorities in decision-making or 
having opportunity to demand accountability. 
“Those who have been given that responsibility to inform the government, 
they don't reach out to the citizens. If we elect a counsellor for our area or MP 
we don't get to meet with them. So who will you report all those challenges 
to?”  Female community FGD04 
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Public participation was the most extensively described mechanism for gaining 
community guidance for priority-setting.  It was described as a requirement for 
county government across all counties, providing an opportunity for the community 
to hold their leaders to account, demanding answers and explanations about poor 
services.  Yet it was frequently identified as a common cause for concern by county 
level technical and political respondents, with a myriad of challenges experienced in 
its implementation and effectiveness.  Community participation in identification of 
priorities is described as taking two key components –1) Public participation carried 
out by the executive, to share previous year’s progress and identify community needs 
and priorities on two occasions (after sharing county budget review and outlook 
paper and after sharing county fiscal strategy paper).  2) Public participation carried 
out by the county assembly, to validate the priorities identified in the executive’s 
workplan and budget and where necessary to raise appeal or request revision (see 
Figure 28). 
Barriers to community participation at public participation meetings:  Some of the 
major challenges commonly identified with public participation by county level 
respondents (technical and political) included reluctance of community to attend 
without provision for transport or stipend (particularly those living in hard-to-reach 
areas or far from the meeting location) and attendance of predominantly educated 
elite or those with political connections, rather than ‘ordinary’ citizens.  In the urban 
county one respondent identified that street dwellers never attend public 
participation meetings, due to the illegal nature of their lifestyle.  There was limited 
participation for many attendees, particularly women in nomadic communities.  One 
respondent described that 100 people may attend, but only three or four people 
actually contribute to the discussion.  Advertising of the meetings to be held was 
frequently described as inadequate, with adverts placed in English language papers, 
rather than in Kiswahili, with short advance notice limiting opportunity for 
participation.  Seasonality was important in both rural agrarian (not during planting 
season) and rural nomadic areas (during the rains when people are more likely to be 
around major towns).  Use of Kiswahili and/or the local vernacular for discussions 
was emphasised.   
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Community priorities:  Through focus group discussion with community members in 
Nairobi and Kitui Counties, community members identified three main types of 
priorities (quality services, healthy behaviours and closer services).   
These related to the need for quality services, highlighted by the need for availability 
of drugs and diagnostic equipment at health facilities (see section 4.4.3); lack of 
trained health workers 24 hours per day able to manage emergencies out of routine 
working hours; overworked health worker leading to patients queuing all day without 
receiving treatment; absence of health worker in the event of staff illness or absence 
and need for more CHVs within the community. 
“As we speak I have brought my children here (health facility) twice and both 
times found no doctor. This past month has elapsed without there being a 
doctor … We would kindly ask for another doctor so that if the previous one 
got sick, and they were two, we would still be receiving treatment.”  Male 
community FGD01   
There was need identified for improved healthy behaviours within the community, 
such as clean water and collection of rubbish, with communities requesting for 
‘water guard’ to safely treat water, bednets to prevent malaria; tools to clean 
communities such as gumboots and shovels and rubbish disposal.   
“Our environment is very dirty. Dustbins should be put in place because litter 
is thrown everywhere. When you go to every street litter is thrown all over the 
place, so the litter should be taken care of because it affects our health.”  Male 
community FGD04 
In more remote areas and in some informal settlements respondents identified that 
the nearest health facility was far away and that community lacked transport/ funds 
for transport and/or that the roads were impassable during rains to access health 
services when needed, creating barriers to care-seeking.    
“You may fall sick in the house and when you think about getting help from a 
health care centre, the distance is long and it worsens your condition. 
Sometimes you have no money for fare and when you get to the hospital you 
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know that you had no other option. So you left home, you have no fare and 
the hospital has no drugs, that worsens your condition and that hurts.” 
Female community FGD04 
Capacity to identify priorities:  There were challenges with identifying the real citizen 
needs and priorities, with county and national level respondents perceiving lack of 
understanding on the part of communities regarding their role (see section 4.4.6) and 
need to strengthen public participation.  In some counties communities were 
frequently described by county level respondents as being passive during the 
meetings, often having low expectations that their participation would bring change.  
Although county level respondents from some counties did say that as the years 
progressed since devolution, communities were learning the value of contributing to 
public participation.  The need for civic education and strengthening of the process 
was commonly described by respondents. 
 “…they (community) still have the perception that this is the government that 
has neglected them for all those years …actually a lot civic education needs to 
be done if you want actually effective participation and effective process and 
actually have the kind of outcome that we expect from this public 
participation.” County Health Respondent, Male48 
At community level the community viewed their role and responsibilities for health 
in terms of keeping the environment clean; referring those who are unwell to the 
CHV or health facility; joining in community meetings such as dialogue and action 
days; contributing funds when a community member needed to travel to a health 
facility; caring for other community members and listening to the advice of CHVs.  
There was no description of a decision-making role.  A minority of community 
members described a desire to be more involved and to know more about their rights 
and how to participate. 
“If we got someone to unite us we could be progressing well [to participating 
in health responsibilities].”  Female community FGD01 
Public participation can bring a significant benefit to the priority-setting process, with 
politicians often described as keen to fulfil and approve workplans and budgets for 
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priorities identified by their electorates during public participation.  However, health 
facility and sub-county level respondents often felt that citizens do not have a holistic 
understanding of health (in terms of health promotion, disease prevention and 
curative services), sometimes leading to requests for visible infrastructure, at the 
expense of ensuring quality comprehensive services.  This contrasts with 
respondents from community level, where community members identified a mixture 
of both curative and preventive interventions as priorities and emphasised the need 
for quality services (although curative health priorities were described more 
commonly than preventive ones).  County level respondents did not describe 
providing community members with information about the risks or benefits 
associated with differing priorities.  At times priorities identified by the community 
and the technical decision-makers conflicted, which needed to be resolved prior to 
finalisation of priorities, workplan and budget.  Sub-county and health facility in-
charges, highlighted that they were often not invited to attend the public 
participation meetings, creating a barrier which they felt prevented them from 
presenting the community with information about the technical health needs during 
the priority-setting process.  The resulting inadequately informed health choices had 
critical effects on patient safety and quality of services, with one community having 
identified renovation of the facility to be a priority, while there was no working 
autoclave for sterilisation of equipment and insufficient equipment for conducting 
skilled deliveries. 
“There is a time they go round collecting the projects the community needs to 
be implemented, this time my community requested their facility to be 
renovated so, the priority of the community is what the county implements... 
but maybe the community doesn’t know whether there are not enough 
delivery sets. You know the community doesn’t matter so much about sterility 
because they don’t know; it’s only the professional who knows what this is.”  
Health Worker, Male11 
Adding to the complexity of this process was the fact that members of county 
assembly were often described by technical decision-makers as being motivated to 
provide popular visible interventions or ‘high vote priorities’ in their attempt to 
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secure re-election (section 4.3.2).  As a result, this led to the communities’ new found 
power in decision-making actually working to their disadvantage, leading to the 
setting of priorities they may have requested, but which do not meet their health 
needs.   
“…they (community) need to have a wider perspective of how [health is] not 
just a hospital.”  County Health Respondent, Male50 
Community power to identify priorities:  There was lack of clarity surrounding how 
to resolve differing community and technical priorities.  As a consequence, in most 
counties preference was described as being given to community-selected priorities 
identified during public participation (perhaps driven by the politicians’ desire to 
satisfy their electorate).  At times technical decision-makers were able to propose 
technical priorities to the community, leading to harmonisation, but at other times 
community leaders were inflexible to revise priorities.  This led to a sense of 
frustration and powerlessness by technical decision-makers (particularly at sub-
county and health facility levels), who felt unable to implement activities according 
to technical need. 
“Once they identify a need it might be not from the technical perspective the 
real need of that community.  But since actually the law has given them that 
power to participate, sometimes our hands are tied as the technical people.”  
County Health Respondent, Male48 
By contrast in the urban county, senior technical health decision-makers disregarded 
the community’s demands, instead implementing their own priority, without 
adequate justification to the community or county assembly and bypassing 
governance structures (by calling last minute public participation meetings so that 
motions were passed unchallenged).  This was echoed by a health worker, who felt 
that lack of consultation with community and lower level health workers had resulted 
in selection of costly, inappropriate interventions such as the construction of 
operating theatres and X-ray unit at the health facility, when the need was 
rehabilitation of an existing, non-functional maternity unit. 
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“This [new theatre suite] is not what we needed; this would not have been a 
priority if the community or us at the facility level were involved.”  Health 
Worker, Female22 
In a number of counties, the public participation was described as a noisy meeting, 
with heated arguments as community members discussed different priorities and 
attempted to hold county leaders to account where services have not met 
community expectations.  However, there were a number of challenges related to 
the political nature of the devolved government.  Opponents to current politicians 
may use the public participation forum as an opportunity to oppose and ‘water down’ 
his or her plans.  Community members participating in these forums may be subject 
to manipulation by local leaders.   
 “…some of the challenges are political because you realise politics plays in 
almost everything so if a person wants something you just go to the 
community and pressure them and these people the community come up with 
a wrong decision on health because of politics … based on someone else’s 
interest which is not good.”  County Non-Health Respondent, Male33 
Public participation was extensively discussed in nine out of the ten study counties.  
However, in one rural agrarian county there was a marked lack of in-depth discussion 
about public participation.  Although it was still described as occurring, it seemed to 
be perfunctory, in order to meet the standards of the Constitution only, rather than 
to genuinely find out community priorities and ensure ownership and participation 
over decision-making.  There was apprehension expressed that politicians may be 
fearful to empower community members in setting priorities through this process, 
as they would not want to lose their own power. 
“For other counties of course and even here our members of county assembly 
are not very comfortable with the system [public participation] because they 
believe it is empowering the citizen so much that they are losing the political 
grip and that has been the issue across the country.” National Respondent, 
Male10 
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Approaches to redress the power balance at community level:  When communities 
(purple Figure 27) are empowered with easily understood information about health 
and the merits and challenges of the choices available to them, then they can be a 
powerful governance force to ensure that political (red), executive (blue) and 
technical (green) decision-makers provide the services they are entitled to (see  
Figure 27).  The need for civic education was commonly described across many 
counties, with the concept expressed that communities needed to know their rights 
and in turn hold leaders to account. 
“…the Kenyan Constitution now gives us more rights to agitate for our rights 
and I think the more people don’t get drugs, the more people are not served, 
the more people don’t have a maternity they need to agitate for it. Put 
pressure on government so that then this pressure goes to the politicians, then 
the politician allocate money.” County Health Respondent, Male24 
One county stood out as having adopted a pro-active approach towards addressing 
power imbalances and ensuring fair use of power for decision-making.  Priority-
setting for health within this county was led by a CEC member for health (with 
advanced qualifications in public health), who adopted a participatory approach to 
priority-setting.  Technical decision-makers across all levels of the health system and 
other stakeholders from county assembly, ward administration, partners, other line 
ministries and at community level were involved in the process.  The participatory 
approach was described and appreciated by all respondents interviewed within this 
county.  This will be presented as a positive deviant case, providing useful lessons for 
other counties (see case study 2).    
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Case Study 2:  Community empowerment for informed decision-making 
In response to differences between technical and community priorities 
this rural agrarian county sought to re-balance power by educating the 
community, ward administrators and members of county assembly 
(MCAs) to understand what holistic health and health care means, so that 
these key groups were better placed to make informed and educated 
decisions, which naturally aligned more strongly with technical decision-
makers.  The steps taken included: 
1. Identified gap between evidence-based priorities (need for health 
promotion and community health) and priorities requested by 
community during public participation (request for ambulance, 
construction of facilities and mortuary) 
2. Engaged with representatives who attended public participation 
meetings, to find out reason for differing priorities and discovered 
that community view health in terms of their proximity to health 
facility, rather than healthy behaviours 
3. Engaged regularly with MCAs from health, water, infrastructure and 
agriculture committees in the county assembly throughout the 
planning and budget cycle to review progress and discuss plans 
4. Held discussions at county level and identified need for advocacy to 
ensure community understand health, so developed plan to rollout 
education advocacy about health through existing community units 
5. Wrote proposal and mobilised funding to hold sensitisation meetings  
6. Held meetings with CHVs to share information about a holistic 
understanding of health  
7. CHVs returned to share the message about health with their 
communities 
8. Held 3-day meeting with ward administrators and sub-county 
administrators for county government (responsible for arranging 
public participation meetings) where they discussed ‘what is 
development?’, ‘what is health?’, experiences from planning and 
budgetary process so far 
9. Invited CHVs to attend meeting to share their activities 
10. Reviewed everything discussed during the meeting to identify gaps in 
planning and budgeting compared with earlier development and 
health discussions 
11. Planned way forward together with ward and sub-county 
administrators to address gaps identified during future public 
participation meetings 
12. Community identified community health activities and health 
promotion as priorities with fewer requests for ambulance and health 
facilities compared with previous years leading to budget allocation 
for the first time. 
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4.3.6 Mechanisms for and against accountability and trustworthiness 
A wide and varied range of mechanisms for promoting accountability and 
transparency within priority-setting were described, particularly by county level 
respondents.  Alongside these mechanisms a vast array of challenges have been 
encountered since devolution.  Many of these have already been described within 
the text and so these will be summarised according to the person/ group responsible 
for the mechanism in Table 11. 
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Table 11 County perceptions of accountability and transparency mechanisms and associated challenges 
Stakeholder 
responsible  
Mechanism in place Challenge 
National Accountability mechanisms in Constitution – public participation, 
county executive committee members accountable to governor, 
leaders accountable to the public, accounting officer accountable 
to county assembly.   
Delayed release of funds from national to county level, limits time 
available to implement all planned activities. 
Governor Accountable to public within the county.   
  
Some county executive committee members felt to be recruited based 
on patronage rather than skill.  
Some governors make demands for interventions not originally included 
in planned activities, but perceived as ‘high-vote priorities’  
County treasury Division of roles mean departments are required to provide 
justification for budget to treasury before receiving funding.  
Regular financial audits to investigate spending. 
Centralised procurement processes at county level, known as 
Integrated Financial Management Information System.  
Quarterly reporting from departments to treasury. 
Quarterly reporting by treasury to county assembly budget 
committee.   
Forging of documents submitted to the treasury. 
Procurement systems (prior to introduction of Integrated Financial 
Management Information System) not sufficiently strong to eradicate 
inappropriate use of public funds, leading to sub-standard projects and 
allegations of corruption. 
Some departments reluctant to submit required reports to county 
treasury.   
County 
executive 
committee 
The county executive committee member for health signs a 
performance contract with targets on behalf of the health 
department.   
The allocation of funds to each department is identified following 
discussion and debate among the county executive committee. 
Documents including workplans and budgets available on county 
website for transparency. 
In one county, six months into the new financial year there was no 
approved annual workplan or budget. 
Process for allocation of funds between departments is not transparent 
outwith the county executive committee. 
Many documents not available on county website. 
Community may not be able to access documents online. 
County health 
management 
team 
Participatory priority-setting with wide range of stakeholders. 
Wide range of stakeholders involved in regular review of progress.  
Authoritarian leadership style which generated fear of dismissal limits 
accountability and participation.    
Health workers Health workers involved with developing annual workplan and 
budget.  
Supervision of health workers.   
Customer care desks at health facilities (established in one 
county). 
Budget received by health facility often does not correspond with the 
plan and budget submitted to county, with no justification for 
difference. 
Theft of public resources (e.g. drugs) or illegal payments at facility level. 
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Stakeholder 
responsible  
Mechanism in place Challenge 
County 
assembly 
Oversight role to ensure the executive plans according to county 
integrated development plan and public participation. 
Health committee for county assembly  conduct visits at health 
facility and community level to follow up and ensure service 
delivery.   
Health department submit annual report to health committee for 
county assembly describing progress made and explain variance. 
Community members can enquire about services from their local 
member of county assembly (MCA). 
MCA may seek to influence decisions made about budget allocation to 
fulfil personal objectives for re-election. 
In one county, health department failed to submit acceptable quality 
report to health committee. 
Some community members unsure how to meet and discuss issues with 
MCA.  
Community Public participation provides an opportunity for the community to 
learn more about progress and services delivered and challenges 
experienced. 
Community should be involved in identifying their needs and 
priorities during public participation which allows the county 
government to make context-appropriate needs-based decisions 
Community may not be adequately informed or educated about their 
accountability role or what they should expect from county 
government. 
Local elite may dominate public participation forums.   
Remote or disadvantaged groups unable to attend public participation. 
Community not sufficiently empowered or informed to make an 
informed choice.   
Health facility 
management 
committee 
Should play a role in selection of priorities and ensuring delivery of 
those services. 
Pilot in one county to strengthen accountability at ten health 
facilities. 
Health facility management committee may not be established.   
Community may not be aware of the funds which have been allocated 
to their health facility.  
Media Use of social media platforms to highlight gaps in services 
provided. 
Engaging with media to highlight when drug deliveries are made 
or if a health facility is opened to strengthen transparency (one 
county). 
 Use of social media to raise concerns may result in politicisation of an 
issue which could have been managed earlier had the appropriate 
measures been in place. 
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4.4 What are the implications of devolution on the delivery of health services?  
As a consequence of devolution there have been considerable changes for health 
service delivery both in facilities and in the community.  This section of the findings 
relates to how the process for priority-setting (see section 4.2.6) and the influencing 
factors (highlighted in section 4.3) affect the performance of the health system, with 
an in-depth focus on community health, indicated by the orange arrow (content of 
priorities set) in Figure 5.  In turn the performance of the health system will influence 
the availability, access and effective coverage of health services provided, and will be 
highlighted in greater detail in section 4.5. 
Devolution has also brought with it a series of opportunities and challenges for 
community health, creating either a benefit or a barrier to community health, 
depending upon how they have been embraced.  Funding changes have resulted in 
sub-counties and health facilities experiencing increased challenges in gaining access 
to funding to implement their activities, compared with prior to devolution.  Human 
resources were particularly topical as an area which many county governments have 
sought to invest in.  However, there have been repeated controversies with recurring 
and ongoing health worker strikes as a result of delayed payment of salaries, slow 
career progression and lack of engagement with health workers throughout the 
devolution process, leading to disillusionment by many.  Drugs and commodities 
varied hugely between counties, with some describing the improvement in drug 
supply chain as the county’s greatest success.  While in other counties supply chains 
deteriorated, leading to frequent stock-outs which affected client care-seeking 
practices.  Infrastructure was a common area for investment, with rehabilitation of 
facilities across all ten counties and nine out of ten investing in building new health 
facilities.  Infrastructure was a politically charged area for investment and at times 
this led to construction of facilities which lacked the staff, equipment and drugs to 
provide services.  In some places, powerful politicians manipulated priority-setting to 
secure more infrastructure within their constituency.  Governance and community 
engagement structures such as public participation forums have been described 
along with the challenges associated with these (section 4.3.5).   
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In order to indicate the variation in priorities described between counties Table 12 
summarises the main priorities identified by respondents within each of the study 
counties.   
Table 12 Priorities identified by county respondents 
County Priorities 
Homa Bay Upgrading of county hospital to level 5, Health centre per ward, dispensary per 
location 
Increase health workers 
Community unit per sub-location 
Kajiado Upgrade county hospital, three dispensaries per ward and strengthen referral – 
ambulance for each sub-county  
Increase health workers (recruit 100 new) and human resource management 
Community health - expand community led total sanitation 
Strengthen drug supply chain 
Improve quality at existing health facility -staffing, equipment 
Kitui Improve facilities, but new infrastructure not a priority 
Improve immunisation, community led total sanitation, health promotion, disease 
prevention, promote care seeking through new community health approach 
Increase health workers 
Improve drug supply 
Kwale Upgrade county hospital – radiology unit and intensive care unit, build maternity wing 
at dispensaries, staff housing and strengthen referral with ambulances 
Community strategy to access health information, commodities, prevent disease, 
referral  
Ring-fence funds for salary and drugs 
Marsabit Building new county hospital, construction of maternity units, supply equipment 
Increase health workers  
Disease surveillance through community health 
Generate demand for services 
Meru Upgrade of level 5 hospital; dialysis unit, cancer unit, CT scanner, trauma centre, 
building new health facilities and strengthen referral – 6 new ambulances 
Increase health workers  
Strengthen immunisation 
Enforce latrine use 
Food fortification 
Nairobi Hospital construction, rehabilitation of health facility, perimeter walls 
Nyeri Infrastructure – new dialysis unit at hospital, buying MRI, building new dispensaries, 
refurbishing existing health facilities and strengthen referral – ambulances and 
equipment 
Human resource – maintain and train 
Strengthen immunisation 
Expand community health - Community testing for non-communicable disease 
Build capacity of health committees 
Strengthen drug supply 
Turkana Infrastructure – rehabilitate county hospital, blood bank, new dispensaries and 
strengthen referral – 14 ambulances  
Recruit health workers (facility and community level) 
Strengthen immunisation 
Promote uptake of skilled delivery  
Collaboration with other ministries for nutrition 
Expand community health 
Strengthen drug supply chain 
185 | P a g e  
 
County Priorities 
Provide health facility with funds in addition to HSSF 
Management training for leaders, hospital board, county assembly 
Vihiga Infrastructure – medicine store, rehabilitate county referral; hospital, add CT scanner, 
intensive care unit 
Expand services at lower levels – add dispensaries  
Increase health workers  
4.4.1 Funding 
The need for sufficient, timely funds and clear actionable plans for how to implement 
priorities was considered vital to ensure implementation by respondents from 
national, county, sub-county, health facility level and CHEWs. 
“A priority that has not been tied to the budget will just remain a priority.” 
County Health Respondent, Male61  
National:  Funding gaps for certain programmes were described within national 
Ministry of Health structures, which limited the degree to which these national 
structures can fulfil their devolved role for capacity building county structures.  For 
example, within the national Community Health and Development Unit, national 
government provide staff salaries, office space and utilities only.  All other expenses, 
even down to vehicle maintenance and any implementation activities (including 
advocacy and capacity building), are funded by partners.  This funding pattern was 
largely felt to be a result of misalignment between the national budgeting process 
and Ministry structure and hindered national staff from carrying out mandated 
activities.   
County:  In general, almost all county level respondents felt they have more funds 
available, compared with prior to devolution.  In particular, respondents from 
counties which were formerly marginalised generally enthused about the higher 
budgets available, with funds based on the equitable share, rather than the strength 
of relationship with the ruling central government.   
“Now the counties are getting more than what they used to get.” County 
Health Respondent, Female01 
Formerly marginalised counties had relatively low numbers of health facilities and 
were grossly understaffed.  Devolution presents them with the opportunity to invest 
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in development through building infrastructure and to recruit health workers.  
However, county level respondents from all counties expressed the opinion that 
despite increased funds, these are still insufficient to deliver optimal health services.  
Decision-making processes placed limits on the decision space available regarding 
how these funds were used (minimum 30% for development), limiting their ability to 
implement activities as planned.   
“The changes we envisioned we really wanted in our facilities, within our 
health centres, dispensaries, we cannot achieve them without money.  So the 
money we are getting is little and we cannot really…the vision we have is big, 
but the resources to achieve the vision are less.” County Health Respondent, 
Male05 
Counties which were well-funded under previous central government were less 
enthusiastic as they had inherited large numbers of health facilities, high wage bills 
and other recurrent expenses.  This in turn reduced their decision space and flexibility 
to respond to community priorities, or invest in innovations for prevention and 
promotion.   
“There is a problem with the formula used to allocate resources has not 
favoured counties that were fully operational.  But has favoured counties that 
had very little in terms of infrastructure, and operationalization. Yes, because 
the ones that are fully operational, much of the resources is just enough to go 
to human resource, just paying salaries and running recurrent expenditure. 
Very little is being left for development.”   County Health Respondent, Male15 
County decision-makers often described delays in transfers of funds to county 
treasury from national level, and further delays in approval within the county.  In 
counties with limited ability to raise local revenue, this increased the threat of health 
worker strike, due to delayed payment of salary caused by lack of funds.   
“…we identify our priorities but we … are not in charge of finances, we have 
to go to the governor’s office to plead for finances to implement what we 
have.”  County Health Respondent, Male26 
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Further delays in approval of the workplan and budget were described at county level 
in the event of a disagreement between the county executive committee and the 
county assembly.  In two counties, this was reported to have resulted in delays of 
over six months, with subsequent failure to conduct planned activities.  Meanwhile, 
non-technical county level respondents from two counties identified capacity gaps 
as leading to underspends and waste. 
Sub-county:  By stark contrast to most county level respondents, almost all sub-
county and health facility level respondents across all three counties included 
(Nairobi, Kitui and Marsabit) as part of objective 2, felt that the amount of funding 
and decision-making authority available at their respective level had reduced (or in 
some cases been completely eliminated).   
“As I speak now, there are no resources that go to the sub-county.  Sub-
counties have to come to the county to scramble for what is left and in most 
cases they don’t get.” County Health Respondent, Male21 
There had been a relocation of decision-making and ability to manage funds from the 
district (now known as the sub-county) to the county level.  Sub-county level 
respondents highlighted the challenges when county administrators, who lack health 
training make health decisions, leading to increased bureaucracy, uncertainty and 
delayed implementation. 
“Actually we have many challenges in the sense that the working of the county 
is very different from the working of the former Ministry of Health.  [Formerly] 
the districts had power to make some decisions in terms of money, the sub-
county now. But now the county system …is that all the money is consolidated 
into one.  So the decision-makers do not even understand health, they treat 
health like any other.  So the buying of drugs and the buying of desks is 
[considered] the same, and because of that, it is very difficult to implement 
our priorities.”  County Health Respondent, Male30 
As a result, sub-county community health focal persons and medical officers reported 
having no government funds available to carry out their activities.  Respondents at 
this level described being unable to carry out activities and having to engage with 
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donors to seek funds.  This lack of funds was intensely frustrating for sub-county 
medical officer respondents in particular, who were used to having been able to 
manage district budgets and to problem solve, but now felt they had been rendered 
impotent to tackle challenges.   
“In terms of decision-making at my level previously, as a sub-county officer of 
health when we were under the Ministry of Health we were being facilitated; 
we had a fund that used to be called HSSF, we would use that fund in our day-
to-day running of my office. Currently we are not getting any funds from the 
county, so you can imagine I have to run an office without funding.” Sub-
County Health Respondent, Female11 
Likewise, for other sub-county level workers such as sub-county public health/ 
community health strategy focal persons, funds generated were submitted to the 
county government, but no funds were returned to the public health team.  This was 
in contrast to the pre-devolution system, when 70% of service charges generated 
were returned by national government to the public health team, to facilitate 
activities such as fuelling and maintenance for motorbikes etc.   
Centralisation of procurement mechanisms to the county treasury has meant sub-
county level respondents and in-charges now need to travel to the county 
headquarters for budget and procurement.  In one remote sub-county this has 
created huge challenges, as the county headquarters is over a five hour drive from 
the sub-county headquarters, there is no vehicle and public transport networks are 
effectively non-existent. 
Health facility:  Following devolution there has been increased reliance of all health 
facility structures on the county government, leading managers and health facility in-
charges to request funds from the county treasury.   
“Facilities now have to ask the county now for money for the things they 
need… So really we decentralized but we really centralized what essentially is 
the most important part of decentralization, you know if management is with 
the smallest units possible.”  County Health Respondent, Female69 
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Following devolution, all primary health facilities receive donor funding from 
DANIDA, the national health sector services fund (HSSF) and maternity 
reimbursement from national government for deliveries carried out after the 
introduction of free maternal health care, which precludes any health facility from 
charging user-fees for conducting skilled deliveries.  The HSSF provided from national 
government and DANIDA donor funding should be paid quarterly to the health 
facilities.  Following devolution payments to health facilities were described by health 
workers as infrequent and at times lower than expected.  One dispensary in an 
extremely remote area described having received HSSF only once per year since 
devolution (although it should be provided quarterly).  There was a lack of 
transparency and justification surrounding redirection of funds, with health workers 
unaware of reasons for this.  
As a result of the lack of regular, adequate operational funding, respondents 
described a range of challenges, such as non-payment of casual staff, some of whom 
have quit as a result; inability to carry out minor repairs and maintenance of the 
health facility; inability to buy instruments or to supplement essential drug supply in 
the event of stock-outs; needing to pay for work-related transport out of their salary; 
lack of funds to support community health activities and needing to refer patients 
who could have been managed at the original facility.   
This lack of operational funds was described as having severe implications for the 
quality of services and thereby limiting the effective coverage of services and 
hindering attainment of universal health coverage (see Figure 5).  For example, in 
one dispensary lack of funds resulted in an inability to purchase gas to run the 
refrigerator where vaccines are stored.  Although the in-charge described attempting 
to borrow a solar panel at the local school, these breaks in refrigeration may have 
resulted in a break in the cold-chain (see Photo 5).   
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 “What we plan during 
the annual workplan [we 
don’t receive], we are 
given another plan than 
that [in] which there are 
little finances for the 
facility.  Like …we might 
need to buy something 
like the gas for the 
fridge, but the funds are 
not available. You see 
we don’t have solar 
here, so if there is no gas then we have to send the fridge to the school where 
there is solar.  You know sometimes if there is no power the vaccines have 
already been exposed meaning that there is lost potency for the vaccines.” 
Health Worker, Male03 
Meanwhile, another health worker described that lack of funds resulted in an 
inability to conduct maintenance of the ambulance, leaving critically ill patients 
having to search for other forms of transport. This was both a potential threat directly 
to patient safety and also consequentially, as patients who observed lack of quality 
would fail to use government health facilities in the future, with implications for 
effective coverage and a knock-on effect on utilisation.   
User-fees at dispensaries and health centres had already been scrapped prior to 
devolution and fees for maternal health care were eliminated in 2013, shortly after 
devolution occurred.  This resulted in a further loss of revenue for health facilities 
who previously charged patients for each skilled delivery.  National government are 
meant to compensate health facilities 2500 shillings (approximately $25) for each 
skilled delivery.  However, some respondents from health facility level reported 
never having received any compensation for deliveries conducted, while others 
reported receiving a much lower amount than expected.  Overall, this has resulted in 
a smaller and less reliable amount of funding at health facility level. 
Photo 5 Gas cylinder for refrigerator at remote health 
facility 
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 “The other challenge that [I] have seen since devolution, they said we have 
free maternity; they said they will be paying at least the dispensary after 
performing a delivery you are supposed to be paid 2500 shillings but that one 
[I] have never seen it here. I have been conducting I think every month I 
conduct at least three deliveries but no compensation.” Health Worker, 
Male14  
Finally, hospitals continue to generate revenue through charging user-fees (excluding 
skilled delivery).  Prior to devolution these user-fees, known as facility improvement 
funds (FIF) were banked with the hospital which had authority to spend these, in 
coordination with the hospital management board.  However, post-devolution, in 
many counties these FIF revenues raised are banked centrally with the county 
treasury.  This has resulted in delays releasing funding back to the hospital and in 
some counties it resulted in lower amounts available to the hospital, if the county 
decided to use the revenue for a different priority.  The lack of transparency 
regarding how county treasury uses these funds has the potential to undermine trust 
of health workers in county government. 
“Previously the national government used to have what we call FIF, Facility 
Improvement Fund that is the money that hospital generate that year at the 
end of the quarter comes back to the facility for the improvement of that 
facility. But currently there’s no such policy in place.  That money comes back, 
we are at the mercy of the department of health. What we generate here 
doesn’t come back.”  Health Worker, Male06 
Community health services:  In general, respondents from county level expressed 
mixed opinions surrounding the impact of devolution for community health, with 
some feeling it had brought many opportunities as a result of the decision space now 
open to counties to innovate and invest in community health.  However, despite 
forming the first tier within Kenya’s health system and being mandated by law, 
respondents across health systems levels identified challenges with raising adequate 
funds for community health programming both before and after devolution.  Prior to 
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devolution, respondents agreed that community health activities were largely 
partner supported, with the exception of national funding for CHEWs salaries.   
“A big part of the low coverage [for community health] has been lack of 
resources to actually establish the unit or to keep it going. Community health 
services right now is very partner driven.” National Respondent, Female08 
Post-devolution funding challenges continue, with respondents (particularly at sub-
county and health worker levels, including CHEWs) from a minority of counties 
having received no funding whatsoever from county government for community 
health related activities (with the exception of payment of CHEW salaries).  
Respondents from these counties expressed reliance on partner support, which 
created sustainability challenges when partner programmes ended.  However, 
respondents across many counties and at national level, highlighted that several 
years following devolution county governments had started/ or were planning to 
allocate funds to community health.  This is highlighted in the quote below by a 
national respondent.  What is interesting about this quote is that while it is indeed 
wonderful that counties are now investing in community health, it is considered 
noteworthy that only 50% of counties have decided to allocate some (not necessarily 
all required) funds towards this basic, essential layer of the health system.  
“Moving to the counties … one of the benefits of devolution, some counties 
have started allocating resources for community health which is wonderful …I 
think we are going to see changes.  Many counties, over 50% have embraced 
[community health]. They have invested in [it], they have put resources in their 
budgets.” National Respondent, Male06 
Even where commitments have been made to community health, the universal 
problem of delayed funds hampered implementation.  CHVs and CHEWs commonly 
described lack of money to pay CHV stipends, leading to low motivation and high 
attrition; lack of monitoring supplies and CHV kits, including protective equipment 
such as gloves. 
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“At times this job becomes very hard … because you are not paid anything and 
as you work you also have your children to think about and other chores, that 
way it becomes hard. Sometimes you just can’t be happy.”  CHV Female12 
CHVs identified that regular supervision from the CHEW was a source of motivation.  
However, there were gaps identified by CHEWs and at sub-county level, with lack of 
funds to support activities such as fuel for supervisors’ motorbikes. 
“We were given motorcycle but not given fuel allowance. So it was very 
awkward you are driving a government vehicle but fuelling it yourself.” CHEW, 
Male04  
Partner collaboration was commonly discussed by respondents across health 
systems levels.  Many respondents at national and county level highlighted their 
dependence on NGO partners for implementation of community health services, but 
also raised a number of concerns surrounding partner support.  Including the 
creation of a cycle of donor dependence, poor donor exit strategies and partner 
priority taking precedence over county priorities.   
“Partners want to do it [community health], but government has not 
prioritized it enough to allocate money to it. Partners will come in and support 
the counties to implement and when the partners come in and support the 
counties to implement, the counties then see there is money; ‘you have 
partners so why should we give you money?’ So it becomes a cycle.” National 
Respondent, Female08 
Following devolution there were mixed opinions regarding the extent of partner 
involvement for community health post-devolution, compared with pre-devolution.  
Some respondents expressed the opinion that there was greater opportunity for 
partner collaboration, while others felt that many community health partners had 
withdrawn, due to corruption or challenges engaging with county government.  At 
times these conflicting opinions were expressed even within the same county.  The 
relationship between county government and partners varied, with respondents 
from some counties having described a productive symbiotic relationship with clear 
division of tasks and responsibilities between county government and partner staff.  
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The more pro-active counties recognised the opportunity which partner support 
could present, directing partners to provide added value, by supporting units in hard-
to-reach areas.  There was recognition of the need for wise implementation to ensure 
sustainability beyond a project lifespan.  However, there were also major gaps in the 
coordination of partners within counties, with government not having set a common 
stipend for partners to provide CHVs.  This resulted in implementation challenges at 
field level when partners provided different stipends or incentives.  This was more 
commonly described as problematic by national level respondents.  Other 
coordination challenges related to partners selecting where they support activities, 
which type of services to support (for example HIV services rather than the general 
community health service package) or supporting quality improvement rather than 
expanding coverage, regardless of the county government priority.   
One of the strengths that partners supporting community health brought was their 
ability to innovate.  County level respondents highlighted the need for partners to 
pilot lower cost interventions, which have the opportunity to be implemented at 
scale at reasonable cost.  
“When you look at the cost of running it (pilot community health reporting 
intervention).  It becomes very expensive... The challenge is that it is supported 
by partners and that is not sustainable… The best thing is to work out a system 
which is efficient in terms of resource… Then now the county department of 
health takes the lead.” County Health Respondent, Male09 
Perhaps the most commonly described challenge associated with partners was lack 
of sustainability and inadequate planning for partner exit and county government 
take-over of previously partner-supported tasks.  In many counties respondents gave 
examples of sudden withdrawal of partner support, with no exit planning, resulting 
in abrupt discontinuation of stipends for CHVs, with high drop-out rates as a 
consequence.  County respondents made recommendations to strengthen the 
partner-government relationship, such as the department of health directing 
partners, introduction of only affordable interventions, earlier withdrawal planning 
and better community ownership of interventions.  
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Examples of best practices:  As a result of the challenges with the centralised system 
of funding, whereby every procurement needs to pass through the county finance 
office, some counties have identified solutions.  Such plans include disbursement of 
funds to the county health management team directly on a quarterly basis, rather 
than going through the office of the county treasury.  A small number of national and 
county respondents identified that steps have already been taken by some counties, 
to delegate authority for decision-making and budgeting to sub-county and health 
facility levels, in order to bypass the bottleneck within the county treasury.  Where 
governance structures are in place, this presents best practice for extending 
decentralisation. 
“Previously we could have our own funds doing those things, but now, even 
the ministry itself has realized that you need to see how they can devolve some 
funds to the sub-counties as opposed to having it centrally, because officers 
were always coming to the county level you know saying ‘we want this, we 
want these activities.’  So, the county management team have come up with 
a way forward that they are going to disperse even to the dispensaries, there 
are some funds for the dispensaries, to utilize at their level.  The plan now is 
to decentralize it.”  County Health Respondent, Male41 
In counties which have prioritised providing budget for community health, this was 
felt to have removed reliance on partners and allowed them to tailor and plan 
community health services according to their own context and disease burden, for 
example training CHVs how to screen for non-communicable diseases (NCDs). 
4.4.2 Human resources for health 
Human resource management was one of the most widely discussed and 
controversial of all the aspects of post-devolution health system delivery.  It was 
recognised as a challenging aspect of devolution for counties, with a range of health 
worker motivations needing to be managed, including timely salary payment, line of 
command, responsibility for payment of staff pension, working environment with 
availability of needed resources and colleagues to effectively carry-out tasks, 
promotions, career progression, in-service training, inter-county transfers, staff 
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accommodation etc.  As a result of poor management, including delayed payment of 
staff salaries and failure to promote staff (see 4.4.1), there have been a number of 
health worker strikes across multiple counties since devolution (see Photo 617).  The 
most recent of these, a doctors’ strike which lasted over two months resulted in the 
issuance of sacking letters from county governments and the jailing of strike leaders 
(as reported in media), following failed negotiations between doctors and county 
government after government failed to implement the 2013 Collective bargaining 
agreement which outlines working environment and equipment, training research 
and remuneration [227](see Photo 718).   
Photo 6 News headline for health worker strike over unpaid salaries in October 2016 
 
Photo 7 News headline for doctors’ strike in January 2017 
 
Following devolution, the recruitment and management of health workers shifted 
from the central national public service board, to 47 new county public services 
                                                          
17 Source: http://www.nation.co.ke/counties/tharaka-nithi-/Nurses-in-Tharaka-
Nithi-issue-strike-notice/3370192-3416386-6158haz/  
18 Source:  http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Doctors-on-strike-get-sacking-letters-
/1056-3783462-nvs4r1/  
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boards.  Counties now have responsibility to hire, manage and fire health workers.  
This contrasts with the situation prior to devolution when national government could 
recruit or move staff, with no reference to the district level.   
Decisions surrounding human resource recruitment and/or promotion are initiated 
within the county health management team as part of the annual work-planning and 
budgeting process and are subsequently shared with the county public service board 
via the chief officer.  County level respondents from many of the previously 
marginalised counties in Northern Kenya have invested heavily in recruitment of 
health workers, with some more than doubling the number of health workers within 
the county following devolution.  While the overall number of health workers in 
remote counties has dramatically increased, many of these counties experience 
challenges with recruitment of specialists.  This is a result of low education levels in 
formerly marginalised areas leading to low numbers of ‘local’ specialists and 
perception of the county being a hardship area creating a barrier to ‘non-local’ 
specialists working there.  As a result, some have adopted innovations such as 
recruiting specialists for one week at a time and trialling telemedicine.   
“We have challenges on staffing, this is our challenge since devolution, there 
is a tendency for people to want to go back to their home counties, and so 
there is a disadvantage to arid areas as there are not enough locals who went 
to school.  We can’t get someone from central to work here, they will work for 
a few months and then will want to leave.”  County Health Respondent, 
Female37 
Some county level respondents identified that the majority of new positions 
recruited were for curative health workers, with counties having neglected to recruit 
adequate additional public health staff, including CHEWs.  CHEW staffing was 
particularly problematic in Nairobi County where respondents identified plans for the 
re-distribution of CHEWs to other positions with no clear plans to replace them.  
Although, several counties have taken the opportunity to invest in human resources 
for community health by recruiting new CHEWs.   
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“Like now the public service board is looking for additional health workers and 
if you look at the list of those they are looking for the priority is on the curative.  
None is being employed for preventive services.”  County Health Respondent, 
Male57 
Changing national and county level roles in human resource management:  Some 
county level respondents felt that health worker strikes had been encouraged by 
national level, in order to undermine the county government as part of a play for 
power.  County respondents typically blamed national level for delaying to pay the 
county government their funds, which resulted in delayed payment of staff salaries.   
 “The national government is fighting the counties by actually wanting to take 
this function [human resource management] unconstitutionally from the 
counties, by saying actually the counties are unable to …look at the welfare of 
health care workers like say promotions, resignations and even capacity 
building and now they are using the unions actually to insist the health care 
workers [strike] so that now they use actually this kind of political rhetoric’s 
so that now the health workers can [be] striking and all these kind of things … 
to actually use as reason to back the function to the national government.”   
County Health Respondent, Male46 
Human resource management transitioned extremely rapidly (within months), with 
counties given insufficient time to put in place a new public service board.  This 
created uncertainty and fear among health workers regarding their future under the 
county government.  Due to the rapid transition, some counties described lack of 
needed capacity by the public service board to carry out the tasks they were 
responsible for, leading to challenges for health workers.  Two and a half years post-
devolution (when this study was carried out), there still appeared to be considerable 
gaps in the capacity of the public service board and human resource management 
within counties, with limited future planning for replacement of staff deaths, 
retirements, transfers etc.   
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“These public service boards are new and most of the people there don’t have 
even knowledge on human resource issues.”  County Health Respondent, 
Male30 
Many counties have inherited a health workforce from national government who 
were already disgruntled, as a result of not having received promotions for many 
years under national level.  Continued delays to promotion as county governments 
try to put in place plans for managing human resources, with health worker files 
remaining at national level, rather than being transferred to county level add to 
health workers’ sense of frustration.  Delays in payment of salaries have only served 
to fan the flames of discontent.    
Many county level respondents and health workers felt that devolution had brought 
improvements in accountability and staff performance as county governments were 
now closer to their staff and better placed to carry out supervision and monitoring 
visits and health workers could more easily contact their supervisor to discuss 
challenges, compared with the former national government.  Although some county 
level respondents also felt that staff strikes were related to staff reluctance to have 
closer supervision under devolution.   
One area with lack of clarity post-devolution has been in-service training.  In general, 
most technical respondents from county level felt that opportunities for training 
were fewer post-devolution and some county level respondents highlighted that 
county governments were not supportive of training budgets (as not considered 
visible enough).   
“Things like trainings sometimes you may not be able to do the training 
because training costs a lot of money and the county government does not 
see much [benefit] out of that, they would rather put up a dispensary of three 
million rather than train people.”  County Health Respondent, Female51 
Changes for health workers:  Many health workers re-located around the time of 
devolution due to reasons relating to tribe and fear surrounding working for a county 
government which was not their home county.  Unfortunately, these fears appear to 
have been well founded in some instances, with descriptions of recruitment due to 
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patronage and better treatment of local health workers compared with health 
workers recruited from a different county, described by county level and health 
worker respondents.  
There was a lack of uniformity in salary between counties with respondents from 
national, county and sub-county level describing challenges, such as disharmony 
among health workers and recruitment challenges associated with different 
remuneration packages.  Furthermore, unique to Nairobi County were differing levels 
of compensation between staff employed by national and county government, which 
created discontent.   
A number of counties spoke about trying to increase the availability of health workers 
in more remote areas, through additional recruitment or relocation of existing staff.  
While an extremely vital aspect of human resource management, some of the health 
workers complained that understaffing was more problematic in their facility post-
devolution. This was a consequence of staff members having been removed (and not 
replaced) to go and work in newly opened health facility.  Or as a result of increased 
demand for services but no increased staff (or drugs) to accommodate this.  This was 
highlighted by community members and youth photographers, who identified the 
need to increase the numbers of health workers at facilities to reduce the long 
queues (see Photo 8 photographer Rufus Njoroge).   
 “Staffing is a challenge since devolution.  You see health is a political gimmick, 
there are many facilities being opened, but the number of staff have not 
increased, so when a new facility is opened staff are moved from one to 
another, so where previously there were two staff at a facility now there is 
one at two facilities and so services go down.”  County Health Respondent, 
Female27 
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“The service is slow. When you 
ask for medicine it’s like making 
a heavenly prayer or something. 
Instead of them giving you the 
medicine because they know your 
sickness the doctor tells you to go 
and make a line and you could 
stand in the line until you get 
tired. So you could be referred 
here but go back home tired for 
waiting on the line until 4:00PM 
for drugs. But for a private health 
centre the service is much faster 
because money talks more than 
your mouth. You are given 
medication and head back home.”   
Male community FGD04 
One health worker at a single-staff health facility identified that at times errors may 
be made as a result of tiredness or the health facility may be forced to close when 
the health worker takes annual leave or attends a training (see Photo 9). 
“We should be four 
nurses [working at this 
dispensary], because all 
things that I do even as a 
person you cannot work 
as a computer; you have 
mistakes, so if you don’t 
rest and you work you 
will have a lot of mistakes 
and you work day and 
night. It is usually a big challenge for us.” Health Worker, Male14 
Photo 8 Long queues at government health 
centre 
Photo 9 Health facility with single trained health worker 
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Changes for close-to-community providers:  Likewise, CHEWs were frequently 
described as overburdened, with one CHEW responsible for supervising and leading 
community health for a population of one million people!  As a consequence of such 
an unrealistic workload, CHVs were unsupervised and unsupported, leading to low 
motivation, increased attrition and reduced service delivery.   
“Right now we don’t have community extension workers. In xxx for instance 
we have just one [CHEW], it is making very difficult to work in a population of 
about one million people... Since devolution those [CHEWs] who were there, 
they were devolved to go and work in another cadres. We have a shortfall of 
workers, we have a shortfall of support, and we have a shortfall of motivation. 
Once CHVs work with no supervision, they feel they are not working so 
population goes down. So since devolution we have a lot of change; our units 
are going down because there is no hope.” Sub-County Health Respondent, 
Male12 
High CHV turnover was felt to be related to lack of funds for CHV stipend, combined 
with a heavy workload.  In one county recruitment of younger persons as CHVs, was 
felt to have resulted in high turnover, with youth working only until a better 
employment opportunity arose.  In another, women were described as more likely 
to continue to work voluntarily, whereas men often dropped out when stipends 
finished.  Meanwhile in a very remote county, failure to recruit CHVs from within 
their own community, resulted with higher attrition noted in those areas.  In one 
county community members acknowledged experiencing coverage gaps in 
community health services after a CHV drops out and so expressed desire for more 
CHVs to be recruited.  Where these challenges were widespread, a number of 
respondents from county, national and health facility level expressed the opinion 
that human resource management should have been retained at national level.  
Although this was not a universal opinion, with respondents from some counties 
preferring human resource management under county government.   
Examples of best practices:  One county prioritised human resource management by 
ensuring that staff were provided with accommodation close to the facility (see 
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Photo 10).  This county also prioritised staff promotions and described a transparent 
relationship with health workers, whereby staff receive early knowledge if there is 
likely to be an unavoidable salary delay.  They have also sought to earmark budget 
for salaries and to ensure that staff promotions are carried out. 
“What we have done …is 
prioritize that every 
dispensary as you put a 
maternity wing we must 
provide a staff house so 
we have come out with a 
design of a staff house 
that can accommodate 
two nurses.  So that at 
least at the middle of the 
night they can come from 
the same compound.  [If] the client knock that mother is in labour [the nurse] 
can respond quickly.” County Health Respondent, Male50 
In response to the challenge surrounding lack of stipend for CHVs, some counties 
have started to innovate with a range of possibilities to increase motivation.  Ideas 
included: plans to introduce monthly stipend; income generating activities (IGA) 
(such as soap making – 
see Photo 11, rearing 
goats and charging for 
NCD testing).  Other 
counties were planning 
to support CHVs by 
covering their national 
hospital insurance fund 
(NHIF) fees.  However, in 
the two counties where 
CHVs participated in 
Photo 10 New staff housing built post devolution  
Photo 11 CHVs demonstrate soap making income 
generating activity 
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discussions, they described feeling demotivated as a result of the termination of 
stipend following partner withdrawal and no provision by the county government at 
the time of discussion.   
4.4.3 Drugs and supplies 
The consistency of drug supply at health facilities varied between counties, with 
some describing this as one of the greatest improvements for health following 
devolution and others describing more irregular supply, with frequent stock-outs.  
The consistent availability of drugs is crucial to the provision of effective coverage of 
services needed for universal health coverage.  When drugs are not available it is the 
poorest people who bear the greatest burden, lacking funds to pay for drugs from an 
alternative source and in some instances forgoing treatment or seeking care directly 
from an unregulated drug seller.   
Supply chain changes:  Shortly before devolution occurred drug supply to health 
facilities shifted from a push (drugs sent from higher level with no input from 
receiving health facility) to a pull (health workers calculate and send request for drugs 
needed) based system.  This has improved efficiency, with each health facility now 
identifying their need and submitting this to the county, who then combines and 
submits the request to the drug supplier.  Respondents from nomadic and some rural 
agrarian counties who felt drug supply had improved following devolution, described 
the more consistent and reliable drug supply as one of the greatest improvements 
for health.  One respondent identified it was part of the county’s aim to ensure 
greater equity, by providing regular consistent drug supplies to all health facilities, 
no matter how remote. 
“I’m seeing a lot of improvement because … in the last few quarters we’ve had 
our facilities almost always having drugs…of course I am sure there will always 
be complaints here and there, but at least we’ve had significant improvement, 
in terms of getting our drug supplies on time.” County Health Respondent, 
Male19  
However, respondents at health facility and sub-county level in the urban and rural 
agrarian county felt that drug and commodity availability had deteriorated following 
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devolution.  Drugs were provided less frequently (at times once per year rather than 
quarterly as expected) and in smaller quantities resulting in many more frequent 
stock-outs.   
“We are supposed to order our drugs quarterly, but now since devolution, you 
find that mostly we get our orders once per year which is not adequate and 
what you order is not what you get.”  Health Worker, Female16 
Reasons for stock-outs:  In some instances, this was felt to be a result of lack of 
capacity by county procurement teams, who failed to understand the vital 
importance for ensuring drugs were available in a timely manner.  This led to de-
prioritisation or failure to pay the drug supplier.  These challenges were commonly 
described by health workers, but were also described by sub-county, county and 
community respondents in certain counties. 
 “So you (procurement officer) do what you think is appropriate for you. You 
don’t understand when I say I need 2,000 of this, you say 20 is enough. Yes, or 
nothing at all. You are not seeing the urgency of having the anti-malarials. Yet 
I am saying ‘it is rainy season we need to have this in place’. To you it’s not an 
issue. You would rather buy a machine that may not be of benefit to the 
patient.”    County Health Respondent, Female56  
County level respondents (technical and political) often described delayed 
disbursement of funds from national level, which created knock-on delay in payment 
for the drug supplier, with the result that at times supplies were not provided.  Issues 
with corruption and theft of drugs within the facility were perceived to be 
problematic by county and community level respondents.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
this was not described by health workers themselves.  
Consequences of drug stock-outs:  The potential consequence of lack of drugs 
described by respondents include: utilisation rates dropping; services become 
unattainable for the most poor, with those who have sufficient money buying drugs 
from the chemist.  The poorest patients remain untreated as they are unable to buy 
drugs from a chemist.  
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“…so we give prescription to the patients [when there is stock-out]; some of 
them buy, some of them don’t buy. You get some house girls who have come, 
so they don’t have money to buy the drugs. They wait until they see the truck 
bringing drugs.  That is the time you find them coming with prescriptions.  Do 
you have this drugs?  You ask them since then have you not felt well? You have 
not bought these drugs, what have you been waiting for?”  Health Worker, 
Female20 
In one of the counties drug stock-outs are so common that it would appear the 
community may have adapted care seeking practices, carving out solutions whereby 
as soon as a health facility receives supplies, many people attend to ‘stock-up’ on 
drugs so that they can self-medicate at a future date when they expect the health 
facility will likely have a stock-out.  CHVs, CHEWs and other community health focal 
persons also frequently reported not having been supplied with adequate kit, such 
as bicycle, identification badge, reporting and referral tools and first aid kit, despite 
having been promised this by county government. 
Examples of best practices:  Counties which had improved drug supply described a 
range of mechanisms which were introduced to ensure more consistent supply, 
including: having earmarked funds within the county budget for drugs; having 
searched to find a supplier which was more reliable (Mission for Essential Drugs and 
Supplies (MEDS) rather than Kenya Medical Supplies Agency (KEMSA)); politicising 
drug delivery within the county by creating media awareness when the governor 
received new stock to demonstrate the effectiveness of the health system during his 
time in office.  Oversight visits carried out by health committee for county assembly 
identified stock-outs.   
 “Now let’s go to the issue of drugs like the first time devolution started the 
health committee team went round some parts of the county and at that 
stage, it was like one year after devolution and we still had a lot of struggles 
with drug supply …. now this time round we went to the sub-counties, drug 
supply are quite okay that was a positive gain.”  County Non-Health 
Respondent, Female25 
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4.4.4 Equipment and infrastructure 
In contrast to other aspects of health system performance which varied considerably, 
all counties described having invested in infrastructure and nine out of ten had built 
new health facilities19.  Additional infrastructure and purchase of ambulances were 
felt to increase communities’ geographic access to health services.  Infrastructure 
and ambulances were perceived to be politically favourable (see Photo 12 and 
section 4.3.2), with citizen’s requesting it during public participation and providing 
politicians with a visible investment to generate support among their electorate.   
“They are keen more in 
terms of short term and 
that is where the 
ambulance come in, 
they are easy to do; 
when they are having 
their rallies next year, 
‘let me talk about I have 
brought twelve 
ambulances, I’ve built 
ten other structures’, 
even if those structures don’t have doctors or nurses.” National Respondent, 
Female12 
Infrastructure sustainability and functionality:  Many counties described 
rehabilitation and opening dispensaries previously built but never opened (see Photo 
13).  The demand for infrastructure did not always correspond with underlying need 
for a new facility and at times, was felt to undermine accountability of priority-setting 
based on need.  A threat looming on the horizon is the lack of future planning for 
new facilities, with many technical decision-makers across the counties and at lower 
levels highlighting that politicians and community simply do not appreciate the 
                                                          
19 The one county which had not built new health facilities had a large number of 
unopened facilities built prior to devolution using constituency development funds.  
Photo 12 Ambulances were a priority investment for many 
counties 
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running and maintenance costs 
needed for every health facility, 
potentially impeding functionality or 
quality of services provided.  This also 
has implications for future 
sustainability, if recurrent costs are 
not taken into account when planning 
new health facilities. 
“Maybe last financial year we put up a 
health centre the physical structure 
and …when we come back this 
financial year the community will say 
we want another health centre in a 
different location within the same 
ward.  They don’t have the knowledge 
that actually this [building] that has been put up requires other things for it to 
function and deliver the service that they require.” County Health 
Respondent, Male46 
In Photo 14 (top left) theatre suite, which does not yet have the needed staff to 
conduct operations, (top right) empty post-natal ward, where there have been 
limited actions taken to promote use of services, (lower left) overcrowded dispensary 
store, (lower right) new health facility is being built just a few km away from an 
existing dispensary with no space for deliveries and lack of basic equipment, such as 
a delivery couch, a sphygmomanometer cuff for measuring blood pressure or 
adequate staff to provide services see Photo 14.  
“Changes must come according to priority. Instead of creating a new heath 
centre, why don’t they improve the one which is there completely to 
accomplish the mission of the first which is there, then they build another one, 
new one. No running water, no lighting, no delivery couch and you are told 
Photo 13 Dispensary in Kwale County 
which will be rehabilitated by the county 
government 
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how many deliveries have you had? How can you deliver? Even sometimes 
they don’t have delivery kits.” Health Worker, Female04 
Photo 14 Health facilities with varied levels of infrastructure investment 
 
Some health facility respondents gave examples where laboratory and community 
clinic infrastructure had been built by county government and the national First 
Lady’s Beyond Zero campaign, but over 18 months later no equipment or staff had 
arrived to ensure the laboratory or clinic was providing services as intended (see 
Photo 15). 
“Since the County 
government came in, they 
put up a structure for our 
laboratory, we’ve not been 
having laboratory service so 
they completed it last year 
August 2014, and since then 
there was no equipment 
which was put at that 
structure, no laboratory 
technician employed, so it’s 
just a structure an empty building standing there.” Health Worker, Male07 
Photo 15 Laboratory constructed but not staffed or 
equipped after 18 months 
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National government and equipment:  A scandal over medical equipment erupted 
in April 2016 that detailed a large post-devolution procurement of specialist medical 
equipment (such as dialysis machines and CT scanners) by national government, 
without having consulted county governors, which created much controversy in the 
media (see Photo 1620).   
Photo 16 News headline surrounding medical equipment controversy 
 
The governors initially refused to receive the equipment as national Ministry of 
Health were acting beyond their jurisdiction by procuring on behalf of the counties 
without their agreement.  National government then agreed to lease it to counties.  
Controversy continued with governors’ claiming to have been pressured into 
accepting unneeded equipment by national Ministry of Health, according to media 
reports.  Equipment purchased was to be provided to two hospitals in every county, 
despite the fact that counties can have over a 30-fold difference in population (Lamu 
county approximately 100,000 and Nairobi county 3.1 million) and some counties 
already had the very equipment being purchased, leading to duplication of extremely 
expensive equipment, such as CT scanners.  Meanwhile, in other counties 
infrastructure and staff needed to operate the equipment were not present, thereby 
forcing county governments to invest in building radiography department and 
employing new health workers or to leave equipment unused.  The large amount of 
funds used to procure these equipment, which in some counties are lying idle due to 
lack of trained staff and in others are used by the minority in the county who are rich 
enough to afford to pay for more complex investigations, might have been better 
invested in strengthening community-based primary health care, which the 
                                                          
20 Source: http://www.nation.co.ke/counties/meru/State-medical-equipment-deal-
is-flawed-says-Munya/1183302-3180732-bf0mgsz/index.html  
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government is responsible to provide to everyone.  
“Instead of being given finances to come and budget they (county 
government) were forced to take some equipment, that’s what happened. You 
were to take equipment and you do not have the personnel who is able to run 
them and you were given. So they are lying all everywhere with no use… it’s 
not good by the way because like us we were given the CT scan machines and 
we have no personnel.”  County Non-Health Respondent, Female46  
Relevance of equipment:  Two counties described having recently opened dialysis 
suites, which raised a host of concerns about equity, as dialysis units were introduced 
at expense of investment in other services which could benefit more of the 
population.  Patients needing dialysis still have to pay for the services (and so only 
the relatively rich will benefit).  Counties are experiencing challenges with ensuring 
trained staff and maintenance of machines, with one county describing breakdown 
of machines within the first year after opening.  This may indicate a lack of 
accountability from the county government to provide health services which respond 
to genuine need and benefit the entire population, rather than those which look 
impressive to the electorate.  There is an urgent need for community empowerment, 
so people are able to demand their right to receive timely, free community-based 
primary health care from their local dispensary or health facility, with referral as 
appropriate.  This sentiment was shared by a national level respondent. 
“Sometimes it’s [priority-setting] not relevant.  You know when you go to a 
county, and you find that county leadership decides okay we want a nice gate 
to our county hospital, and then you walk into the county hospital and there 
are no drugs.  Then probably the workers have not been paid.  What does that 
say? It’s because the, the leader wants to say ‘you see we know our hospital 
is shining’.  So it may not necessarily be speaking to the needs and that’s why, 
probably my suggestion would be … We need to empower the communities to 
demand.” National Respondent, Male07 
Examples of best practices:  In many cases expansion of infrastructure (particularly 
dispensaries) was entirely appropriate, particularly in formerly marginalised areas 
212 | P a g e  
 
where there was a huge deficit and extremely limited geographic access to services.  
Many counties described investing in infrastructure for primary care, such as 
dispensaries and health centres which typically benefit poor population more than 
rich.   
“The health infrastructure, in terms of the dispensaries, and the health 
centres.  Before the county government came in, we had a challenge, whereby 
facilities were 55 kilometres away from a settled community.  So, it is our 
priority to make sure that at least, we reduce the distance which the 
community has to travel so that now we are at 35 [km].” County Health 
Respondent, Male41 
However, this was an area which was open to manipulation and in many cases 
extreme care was needed to save counties from building infrastructure they would 
struggle to maintain. 
4.4.5 Quality and functionality of services 
Quality was not explicitly explored or defined by respondents, although it was 
identified implicitly in terms of staff time, attitudes, stock-outs, availability of quality 
data for evidence etc.  This was a limitation with the study and is an important future 
area for research.  The implied references to quality have already been highlighted 
throughout the results and so will not be repeated here.  Further quality related 
findings are highlighted in section 4.5.8. 
Quality of health facility services:  In some counties there was the perception that 
the quality of services had reduced considerably following devolution, despite the 
introduction of quality improvement through the Kenya Quality Model for Health 
[228].  Health workers and community respondents raised concerns around the 
quality of services provided at government facilities as a result of lack of supplies 
(such as laboratory and drugs) and insufficient numbers of staff who are overworked 
as a result.  This was felt to lead to poor staff attitude as a result of stress and 
demotivation; clinician error due to tiredness and lack of support; long patient 
waiting times, with health workers having to serve up to 200 patients per day without 
the needed resources and support prerequisite to providing quality services.    
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“I have a problem with the services the doctors give and I feel bad about it, 
because I came here one day and I was misdiagnosed. The quality of services 
in this health centre should be upgraded.”  Male community FGD04 
In formerly marginalised nomadic counties in Northern Kenya service quality was felt 
to have improved.  In these counties many county level and health worker level 
respondents described community perception of improved quality having led to 
increased utilisation of health services following devolution.   
“The perception of the people on the ground they perceive, before the 
devolution that the hospital is idle there, it has no equipment, it has no 
medicine and nobody is asking... the perception has changed, people are 
going for the treatment in the hospitals.” County Non-Health Respondent, 
Male24 
Quality of community health services:  Quality of community services was 
commonly discussed by respondents across counties, although it was referred to in 
terms such as ensuring ‘functionality’ or ‘operationalising’ community units.  For a 
unit to be considered functional it ought to have an established community health 
committee; trained CHVs; trained CHEW working who is supported with transport 
and tools to carry out his/her tasks; linkage to a health facility with a trained health 
worker; CHVs’ have kits and reporting tools; regularly meeting for dialogue and 
action days and submitting reports.  Respondents often highlighted challenges with 
ensuring functionality of community units.  The CHEW was considered a vital actor 
to a functional unit.  However, even the most active and motivated of CHEWs are 
limited if CHVs are not motivated to work as a result of the lack of incentives.  While 
respondents from many counties described expansion in coverage of community 
health services, very few described county government focus on maintaining the 
quality of community health services throughout expansion.  In fact, many 
respondents described deterioration of quality (referred to as functionality), with 
failure on the part of most county governments, to recruit sufficient numbers of 
CHEWs for supportive supervision, limited availability of needed supplies and 
reporting tools and limited funding set aside to support supervision activities.  
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Functionality was often felt to be related to the presence of external partner support.  
Once partner support was withdrawn county respondents typically identified that 
sustainability became an issue and community units ceased to function optimally.  In 
one county, quality has been neglected to such a degree that 50 new community 
units have been established, with no plans or budgets in place to train the CTC 
providers in those units to carry-out their intended functions.  Nor was there mention 
of community health committees having been established, procurement of CHV kits 
or tools or recruitment of CHEWs to support these units. 
Within the community health strategy CHVs should be supported and supervised by 
CHEWs.  However, while many counties described expanding coverage with CHVs, 
only one described a concurrent rise in the number of CHEWs to maintain quality 
supervision throughout expansion.  This is likely a result of the fact that in many 
counties new community units are established through partner support, while 
recruitment and employment of CHEWs falls within the remit of county 
governments.  In fact, one county described that the number of CHVs had more than 
doubled while there was a reduction in the number of CHEWs. 
“Human resource, so that is one area where we that problem. But the 
community health volunteers themselves have gone up. We have actually 
moved from about 500 to slightly above 1000… But for extension workers, it 
has remained the same rate, same or it has reduced.”  County Health 
Respondent, Male57 
Different approaches by counties to the revised community health strategy, which 
recommends increasing the number of CHEWs and reducing the number of CHVs 
adds another layer of complexity for ensuring quality community health services, see 
case study 1. 
Examples of best practices:  Examples for best practices in improving quality of 
services at health facility or community level were limited.  Only one county 
described having invested in refresher training for pre-existing units and seeking to 
ensure that existing units have the required kits, alongside having established a small 
number of new community units.   
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“The last two or three years, we have been focusing on training, now we have 
said ‘okay let’s try to functionalize the existing [community units]’.” County 
Health Respondent, Male49 
4.4.6 Governance and community empowerment 
The Constitution describes that the community have the opportunity to participate 
in priority-setting and governance to review progress against plans, through public 
participation meetings and existing health facility management committees.  
However, as a consequence of inadequate engagement communities are not yet 
adequately informed to take up this role as intended.  Community empowerment 
was deemed fundamental to successful implementation and to achieving health, as 
highlighted by national and county respondents.   
“Basically for me without empowering the communities or having them 
engaged in their health, we in the health sector or the health ministry, we 
can’t really give health to people.” National Respondent, Male14 
Some respondents at national and county levels felt more power had been brought 
to the general community, through greater accountability of the county to the 
community, see Table 11, with devolution presenting an excellent opportunity to 
strengthen community ownership, allowing community members to hold their 
leaders to account. 
“The other thing that we’ve seen with devolution is unprecedented local 
accountability… There is that high level accountability from the locals to the 
top management in the county which can only help to improve service 
delivery.” National Respondent, Male10 
Public participation meetings were the most commonly discussed channel through 
which community ownership for health (and other services) was demonstrated.  
Other mechanisms included community representation during quarterly county 
stakeholder meetings and health facility management committee review meetings 
held to assess progress against targets and to identify solutions to challenges.  As 
highlighted in section 4.2.3, there are considerable challenges to effective 
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community ownership of the process and apathy towards participation as a 
consequence of previous neglect under central government.   
“The community also needs to be quite informed because many times they 
don’t know that they have a role. In doing that, they need to be sensitized 
much more so that they understand that it is their right.” County Health 
Respondent, Male23 
Although, limited actions had been taken to strengthen community empowerment 
(outside of the public participation meetings), there was a common recognition of 
the need to strengthen community understanding and ownership for health, along 
with providing them with guidance for how to set appropriate priorities.  The new 
Constitution was recognised as an opportunity for the community to demand more 
from their leaders and politicians. 
Examples of best practices:  Some excellent practices to empower the community to 
understand health, their role in decision-making and to understanding the choices 
available to them within the public participation process have already been 
highlighted in case study 2.  Where implemented, community health approaches 
have promoted community ownership for health and encouraged utilisation of 
health facility services. 
“The community are getting to know that health is their right and they are 
coming to seek the health service.” CHEW, Female02 
The benefits of community health approaches for building community ownership for 
health described by CHEWs, sub-county and county community health focal persons 
were many. The ability for CHVs and CHEWs to provide tailored health education to 
each household; to improve community members’ understanding about health 
services and to feel more empowered to interact with the health system and use 
facility level services was mentioned.   
“Some people have fallen sick and are afraid to go to the hospital when the 
CHWs come they [CHWs] approach you and talk to you, at least counsel and 
encourage you and bring you to the hospital and the person sees they are 
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cared for and they get the courage to go to hospital and to start treatment 
and there you’ll find that the CHW will have saved a life” Female community 
FGD01    
Respondents also highlighted the potential to expand coverage of health services 
beyond what is covered by the health facility, thereby including disadvantaged 
groups and those in hard-to-reach areas; to provide early targeted disease response; 
to empower the community to make informed choices and decisions about health, 
along with enabling them to identify risks and mitigate these and to identify public 
challenges and find community driven solutions.   
“Community health if well embraced is the solution to many of these problems 
we are seeing because for one; people are having informed choices and 
informed decisions and they will make their own decisions.”   County Health 
Respondent, Male03 
A tragic story from a CHEW explained how a new health facility opened, but had not 
yet engaged with the community to encourage attendance.  A young mother 
delivered at home where she suffered post-partum haemorrhage and later died, 
without ever having sought care at the new health facility.  The following quote from 
a health facility in-charge provides an example of how community health can change 
care-seeking practices, by promoting empowerment and understanding of health.  It 
tells how a mother’s life was saved during delivery of twins due to the revised 
traditional birth attendant role, which encouraged attendance at the health facility 
for delivery.   
“So we encourage them, they are not delivering at home, they are to seek the 
health provider as required and visit the ANC clinics as required. That one has 
helped to improve on skilled delivery. We have reduced the mother and the 
neonatal mortality rate that was in the county. Like last week I had a case of 
a mother …she had twins. …So I educated her and told her and told her she 
had twins so, hers was to deliver in hospital. I gave a TBA that is one of 
reproductive health to take care of the mother.  Once she reached labour she 
referred the mother [to the dispensary, where I] delivered the first twin and 
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the second twin delayed. So I referred her to the district and she received 
assistance and got her two babies and the mother is well and she is discharged 
now. So you see if the mother had stayed at home and delivered the first twin 
and the second delayed they would have lost their lives.” Health Worker, 
Male09 
In summary, changing power dynamics with the establishment of the county 
governments has led to increased funding availability at the county government 
level.  This has resulted in investment in infrastructure and ambulances, at times at 
the expense of intangible preventive health services, including community health.  
There have been mixed implications for human resources for health, with counties 
often increasing the numbers of health workers, but struggling to manage staff, 
leading to unrest and strikes.  Drug and supply chain management varied widely 
between counties.  Sub-county and health facilities typically described having less 
funding available post-devolution, with implications for quality and functionality, as 
they do not have the resources needed to problem solve.  Governance structures 
have been established through public participation forums and existing health 
committees at facility and community levels.  However, further action is needed to 
empower all community members to appreciate and demand holistic health services.   
4.5 What are the implications of devolution for health equity? 
The following section will provide an overview of how devolution has influenced 
health equity, by covering the following issues:   
 Overview of how equity was perceived and understood by the various groups of 
respondents, in order to better understand how this influenced later discussions 
surrounding equity, see section 4.5.1.   
  Summary of social determinants perceived to influence a person’s health, see 
section 4.5.2.   
 How devolution has influenced (or not) these social determinants of health to 
effect a person’s power to participate in priority-setting, see section 4.5.3. 
  How devolution has influenced (or not) the health services made available by the 
devolved government, see section 4.5.5. 
219 | P a g e  
 
 How devolution has influenced (or not) a person’s ability to access health 
services, see section 4.5.6 
 How devolution has influenced (or not) a person’s ability to use health services, 
see section 4.5.7  
 How devolution has influenced (or not) the quality of services available, see 
section 4.5.8 
 Finally, it will conclude with recommendations to improve equity as identified by 
the respondents, see section 4.5.9.  
4.5.1 How is equity understood? 
The most frequently described reason national and county respondents gave for 
devolution of health services was to improve equity of service provision.  National 
respondents also tended to emphasise community empowerment as an objective for 
devolution.  Health workers from sub-county, health facility and community level 
identified that inequity was a driver for devolution.  However, health workers were 
faster than county respondents to temper this by saying that there have been 
‘teething problems’ and challenges with the functionality of service delivery since 
devolution.   
Improving equity was most commonly described in terms of improving access and 
bringing services closer to the ‘ordinary person’.  County and national level 
respondents placed a strong emphasis on re-distribution of resources, based on 
geographic and financial access to health services in their understanding of equity.  
However, one national level respondent highlighted this as a common weakness in 
the accepted understanding of equity within Kenya. 
“For a very long time in fact we looked at equity from the lens of financial 
access and geographical access and a lot of the efforts were targeting that 
and ignoring other aspects …But actually there is quite number of barriers to 
access which we haven’t focused on and the policies have been very silent on 
that.”  National Respondent, Male11 
By contrast, respondents at sub-county and health facility level, who also highlighted 
the importance of geographic and financial access, placed a much stronger emphasis 
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on the dimensions of quality, such as the need for adequate drugs and staff in order 
to provide equitable and effective services.  Community members, CHEWs and CHVs 
emphasised the need for a lack of prejudice, favouritism or tribalism, with services 
available for everyone.  They also emphasised the importance of justice and receiving 
their right to health care, along with quality, respectful and timely treatment at a 
location convenient to them.   
 “[Fairness means] they should get high quality health services that reach 
everyone at the right time.”  CHV Team Leader, Female08   
Interestingly, just a small minority of respondents identified the need to clarify that 
when pursuing equitable health care, governments should prioritise essential 
community and primary health services first.   
“Health is complex in its needs; so we can only talk of equity for the primary 
services or services equating from primary services.” Sub-County Health 
Respondent, Male09 
Despite the majority of respondents understanding the concept of equity, a minority 
of county non-health respondents defined it as equal distribution of resources, rather 
than distribution according to need.  This was considered by one respondent to be 
the understanding of politicians, which has led to challenges in ensuring resource 
distribution where most deserved, see section 4.3.2 and section 4.5.5.   
“To me equity in health is a very thorny issue and more so after the county 
government because one thing is everybody is asking to have a share, which 
to me is not equity. To me equity is having the service where it’s most 
deserved. That means in one of the counties you could have more dispensaries 
than another one, depending on the need.” County Non-Health Respondent, 
Male47 
National policies were felt to have an influence on equity, by identifying selected 
groups who should receive services free of charge, such as children under-five, 
pregnant women and street families.  However, while policy is in place there is an 
implementation gap as a consequence of unclear channels regarding the funding for 
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these ‘free’ services, so at times the patient has to pay for what should be provided 
free.  Lack of the needed drugs and commodities was frequently described as 
undermining equity of services provided, particularly within Nairobi County.  Fairness 
for health services should also mean fairness to the health workers, including CHVs 
by ensuring they receive adequate compensation and the tools needed to safely 
carry out their tasks.   
4.5.2 How do power dynamics and social determinants of health influence 
vulnerability? 
As described earlier in section 2.3.6, health equity goes beyond health and is a 
consequence of the privilege and disadvantage within society and the health system 
(described earlier in this chapter) intersecting with the dimensions of social 
inequality experienced in a person’s life [3].  The following section will highlight which 
dimensions influence an individual’s ability to engage with and use health services 
and will start to unpack how they intersect.  This will be developed further in the 
discussion chapter.  In order to understand more about the reasons for inequity and 
actions which have been taken to address inequities, respondents were asked to 
identify people who they considered vulnerable or who might struggle to use health 
services.  Dimensions of social inequality which were described as influencing a 
person’s vulnerability and/or ability to use health services included:  age, drug and 
alcohol misuse, gender, geographic location, poverty level, experience of stigma, 
occupation, disability, political difference to local and/ or county leader(s), as 
indicated in Figure 31.   
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When two or more dimensions intersect in the life of an individual, a complex pattern 
emerges according to the level of power and privilege held by that person.  This was 
influenced by larger forces and structures at work within the context and will be 
described more fully in chapter 5.  The following section will identify for each 
dimension the perceived reasons why it was felt to contribute to a loss of power, 
increased vulnerability and challenge in using the health system by the person who 
experienced it.  Photographs from the photovoice participatory research will be 
triangulated with qualitative data collected through interviews and FGDs from 
community to national level.   
Age:  Age was identified as a social circumstance which could influence a person’s 
power and contribute to vulnerability and challenges using health services.  The 
young and elderly were most commonly identified as being vulnerable.  This was 
perhaps a consequence of limited power held by these groups, perhaps as a 
consequence of societal forces which prioritise the economically active population, 
rather than children, youth or the elderly.  
Figure 31 Intersectionality wheel as described by respondents 
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Elderly people were identified as vulnerable across almost all counties.  In particular, 
elderly people were felt to be vulnerable if they were alone or lacked social capital, 
perhaps if their children had left for education and employment elsewhere and did 
not return to support their parents.  Other categories which intersected with 
advanced age to increase the challenges experienced in using health services 
included: geographic location, poverty level or disability, lived far from a facility, 
lacking in money for transport created challenges in accessing facility-level health 
services.  
“So we leave our elderly people back in the villages, and that’s a very 
vulnerable group.”  County Non-Health Respondent, Male06 
Children were identified to be potentially vulnerable by county, sub-county and 
health facility level respondents when age intersected with other categories, such as 
poverty, being orphaned or having alcoholic parents who did not provide the care 
and love needed.  Children who were orphaned, were felt to have lack of power and 
privilege and little ability to raise enough money to meet their basic needs, as 
described by county respondents and youth photographers.  The premature burden 
placed on orphans and vulnerable children living in child-headed homes of raising 
resources to meet their needs may result in neglect of their health.     
“It’s also in the slums 
that you’ll get child-
headed families.  Yes, 
parents have died, but 
the older child assumes 
the responsibility of the 
parents. Yeah and also, 
so health may not be 
really a priority, why?  
Because that child is 
busy thinking about 
how to fend for 
Photo 17 Community members recycling plastic in 
Korogocho – a job often carried out by children and youth. 
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themselves.  So will he or she go to hospital when they are unwell when they 
can go and do some job somewhere?” County Non-Health Respondent, 
Female15 
Youth photographers highlighted that within informal settlements, children and 
youth often scavenge for plastics to recycle in order to earn an income for the family 
(see Photo 17, photographer Rhonda Namwendwa).   
Youth did not attend health education or health facility for services as frequently as 
needed, according to respondents from community to county level, when these 
services were not ‘youth friendly’.  This may have been due to the health system 
having been oriented around an adult population, rather than accommodating youth 
(perhaps due to societal norms).  CHVs identified some challenges engaging youth.  
Perhaps as a consequence of youth’s lack of engagement with health services, health 
facility level respondents described youth as being vulnerable, with girls and young 
women in particular at risk of teenage pregnancy, due to a lack of the needed health 
information and the need for youth specific sexual health education was highlighted. 
“Youths shy away from attending normal processes that are there in our 
hospitals.” County Non-Health Respondent, Male29 
Youth photographers expressed appreciation for the work which CHVs carry out.  
One youth photographer acknowledged that youth often do not like to attend health 
facilities, but that CHVs are helpful in encouraging attendance (see Photo 18 
Photographer Mary Wakjiku). 
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“CHW, they have assisted the 
community in so many ways because 
my age mates really don’t value 
visiting health centres yet they are the 
most with early pregnancy issues so 
they usually advise on the importance 
of visiting hospitals and at the same 
time they offer first aid.”  Youth 
photographer film.  
Alcohol and drug misuse among youth 
was commonly discussed, by 
community and CHVs in the urban 
county, as intersecting dimensions 
which contribute to vulnerability.  
This creates barriers to CHVs trying to 
help them.  Youth photographers acknowledged the challenges associated with drug 
and alcohol misuse among their age mates, relating it to peer pressure and 
unemployment.  This was a frequent discussion topic and youth also chose to capture 
photographs of drug misuse21 (see Photo 19 photographer Mary Wanjiku).  
“Most of the youth have 
joined the abuse of illegal 
drugs because of high cases 
of unemployment, peer 
pressure from friends.”  
Youth photographer 
caption. 
 
                                                          
21 The photos were staged by the youth participants themselves, due to 
confidentiality concerns around ‘real’ photos of drug misuse. 
Photo 18 Staged demonstration of CHV 
giving polio vaccination. 
Photo 19 Staged photo of drug misuse 
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Drug and Alcohol Misuse:  Drug and alcohol misuse was felt to contribute to a 
person’s loss of power and privilege as a consequence of intoxication increasing their 
exposure to sexual violence, risky sexual practices, feeding a cycle of poverty.  Youth 
photographers highlighted that parents who are alcoholic may fail to care for their 
children as a consequence of intoxication.  Poverty was felt to intersect with alcohol, 
with a lack of other employment options leading to brewing illegal alcohol (see photo 
20 Photographer Irene Akoth).  This was a topic of intense discussion during the 
photo exhibition with local leaders due to its illegal nature, who subsequently closed 
the chang’aa (illegal alcohol) dens. 
“Chang’a makes 
parents forget their 
duties.  The things that 
they do are harmful to 
our health.  If someone 
gets used to those 
drugs he becomes idle.  
The people who cook 
and sell these things 
are in danger, if she is a 
girl she may be raped.”   
Caption youth photographer. 
Alcohol or drug misuse may also lead to limited access or use of services, as 
community members often identified that a person with alcohol misuse may refuse 
to meet with the CHV or may reside in areas associated with crime, where the CHV 
may be fearful to enter due to security concerns. 
 “There are places known to be dens of brews, so people are afraid of going 
there, reaching out to them.”  Community Key Informant, Female13 
Gender:  Gender was identified to influence a person’s power and level of 
vulnerability.  Women were described as having primary responsibility for caregiving 
and raising children.  County level respondents recognised that women experience a 
Photo 20 Chang’a brewing. 
227 | P a g e  
 
combination of both biological and imposed risks.  The biological risks described were 
those associated with pregnancy and childbirth occurring as a result of women’s 
physiology.  These risks intersected with other dimensions, such as geographic 
location or level of poverty, with the result that poor women living in hard-to-reach 
areas may struggle to access and use services, such as skilled delivery due to lack of 
funds for transport.  This in turn may lead to inequitable morbidity and mortality 
among women.  This was influenced by the extent to which the health system was 
designed to extend services (or not) to women who experience multiple intersecting 
dimensions. 
External imposed risks occur as a consequence of women’s lack of power in decision-
making compared with men and are influenced by a number of other factors such as 
her age, tribe and geographic location, which are in turn influenced by the strength 
of patriarchal norms.  Depending on the dimensions present in a woman’s life at a 
certain point in time, this could lead to the occurrence of dangerous practices such 
as child marriage, female genital mutilation and gender-based violence.  Gendered 
and patriarchal social norms led to loss of power and privilege among women, which 
resulted in their inability to own land, to control finances or make decisions about 
seeking health care or family planning, without first gaining her husband’s 
permission.  Gender intersected with geographic location and occupation leading to 
nuanced vulnerability among women as a result. For example, in one of the 
pastoralist counties it was described that during the dry season the men left with the 
cattle, leaving the women behind with no source of income to support their 
households.  Meanwhile, in a lakeshore county there was increased vulnerability for 
women who were obliged to have sex in order to gain access to fish to sell due to 
falling fish stocks (this was not widely described in other counties). 
Among nomadic populations, gender, age and tribe intersect, often leading to early 
marriage among girls and female genital mutilation (FGM).  High illiteracy among girls 
and low economic empowerment for women were felt to further compound women 
and girls’ vulnerability.  In one of the counties one respondent described how 
activities to reduce the practice of FGM had been carried out among women.  
However, underlying patriarchal norms were not addressed and women were so 
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disempowered that this had no effect in countering the practice.  Men demanded to 
marry a girl who had undergone FGM and girls still underwent FGM.  In an attempt 
to stop FGM members of the gender team have now determined to engage with men 
as well as girls. 
“The culture also disadvantages the Maasai woman.  We have early 
marriages, we have FGM, we have high illiteracy levels.  Low economic 
empowerment, so the women and the girl are more vulnerable.”   County Non-
Health Respondent, Male03 
Gender-based violence (GBV) was described in many counties as occurring 
commonly, particularly rape of adolescent girls in informal settlements.  It was also 
commonly described by the youth photographers living in the informal settlements, 
who identified that toilets which are located outside a plot of houses and with no 
door presented an increased risk of rape for girls living within the community (see 
Photo 21, Photographer Verine Adhiambo).  Solutions identified in response by youth 
were renovating toilets with a door and building toilets within housing plots. 
“This is a toilet. I don’t 
like the way it looks 
[because] it’s built 
outside a plot. It doesn’t 
make sense. A girl can 
easily get raped while 
going to the toilet.”  
Youth photographer 
FGD 
While women were 
identified as being more 
vulnerable compared with men, there were different vulnerabilities described for 
men, particularly by respondents at community level.  Men were often away during 
CHV home visits, as a consequence of having an occupation based outside the home, 
therefore they did not benefit from the CHV’s services.  In addition, there was a 
Photo 21 Toilets without doors identified as high risk 
location for rape 
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perception described by men that health services were primarily intended for 
women and children rather than men, which created a barrier to them seeking help 
when needed.  Meanwhile within Nairobi drug and gang-related violence among 
young men was highlighted. 
In addition to influencing access and use of services at community level, gender also 
plays a key role within the health workforce.  This was reflected in our study as Table 
13, which highlights a snapshot gender breakdown for a selection of respondents 
within this study indicates. 
Table 13 Distribution of men and women interviewed within the workforce 
  Male Female # respondents 
CHV 12 12 24 
CHV team leader 4 9 13 
Mid-level health worker 32 17 49 
County level decision-maker 85 35 120 
National level policy -maker, NGO, academic 11 3 14 
  144 76 220 
Table 13 shows that women interviewed were equally represented with men as 
CHVs.  Women interviewed occupied more of the CHV team leader position, a role 
with added responsibility but not necessarily extra (any) financial remuneration.  
Women interviewed were under-represented in mid-level health worker positions 
(which included a wide range of roles from CHEW and nurse in-charge to sub-county 
medical officer for health).  At county level women constituted around 30% of 
respondents, which is largely in keeping with the two thirds gender rule (where no 
more than two thirds of the members of county assembly can be of the same gender, 
see 4.5.4), that women should occupy at least one third of county decision-making 
positions.  Meanwhile, at national level women interviewed were grossly under-
represented, with only three out of 14 respondents being women.   
Religion and Cultural Beliefs:  A number of other dimensions including religion and 
cultural beliefs were identified as contributing to a person’s level of power (or lack 
thereof) by respondents at county and other levels.  Those who adhere to certain 
religions were described as refusing to seek treatment or immunisations for their 
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children.  Other forms of health services frequently denied or refused by those who 
adhere to certain religions, including use of family planning were also described.   
“Some religions in the county …do not go to hospital or do not want to listen 
to health care workers.”   County Health Respondent, Male02 
Cultural beliefs were more commonly described by respondents at community, sub-
county or health facility level than by county respondents.  Due to cultural beliefs 
and practices intersecting with geographic location (rural), female gender and age 
some girls were exposed to certain dangerous practices, such as FGM as described 
earlier.  Meanwhile, use of traditional medicines as an alternative to seeking care at 
a health facility was described, with observance of cultural practices felt to intersect 
with geographic location (remote areas), marital status (married) and education 
(illiteracy).  These beliefs also had an influence over health-seeking practices such as 
skilled delivery, with women choosing to deliver at home in order to uphold these 
traditions.   
Another challenge described in two counties was the community’s resistance to 
certain healthy behaviours such as latrine use or lack of acceptance for the CHV, 
perhaps due to reasons of culture not having been adequately understood and 
addressed when introducing the community health strategy.    
Geographic Location:  Geographic location was found to influence a person’s power, 
privilege and health through exposure to environmental risk, their (in)ability to 
access health services and to participate in decision-making to set priorities, see 
4.5.3.  Exposure to environmental risk was most commonly discussed in urban 
areas22, while geographic access to services was most frequently raised in nomadic 
and agrarian counties.  Those in the most remote areas, particularly in nomadic 
counties, were described as experiencing the greatest geographic barriers to 
accessing and using health services, as a result of long distance and transport costs.  
This also creates a challenge to joining public participation meetings typically held in 
main towns.  For those in urban informal settlements and in certain areas in rural 
                                                          
22 This may have been as a consequence of the insights provided through photovoice 
research (only carried out in Nairobi).   
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counties, insecurity created a barrier which hindered use of services, particularly at 
night (regardless of the geographic availability of the service).  CHVs were identified 
as workers who can extend the coverage of services to those living in hard-to-reach 
areas (see section 4.5.6). 
In Nairobi and Kitui counties, some respondents identified that those living in certain 
areas, such as within informal settlements or in dry areas had higher disease burden 
of respiratory infections, diarrhoea and malnutrition as a consequence of lack of 
clean water and sanitation; poverty and lack of varied diet; exposure to raw sewage 
in their living environment or exposure to pollutants or toxic fumes from burning 
rubbish.  These environmental risks pre-dated devolution.  However, there were 
limited discussions by community members about changes to environmental risks 
brought about by devolution in urban areas.  In rural areas, community led total 
sanitation was commonly described as a county government and partner 
collaboration to improve access to sanitation.     
“Those people in dump sites they usually have many sicknesses, because of 
the working conditions they work in. Because you find every time it’s burning 
and when they continue to inhale that smoke they catch chest related 
sicknesses.” Community Key Informant, Male11 
An interesting finding which emerged through the photovoice research was the 
variation in the level of poverty and exposure to risks, even within the one informal 
settlement.  During the photovoice research the youth photographers visited five 
different villages within Korogocho informal settlement.  In the subsequent 
discussions youth talked about the differences between the villages.  Some villages 
were felt to be more dangerous than others if houses were congested, poorly 
constructed, located near stagnant water and if toilets were not built within the 
housing plot (see Photo 23 Photographer Rufus Njoroge).  However, in other villages 
houses were considered safer if they have a private yard (see Photo 22 Photographer 
Rufus Njoroge), were kept clean and were located near the police station, which had 
recently been built and was felt to have led to a reduction in crime in the surrounding 
area.  In addition, some houses had additional sources of food and/ or income with 
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a cow or sack-based kitchen garden within their compound.  This therefore 
demonstrates how different aspects of geographic location can intersect to influence 
a person’s position of privilege or level of vulnerability. 
 
 
 
 
Inadequate sanitation was highlighted by youth photographers as a cause of ill health 
during discussions and photos, which related to the lack of adequate sanitation and 
toilets within the informal settlements.  Again sanitation was not uniform 
throughout, with some villages considered to have much better sanitation than 
others. 
“And in Kisumu Ndogo most of the plots had no toilet, first this area had only 
one toilet and there was poor disposal of human wastes all over.”  Youth 
photographer FGD  
The rubbish abandoned in some villages within the informal settlements was 
highlighted by many of the youth photographers as a cause of ill health (see Photo 
24 Photographer Rufus Njoroge).  However, they also highlighted that there has 
recently been the introduction of rubbish collection, which is improving the general 
environment within the community (see Photo 25 Photographer Rufus Njoroge).  This 
Photo 22 Safe and clean enclosed 
compound  
 
Photo 23 Unstable housing located 
overhanging river 
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intervention was described as having been facilitated by the youth, demonstrating 
agency and power in addressing a risk factor for ill health.  Participants did not 
describe any link between this improvement and changes brought about by the 
county government as a 
result of devolution. 
“Under the rubbish you 
don’t know whether there 
is still flowing sewage 
below them, and one can 
step on them and get into 
the sewage and maybe 
there could be some 
metallic objects that can 
injure you.”  Youth 
photographer FGD 
“A lorry that collects 
garbage… I loved it, 
because the people 
collecting the garbage are 
the youth.  The youth have 
come up with groups they 
go to every plot giving out 
plastic bags for garbage 
and they come for it on 
Saturday, if they don’t 
come for it there is a 
specific place where they keep then collect them on Monday using the lorry… [so] the 
community becomes clean.”  Youth photographer FGD 
Poverty Level:  Poverty as a dimension of social inequality was felt to commonly 
intersect with other dimensions, creating a barrier to accessing effective care and 
Photo 24 Rubbish dumped in the street. 
Photo 25 Lorry collecting rubbish 
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contributing to malnutrition.  It leads to limited power and lack of agency, where 
people who are poor have few options surrounding where they live (geographic 
location) and how they are employed (occupation), potentially resulting in increased 
exposure to environmental health risks, compared with people who are not poor.  
These environmental risks included: spread of tuberculosis in poorly ventilated 
thatched houses in rural areas.  In informal settlements, wound infections from 
working in dirty water and respiratory problems from burning rubbish were 
commonly described.  Lack of money to pay for child care, resulted in some children 
being left at home while parents worked.   
Extreme poverty contributes to hunger and malnutrition, at times intersecting with 
HIV in Northern Kenya to increase vulnerability, as respondents identified up to 60% 
of HIV patients could not afford food and were unable to take their antiretrovirals on 
an empty stomach, leading to poor adherence.  One respondent identified CHVs as a 
potential opportunity for identifying those patients in need of food support or cash 
transfer.  There were no longer term strategies described to tackle the underlying 
cause of malnutrition and poverty, leaving the acutely malnourished patient at risk 
of recurring malnutrition and its associated health complications.  This was also 
recognised by some respondents at national level, who identified the need for a 
community approach which sought to tackle dimensions of social inequality by 
ensuring stable income through agriculture, access to water and sanitation services 
etc. in addition to expanding health service coverage. 
“The community approach, not now community health, but community 
approach in many things, security, agriculture… It is one of the elements in the 
social pillar which we must implement if we must change those inequalities. 
Because the inequalities won’t be provided [for] by the many complicated 
things that we want in place.”  National Respondent, Male06 
Occupation:  Poverty, geographic location and occupation intersected, leading to 
limited power and agency, resulting in reliance on more dangerous occupations, such 
as scavenging on the dump site, brewing illegal alcohol, commercial sex work or 
working with pollutants.  One respondent described that occupation was also felt to 
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influence the quality of care provided, with government officers being provided a 
higher standard of care than an ‘ordinary’ person. 
“If an officer goes [to health facility] he is treated first. Then everything is paid 
for, high cost drugs are given on time, ambulance services are given, but if it’s 
a normal person no medicine, some even go without medicine at all.”    County 
Non-Health Respondent, Female36 
Education:  Education was infrequently described by county level respondents, but 
more commonly discussed among those at sub-county or health facility level, with 
lack of education described as creating a barrier to seeking care at a health facility 
and to participating in decision-making. There is need for concurrent improvements 
in education and health.   
“Health cannot stand alone and say ‘I can do this one here without the support 
of education’, if decision-making is a process that is hindered by the level of 
education then what do you need to do?  Education department has to come 
[with] you that is the first part of it.”  County Non-Health Respondent, 
Female12 
Low education and a failure to consider language barriers when planning training 
materials and resources created barriers during CHV training.  In some geographic 
locations, where the majority of the population have limited spoken Kiswahili/ 
English language skills, the lack of training and reporting materials in mother tongue 
has created a barrier to the recruitment of those who don’t speak English.  In another 
remote community the CHEW identified that some communities did not have a 
resident CHV due to the high levels of illiteracy excluding residents from selection to 
be a CHV.  
“Those who are far don’t have community health workers. Because they are 
moving from one place to another and when we chose those communities 
health workers we targeted at least those who can write and talk English. So 
we saw those who are around town most of them understand. So those who 
are far there is a problem, there is a gap.” County CHEW, Female02 
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Illiteracy was perceived by county and health facility level respondents as creating a 
challenge to understanding health education and lack of power contributed to 
limited confidence to seek care with a skilled health worker.  Aligned with this, one 
national respondent outlined the need to address this and engage illiterate groups 
with community health services. 
Disability:  Mental and physical disabilities were identified as potentially leading to 
increased vulnerability by respondents across counties, health systems and 
community levels.  Respondents from several counties and at community level 
identified that it may be difficult to reach and assist people with disabilities, as a 
result of stigma which means that people with disability are hidden at home.  For 
those with mental illness stigma appeared to be even stronger, particularly described 
by respondents from more remote settings, where cultural beliefs associated mental 
illness with wrongdoing. 
“Another reason is the hiding of the persons living with disability, done by their 
family members, out of shame… and so they don’t get the health services they 
need.”  Male community FGD01  
Stigma:  Stigma was described relating to HIV status, sexuality or marital status, 
which could lead to loss of power and increased vulnerability.  CHVs described the 
presence of stigma creating a barrier to HIV positive people engaging with services, 
particularly in rural areas where some people believe that HIV is a curse. 
“Mostly you find that if a person is ailing from HIV or HIV AIDS, that person 
has a lot of challenges in the family because they think he is cursed and yet 
the truth is that it’s not a curse; it’s a disease like any other, and if one follows 
the appropriate treatment schedule he/she will live a desirable life. So you find 
that a person like that, within the family, will have a lot of challenges.”  CHV 
Team Leader, 01 
In general community respondents identified that the CHVs often visit people living 
with HIV at home, leading to increased coverage with community health services 
compared with the general population.  Although, if CHVs have not been adequately 
trained they may fail to visit that person.  However, there were challenges with CHVs 
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visiting HIV positive patients, as some were fearful to disclose HIV status and accept 
help.  CHVs themselves identified that they prioritised to visit households with a sick 
person living there more frequently than other households.  Some community 
members mentioned that there are differences in the types of illnesses receiving 
community health services, stating that those with TB or HIV receive help, but 
children with epilepsy or asthma do not, perhaps because the CHV is uncertain how 
to help.  
A small number of respondents across several counties identified that stigma 
towards gay and lesbian people may create barriers to their use of health services.  
This was identified by respondents across several counties, along with the need to 
introduce policies which safeguard their interests.   
“So here we have actually quite a significant group of the gays and lesbians.  
Yeah, so you know those are vulnerable groups… given the stigma I think that 
is also quite high. So those are guys that we, you know we need to make sure 
that we create a very friendly system and even policies so that we safeguard 
their interests.” County Health Respondent, Male19 
Stigma was described regarding being an unmarried pregnant woman in a rural 
nomadic county.  However, interestingly this stigma conferred a protective function 
for uptake of skilled delivery, with one nurse describing that the traditional birth 
attendant will not deliver the child for an unmarried woman and so unmarried 
women typically sought delivery care at the health facility.   
Tribe and Political Difference:  Conflict between tribes was described in three 
counties, all of which described that this conflict and potential resulting displacement 
could have implications for health of the affected populations, due to the 
displacement; fear of seeking care from someone of a different tribe; closure of 
health facility due to insecurity; lack of access to adequate food and conflict related 
injuries as well (see section 4.5.6).  Fortunately in one of the counties it was felt that 
there had been reduced conflict between tribes since devolution, as a result of 
dialogue and peace building efforts by politicians. 
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However, a new emerging vulnerable group identified following devolution are those 
who did not vote for the elected governor or member of county assembly, described 
by several respondents at both county and community levels.  People experiencing 
this dimension were described as receiving fewer services.  
“Let me just say our village is among those that have been, what do you call 
it, neglect? I mean neglected. The leadership is also dismal. I mean general 
government leadership, and this is brought about by political differences. The 
councillor didn't elect me, they are not of my tribe. You find that village, 
because they are sure they did not choose that councillor or MCA, it's 
neglected.”  CHV Team Leader, 09 
4.5.3 How can social determinants of health influence participation? 
Gender, age, education, geographic location, disability, poverty level were all felt to 
influence a person’s ability to attend and contribute during public participation, as 
already highlighted earlier in section 4.3.5.  Many respondents felt that while 
representatives for women, youth and people with disabilities were invited, the 
public participation meeting was subject to elite capture, with those who hold most 
power within communities dominating discussions.  Depending on the county 
context, those who are felt to hold limited power or to be stigmatised, such as the 
youth, street dwellers, women or those who are illiterate have limited involvement 
during public participation.   
“Illiterate ones are never involved. They will not even know some of these 
processes [public participation].” County Non-Health Respondent, Male19 
Those living in remote areas and/or persons with disabilities experience travel 
challenges to reach public meetings and community norms prioritise the opinions of 
elders over youth.  Women, people with disabilities and youth are now required to 
be given an opportunity to speak if they attend the public participation.  However, in 
some counties there are still major barriers to learning women’s opinion during these 
meetings.  Women were often considered too busy to attend a public participation 
or not permitted to attend by her husband in nomadic counties.  Even where women 
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were present at public participation, in some settings they were often too fearful to 
speak.   
“When people go to the fields to do public participation, the women are 
always behind doing other things, in the households, taking care of children, 
and so on. So they are hardly fully represented in those public participation 
things and what that entails is it is a woman who knows what she needs in a 
health centre. …One they miss out of the quorums and number two even if 
they come up they may not be able to speak out. There are challenges where 
the real priorities can be captured.”   County Non-Health Respondent, 
Female25 
Perhaps as a consequence of the dominance of elites during these meetings, one 
respondent described public participation as meeting the requirements of the 
process, but not fulfilling the intended objectives for fairness. 
Interviewer: “Do you feel that the decision-making process for health is just 
and fair?  
Respondent: It is just but it is not fair (laughter)  
Interviewer: Yes, so why that difference?  
Respondent: It is just because the process is followed and people are involved 
in the decision-making. But it is not fair, because you go through that process 
and at the end of the day, you don’t achieve anything.”  County Non-Health 
Respondent, Female34 
4.5.4 Actions to address social determinants for health since devolution 
A range of interventions was described to address social determinants for health.  
Respondents (typically gender and children’s office representatives) from seven 
counties described the introduction of cash transfers for children from poor families, 
those with disabilities, the elderly and the poor as part of the national social 
protection unconditional cash transfer programme.  In addition, some respondents 
described the conditional nature of cash transfers following completion of antenatal 
care visits or immunisation.  In another county the children’s officer described 
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working alongside health workers to provide comprehensive care for the poorest 
families.   
Another area of change described across all counties is the two thirds gender rule.  
As a consequence, participants felt there are now more women in leadership 
positions.  Of the 120 county level respondents interviewed for this study 35/ 120 
are women, with 85/120 male respondents.  However, while there are more women 
in leadership positions some of these women acknowledged that they were only in 
position, due to the two-thirds gender rule, rather than having been selected by the 
community.  This indicates that this form of affirmative action which forcibly provides 
(some) women with the power to participate in county government (which has been 
traditionally held by men), is still necessary until women are viewed as equally able 
to take on these roles in decision-making as men.   In fact, more action is needed to 
transform patriarchal forces if this action is to overcome tokenism and achieve its 
purpose.   
Since devolution, respondents described some confusion regarding the provision of 
gender-related services.  Typical activities described by gender representatives 
include social development, community mobilisation, gender mainstreaming and 
referral of cases of gender-based violence.  Lack of clarity surrounding where 
responsibility for provision of these services lies following devolution has led to a 
significant funding gap and lack of clear roles and responsibilities.  Gender is still 
considered a national function, but does not receive national funding.  It has been 
moved to a new department, however those with the new responsibility for 
providing gender services (youth officers) are not trained to manage gender activities 
and so many former gender officers still continue to carry out unfunded gender 
activities.   This was felt to be a consequence of misunderstanding by those who 
planned the restructuring.  Gender representatives felt that gender was perceived as 
a programme only within the ministries, and was not recognised to be an outreach 
programme which starts at household level.   
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 “For gender there is no allocation from the national government.  For 
specifically gender issues, there is no allocation since devolution started.” 
County Non-Health Respondent, Female34 
4.5.5 What effect has devolution had on improving equitable availability of health 
services? 
Since devolution the equitable availability of health services between counties 
appears to have improved following investment in infrastructure (see section 4.4.4), 
human resources for health (see section 4.4.2) and expansion of availability of 
services, particularly in formerly marginalised counties.  However, political 
interference (most frequently described by technical county level respondents) was 
at times felt to have had a negative impact on the level of equity within counties, 
with powerful leaders having more services available within their ward, compared 
with others, regardless of need (see section 4.3.2).  This led to the emergence of a 
diverse picture, with respondents from some counties painting an extremely positive 
picture, with multiple actions implemented to promote more equitable provision of 
health services based on need within the county.   
Availability between counties:  Respondents across levels discussed the difference 
in geographic availability of health facilities, favouring some counties more than 
others, with formerly marginalised counties having entered the devolution period 
grossly underserved in terms of infrastructure and skilled health workers.  
Respondents identified that after devolution there was increased funding available 
at the county level for health within these formerly marginalised remote counties 
(see section 4.4.1).  County level respondents from many counties described  
investment to increase infrastructure and to ensure allocation of staffing so that all 
health facilities, including the most remote have at least one trained health worker 
(see section 4.4.4).   
The equalisation fund was introduced in an attempt to remedy the ills created under 
the former centralised government, which had neglected to provide even basic 
services for huge swathes of their population.  In addition, there has been expansion 
of service availability within some of these remote counties, as reported in the media 
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that Wajir and Mandera counties, have performed their first ever Caesarean section 
deliveries following devolution (see Photo 2623). 
“I think under devolution, there is more equity, communities that were 
previously marginalized; I’m talking about Turkana, Mandera, I’m talking 
about Wajir, Garrisa, Moyale, are receiving unprecedented development, 
things that they never imagined they would get. There is also the equalization 
fund which is also meant for these historically marginalized areas which is 
helping them also.” National Respondent, Male10 
 
Availability within counties:  Improvements in service availability within counties 
were described with county governments being better placed to understand the 
needs of their population than national level and focusing new facilities and 
community units in underserved areas in response.   
“In the past of course, the planning process was so centralised, that somebody 
making a decision about an area he does not know. So he could be talking 
about a facility one kilometre away from an existing one, but he will not know. 
But now …we know where these facilities are and we know the places that are 
under served.”  County Health Respondent, Male58 
However, not all respondents described positive changes for improving health equity 
since devolution.  Many described persisting or worsening inequities as a 
consequence of devolved government.  With the transformation from a single central 
government to multiple county governments many respondents described the 
                                                          
23 Source:  http://www.nation.co.ke/counties/WAJIR--Habaswein-hospital-
conducts-first-CS-delivery/1107872-3297206-sdhiv7z/index.html  
Photo 26 News headline about introduction of caesarean section in Wajir County 
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introduction of biases and political interferences, as a result of the governor and/or 
member of county assembly wanting to provide for his/her own constituents (see 
section 4.3.2).  This resulted in interference with the technical decision-makers’ 
desire for provision of services based on need, versus the politicians’ desire for 
equality of services among all wards.   
 “You know the clamour is usually for equal rather than equity. Yeah, so 
everybody wants the same size of the pie, rather than the size that they 
deserve based on the circumstances.”  County Health Respondent, Male15 
As some respondents described in section 4.3.2, politics at times had a negative 
effect on the extent of equity demonstrated in health services provision, where self-
interest by those in positions of power undermined equitable provision of services.  
Worsening inequities were often a consequence of an over-emphasis on construction 
of infrastructure, rather than seeking to identify and address underlying causes of ill 
health. 
 “Our problems are mainly in the communities that are in the low income 
levels. But now, when you look at our budget you find that we want to 
construct a very big hospital. These people might not even come to this 
hospital. The issues they have are very basic, maybe even just provision of 
supply of clean water. You supply clean water, and 50% of their issues are 
[solved], they don’t need that hospital.  So I believe when it comes to equitable 
distribution, we are not doing that.” County Health Respondent, Male30 
In general respondents said that services were provided to everyone and were not 
withheld based on someone’s tribe, although some respondents did speak out and 
identify that those who had voted for the governor and/or the elected member of 
county assembly may receive more services compared with those who had not, see 
section 4.5.2.  In several counties where a minority tribe had formerly been 
marginalised, county level respondents described that county governments were 
taking actions to include these groups more.   
Availability of community health services:  Availability of functional community 
health services varied both within and between counties, depending on the degree 
244 | P a g e  
 
to which it was prioritised (or not) during decision-making (see section 4.4.1).  
However, expanding the availability of community health services to ensure full 
coverage to the whole population would provide an important step in transitioning 
towards universal health coverage.  As counties develop health services which are 
designed to meet the needs of their population, some have already started to 
increase the availability of services by CHVs which seek to meet local health needs.  
For example, in several counties with high communicable disease burden 
respondents described that CHVs should provide treatment using community case 
management.  In another county with a high NCD burden, CHVs have been trained 
to screen for hypertension and diabetes.  While encouraging that these services are 
being introduced, there still exists a gap with ensuring the effectiveness of service 
delivery, due to supply chain gaps.     
Availability of facility level health services:  In response to the biological risks 
associated with childbirth many of the respondents described the importance of 
improving maternal and child health, highlighting the national policy for free 
maternal health care introduced in 2013 and describing measures taken to expand 
availability of skilled delivery services, such as building maternity wings at health 
facilities.   
In one county respondents described that they have observed an increase in women 
reporting GBV.  Alongside this there was a need identified in several counties to 
expand the availability for the delivery of comprehensive GBV services to more 
health facilities.  There was also expansion in the range of services available.  Within 
one county a health worker in a remote health centre, described that she was now 
able to provide antiretroviral therapy for HIV positive clients instead of referring 
them to another facility many miles away.   
4.5.6 What effect has devolution had on improving equitable access and 
acceptability of health services? 
Improving geographic access to health services has been an important priority for 
many counties.  This has led to expansion of the number of health facilities and 
improved access to primary health care services for many living in remote areas.  
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However, throughout the expansion there has not been the same level of priority 
given to ensuring quality of services or addressing acceptability, with the 
consequence that effective coverage has been restricted.  Access to community 
health and outreach services following devolution have been mixed, with some 
counties having prioritised context-specific community health interventions and 
others having neglected the same.  All counties have received a mobile clinic through 
the First Lady’s Beyond Zero campaign.  Aside from the new mobile clinic, in general 
outreach services were felt to have suffered following withdrawal of partner support 
for these following devolution, but without the needed financial support from county 
government.  
Access to community health services:  In recognition of the role community health 
can play in expanding access to health services, county and sub-county level 
respondents identified that areas with unmet need were prioritised first for receiving 
a new community unit.  Meanwhile, at the household level community members 
generally felt that CHVs prioritised attending the homes of those who were 
‘vulnerable’, including those who were poor.  For the most poor a home visit from 
the CHV may be the only health care they have access to.  
“I wanted to report that those who are disadvantaged are the ones given 
priority.  They (CHVs) care for them the most.”  Community Key Informant, 
Male02 
Not only do the CHVs visit those more disadvantaged at home more often, but many 
CHVs also sought to respond to the basic needs of their clients (and neighbours) as 
evidenced by a number of examples given by community members, CHVs and CHEWs 
of CHVs providing financial assistance, from their own pockets, to help the most poor 
with transport, drug costs or basic essentials such as food.  This was a challenge for 
the CHVs, who do not receive payment and may not have enough money for their 
own needs, thus deepening their own poverty.   
 “I do not have much income. Maybe if I visit and somebody tells me that they 
don’t have fare and if I have 50 shillings I can give them. Sometimes I may not 
be able to help because they may say they do not have food and even I don’t 
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have food or I have but it is a little that cannot even be enough for one day.”  
Female CHV12 
In contrast to the norm that CHVs prioritise visiting their more disadvantaged clients, 
a small minority of community members in the most remote areas included in the 
study, felt that the CHV prioritised services to those in the community who are richer 
– those with a ‘pot belly’ or who have a tin roofed house, because “he (CHV) will go 
to that person because he will get something there.”  Male community FGD02 
In several of the more 
remote communities in 
a rural county where 
community members 
participated in FGDs, 
community members 
and CHVs agreed that 
CHVs did not visit homes 
which were far from 
their own due to the 
long distance between 
the CHV home and the client’s home and a lack of transport to assist CHVs to reach 
more distant homes (see Photo 27).   
CHVs and other health workers and decision-makers identified a number of 
challenges with coverage.  At the time of the study only one agrarian county, which 
had high communicable disease burden (including extremely high HIV prevalence) 
and had received intense partner support to scale up community health, had 
achieved full county coverage with community health services.  Due to the former 
reliance on donor and partner support for community health, coverage is still largely 
determined by where partners have supported the establishment of community 
units.  Depending on the county and the partner this may have benefited the hard-
to-reach or the easy-to-reach populations.   
Photo 27 CHV conducting home visit in Turkana County 
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Some respondents from remote counties identified a preference for establishing new 
community units in more densely populated areas, which is logical as it will rapidly 
extend coverage for more people.  A community unit should also only be established 
within the catchment of a working health facility, in order to ensure supervision, 
linkage and referral opportunities.  However, this means that the most remote, low 
density communities will continue to be excluded from receiving any form of health 
services. 
“We cannot open a community unit in areas which [don’t have a health 
facility].  You know it has to be linked to a facility.”  County Health 
Respondent, Male47 
Lack of variation in the number of CHVs for low density areas or hilly terrain created 
challenges for the CHVs, with some having to travel up to 20km between 
homesteads. Other geographic contextual factors also came into play and created 
challenges; including insecurity in informal settlements or very remote areas, with 
wild animals, including elephants, having created a challenge to providing services in 
one county.  In one Northern nomadic county with vast distances between villages, 
the approach had been modified, so that CHVs were recruited even from within the 
most remote communities.  Therefore, as the population group moves and migrates, 
even across country borders, so too the CHV moves with them.  Satellite phones were 
distributed to certain communities for security reasons and CHVs were encouraged 
to use these phones to alert health services in the event of obstetric emergencies. 
“So today you will find this group living in Kenya, tomorrow they have crossed 
the border to Uganda…, but you know you cannot find facility, health facility 
remains home. So we make sure that we get CHVs from those communities, 
so they move with these communities. Whenever there is an issue they 
communicate…to pass information in case for example there’s obstructed 
labour, we can easily get that [information].”  County Health Respondent, 
Male39 
Even where community units have been established there were at times coverage 
gaps.  Respondents from one nomadic county in Northern Kenya, identified that prior 
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to devolution CHVs had been identified during a community meeting held in the main 
town.  Assumptions were made that each catchment village would have sent 
representatives to this meeting.  However, due to distance and inadequate 
mobilisation there were few from the more remote catchment populations, with the 
result that CHVs were recruited predominantly from the main town.  In order to 
ensure coverage of community health services in all villages, the county team were 
now returning to repeat the process.   
The range of services provided by CHVs varied between counties.  In some of the 
more remote counties, health facility level, key informants and community 
respondents identified the lack of curative services provided by CHVs as problematic. 
Access to primary health care at facility:  Most counties described trying to reduce 
differences in geographic access to primary health care by building new health 
facilities in the more remote areas (see section 4.4.4).  However, devolution has also 
brought challenges with priority-setting bringing more resources to the geographical 
area where powerful politicians are from (see section 4.3.2).   
The challenges of geographic access to health facilities were discussed in all counties, 
most extensively in those counties with nomadic populations, with health facility 
services designed for a fixed rather than a mobile population, which created 
challenges leading to lower utilisation of services at health facilities.  Photo 28 shows 
nomadic populations in Marsabit County who live far from a fixed health facility.  For 
those who lived far from the health facility (either in urban or rural areas) poor road 
infrastructure created a barrier, with community members obliged to carry patients 
on their backs to reach health facilities in some areas as a consequence of impassable 
roads.  For patients who lived far from a health facility who were also poor and/or 
elderly/ disabled/ heavily pregnant women, transport costs could be a major barrier 
to using services at the health facility.  Low community awareness about services also 
hindered access to the services.  In these communities outreach services formed a 
vital part of routine service delivery. 
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Photo 28 Nomadic populations in Marsabit County 
  
In addition, seasonal changes influence access to health facilities with respondents 
from several counties (both rural nomadic and rural agrarian) identifying that during 
the rainy season some communities were cut off and unable to access the health 
facility due to seasonal rivers (see Photo 29).  Meanwhile in dry season those with 
nomadic populations found that catchment populations varied widely with 
populations moving in search of water sources for livestock.   
“The county they should 
be ready to fund for an 
outreach because some 
places … when it rains it’s 
like they have been cut 
off in terms of 
transport.”  County 
Health Worker, Male03 
 
 
Photo 29 Flooded road in Marsabit County, Kenya 
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Having access to 24 hour services was also discussed by community members and 
youth photographers as essential to equitable services, particularly within the urban 
county (see Photo 30 Photographer Mary Wamjiku).   
"Free 24 hours, 
maternity services…This 
is one thing that helps 
our community because 
this is the only public 
hospital and has free 
maternity services. It has 
helped the community a 
lot since people can 
access those hospital 
services for free.” Youth 
photographer FGD 
Access to primary health care for patients with different abilities:  In many counties 
respondents described ensuring that a ramp is available at any new health facility 
which is being constructed, to ensure access for wheelchair users after arrival at the 
health facility.  However, just reaching the health facility was highlighted as a 
challenge for people with disabilities.  Respondents from a few counties identified 
that CHVs were are an important means of identifying and assisting people with 
disabilities and ensuring their linkage to support services.  There were no other 
discussions about how counties were seeking to help those with disabilities to reach 
the health facility in the first place.   
“They [CHVs] are able to reach out to them, in fact we are able to get some 
out especially the disabled, the children with disability that used to be hidden, 
and nowadays we can see them being brought forward.” Sub-County 
Respondent, Female10 
Having health workers trained in sign language at primary health facilities was an 
identified gap.  Two counties had started or were planning to train health workers in 
Photo 30 Sign advertising free 24 hour maternity services 
at government health facility 
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basic sign language, in order to improve access to services for deaf patients.  
Meanwhile in another county those with physical disabilities were given first priority 
in the facility and a sign language translator was contacted as needed to assist with 
translation.   
Outreach health services:  Outreaches were identified by county, sub-county and 
health facility respondents as a means of improving health service coverage for the 
most remote communities, who did not have easy access to receive these services at 
a static health facility.  The most widely described outreach services introduced were 
the beyond zero mobile clinics provided to each county by the First Lady.  These 
mobile clinics were felt to have contributed towards improved service access.  
However, there were still some challenges in how the beyond zero mobile clinics had 
been distributed, with all counties receiving one large bulky mobile clinic to achieve 
equality in distribution, regardless of level of need/ population size/ geography/ road 
terrain etc.  (see Photo 31).  As a result, the most marginalised remain unable to 
benefit from these mobile clinics.   
“If you also look at what 
the first lady in the 
country is also doing 
under what we are calling 
Beyond Zero, is all about 
equity. It is only that for 
her it is so political 
because she says every 
mobile clinic in every 
county, but some 
counties do not require 
that mobile clinic… she’s 
combining both; equity and equality. She should have gone with a different 
support which is needed there.” National Respondent, Male09 
Photo 31 Challenging road terrain in Turkana County, 
Kenya 
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In addition to the Beyond Zero mobile clinic other forms of outreach services were 
also conducted.  These were often supported by a partner organisation and provided 
integrated routine services, such as immunisation, growth monitoring and antenatal 
care.  However, these were often vertical programmes which provided incentives for 
health workers (facility and community level), when donor or partner funding ended, 
challenges were described with allocation of government funding for these services 
following devolution.  Some sub-county and health facility level respondents 
identified there had been no county government funding for outreach services 
received at the sub-county level.  Thereby leaving the most remote community 
members completely unserved by any health service. 
“We normally have integrated outreach where the preventive services, the 
promotive services, the nutritional services, the underweight children are 
[identified], so all these services have been integrated before.  But that 
programme is no longer there and we expect the County government to be 
filling those gaps and it is not forth coming so we have a very big problem.  So 
we can say there are totally no access.” Sub-County Respondent, Male04 
At the health facility level some respondents identified that they would try to allocate 
some of the facility funds for conducting outreach services.  However, delays in 
receiving funds at the health facility level hindered their ability to consistently carry 
out these outreach activities.  Even where outreach services are conducted patients 
were still unable to access and use health services in a timely manner, in the event 
of an emergency or for skilled delivery.   
“There are communities that are hard-to-reach, and most of the times if you 
conduct these outreaches once per month. You have a mother or a child who 
is sick, this family has no means of transport, in my area 30 kilometres interior 
there are no roads.  These people are not able to get these services although 
they are supposed to seek health services at my facility it is a bit difficult for 
them to reach. Only those who are closer to the facility [access health 
services].” Health Worker, Male08 
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In the most remote 
counties there were a 
minority of respondents 
who described the 
introduction of 
interventions to encourage 
use of health facility 
services, such as birth 
waiting homes for women 
from remote areas to wait 
during the late stages of 
pregnancy to ensure they will be able to have a skilled delivery (see Photo 32).   
Access to referral services and secondary or tertiary care:  Within a county, major 
hospitals, breadth of services and more experienced health workers were typically 
centred in urban areas, rather than the more remote places.  As a result, those living 
in more remote areas, who were poor were felt to experience a double challenge in 
reaching secondary level care.  At one county hospital where there was a waiver 
scheme in place, one respondent acknowledged that while the scheme covers costs 
associated with medical bills it does not cover associated costs, such as transport or 
loss of earning.  As a result, the most poor never even reach the hospital.   
 “The range of services are not evenly spread throughout the county.  The 
county headquarter has got the county referral hospital, with almost 20 types 
of services. Somebody in a remote village, may only be accessible to the 
dispensary with very limited range of services.”  County Health Respondent, 
Male61 
Many counties have invested in ambulances in efforts to strengthen referral services, 
but the study found limited evidence to suggest this increased referral equity 
(particularly for non-maternal health-related emergencies).  Referral costs varied 
between counties, with no consistent policy regarding payment for ambulance 
referral.  In one county, ambulance services were available free of charge for 
Photo 32 Recently constructed birth waiting homes in 
Marsabit County, Kenya 
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maternal health related emergencies.  However, any other emergency could not use 
the ambulance, as a result of which the patient and their family would be obliged to 
seek private transport to reach a hospital – often creating a barrier to patients 
seeking care in the event of an emergency.    
“There is a lot of challenge in our transport; like I told you, many communities 
are at the outside so distance; we had only one ambulance. And that 
ambulance is only for maternal health. Purposely for maternal health. In case 
a mother want to deliver, when they call the ambulance fetches them. But the 
others, in case someone is sick they’ll have to hire a vehicle. Of which 
everybody doesn’t have all that money to hire a public vehicle, so there is a lot 
of challenges.”  CHEW, Female02 
Within Nairobi, even when a patient reaches a primary health facility there was only 
one ambulance shared between three sub-counties, which resulted in considerable 
referral delays as a consequence of heavy Nairobi traffic.   
4.5.7 What effect has devolution had on improving equitable utilisation of health 
services? 
Devolution has provided counties with the opportunity to find new ways to increase 
service utilisation beyond simply increasing availability of health facilities that has 
already been discussed.  
CHVs can promote service utilisation:  Interventions described which can promote 
utilisation include: encouraging attendance through CHVs, defaulter tracing, CHV 
accompanied referrals, training traditional birth attendants as birth companions to 
accompany women to the health facility and providing mothers who attend for 
skilled delivery with a birthing pack, including shawl, khanga, soap and a basin.   
“…triple number of patients coming in the facility (since devolution). You have 
seen the immunization the coverage has gone up because the mothers are 
able to come to the facility, we are also able to reach them, the community is 
well mobilized …, and you can see a number of deliveries has gone up, our 
people don’t like coming to the hospital to deliver. But because of this CHV is 
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impacting, they are able to come to the facility, now they are able to come to 
the facility, and then we have also improved the mother pack, the baby pack, 
so when they come to the facility they get a dignified delivery. They have at 
least a shawl to wrap their baby, they have a khanga for them to wear. They 
can get soap, they can get a basin, so that also motivates them to come to 
hospital.” County Health Respondent, Female40 
The community health strategy was identified as an opportunity for tackling inequity, 
as it would ensure that uncomplicated illness was identified and managed early, 
therefore reducing the burden at health facility level and ensuring that the number 
of cases at the health facility would be fewer, to allow for waiver coverage of all who 
needed it. 
Facilitators and barriers to service utilisation:  Respondents from many counties 
described the introduction of free maternity care and free health care at dispensaries 
and health centres, based on national policy.  Although fees (non-maternity related) 
were still in place for services at hospitals.  Among health facility level respondents, 
the introduction of these policies was often felt to have increased service utilisation.  
“Following the free medical services; the work load has grown very, very high. 
Services have been rendered available from high levels down, referral systems 
have improved.” Health Worker, Male11   
Despite having free health care for maternal health and free services at dispensary 
and health centre, respondents from county and lower levels all identified that 
poverty was still felt to lock the most poor people out of using health services, 
perhaps due to transport costs to reach the facility. 
Respondents from many counties described a waiver system whereby fees (from 
hospital care) can be waived if a patient is unable to pay.  However, several 
respondents described that there were often considerable delays in establishing 
whether someone was eligible for waiver or not.  As a result of these delays there 
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have been reported cases of patients detained in hospital, as a result of inability to 
pay and long delays in the waiver system (see Photo 3324).   
Photo 33 News headline for detained patient in hospital 
 
4.5.8 What effect has devolution had on improving quality of health services? 
Quality of health services was infrequently described as a priority for health services 
by county level respondents.  While there were examples given of improved quality, 
such as stronger supply chain in some counties, in general, much of the discussion 
surrounding quality happened at community and health facility level and tended to 
be critical, identifying quality gaps at public health facilities.  Many of these existed 
prior to devolution, but there was limited discussion about interventions introduced 
by county governments to improve quality.  
A range of respondents highlighted that Kenya has a very inequitable dual level 
system for health (which pre-dates devolution), where those who are rich pay for 
quality private care and those who are poorer receive perceived lower quality 
government services, where diagnostic tests or drugs may not be available.   
“I think generally equity issues in Kenya are big because the whole issue of 
private-public dichotomy; if you have money you go to Nairobi hospital you 
get really good services, if you don’t have money you end up in Kenyatta and 
                                                          
24 Source:  http://www.nation.co.ke/counties/mombasa/Damaris-Muema-hospital-
bill/1954178-2911118-oa8he6/index.html    
257 | P a g e  
 
you get such bad services. So the whole issue of equity is vague, it just doesn’t 
happen.” National Respondent, Female12 
While services at dispensary and health centre were meant to be provided free of 
charge, lack of adequate drug supply and funding to the health facility resulted in 
stock-outs, with patients therefore forced to buy drugs elsewhere.  Community 
members identified that if they had enough money they would attend a private clinic, 
where they could get better quality treatment and receive the drugs needed.  As a 
consequence of lack of drugs at public health facilities, the most poor may not have 
the needed funds to pay for drugs and so remain locked out of receiving quality 
health care, despite the presence of policy for free services at dispensaries and health 
centres.  At times some community members even said they were unable to receive 
treatment if the health facility had no drugs, as they had no money to buy the needed 
medicines.  This was described by youth photographers who described the challenge 
of lack of drugs at government health facilities and the ease of being able to purchase 
drugs directly from a chemist/ drug seller (see Photo 34 Photographer Joseph 
Owino). 
“You can go to the 
hospital and make lines 
(queue), when you get to 
the doctor, the tests are 
run on you and 
prescriptions given and 
maybe you have no 
money to buy the drugs; 
you went there knowing 
you will be given drugs 
and then you are 
referred to a chemist and 
you don’t have the money.”  Youth photographer focus group discussion  
Photo 34 Private chemist shop in Korogocho informal 
settlement 
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National respondents were aware of this challenge, with one respondent identifying 
potential future challenges with drug resistance as a consequence of patients 
bypassing government health facilities due to frequent stock-outs and buying drugs 
directly from the chemist. 
“Every area you go to, you are told drugs are not here [government health 
facility].  They prescribe and you go buy outside. This has made the cost of 
treatment higher and not affordable …Of course that tells you that only the 
people with resources will now be able to access services that are relevant.  
People who are wealthy will afford to pay in the private clinics.  People who 
are poor will wait and seek alternatives, like going for traditional medicine or 
self-treatment, self-medication on the counter. That contributes to drug 
resistance or mismanagement.”  National Respondent, Male04 
One county described having introduced simple changes to strengthen reliable 
service provision in more remote areas, providing them with larger and more 
infrequent funding and supplies, so saving the health worker from long and frequent 
journeys to collect funds. 
Community health services experienced similar challenges to health facilities, with 
low functionality being a problem, which undermined the effective coverage of 
services provided (as highlighted in section 4.4.5). 
4.5.9 Respondents recommendations to strengthen equitable priority-setting  
Respondents’ recommendations for supply of health services  
A range of recommendations for more equitable priority-setting were proposed by 
respondents.  These largely centred around building capacity of decision-makers 
(both technical and political), county human resource managers and procurement 
staff; ensuring a quality focus; developing strong collaboration with political 
decisions makers throughout the priority-setting process; more participatory 
priority-setting process; greater decentralisation of funding to lower levels (sub-
county, health facility and community unit); exploring alternative funding sources; 
building community ownership and understanding of their role and rights for health 
and exploiting opportunities for innovation. 
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Building capacity:  As has already been highlighted there were a range of challenges 
with priority-setting which include over-investment in infrastructure and under-
investment in community and primary health services.  This was felt to be both due 
to the political nature of decision-making and a lack of understanding of health, in 
terms of both preventive and curative aspects.  In order to ensure more equitable 
priority-setting which benefits all people, not just an elite few there is need for 
capacity building of decision-makers (technical and political) in understanding health 
and equity; strategic planning; cost-effectiveness approaches; proposal 
development; procurement mechanisms and human resource management.   
“From the supply-side, I think there is definitely need to first build the capacity 
for the different decision-making, for allocation and for managing the 
resources but also we need more flexible policies to be able to adjust or adopt 
services to community needs and demands.”  National Respondent, Male11 
Ensuring a quality focus:  Quality has been a missed opportunity throughout 
devolution.  Despite the prominence placed on quality improvement by national 
government, there has been a lack of emphasis on quality by county level decision-
makers leading to policy-practice gap for equity-related policy, such as lack of regular 
drug supply to health facilities resulting in patients having to buy drugs from a private 
pharmacy, despite the presence of the waiver policy or free health services at 
dispensary and health centre level.  It is important that moving forward quality 
becomes a central focus to ensuring equity. 
“A mother comes with a child under-five years, who is seen for free because 
the policy says the child should be seen for free, but it is not free as there is a 
cost to the institution – for injection, syringe, drugs, gloves, or laboratory 
investigations.  These are all free but in a real sense they are not free because 
someone has to buy the drugs etc., so as much as the patient doesn’t pay, the 
government does not reimburse.  So when a patient comes who is exempted 
under the policy but nobody has paid, so now if a facility doesn’t have what is 
needed to offer services and can’t pay so the mother then has to go and buy, 
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so this hampers the quality of the services.” County Health Respondent, 
Female28 
Strengthening political collaborations:  A key recommendation to improve health 
equity was the need to engage with politicians.  As highlighted above this needs to 
begin by building the understanding of holistic health by politicians.  There is also a 
need to develop their understanding of equity as provision according to need, not 
equality.  Section 4.3.5 develops more comprehensively approaches which may be 
used to promote improved priority processes while working within the political 
system.   
“The recommendations I would give is actually to capacity build the 
politicians, to capacity build also the health professionals in understanding 
how to conduct the needs assessments so that they can offer services based 
on the need; that is capacity buildings especially to health professionals and 
politicians; national assembly, senate, you go down to the county assemblies.” 
National Respondent, Male09 
Greater devolution of funding:  One of the main challenges highlighted by sub-
county and health facility level respondents was the re-centralisation of funding to 
county level, which effectively removed their ability to make or implement day-to-
day decisions at their respective level.  It was commonly acknowledged by 
respondents across levels that devolving resources to lower levels is a much needed 
intervention, this was more fully explained in section 4.4.1.  However, alongside/ 
instead of this there is need for greater capacity-building for how to use existing 
funds, with reports of under-spending in certain counties. 
“If you asked me resources should go down even to the health facilities, to the 
community units.” County Health Respondent, Male21 
Explore additional funding sources:  While not widely discussed a small number of 
respondents identified the need to find additional funding sources, to ensure 
adequate availability of services.  This included promoting uptake of health 
insurance, building opportunities for public-private collaboration, building amenity 
wards and proposal writing to engage with donors.   
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 “…there should be wider engagement with other key players in health that is 
partners, that is the private sectors, the community itself.” Sub-County Health 
Respondent, Male09 
Generation of innovations:  Devolution provides a platform for counties to identify 
innovations addressing the unique needs for their catchment populations.  A range 
of innovations were identified.  Some are already being implemented, such as the 
NCD screening carried out by CHVs in one county and others are still ideas held by 
forward thinking health workers, such as outreach mental health services carried out 
at the health centre once per month.  There needs to be opportunity and 
encouragement for health workers and others to share their potential solutions with 
those at county level who finalise plans and budgets.  
Recommendations to strengthen community empowerment and demand for 
equitable health services 
Key emerging recommendations from the study were the need to increase 
community participation and the need for greater community ownership.  Certainly, 
there were opportunities identified in many counties surrounding strengthening 
public participation, particularly for the most vulnerable, with an expressed need for 
mechanisms to be introduced to actively pursue the opinion of more vulnerable 
groups, who may be neglected as a consequence of current processes. 
“And also the vulnerable they need to be included in the decision and policy 
making… hear their voices …Not influencing what they have to say.”  County 
Health Respondent, Male43 
Some respondents identified that there needs to be greater community 
understanding of health for priority-setting.  Community also need sensitisation to 
know their role and responsibilities for protecting their health and their right to 
health services. 
 “From the demand-side which is the community side, I think we need more 
and more sensitization of communities to make them aware of their role and 
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the place they have in contributing in decision-making and improving the 
service.” National Respondent, Male11 
Well-funded community health strategy, with incentivised CHVs was viewed by many 
respondents as vital to building the community’s ownership for health and tackling 
the root causes of ill health. 
“For me community health is a way we can actually get almost the universal 
health coverage that we need in Kenya because people will understand that 
health is their mandate, health is their responsibility and they will take it as an 
important thing by themselves.” National Respondent, Male14 
4.6 Results summary 
In summary, county-level priority-setting for health following devolution in Kenya is 
a complex web of inter-related factors, influenced by, and in turn influencing, the 
power dynamics working between actors at the same and different health systems 
levels.  National and county guiding documents, county equitable budget share, 
locally generated revenue and conditional grants provide the official framework 
within which priority-setting takes place.  Evidence and community priorities should 
drive the process.  In the absence of adequately clear guidance and criteria, all too 
often politics and plays for power (a consequence of the influence of socio-political 
and economic factors) move into the newly created power vacuum at county level.  
This has undermined accountability mechanisms and led to distortion of the process. 
The implications of this have been shifting of priorities in favour of visible curative 
interventions over less visible public health services.  Overall equity between 
counties has in general improved, but within county equity has at times been 
compromised by lack of understanding (from politicians and community members) 
and political aspirations of politicians.  However, despite these challenges, many of 
which are to be expected after such a major change, there are encouraging signs and 
best practices emerging.  Select county governments are carving out space to use 
their new agency within the objectives of devolution, by empowering and engaging 
with decision-makers from community level upwards to develop context-specific 
health services, which seek to expand community health approaches as the platform 
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from which to build and extend universal health coverage to their whole county 
population.   
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Chapter 5:  Discussion 
Discussion introduction:  This study triangulates findings from different qualitative 
methods, including in-depth and key informant interviews; focus group discussions 
and photovoice participatory research methods to provide an in-depth 
understanding from a range of perspectives of the priority-setting process at county 
level (objective 1), and the implications of devolution for community health 
(objective 2) and health equity (objective 3) within the study counties (see section 
1.2).    
Findings reveal a high degree of variation in priority-setting processes between the 
ten counties studied in the first few years following the devolution of decision-
making and budgeting authority to county governments.  This variation is a 
consequence of the complex and political nature of priority-setting processes for 
health unfolding at county level at the start of the journey towards devolved 
governance.  Multiple decision-makers, each holding their own values and 
motivations for setting priorities, with varied and evolving levels of power, interact 
together within the priority-setting process.  In a context where patronage has long 
been normalised and in the absence of sufficient clear guidance about roles, 
responsibilities and processes, priority-setting can become distorted.   
Overwhelmingly the findings from this study relate to power – changes in the levels 
of power held by central and sub-national authorities following devolution; power 
plays between actors at the county level (see Table 10); changes in power for health 
workers (both at health facility and community levels) and the implications of this for 
health service performance and changes (or lack thereof) at community level, 
including for vulnerable groups.  This chapter will relate study findings to existing 
literature to analyse both process and power relations and their implications for 
county priority-setting using the conceptual framework presented in Figure 5.  
As shown in Figure 5 an intersectionality approach to analysis will be combined with 
four main frameworks (Walt and Gilson (1994); Barasa et al. (2015); Bossert (1998) 
decision space mapping and Tanahashi (1978)), in consideration of the interactions 
265 | P a g e  
 
between process and power and the equity implications of this (see section 5.1 and 
section 5.3).  The following intersectionality principles will be applied  [153]:  
 Consideration of how power influences priority-setting, including the processes 
and systems of power, resulting from the historical, social and political context 
within which priority-setting takes place. 
 The importance of time and space in considering how historical factors have 
changed over time, leading up to the present day and how positions of privilege 
or disadvantage have changed since devolution came about. 
 Multiple levels of analysis (across national, county, sub-county, health facility and 
community) to understand how priority-setting has influenced health system 
performance for community health. 
 How intersecting social determinants of health (such as gender, place of 
residence, poverty level) contribute towards ability to engage with priority-
setting and to access and use effective health services.   
 The study also seeks to apply principles of social justice and equity in considering 
how complex social and power relations following devolution have contributed 
for or against social justice and equity across different county contexts. 
 Other intersectionality principles such as reflexivity and inclusion of diverse 
perspectives from photovoice participants, as identified earlier in section 3.2. 
5.1 Devolution – Interactions between process and power 
In this section study findings will be reviewed in light of intersectionality principles 
and Walt and Gilson’s (1994) model for health policy analysis (see Figure 3) [53], 
drawing upon political economy analysis and drawing out key findings in relation to 
the four aspects of the policy framework (context, content, process and actors).  For 
analysis of the process component, Barasa et al.’s (2015) framework will be applied.   
5.1.1 Context for priority-setting following devolution 
Our findings reveal that decentralisation in Kenya was driven by the desire to address 
and reduce inequities, which had arisen under the former national government, to 
reduce corruption and increase accountability and citizen’s participation in making 
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decisions (see section 4.1.1).  In keeping with previous analyses of decentralisation, 
citizens wanted greater involvement and participation in making decisions about 
their development, amid growing frustration with inequities and inefficiencies [25].  
Devolution has been viewed as the remedy to these challenges [26].  The motivations 
for Kenya’s devolution are in keeping with those driving decentralisation reforms 
across sub-Saharan Africa and globally [37].   
Intersectionality approach to understand the context:  The attention paid to the 
structural relations of power through intersectionality approaches, provides a 
structured way to engage with the complexity of the political (and social and 
economic) context within which devolution in Kenya is taking place [208].  Local, 
regional, national and international systems form a complex web that combines to 
create and sustain social and health inequities [152].  Figure 31 in the results has 
already highlighted dimensions of social inequality described by respondents as 
influencing a person’s power and privilege.  In light of the literature, Figure 32 builds 
on those dimensions (blue) by referencing the hierarchies, types of discrimination 
(orange) and larger societal forces and structures (green) which work together to 
reinforce patterns of inclusion or exclusion from power and privilege.   These forces 
(which include patriarchy and capitalism, legacies of colonisation such as tribalism, 
along with discriminations such as sexism, classism and ableism, among others) are 
useful to consider when examining the effects of policy decisions, such as devolution 
on a range of citizens, with varying levels of (dis)advantage within society, see section 
4.5.2.   
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Figure 32 Kenya intersectionality wheel 
 
Objectives for devolution in Kenya focus on citizens’ empowerment, promotion of 
national unity and eradication of inequalities [26].   This was in part a response 
seeking to alleviate the effects of structural forces such as colonisation, which had 
led to the ethnocentrism fuelled violence during 2007 elections and long-standing 
inequities based on geographic location or tribe (see Figure 32).  However, in keeping 
with two recent Kenyan studies [25], [179], our findings indicate that patronage 
norms (which often have tribal associations) have not been eradicated.  Instead, in a 
minority of counties these norms have found ways to flourish within the devolved 
governance system, leading to nepotism during staff recruitment and distribution of 
services which aligns with patronage networks (see section 4.3.2).    
Emergence of a new dimension for social inequality:  Our study also revealed the 
emergence of a new potentially vulnerable and politically disenfranchised group - 
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those who had voted for someone other than the current elected leader (see section 
4.5.2).  If not urgently addressed the implications of these findings may lead to the 
continued cycle of division and inequity which were drivers for devolution in the first 
place, as was described in the Philippines when prior patronage norms remained 
unchallenged following devolution [229].   
Lessons for Kenya from other contexts:  Diverse contextual factors, such as the size 
of the economy, the degree of institutional and political development, population 
demographic, social characteristics, the extent of social capital, level of urbanisation, 
political economy factors (such as presence or absence of patronage culture) and 
degree of aid dependence influence the shape and performance of devolution within 
a specific country [230].  As a fellow East African nation and former British colony 
there are similarities between the context within which devolution took place in 
Kenya as in Tanzania, such as earlier de-concentration within Ministry of Health to 
district levels and previous challenges with mis-management of funds [231].  
Meanwhile, as a middle-income country with vast socio-economic inequalities 
between sub-national levels there are certain similarities and opportunities to learn 
from experiences of Indonesia, the Philippines and Brazil, which are highlighted in 
Table 14.   
Table 14 Lessons for Kenya from the Philippines, Indonesia and Brazil 
Country, context, 
devolution 
Context, content, process and power for 
devolution 
Lessons for Kenya 
Philippines 
[29], [229], [232] 
 
Devolved 1991 
Local 
governments 
given discretion 
in financing and 
planning, 
determining 
which 
programmes to 
fund  
 
History of 
colonisation 
Central guidance and capacity 
Lacks clear national standards  
Varied ability of local government to be 
effective health managers.  
 ‘Soft approach’ to non-compliance with 
local mandate to fund basic services before 
other projects, waste and corruption 
 
Governance and community empowerment 
Health competes with other local 
programmes for funds, but politicians favour 
visible projects (infrastructure over health) 
Politicisation of health services, with 
curative emphasis  
Patronage leads to continued dominance of 
local elite 
Need for strong central 
guidance in light of varied 
levels of local capacity. 
Central government need 
firm stance on non-
compliance and corruption 
 
 
Need to ensure 
understanding of health to 
avoid curative-heavy focus 
Need for stronger governance 
mechanisms –  
Creating public participation 
forum is not enough, it will 
just further empower 
politicians and elite if 
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Country, context, 
devolution 
Context, content, process and power for 
devolution 
Lessons for Kenya 
Extreme former 
centralised 
government  
Political system 
characterised by 
patronage, elite 
entrenchment, 
corruption, non-
compliance with 
regulations 
Internal and 
external 
pressures to 
decentralise 
Wide disparities 
between regions 
prior to 
devolution. 
 
Local health boards in policy – but slow to 
operationalise and lack of meaningful 
community participation 
Devolution led to empowerment of the 
mayor rather than the community 
The corruption in the former context did not 
disappear with the new governance model  
 
Human resources for health 
Health workers lack of confidence in local 
government to provide services, to manage 
their salaries, benefits and advancement 
and fear of politicisation of appointments, 
leading to demand for re-centralisation of 
HRH management. 
CHWs receive payment during election 
campaign period. 
  
Quality and equity 
Many local hospitals unable to run at pre-
devolution standards, leading to closures. 
Potential increased inequity between local 
governments – some have devolved 
hospitals with greater expenses, some have 
fewer resources for income generation. 
Inequities in access to services, e.g. family 
planning depending on position of local 
government. 
community not genuinely 
empowered 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Need for urgent engagement 
with striking health workers.   
Need for public service board 
capacity building 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inclusion of poverty level in 
equitable funds and 
conditional transfer for 
counties with level 5 hospitals 
will help to alleviate some of 
financing challenges. 
 
 
 
Indonesia 
[233], [234] 
 
Devolved 2001 
Big-bang 
devolution across 
the country  
Radical fiscal, 
authoritative and 
administrative 
decentralisation 
 
History of 
colonisation 
Former highly  
centralised, 
hierarchical 
system 
Low public 
funding for 
health 
2/3 of financing 
private 
Wide income 
inequalities and 
Central government and local capacity 
No national vision for next 20-30 years 
Wide variation in local leadership, vision, 
performance and resource utilisation 
between districts.  
Initial unrestricted block grants provided 
from the centre to districts and innovation 
encouraged - some districts innovated with 
delivering services responsive to local needs. 
Positive deviant case of politician improving 
quality and quantity of services – popular 
with citizens and therefore with politicians. 
BUT subject to central capture and MOH 
attempted to re-consolidate power at 
centre, with districts angered by take-over.  
 
 
Local decision space 
Central government maintain control of HRH 
and made contract staff permanent civil 
servants, limiting district ability to flexible 
respond to staffing needs Limited discretion 
over only 1/3 of public funds for health by 
district, with result that health centres have 
low autonomy. 
 
Clear national vision needed.  
Where local leadership is 
lacking central guidance is 
needed.  However, central 
government acting beyond 
their jurisdiction likely to be 
poorly received by counties. 
National level should take 
care with how guidance is 
given to ensure not viewed as 
‘take-over’. 
Politically popular 
interventions likely to 
proliferate – care is needed 
to ensure clear central 
guidance provided as needed. 
 
Need for further 
decentralisation to health 
centre levels for greater 
problem-solving ability 
closer-to-communities 
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Country, context, 
devolution 
Context, content, process and power for 
devolution 
Lessons for Kenya 
uneven access to 
services 
Pre-existing 
strong emphasis 
on maternal and 
child health  
 
Funding  Capitation payments from central 
government but delayed reimbursements 
leading to patients turned away  
 
 
Evaluation 
Some districts innovated, but inadequate 
evaluation of the processes and outcomes 
following devolution meant lost opportunity 
to learn lessons.  
 
Governance 
Politicisation of health as a vote buying 
strategy, but no vision beyond the next 
election term. 
Blame game between centre and district 
leading to low accountability to district 
population. 
Reimbursements to health 
facilities for free maternal 
policy must be timely and 
according to work conducted. 
 
Need rigorous evaluation to 
ensure sharing of innovation 
and best-practices 
 
 
 
Need for overarching national 
vision for health and long-
term county vision which 
extends beyond an electoral 
term. 
Brazil 
[44], [235] 
 
1988 New 
Constitution  
1993 Devolution 
operationalised  
Gradual selective 
decentralisation 
Health sector 
reform driven by 
civil society  
Unified health 
system based on 
principle of 
health as citizens 
right and states 
duty 
Three tier 
devolved 
government 
 
History of 
colonisation 
Former rigid 
centralised 
government 
Huge 
socioeconomic  
and health 
disparities 
 
Central government 
Central government has clear aim and vision 
for health and improving equity.  
Family health programme (team of health 
workers and CTC providers provide curative, 
preventive services at facility in home and in 
community) – initially introduced vertically 
but now main strategy for municipal health 
systems. 
Primary care quota used to meet this with 
central MOH transfer to municipalities to 
finance primary health care. 
Central government created support for 
community health approaches using media 
and community accountability. 
 
Governance and community empowerment 
Councils and management committees at 
each level of government. 
Managers at each government level sign 
commitment to health goals. 
Greater number and variety of stakeholders 
take part in decision-making. 
 
Equity 
Introduction of Bolsa familia to improve 
equity – which targets low income 
households with:  
1. Actions to create employment and 
income generation opportunities 
2. Access to public services  
3. Income transfers. 
Although, inequities still persist. 
Clear central government 
vision for health and equity is 
important for guiding 
counties. 
Initial vertical 
implementation of PHC 
intervention can become 
county-led, if well planned 
and implemented. 
Careful use of quotas, media 
and gaining political support 
can ensure implementation 
of community-based primary 
health care approaches. 
 
 
Strong community 
governance mechanisms and 
involvement of ‘marginalised 
groups’ promote 
empowerment and 
accountability. 
 
 
Equity interventions need to 
include intersectoral actions 
to address underlying social 
conditions, as well as improve 
access to services. 
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Kenya’s context in light of earlier de-concentration:  Earlier health reforms in Kenya, 
introduced in response to global pressure such as structural adjustment reform and 
introduction of user-fees for cost-recovery, led to deterioration in health 
performance, a widening equity gap, decreasing overall coverage of essential health 
services and rising under-five mortality rates, see Figure 12 and Figure 13.  
Meanwhile, earlier moves to decentralise health via de-concentration were found to 
have mixed impact for health, with greater budgeting and annual workplan 
autonomy at the former district level, but limited connection between the workplan 
and budget submitted and the funds received [180], [181], [183].  Elimination of user-
fees at dispensary and health facility level was followed by subsequent increase in 
utilisation rates from 1.7 to 3.1 visits per capita over a decade  [166] and saw under-
five, infant and neonatal mortality begin to fall (see Figure 12).  Although challenges 
persisted with insufficient compensation for lost fees, resulting in continued charging 
of user-fees [184].  Readiness to provide health services is limited at county level 
according to a Ministry mapping exercise carried out in 2013, where all study 
counties scored 65% or lower for health service readiness (see Table 4) [21].  These 
figures are worsened by large inequities in coverage and use of health services 
relating to geographic location, poverty level, education and gender  [161], [198].  
County-specific cultural behaviours, practices, differing disease burdens and 
changing disease aetiologies further add to the complex picture for health in Kenya 
prior to devolution [161], [22]. 
5.1.2 Content for priority-setting following devolution 
This section will summarise the content of the reforms for priority-setting at county 
level, according to policy, following devolution.  Meanwhile, section 5.2 will 
summarise the content of the priorities set and decision space available to county 
governments following these reforms (see Figure 5).  Devolution resulted in the 
creation of 47 new county governments with changes to the roles and responsibilities 
for national and district/ sub-county levels, along with the removal of the provincial 
level and the creation of the county government level (see Table 2).   
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Big-bang approach:  Kenya’s rapid and sudden devolution of major functions and 
sharing of national resources to sub-national levels has much in common with 
Indonesia’s ‘big-bang’ decentralisation of the late 1990s [230].    In Indonesia 
extensive political change occurred in a short space of time, following resignation of 
the former President who had held power for over 30 years.  Similar to Kenya, this 
political change led to the handover of power from a highly centralised government 
to sub-national (district) authorities, changing the relationship between the citizen 
and government [233].  Other similarities include the presence of wide income and 
health service access inequities between sub-national units at the time of devolution 
(see Table 14) [233].  Yilmaz et al. (2008) highlighted that big-bang reforms initially 
place high emphasis on increasing discretionary powers at the sub-national level 
leading to relatively high decision space, but accountability measures often come 
later.  Until strong accountability measures are established this can create perverse 
incentives for the new sub-national authorities, leaving them susceptible to elite 
capture or reckless decision-making [236].  There is early evidence of these 
implications from our findings, which will be analysed in section 5.1.4.  
Official legislation for distribution between counties:  Based on our study, priority-
setting at county level is officially influenced by legislation from both national and 
county level, which creates the legal framework bounding priority-setting (see 
section 4.3.1).  The formula for distribution of funds between counties 
(predominantly based on fiscal need with high basic equal share) applied in Kenya 
improves upon that initially adopted in the Philippines in the early 1990s, which was 
based only on population size and land area, thereby disadvantaging poorer local 
governments due to their limited ability to generate local revenue leading to the 
closure of many hospital as a consequence (see Table 14) [229], [237].  The strong re-
distribution of funds by central government to minimise inequities in financing is in 
keeping with positive health equity outcomes for decentralised health systems in two 
systematic reviews of health equity and decentralisation [67], [68].   
In addition to the equitable share, counties can apply for conditional grants and raise 
their own locally generated revenue.  However, there was wide variance between 
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counties in terms of their capacity to generate revenue (see section 4.1.2).  Given the 
vastly differing nature of counties capacity to generate revenue there is the potential 
for deepening inequities, which was also acknowledged as a threat following 
introduction of the 1996 basic operating rule for funding in devolved Brazil and 
identified globally following systematic review [67], [68], [238].  Brazil’s introduction 
of per capita payment to municipalities for community-based primary health care has 
helped to address inequities and ensure more equitable provision of basic services 
(see Table 14) [235]. 
Absence of legislation for distribution within counties:  There are high levels of 
inequality within counties in Kenya.  For example, within Nairobi county the ward 
with the highest poverty rate is a staggering seventeen times poorer than the ward 
with the lowest poverty rate [239].  The lack of clarity surrounding how funds should 
be distributed within counties is in keeping with a recent report by Kinuthia and Lakin 
(2016), which found that Kenyan counties have adopted two main approaches from 
national level for intra-county distribution of funds – application of modified 
commission for revenue allocation formula and modified application of constituency 
development fund, based on large equal share (75%) with smaller equity share 
(25%)[239].  The example of Meru County included in both our study and Kinuthia 
and Lakin’s study highlighted that 85% of ‘ordinary revenue’ funds are shared equally 
among wards, with just 15% shared based on need (population, poverty and 
infrastructure levels).  Kinuthia and Lakin (2016) felt that too much emphasis had 
been placed on equality rather than equity [239].  This was in keeping with findings 
from our study (see section 4.5.1).  Given the diversity of approaches already adopted 
by counties in this regard, this presents an excellent opportunity for county-to-
county learning, where best practices could be identified by national experts, with 
further recommendations provided (as Kinuthia and Lakin have done in their recent 
report) and shared between counties for adoption.  However, national government 
will need to ensure strong monitoring structures are established in order to learn 
from Indonesia, where evaluation structures were not in place and opportunities to 
learn from innovations following devolution were lost [234]. 
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Addressing inequities both between and within counties will be crucial if devolution 
is to attain its equity related objectives.  Earlier studies of decentralisation in Canada 
found that inequities in access to health services was mainly driven by variations in 
use of health services between provinces.  However, the distribution of self-reported 
health was found to be mostly due to health differences between the rich and poor 
within a province, rather than between provinces [240].  Policies and actions must 
address both central and county level to guide distribution of funds, both between 
and within counties, in order to ensure inequities and challenges are reduced.   
5.1.3 Process for priority-setting following devolution 
The process for setting priorities at county level as identified in the Constitution was 
in general consistently applied across counties, see Figure 28.  However, while the 
process was followed, some of the steps were merely perfunctory in nature – 
fulfilling the requirements but not striving towards attaining the objectives specified 
in the Constitution.  All seven concepts (stakeholder involvement, stakeholder 
empowerment, transparency, revisions, use of evidence, enforcement and 
incorporation of community values) outlined by Barasa et al. (2015) as key conditions 
to consider when evaluating priority-setting processes were described by 
respondents, with varying levels of application within the priority-setting process. 
Stakeholder involvement:  Our study findings identified five main groups involved 
with decision-making at the county level – technical decision-makers, governor and 
members of the county executive committee; members of county assembly, 
community and other county stakeholders (see section 4.2).  These groups are 
engaged through a variety of forums including stakeholder forums, public 
participation, community dialogue days and public barazas.   
In contrast to other settings, health worker involvement in county decision-making 
was limited, with few health workers invited to attend public participation meetings 
and lack of similarity between annual workplan submitted and budget received at 
health facility level.  As a result, priorities set following public meetings often did not 
take into consideration the health worker’s technical understanding of needs and 
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challenges experienced when providing services (see section 5.1.4).  Exclusion from 
public participation meetings was not described by CHVs, perhaps because of their 
embedded position as members of the community.  Unfortunately, because this was 
not explicitly probed with CHVs it is not possible to tell the extent to which CHV voices 
were heard during these meetings.  The isolation of health workers from the priority-
setting process has implications for motivation of workers.  There have already been 
multiple (ongoing) strikes by health workers, due to poor human resource 
management practices.  The continued exclusion of health workers from decision-
making could lead to health worker demands for re-centralisation, as occurred in the 
Philippines [29]. 
Who is and isn’t involved with priority-setting is more fully captured when 
considering the actors and power dynamics according to Walt and Gilson’s health 
policy analysis model (see section 5.1.4).   
Stakeholder empowerment and incorporation of community values:  There was 
perceived lack of community knowledge of their roles and responsibilities for health 
governance, which hindered their ability to effectively participate in priority-setting.  
In the absence of strong accountability mechanisms and clear guidance to resolve 
differing opinions, manipulation and power plays came into effect.  This echoes 
similar findings from Tanzania, where a lack of guidelines at facility level and low 
awareness of roles and responsibilities by health facility governance committees led 
to poor participation in planning processes [241].  Lack of clarity surrounding the 
meaning of community participation has previously been noted elsewhere and 
contributes to challenges with citizen’s expectations and its subsequent 
implementation [242], [243].  A study in Tanzania revealed that simply creating 
forums for community participation in the absence of capacity building and support 
may not lead to more responsive priority-setting.  Instead effective community 
participation needs effective mobilisation of both the community and the health 
system with ongoing guidance through written directives and management [242]. 
A range of challenges to ensuring effective engagement of actors within priority-
setting processes were experienced, due to inadequate mechanisms to minimise 
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power differentials between actors.  This resulted in variation surrounding who does 
and who does not have a place at the table for priority-setting in practice, compared 
with policy.  ‘Elite capture’ resulted where the predominant voices heard during 
public meetings were those of the local elite (see section 4.5.3).   Marginalised groups 
such as street dwellers, those who are poor, people living in hard-to-reach areas or 
women from nomadic counties experience barriers to attending or participating in 
discussions due to strong financial, geographic, cultural or societal norms (see section 
4.5.3). This is in keeping with systematic review findings, which revealed that 
intended beneficiaries were excluded from decision-making processes even at local 
levels, with social norms acting to exclude marginalised groups from participating 
[244].  Similar challenges with participation have previously been described in other 
devolved settings, such as Mali and Tanzania [241], [245].   
Elite capture was a threat recognised prior to devolution in Kenya by Nyanjom (2011).  
In response, legislation was introduced to ensure that if a woman, youth or disabled 
persons’ representative is present during a public participation meeting, they must 
be given the opportunity to participate.  However, this mechanism has proved 
inadequate in ensuring full active participation from all members of society, leading 
to official policy for their inclusion becoming mere tokenism, with meetings still 
dominated by more powerful voices.  Social participation, especially of marginalised 
groups is an important way to gather evidence to understand social determinants for 
health and barriers to effective coverage with existing health services [44].  It 
provides the means to act on social conditions and factors which influence ability to 
access and use health services through community mobilisation.  Without 
information from marginalised groups, setting priorities to provide health services 
becomes guess work, lacking insider knowledge.  De Andrade et al. (2015) conducted 
a study of reforms introduced in Latin American countries and found that in Brazil 
deliberative mechanisms of participation were institutionalised among 
disadvantaged populations, to ensure their active involvement to enhance equity 
[44].  There, the Constitution created space for participation through health councils 
where half of counsellors specifically represent health system users (not providers) 
[246].   
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Alongside increased community participation by marginalised groups, there is the 
need for new commitment to create disaggregated databases, which reflect equity 
indicators for monitoring and planning for health service uptake in county data 
sources.  This will need fresh commitment and capacity building, as data in Kenya has 
not been disaggregated for gender, despite the launch of the Women’s Bureau to 
promote gender awareness over 40 years ago [17].   
Transparency:  There was a lack of transparency surrounding the procedures and 
justifications for priority-setting.  While the steps to be followed in the priority-
setting process were widely known (see Figure 28), the process for how values were 
considered and how differing values or priorities were resolved was unclear and not 
reflected in the steps identified (see section 4.3).   There was no common set of 
criteria described and a lack of clarity regarding roles and responsibilities for the 
different actors.  In the absence of clear guidance some counties had invested in high 
cost services which would benefit a small minority of the population, such as dialysis 
services.  Those involved with the priority-setting process had little clarity regarding 
why this had been prioritised above other services which were more cost-effective 
and equitable (see section 4.4.4).  This contrasts with recommendations from a 
recent study of the position of renal dialysis within universal health coverage, which 
recommended that every government should implement actions to prevent chronic 
kidney disease, to screen and ensure early treatment of patients with diabetes 
and/or hypertension [247].  Whereas governments should only consider 
programmes that subsidise renal dialysis depending on available resources and other 
competing priorities [247].  While one of the counties which was introducing renal 
dialysis within the county was expanding community level screening for diabetes and 
hypertension, the other was not.  As the accountability for reasonableness 
framework acknowledges, establishing a fair process for priority-setting is easier than 
agreeing on principles or values and makes it possible for all stakeholders to learn 
about the process [80].  Therefore, all decision-making actors should have a common 
understanding of the reasons for why a priority has been selected, even if they 
disagree with the selection of the priority itself.     
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Revisions or appeal mechanism:  Previous study of the views of decision-makers 
across Canada, Norway and Uganda revealed that a fair process for priority-setting 
should have “provision for people to express their dissatisfaction with the decisions 
and revisions based on the available evidence and the public’s reactions to the 
decisions” (page 769 [79]).  Opportunity for revision is already built into the priority-
setting process in Kenya through public participation.  However, once this stage has 
been passed and the budget approved there is extremely limited opportunity for 
appeal.  This creates challenges for health workers, CHVs and community members 
who may not have attended public participation meetings.  When the health workers 
and CHEWs finally find out their approved budget from county level, it may not align 
with the workplan which they had submitted to sub-county managers, but there is 
no opportunity for them to appeal this.  These findings are largely in keeping with an 
earlier priority-setting study prior to devolution in Kenya, which found challenges 
were described for patients to appeal against poor treatment, with no clear 
description for mechanisms for health workers or community members to appeal 
priorities set [192].  The implications of a process which does not include adequate 
opportunity for appeal and revision is perception of the process as unfair, thereby 
undermining its perceived legitimacy [79]. 
Use of evidence:  County level decision-makers reported using data from county level 
health information system and national sources to guide their decision-making (see 
section 4.3.3).  Service coverage data was used to identify low coverage areas in need 
of more intensive intervention in some counties.  However, there was a lack of clarity 
about the use of evidence to select priorities and a recognition of the need for a more 
scientific approach.  There were concerns raised about the quality of data available 
to guide decision-making, in keeping with previous evidence which identify 
challenges with the availability and quality of basic data needed for making informed 
decisions at local level [37], [248].  Recent systematic review of the use of data at 
district level for decision-making identified three needed features – timely, relevant 
and good quality data, a structured decision-making process which includes steps to 
help build consensus and well-defined community role [248].  The need for a close 
relationship between data producers and data users to ensure the relevance of data 
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for decision-making and capacity-building for decision-makers to use data was also 
highlighted [248].    
In addition to the use of data at county level, there was some discussion of 
presentation of data using the chalkboard by CHEWs and CHVs during community 
dialogue days.  However, data presented in the form of numbers without a 
denominator limits the opportunity to truly appreciate the health context at a local 
level.  Simple changes to how data is presented could lead to greater community 
understanding and ownership over their data.  Studies from Uganda (using 
community-based scoring of primary care providers) and Ethiopia (using community 
assessment and planning for maternal and child health) provide examples where 
community level assessment and planning have been used successfully [249], [250].  
Within these processes data collected and presented was easily understood, ongoing 
supervision and support was provided and there was recognition of existing power 
relationships with attempts made to avoid ‘elite capture’ by identifying and involving 
the most vulnerable groups [249], [250].  These methodologies have been adopted 
and used in other settings, including Kenya, where the chalkboard has been 
introduced as a method to use during community action days, where the aim is for 
the CHEW and CHVs to present and discuss simple data with community members 
and identify community-led actions to take in response.   However, an earlier 
REACHOUT study has revealed challenges, with their implementation in Kenya being 
dependent on partner support and community lack of awareness of their role limiting 
participation [251].  Devolution presents the opportunity to embed these 
innovations within community accountability structures, if backed by local political 
will. 
Enforcement:  Respondents described a wide range of accountability mechanisms 
which have been established within the county (see Table 11) in order to seek to 
compel those in decision-making roles to respond to the demands of locally elected 
officials, community and central government.  Similar mechanisms have previously 
been shown to play a key role in ensuring success for devolution [27], [31].  In keeping 
with a study in Pakistan we found variance in the degree of accountability to locally 
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elected officials (politicians) between counties according to the degree of 
accountability demanded for those choices by the community and other 
stakeholders [54].   
Mitchell and Bossert (2010) highlighted the difference between whether a 
governance or health systems perspective to devolution is adopted, see section 2.1.3 
[37].  The combination of 1) downward accountability to the community through 
public participation, 2) horizontal accountability to locally elected members of 
county assembly through reporting and follow-up by budget and health committees 
for county assembly and 3) upward accountability through performance contracts 
provide a range of mechanisms through which accountability should be enhanced, 
see Table 11.  However, there were challenges with lack of transparency and 
accountability within counties, as mechanisms are only effective in so far as they are 
respected and adhered to by each of the actors.  In certain instances, accountability 
was challenged by actors who held excess power, and appeared to consider 
themselves ‘above the law’ with the result that they no longer felt bounded by the 
official accountability mechanisms.  This finding is in keeping with earlier results from 
a study of central annual operational planning in Kenya, which found that individuals 
who wielded significant technical power, had a high degree of independence from 
and minimal accountability to hierarchy structures [195].  These findings concur with 
Yilmaz et al. (2008) who highlighted that following sudden devolution the strength of 
accountability mechanisms often lag behind the devolution of powers [236].   
In summary, according to policy, Kenya has introduced all seven conditions 
recommended for evaluation of the process for priority-setting by Barasa.et al. 
(2015).  However, as this section has highlighted there are considerable gaps 
between the policy and practice of these conditions.  Ultimately, meaningful 
community empowerment is needed to ensure citizens know their role and rights, to 
ensure their voice is heard at the decision-making table, to provide them with the 
skills to use and understand their local health data and to re-address power 
structures, to ensure demands for accountability are respected.     
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5.1.4 Power dynamics between actors for priority-setting following devolution 
We find Kenya’s transition towards devolution is transforming the former centralised 
balance of power, leading to greater ability for influence at the county level, with 
reducing power at national and sub-county (district) levels and varied change at 
community level.  Within these changing power structures, politicians are felt to play 
a greater role in priority-setting for health.  The interfaces and tensions between 
politicians, technical actors and the community has at times, been felt to undermine 
the suitability of priorities set.  While power has changed drastically at the national 
and county levels, there has been varied and typically limited change at community 
level.  We found limited consistent community empowerment for meaningful 
participation in priority-setting (although positive exceptions are presented, see case 
study 2).  Underlying social structures and discriminations generally continue 
unchanged, leading to the continued exclusion of those most vulnerable from 
priority-setting processes, see section 4.5.3.   Gaventa’s power cube [49] (see Figure 
2) with consideration of Veneklasen’s (2002) expressions of power [47] provide a 
helpful framework to use for analysing the places, spaces and forms of power.   
Places of power:  Priority-setting for health has brought changes to the places and 
levels where power operates, bringing reduced power formerly enjoyed by national 
authorities, who have in turn failed to provide adequate capacity building for county 
level decision-makers.  This is in keeping with other contexts where national actors 
sought to undermine sub-national levels, if not incentivised to work 
cooperatively[46].  In keeping with findings from Philippines and Indonesia[29], 
[252], health workers from sub-county and facility level in Kenya have experienced a 
loss of power and are often excluded from community public participation meetings.  
This has at times led to the setting of priorities which do not always meet urgent 
technical needs.   
Spaces of power:  Since devolution, policy has sought to emphasise the ‘invited 
spaces’ for identifying priorities, through the public participation forums[26].  In 
practice however, we found that the spaces where power operates and priorities are 
set appears to be heavily influenced by the leadership style of the county executive 
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member for health (who typically leads the health priority-setting process).  Where 
the CEC for health has an authoritative style, many decisions were made behind 
closed doors, with only select few involved with these decisions, see section 4.3.2.  
This typically reinforced a ‘power over’ approach [47] (see Table 10), which was by 
far the most commonly described expression of power.  County level technical and 
political actors often appeared resistant to share power with actors from other levels 
within or outside the health system, although several exceptions were described.  By 
contrast, where the CEC for health encouraged a more transparent and participatory 
style, priority-setting took place in a more participatory manner with greater use of 
the ‘invited spaces’ (see case study 2).  This encouraged a ‘power with’ approach to 
decision-making and encouraged community members, health workers, politicians 
and others to work together to understand health and generate the ‘power to act’ in 
selecting priorities [47].   
As yet, there were limited descriptions of discretionary use of power to forge new 
claimed spaces.  Although, some mentions about the use of social media platforms 
were mentioned (see Table 11).  This may be as a consequence of the short 
timeframe for devolution to date and that as time progresses actors from 
community, health facility and sub-county levels will explore and forge more 
opportunities for discretionary use of power.  It may also have been as a consequence 
of the study focus, which primarily sought to explore county level priority-setting 
processes and participation of actors from other levels within this, rather than 
processes at other levels.   
Forms and visibility of power:  Priority-setting at county level demonstrates all three 
dimensions of power first described by Lukes (1974) [50] and later work by 
Veneklasen (2002) and Gaventa (2006) as visible, hidden and invisible forms (see 
section 2.1.4).  Visible power is demonstrated through the process as identified in 
the Constitution (2010), which includes opportunity for citizen participation through 
public participation forums, actors within executive and legislative arms of county 
government and county laws and policies.  As a consequence of the rapid roll-out of 
devolution, however, additional guidance surrounding priority-setting processes and 
structures (including accountability mechanisms), county laws and policies and 
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recruitment of needed staff had not yet been put in place when the reforms started.  
This created a vacuum at county level, which allowed ‘hidden power’ to have a 
disproportionate effect, with certain powerful actors able to control the extent to 
which other actors are included (or not) in identifying priorities, the content of the 
priority-setting agenda and ultimately the priorities set [47].  ‘Invisible power’ and 
the norms and structures which have contributed to the marginalisation of certain 
groups prior to devolution have generally not yet been addressed (see Figure 32), 
limiting opportunity for active participation of all citizens within priority-setting 
processes and limiting the success of devolution to date. 
Leadership capacity:  Lessons from other contexts suggest that in the absence of a 
clear national vision and strategic direction county decision-makers will set priorities 
of varied suitability, depending on their pre-existing capacity and local internal 
politics.  This occurred previously in the Philippines and Indonesia, where lack of 
strong central direction to guide weak district authorities resulted in wide variation 
in performance and resource utilisation between districts (see Table 14) [229], [234].   
Analysis of our data highlighted a number of leadership gaps among technical 
decision-makers at county level.  This limited capacity by technical decision-makers 
to carry out the needed evaluations for wise evidence-based decisions can 
undermine priority-setting processes [85].  Previous studies have shown that in low-
income countries local officials may make choices in ways which are ill-informed or 
poorly carried out [54], which places constraints on their ability to carry-out effective 
health management and may lead to sub-optimal decisions as occurred in Tanzania 
and the Philippines [253], [229], [231].  Recommendations from the Philippines’ 
experience included conducting decentralisation reforms in a phased manner with 
considerable capacity building at both central and local levels [254].  These 
recommendations have not been acknowledged in Kenya during the push to devolve.  
If not addressed this will undoubtedly lead to deterioration in health system 
performance and ultimately health outcomes.  While some steps have been taken to 
build national government capacity in evidence-based decision-making, it is 
important these skills are transferred to county level, including both executive and 
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legislative arms of county government and to community based structures and CTC 
providers acting in their interface role between community and the health system.   
In addition, limited capacity by politicians to understand and engage with health 
decision-making and of technical decision-makers to think politically were common 
gaps.  Previous research in Pakistan revealed that in districts with lower capacity 
there was greater reliance on historical budgets with limited innovation for service 
delivery [54].  Formerly marginalised counties have the potential to become further 
disadvantaged by the capacity gap, as a consequence of historically lower education 
levels leading to unwise decision-making by ill-prepared decision-makers [27].  
However, the data from our study revealed one of the formerly marginalised 
counties recognised their limited capacity at the onset of devolution and ensured all 
technical decision-makers underwent appropriate training (see section 4.3.2).  This 
intervention to build local capacity is likely to have the effect of encouraging local 
decision-makers to take more advantage of the decision space available to them [54].  
Majority voting model and patronage norms:  The exploitation of the priority-setting 
process to secure votes is in keeping with the ‘majority voting model’ outlined by 
Goddard et al. (2006).  This paper highlights that politicians are not purely motivated 
by benevolent ideals to further social welfare, but will also be motivated by their own 
self-interests, including consolidating political support and maximising their voter 
base [55].  In some counties (typically rural ones) limited employment opportunities 
contribute to limited agency and loss of power by community members, with 
subsistence farming the main form of employment.  As a consequence of limited 
employment options some governors used patronage to mobilise support, with 
promises of employment in civil service (and other benefits) for those from a similar 
tribe who supported and voted for the governor during his election.  Reinforcement 
of local patronage over staff following decentralisation has previously been 
recognised as a potential implication for human resources [255].  These practices 
continue the colonial legacy and the misuse of power which emerged from this [179].  
Respondents from some counties described that communities which were not 
politically affiliated with the governor had not benefitted to the same degree as 
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communities which had been supportive, or which were the ‘home area’ for the 
governor.   
Local members of county assembly want their own constituency to be given high 
priority, or at least equality for health systems investment, disregarding underlying 
inequities and differing needs, in keeping with findings following decentralisation in 
Tanzania, which revealed political interference with priority-setting [231].  In both 
Kenya and Tanzania, this has led to construction of health facilities with no/ limited 
consideration or planning for other associated needs, such as staffing and 
operational costs [231].  In some counties the members of county assembly 
effectively hold the county executive committee to ransom, by refusing to pass the 
budget until their own personal needs (sitting allowances) or their constituents 
needs (typically for visible infrastructure objectives) are met [178].  When the budget 
is not approved the county is forced to operate using an emergency budget, thereby 
scaling back service delivery to a bare minimum, having implications for quality and 
timeliness of implementation of planned and budgeted activities.  Once the budget 
is approved, which meets the politician’s objectives, he/she is favourably portrayed 
as having provided for his/her constituents, which can be expected to lead to more 
votes during the next election.   
In other counties it is the governor who holds huge power over the process, forcing 
the county health management team to budget for interventions, which he (all 
governors were male at time of research) has already promised to the electorate 
perhaps as part of the patronage mechanisms used to mobilise for support during his 
election campaign [25], regardless of the findings from the evidence or public 
participation meetings.    In a democracy, political parties tend to move towards the 
position of the median voter in order to secure (re)election.  This may explain why 
policy-makers seek to direct resources towards certain population groups at the 
expense of others, regardless of the efficiency or equity implications of those 
decisions [55].  It has previously been observed following decentralisation in Tanzania 
[231].  This is likely to lead to the neglect and further marginalisation of smaller 
population groups such as hard-to-reach or sparsely populated nomadic areas, while 
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resources are focussed on  heavily populated areas (where there are a lot of votes) 
[165]. 
Within Kenya, this may explain the political preference for infrastructure, as a 
consequence of how former national politicians encouraged citizen’s to evaluate 
their leader based on his/her ability to fund projects, including infrastructure, for 
certain groups in local communities [179].  Meanwhile, public health interventions 
which may be more equitable and cost-effective were not popular priorities with 
politicians, as the community was not sufficiently informed or empowered to 
recognise their value.  It also explains why political affiliation and tribal ties are 
important features following devolution, with politicians seeking to reward and 
retain support from those viewed as likely future voters.  The fact that devolution of 
health has become highly politicised should hardly be surprising, given that 
devolution is the product of a political process which influences actors’ access to the 
policy-making process [238], [255].   
While the technical decision-makers may not have been elected, they too are 
political actors in their own right who have personal objectives for career 
advancement and institutional interests [46].  Application of incentives for the 
technical decision-makers is also of importance for selection of priorities and the 
degree of success in their implementation.   
Corruption:  This may have been a contributing factor to the strong preference for 
infrastructure.  Corrupt leaders wanting to benefit personally at the expense of their 
electorate were described as ‘looting resources’ through shoddy procurement 
processes (see section 4.3.2).  The contracting process as a source of returns for 
corrupt officials and suppliers has been highlighted in previous study in Latin America 
[256].  While it is often challenging to gain direct and specific evidence of corruption, 
qualitative work from previous studies have found that knowledge and strong 
perceptions of petty theft provide a sense of its importance and lend credence to 
allegations of theft  [256].  Ultimately, this may lead to deterioration in utilisation of 
services, as occurred in the Philippines where corruption was found to reduce 
immunisation rates, delay newborn vaccination, reduce satisfaction and discourage 
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use of public services and increase waiting time at health clinics, with the impact 
borne most heavily by the poor than the wealthy [257].   
Majority voting model without using patronage norms:  While Kenyan citizens have 
to some degree been conditioned to evaluate leaders against provision of 
infrastructure and patronage norms, there is opportunity to strategically re-frame 
the manner in which leaders are assessed.  Brazil provides an interesting example 
within a decentralised governance system, where central authorities introduced a 
community-based primary health care programme, which incorporates provision of 
services by CTC providers known as health agents.  In order to ensure success and 
support for the programme, which was dependent on agreement from sub-national 
mayors, the central government created pressure by generating high media coverage 
and encouraging communities to demand these services from their local government 
through messaging such as “Simply don’t vote for your mayor if he doesn’t provide 
you access to our health programme”  (page 1775 [258]).  In addition, high numbers 
of newly recruited CTC providers (health agents) who wore visible uniforms and kits, 
visited households on a daily basis forming an extremely visible public sector 
presence within a constituency.  As the health agents became more established they 
sought to ‘educate’ decision-makers about the need for further public health 
initiatives, such as cholera campaigns.  In the end, the programme was popular with 
citizens and as a consequence political leaders (mayors in Brazil) were rewarded 
politically for supporting the programme, leading to replacement of the former 
patronage dynamic with a more service-oriented one (see Table 14) [258]. 
Community empowerment: Meaningful social participation needs a willingness to 
transfer real power to communities and as a result to deal with the consequences of 
people’s demand for transformative change [246].  However, many governments can 
obstruct or resist community participation which raises concerns about living 
conditions or proposes solutions [246].  This was acknowledged as a challenge in our 
study, with some members of county assembly fearing empowering the community 
due to loss of their own ‘political grip’ (see section 4.3.5).  There has been limited 
progress to develop ‘power within’ for community (and in particular vulnerable 
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groups), due to failure to address underlying social norms and structures [47].  In 
addition, opportunities to develop ‘power with’ community members, have often not 
been inadequately seized, as community members do not seem to have been 
informed about their role (see section 4.3.5), the choice of interventions available to 
them or provided with the data which would allow them to make informed decisions, 
similar to findings in Tanzania [231].  As a result, community members have limited 
opportunity to demonstrate meaningful ‘power to act’ to select needed priorities.  
Instead, community members were described as often requesting new 
infrastructure, even when existing infrastructure was not yet operational.  County 
decision-makers and health workers described communities as having ‘unrealistic 
expectations’ and failing to make wise decisions, in keeping with findings from 
Tanzania where health workers felt that planning was the responsibility of health 
experts, rather than community members [231].   
In a recent report by Lakin and Nyagaka (2016) similar challenges with current public 
participation in Kenya were identified, including that decisions were made and 
justified with a vague explanation, without providing adequate additional details 
[259].  In their review of county budget documents, they found most fall short of 
providing the information needed to meet the standards of deliberation.  They 
identify that public participation is a ‘vague and indeterminate concept’.  In response, 
they propose that public participation should be refined and replaced with the 
concept of public deliberation.  Thereby, placing exacting standards on governments 
and creating conditions for “deliberation by providing information, reasons for 
decisions, and space for choices to be discussed” (page17 [259]).  This means the 
public should be provided with the choices available and the reasoning behind those 
choices so they have sufficient information to allow them to question it, particularly 
for preventive versus curative health interventions.  Likewise, public deliberation 
recognises that not all public inputs to the priority-setting process are equally 
reasonable.  As a result they highlight that there must be an explanation of the 
process by which public inputs are filtered and selected [259].  While, not all 
participants will eventually agree on the priority set, they should agree that the 
process used for reaching the decision was fair and legitimate.  This is in keeping with 
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the principles of accountability for reasonableness and three of the outcomes from 
Barasa et al. (2015) framework (stakeholder empowerment, transparency and 
incorporation of community values) [77], [80], [259].   
FGD findings from community members identified a mixture of curative and 
preventive interventions (see section 4.3.5), which contrasted with county 
respondents’ perspective which emphasised that community often prioritised 
infrastructure.  Community findings were in keeping with a study by O’Meara et al 
(2011), which reviewed community level priorities in Kenya prior to devolution.  At 
that time the main priorities identified included heavy emphasis on preventive 
priorities such as health education, sanitation, clean water.  Other priorities included 
low use of antenatal care or skilled deliveries, malaria and malnutrition.  Distance to 
the health facility was raised as a challenge in only 8/15 health facilities studied [193].  
While still deemed a moderate priority by the community, distance to a health facility 
was described by many county level respondents in our study as being one of the 
greatest priorities for health following devolution, contrasting with this earlier study.  
A further follow-up study to review minutes from community public participation 
meetings, rather than responses to a researcher during FGD, would provide insight 
to identify whether distance to a health facility was in fact raised as the predominant 
key priority by community members attending.  Another potential reason may be a 
change in priority as a consequence of devolution with community members now 
demanding more infrastructure as a result of the change or as a result of how 
facilitation of public participation meetings occurs.   
In Kenya, the community voice was generally held in high esteem in official policy, 
with the formalisation of the need for public participation (see section 2.1.3).  
However, in practice many counties have not provided adequate resources for public 
participation, thereby undermining participation efforts and failing to address 
barriers to attendance experienced by many citizens (see section 4.5.3).  
Respondents from marginalised counties often spoke about the reluctance of citizens 
to attend public participation as a result of their previous negative experiences under 
central government.  Highlighting the need to first address the political and historical 
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legacies from the former centralised government, before citizens will accept to 
attend and contribute [246].  Finally, participation requires stakeholders to 
understand the process, to have a clear vision for what can be achieved and access 
to interpretable evidence.  The most disadvantaged citizens need to be identified in 
advance, with a plan developed to overcome barriers to attendance to ensure their 
representation.  This may include options such as female-only meetings, use of social 
media platforms for engaging with youth, ensuring transport for those with limited 
mobility and attention to language and cultural appropriateness for ethnic minorities 
[246].     
In order to avoid public participation becoming simply ‘tokenism’, it is important that 
decision-makers realise the value and importance of community participation in 
using local data to track progress and identify priorities, using principles of public 
deliberation [246].      
Health worker and technical decision-maker disempowerment:  Throughout this 
process technical decision-makers at health facility and sub-county levels (see 
section 4.4.1 and section 4.4.2) appear to have much lower influence and power in 
setting priorities compared with before devolution.  The role played by CTC providers 
and health facility management committees in development of the annual workplan 
and budget for facility and community unit activities was undermined by the little 
relation between the workplan submitted and the funds received, making service 
delivery highly challenging (see section 4.4.1).  This has potential implications for 
trust relationships between these health workers (facility and community level) and 
county level decision-makers. Recognition of CTC providers by trained health workers 
as collaborators, involved with regular meetings and planning and implementation 
of programmes is felt to lead to better implementation of activities, as demonstrated 
by study of village health volunteers in Thailand [260].   
In some settings, health workers were excluded from community public participation 
meetings, leading to the setting of priorities which did not meet urgent technical 
needs.  For example, in one health facility the community prioritised superficial 
rehabilitation and repainting of the facility, when the health worker identified that 
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the genuine need was purchase of a steriliser and new delivery kits.  This contrasts 
with Tanzania, where the health care priority-setting process was dominated by 
health professionals and community members were excluded from meetings held to 
identify priorities [231], [261].  However there are some similarities with findings 
from Philippines where health workers felt excluded from the process of devolution 
and Indonesia where local health officials and volunteers are not involved in priority-
setting processes (despite policy which recommends this), leading to planning which 
does not accommodate for local needs and health problems [29], [252].  In contrast 
to the findings from Indonesia, CTC providers in our study did not describe having 
been excluded from public participation meetings, although this was not expressly 
probed and their role within priority-setting needs further study.  This may have been 
due to the fact that as embedded community members they were included within 
community level meetings.  This provides opportunity for CTC providers to forge a 
new, stronger role in presenting their community’s health needs within this forum 
and demanding accountability, particularly from former CHVs now elected as 
members of county assembly.   
5.2 Use of decision space and changes in health systems performance  
Our study found that devolution resulted in considerable changes regarding where 
power is located.  There was a downward shift in power for making decisions about 
planning and budgeting for health services from national to county level, alongside 
an upward shift in power from district/ sub-county and hospital to county level. At 
community level mechanisms for participation have been established, but there was 
limited evidence for genuine empowerment of the community in priority-setting 
within our study.  Even between counties the distribution and use of power varied 
considerably.  In almost all counties, findings revealed innovative use of power, 
resulting in considerable changes for health service delivery.  We found limited 
evidence for strategic application of directed change by central government so far.    
Application of Bossert’s decision space approach provides scope to review the space 
open to county level decision-makers (see Figure 33).  This allows the opportunity to 
compare the ‘de jure’ decision space of official choice allowed over functions, 
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compared with the ‘de facto’ informal decision space which explains the powers 
actually used (or not) in practice [54].  In general, following devolution there is 
moderate to wide decision space at county level.  However, we found that decision-
space available to actors at sub-county, hospital, health facility and community unit 
level has narrowed since devolution.    
Figure 33 Bossert decision space following devolution in Kenya 
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5.2.1 Finance:  Mixed decision space and limited central guidance may create 
challenges with budget allocation   
There were mixed findings for finance, with narrow decision space for sources of 
revenue, due to heavy reliance on central transfer of funds.  However, limited central 
guidance or restrictions led to relatively wide decision space regarding allocation of 
expenditures.   
Reliance on central funding:  In general, counties were heavily reliant on transfer of 
funds from central government, with limited capacity to generate local revenue (e.g. 
through taxation) described, although this varied considerably between counties.  
This has been described in many other devolved settings, including the Philippines, 
Tanzania and Indonesia, where central funds constituted up to 90% of funds received 
at sub-national levels [231], [237], [262].  Funds were often transferred late, as a 
result of delayed finalisation of the appropriation budget, due to disagreements and 
power dynamics between the two arms of county government and delayed transfer 
from national level.  In Tanzania similar high dependence on delayed central transfers 
created difficulties with implementation of planned activities [231].   
Few central directives for spending:  Despite increased funding available at the 
county level following devolution, there were felt to be some limitations on decision 
space as a consequence of national directives for minimum spending of 30% of funds 
for development activities (in some counties this was increased up to 70%) and high 
pre-existing salaries for health workers.  This feature is in keeping with findings from 
Indonesia, where despite doubling of public funding for health services at district 
level in the five years following devolution, there was little increased discretion for 
managing funds for health due to high personnel expenditure [262].  However, in 
Kenya there are few other central restrictions or earmarking of funds by central 
government, in contrast to many countries, including Indonesia, Uganda and 
Columbia where key decisions surrounding funds are made by central government 
[28], [29], [262].  These limited central restrictions for how funds are used at county 
level (except minimum spend on development activities)  is more in keeping with the 
Philippines, where central authorities place few restrictions on central transfers [37].   
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Implications of limited spending directives:  In the absence of guidance prescribing 
how funds should be used, decision-makers are open to pressures, which may lead 
them to make inappropriate decisions.  This has led to emphasis on curative over 
preventive health services, which is at odds with the direction provided in the Vision 
2030 document [169], but is in keeping with findings following decentralisation 
reforms in the Philippines and Indonesia [254], [263].  There in the absence of clear 
national guidance and capacity building ideological differences at local government 
level led to the neglect of priority services, such as family planning [254].  It is 
therefore important that central government in Kenya monitors the performance of 
the health system to ensure that public health interventions are maintained, taking 
action to ensure their continued delivery if needed.  For example, in response to early 
experiences under decentralisation, where municipalities refused to invest in public 
health, the central Bolivian government introduced earmarking of funds for public 
health activities [37].  Meanwhile, Chile and Brazil earmark and distribute per capita 
funds for primary care services, which is felt to contribute to achievement of health 
systems goals with improved equity for health spending at sub-national level [37], 
[107].  Conditional grants were described by some national level respondents as a 
possibility to guide county priority-setting to align with central objectives, although 
it was not commonly described at the county level and does not appear to have been 
widely applied to date in Kenya.  This is in contrast with Uganda, where conditional 
central grants constitute up to 85% of district level budgets [37]. 
Kenya’s national government introduced free maternal health care around the time 
of devolution, which specifies services which local governments are required to 
provide free of charge.  Many interventions have been introduced by county 
governments in response, such as building maternity units and, in some counties, 
provision of incentives to encourage mothers to attend for skilled delivery.  Counties 
are free to determine the user rates for hospital fees in collaboration with the local 
hospital board.  However, national policies such as the free maternal health policy 
and free primary health care at dispensary and health centre, mean that there are 
restrictions prohibiting user-fees at these levels.  
295 | P a g e  
 
Freedom for procurement:  Counties are responsible for ordering drugs and supplies 
and arrange payment for these, but must order from a list of pre-specified suppliers 
outlined by national government, in order to maintain economies of scale and the 
benefits accorded through this [37].  There were no guidelines described regarding 
the percentage of funds to be spent on pharmaceuticals.  In the absence of clear 
guidance and adequate capacity some counties have struggled to maintain regular 
drug supplies.  A recent systematic review revealed negative effects on the 
availability of medicines due to increased bureaucracy and lack of the needed 
management skills for procurement at local levels following decentralisation [64].   
5.2.2 Service organisation:  Limited spending for community health may have 
equity implications   
The changing roles and responsibilities between national and county levels has 
created challenges.  For example, the national unit for Community Health and 
Development revised the community health strategy (a national function) early in 
the devolution process (2014).  At this point counties were gaining new autonomy 
for priority-setting, planning and budgeting, with roles, responsibilities and 
communication channels between the various levels still to be clarified.  As a result, 
what ought to be a complementary process with national level leading the 
development of policy guidance and counties choosing to adapt and implement 
within their context as appropriate, has instead appeared contradictory in nature.  
This has led to uneven uptake of the revised strategy by county governments (based 
on our study findings), with some counties taking up parts of the strategy, some 
continuing unchanged and some introducing an entirely new community health 
approach, with little reference to national guidance (see case study 1).   
New central government role towards service organisation:  The role of national 
government in providing guidance to sub-national levels following devolution needs 
careful planning and negotiation.  Lessons can be learned from Indonesia, the 
Philippines and Brazil for national government’s role in guiding sub-national 
authorities (see Table 14).  Central government in Indonesia issued instructions to 
districts to provide free in-patient care for poor patients, which angered districts who 
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viewed the instructions as a deliberate move to take back devolved powers [233].  At 
the other extreme the Philippines adopted a ‘soft approach’, where central 
government refused to investigate sub-national corruption or failure to provide basic 
services [229].  Finally, in Brazil central government used a combination of 
approaches to ensure provision of community-based primary care services including 
use of quota funding, promotion through the media, generating community and 
political support [235].      
Functions maintained at national level include central procurement of vaccines25; HIV 
service delivery; disaster and outbreak response; ports and borders in order to 
benefit from relative economies of scale for procurement and  “substantial positive 
inter-jurisdictional externalities and have little variation in efficient levels of local 
output” (page 677 [37]).   
Implications of service organisation choices:  Coverage with some key health 
services became more equitable in Kenya over the last decade.  Multi-country study 
has shown that in middle-income countries vaccination coverage levels were lower 
in decentralised countries than in centralised ones [31].  It will be important to 
monitor coverage with key services, such as vaccination, to ensure there is not a de-
prioritisation of immunisation following devolution due to political preference for 
curative services over preventive ones (see section 4.3.2 and section 5.6).   
Immunisation falls within both national and county responsibilities (national level 
procure vaccinations; counties procure syringes and conduct immunisation).  This 
joint national and sub-national responsibility for immunisation was previously 
adopted in Indonesia following devolution.  There immunisation rates stagnated in 
the period following devolution and recent evaluation revealed no significant 
association between fiscal decentralisation and immunisation outcomes [264].  
However, where districts had invested in the number of village health posts (which 
                                                          
25 Drug procurement determined at county level must be bought through suppliers 
pre-specified by national government.   
297 | P a g e  
 
provide promotive and preventive health services, often by CTC providers within 
villages), immunisation status was higher [264].     
Wide freedom in allocation of funds for community health, primary health care, 
public health interventions or tertiary interventions gives counties autonomy to 
determine which programmes are implemented and their level of financial backing.  
While allowing a high level of choice, all counties do not yet appear to have the 
needed capacity to make these decisions.  Limited decision-making capacity has been 
widely described as a potential threat associated with devolution in Tanzania, 
Uganda, Pakistan and India [29], [37], [231].  However, in Mali considerable efforts 
were made to strengthen sub-national capacity prior to the roll out of devolution 
with positive effects for decision-making [245].  Early signs of poor decision-making 
in Kenya, includes no allocation of funds for community health activities by some 
counties studied (excluding the payment of CHEW salary).  It may be wise to study 
the spending of the best performing counties and use this as a means of providing 
some form of guidance for use of funds by counties.  For example the positive deviant 
case study 2 provides an innovative example of best practices for engaging with 
communities and other stakeholders to build capacity to understand health 
(including preventive and curative aspects).   
Choice for service organisation at hospital level:  County authorities have a wide 
degree of autonomy over decisions made at the hospital.  However, the hospital itself 
has more narrow decision space for use of facility improvement funds following 
devolution.  In most counties studied the county treasury collected facility 
improvement funds generated from the hospital and determined the percentage of 
these to be returned for the hospital to use, with the hospital required to request 
and seek permission for all expenditures from the county treasury (see section 4.4.1).  
Although, in some counties the local authorities have recognised that the hospital’s 
decision space is too narrow and have decentralised further, so the hospital has 
autonomy to manage their own budget, in collaboration with the hospital board.  
These findings are in keeping with previous study in Kenya which found reduced 
hospital autonomy, due to county health departments having taken over former 
hospital managed roles [265].  This has led to hospital managers feeling 
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disempowered, inefficient service delivery due to increased bureaucracy, reduced 
staff motivation, limited scope for community participation, due to the limited role 
for hospital management committees and compromised quality of care [265].   
The changed funding in hospitals, where locally generated facility improvement 
funds are not retained for use by the hospital, but instead are returned to the county 
treasury, reflects findings from Indonesia.  There hospitals were put under pressure 
to generate revenue by the local government and around 75% of revenue created at 
public hospital went to the local government [263].  If not quickly addressed this will 
likely contribute to a widening gap between rich and poor patients.  A recent study 
conducted of priority-setting in hospitals in Kenya has already shown that revenue 
maximisation was a dominant priority-setting criteria, where departments which 
generated revenue were prioritised over those which did not, such as services for 
children under-five which do not generate user-fees, leading to inequitable budget 
allocations [197].  Although not expressly probed for hospitals in our study, there are 
echoes of this through the data, with stories of counties prioritising dialysis units 
which will generate revenue, while no funds were allocated to community health 
approaches which have no revenue generation potential. 
Counties have the choice to expand insurance plans and some described having 
expanded insurance coverage for selected groups such as CHVs and certain 
vulnerable groups.  However, no county described designing their own insurance 
plan (although this was not expressly probed).  The equity implications of varied 
introduction for selected groups are highlighted in section 5.2.4.  
5.2.3 Human resources:  Increased recruitment but challenges with management
  
Human resource management is crucial as it accounts for such a large proportion of 
the health budget, similar to other devolved countries such as Pakistan, where 70% - 
80% of fiscal transfers were earmarked for salaries [37].  Our study found moderate 
to wide decision space for human resources at county level, with local freedom to 
hire new permanent and non-permanent staff and fire poorly performing health 
workers as well as determining remuneration (within broad limits).  However, unlike 
Pakistan, central authorities in Kenya did not specify or earmark funds for salaries at 
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the county level [37].  While county authorities have the freedom to earmark funds 
at their level, respondents from only one county government reported having 
earmarked funds for salaries.  This means that while counties have the space to hire/ 
fire and manage staff, they also have the space to decide to reduce funds for salary, 
to be spent on another priority instead.  This allows counties the opportunity to 
distribute lower cadre workers within the county in a more realistic and needs-based 
manner than under central government, similar Tanzania and Mali [245], [266].   
Counties (particularly those considered marginalised) now experience greater 
degree of freedom to innovate in order to recruit and retain needed staff, with some 
counties having invested in renovating or building staff accommodation, others 
introducing higher salaries to attract health workers (see section 4.4.2).  The 
increased local authority and flexibility in hiring practices can increase competition 
between counties.  The implications of this may lead to increasing health workforce 
distribution inequities between counties, as occurred in other countries as a result of 
limited effective mechanisms to attract and retain staff [266], [267].   
One possible threat associated with the counties’ capacity to recruit new health 
workers is the preference for curative health workers.  This was acknowledged in 
Indonesia where local government priority was for medical officers, rather than 
public health professionals, due to the general perception that “health is a medical 
matter” (page 78 [268]).  Similarly in China, limited guidance and capacity building to 
support managers after decentralisation reforms was felt to have led to unwise 
management practices, resulting in over-treatment and neglect of preventive care 
[269]. 
Implications for CTC providers:  Recent national community health strategy revisions 
have led to variation and ad hoc implementation of parts of the strategy by county 
governments.  A recent survey of CHVs and CHEWs in Kenya found that 96% felt the 
county governments were not doing enough to support their work, due to lack of 
compensation.  This dissatisfaction has increased from 86% among CHVs and 84% of 
CHEWs who felt the national government had not done enough historically to 
support community health [270].  In the absence of guidance surrounding the limits 
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to adapting national strategy to local context, there is wide opportunity for 
innovation such as new CHV NCD screening role.  However, there is also the threat 
that health workers, particularly CHVs who have undergone limited training will 
experience an increasingly heavy workload without the supervision and ongoing 
training needed for good performance [10].  Given the withdrawal of financial 
support for CHV stipend by many donors and county discretion to provide stipends 
(or not), this creates inequitable working conditions for CHVs between counties, 
depending on the stance adopted by each county government. 
Implications for skilled health workers:  A number of challenges have arisen with 
human resource management post-devolution, with many counties struggling to 
ensure timely payment of staff, blamed on late transfer of funds from national level, 
in keeping with similar findings in Nigeria and Tanzania [231], [271].  Other challenges 
include limited future planning for human resources in some counties; perception of 
exclusion from decision-making processes by many health workers and lack of clarity 
for transfer of staff between counties.  Increased reporting of nepotism and political 
interference was a cause for growing concern in some counties, in keeping with 
findings from other decentralised countries [266], [267].  Another problem within 
Nairobi was the differential in the pay scale between national and county health 
workers.  This contrasts with Uganda, where pay scale differentials were harmonised 
prior to devolution [29].  If unaddressed this may lead to distortion in the numbers 
of health workers employed by national and county government as staff seek to 
pursue better employment conditions, as occurred in Nigeria [271].  There local 
government was responsible for employing primary health care workers but delays 
in funding transfers led to late and irregular salary payment.  Meanwhile secondary 
and tertiary health workers were employed by higher levels of government where 
salaries were higher and more regular.  As a consequence primary health care 
workers were attracted to leave their posts and seek employment where conditions 
were better [271].   
The possible implication of failing to address these challenges and discontent among 
staff, include health worker strikes, which have recurred in many counties since 
devolution began.  The most recent being the doctors strike which lasted two 
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months.  Some respondents expressed the opinion that human resource 
management should have remained under central government control due to 
inadequacies with human resource management by their local county authorities 
(see section 4.4.2).  This finding was in keeping with the transfer of health workers 
from national to local government in the Philippines, which brought adverse reaction 
among the staff, as a result of having been excluded from the decentralisation policy.  
In the Philippines, devolution initially brought a deterioration in employment 
conditions for devolved health workers, with lower salaries relative to central 
workers and unclear career progression [29], [237].  As a result health workers 
protested and lobbied for recentralisation of human resource management, which 
led to extensive changes in how human resources were managed and reduced local 
decision space for human resource management, and is a potential risk for Kenya 
[29].   
5.2.4 Access rules:  Mixed effects for health equity   
Since devolution has previously shown mixed effects for influencing health equity 
[67], [68], it is important that the equity of effective service coverage is monitored, 
with positive incentives and sanctions introduced by national level to encourage 
county governments to ensure that health needs of the most vulnerable are met.   
Availability:  National and county government are seeking to increase service 
availability by removing financial and geographic barriers, such as free maternal care, 
removal of user-fees, increasing insurance coverage for vulnerable groups and 
building infrastructure.  In addition to removal of user fees, there are pre-specified 
key populations identified by national government, who are entitled to 100% 
coverage with Kenya Essential Health Package (KEPH) services to be provided by 
county governments.  These groups (people living in congregate settings, children, 
youth, health workers, commercial sex workers, women, persons with disability, 
elderly, marginalised and religious/cultural communities, those living in hard to reach 
areas [22]) were largely reflected in our study when respondents were asked to 
identify dimensions which may increase someone’s vulnerability or ability to use 
health services (see section 4.5.2).  However, while the national health policy 
specifies that they should receive 100% of KEPH services it does not identify how it 
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should be provided.  This provides opportunity for innovation, but also carries with 
it the risk that the Essential Package of Health will only be loosely enforced, as 
occurred in Uganda [29].  There conditional grants were introduced to encourage 
primary health care spending and these could be considered in Kenya to guide 
decision-making which ensures provision of community-based primary health care 
[29].  However, it is still too soon to tell whether central measures to encourage 
primary health spending are needed.   
As a result of the lack of clarity, each county authority defines their own priority 
populations and specific interventions to target and address the needs of these 
groups.  Varied introduction of insurance coverage for selected groups has the 
potential to extend health coverage for the most poor.  Lessons could be learned 
from Switzerland, where a central ruling outlines that sub-national authorities should 
provide financial assistance for insurance premiums for those unable to pay them, 
but the sub-national authorities define the criteria which determine access to this 
assistance, leading to considerable differences in the economic burden of seeking 
healthcare  [272].  Given the differences between Kenyan counties where poverty 
levels vary between 22% to 88% living below the poverty line [198], careful review 
and evaluation of insurance coverage provided by county governments, is needed to 
ensure that the benefits of being able to identify the most vulnerable within each 
county does not lead to exclusion of certain vulnerable groups.  Care is needed to 
avoid widening gaps, as formerly marginalised counties may struggle to extend 
geographic coverage (through construction of facilities, investment in facility level 
health workers and CHVs), meanwhile trying to improve financial access for the large 
percentage of their population living below the poverty line.  
Utilisation:  While infrastructure expansion and refurbishment was almost 
universally described, there was limited description about investment in demand 
generation activities to promote the utilisation of these services.  While outpatient 
attendance was typically described as having increased, many health facilities 
continued to experience low uptake of skilled delivery as a consequence of 
inadequate community engagement.  In areas where community health approaches 
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had been adopted, respondents described the benefits of increased utilisation of 
facility services following CHV led demand generation (see section 4.5.7). 
This remains a relatively untapped area of opportunity which could be used to the 
mutual benefit of citizens, health workers and politicians.  County governments now 
have wide scope to innovate and experiment with increasing the acceptability and 
use of health services for all citizens, including the most vulnerable.  Lessons could 
be learned from a positive-deviant case in Indonesia, where one sub-national leader 
(similar to the governor) convinced the local parliament (similar to the county 
assembly) that “their interests would be best served by providing decent services to 
the local population, rather than pandering to party elites” (page5  [233]).  Strong 
leadership with a clear vision for improving health services led to increased quality 
and quantity of health services which improved health outcomes.  The improved 
services were hugely popular, leading to a landslide victory in the next election and 
providing impetus for other politicians to provide constituents with similar services 
thereafter [233]. 
Quality improvement and quality:  Differing national and county priorities 
Quality was notable by its absence in our study.  It was rarely described as a value for 
priority-setting and infrequently described as a priority which counties were seeking 
to address. 
Quality improvement:     This lack of focus on quality of health services following 
devolution was highlighted as a challenge by many respondents, despite increasing 
national focus on quality improvement mechanisms for health, as outlined through 
Vision 2030 and national health guidance documents, including quality improvement 
specific guidelines which identify the need for quality improvement teams within 
every county [228].  This contrasts with an earlier study of priority-setting in Kenya 
by Bukachi et al. (2013) conducted at district level prior to devolution.  In that study 
quality was considered the most important value held by decision-makers, along with 
other values which may be considered part of quality services such as honesty, 
patients dignity and openness [192].  Interestingly, equity or fairness were not 
described at that time as being important values (unlike in our study where these 
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were the most commonly held values).  It would be interesting to explore this in more 
depth, including reasons for why the emphasis has shifted from quality to equity in 
the values guiding decision-making, if this is the case.  Potential implications of 
limited identification of quality as a guiding value include possible deterioration in 
the quality of services over time, see below.   
Quality:  Quality of services provided does not appear to have improved since 
devolution, with new infrastructure lacking the needed staff and supplies to function, 
increased drug stock-outs, long queues, insufficient numbers of health workers 
significantly threatening quality of services in a number of counties.  Although many 
of these issues pre-date devolution, there have been limited measures to address 
these gaps (with the exception of recruitment of more health workers in many 
counties).  There does not appear to be any monitoring of the effective coverage of 
services available at new health facilities by national level.  Our finding of mixed (or 
in some cases deteriorating) quality of services in the first few years following 
devolution has been described elsewhere, with variation in service quality described 
between sub-national authorities in Zambia and the Philippines where quality of 
hospital care deteriorated alongside improving quality for other health services [29]. 
Meanwhile in Indonesia, service utilisation at public health facilities remained static, 
due to low quality of services provided by both public and private providers, which 
remained unaddressed, due to failure to monitor quality and lack of incentives for 
improvement [234].  It is important that quality improvement measures introduced 
by national government are adopted by county health management teams to 
monitor the quality of services as devolution progresses.   
5.2.5 Governance:  Mechanisms for accountability and transparency established 
but not always respected   
One of the driving forces for decentralisation was demand for greater citizen 
participation in decision-making.  Following devolution, there appears to be 
moderate governance space, but with a number of missed opportunities for including 
stronger community voice and participation.   
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Mechanisms for accountability and transparency:  In keeping with Brinkerhoff and 
Bossert (2008), the types of accountability mechanisms present in Kenya relate to 
the relationships between the three main groups of actors – state and citizens, 
provider and state  and provider and citizen [42].  These mechanisms and challenges 
experienced relating to these mechanisms, are highlighted in Table 15. 
Table 15 Accountability mechanisms and challenges for health priority-setting since 
devolution 
 Mechanism Challenges 
State and 
citizen 
Community votes for 
leaders during election. 
Public participation 
meetings. 
Community not adequately informed of their health 
rights and governance role relating to health. 
Inadequate funding for public participation limits 
attendance of poor. 
Failure to address underlying norms and beliefs, e.g. 
patriarchy, limits women’s participation in priority-
setting. 
State and 
provider 
Provision of budget to 
health facility. 
Provider participation in 
priority-setting. 
Limited relationship between budget submitted to 
county and budget received at health facility level. 
Limited opportunity for provider participation in 
priority-setting processes. 
Provider and 
citizen 
Community and health 
facility management 
committee. 
Committees not functioning in all areas. 
Cleary et al. (2013) identified a range of mechanisms for promoting internal and 
external accountability.  Many of these mechanisms have been established in Kenya, 
both before and since devolution (see Table 11).  Cleary et al.(2013) highlighted that 
accountability mechanism are influenced by resources, attitudes of actors and 
values, beliefs and culture of the system [43].  In keeping with these conclusions our 
findings reveal that accountability mechanisms introduced, have experienced a 
number of challenges (see Table 15).  In summary, these mechanisms can only be 
effective in so far as they are respected by all decision-making actors (actor attitude); 
that current limited investment in public participation meetings limits the 
opportunity for participation by marginalised groups (resources) and that failure to 
address the underlying beliefs and norms of the system, limits participation by 
marginalised groups, for example limited attendance and participation of women in 
areas with strong patriarchal norms (values, beliefs and culture).   
Three public participation meetings have been introduced within each annual 
planning and budget cycle.  However, we found limited community empowerment 
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to understand health, their decision-making role and to make informed decisions 
about health services.  These findings are in keeping with study by Lakin and Nyagaka 
in Kenya (see section 5.1.4) and studies from Tanzania and Philippines, which found 
that genuine community participation in health planning at the health facility level 
was hindered by lack of awareness among community members, with poor 
communication between levels, lack of clear roles and responsibilities, lack of 
management capacity within governing committee and lack of financial resources to 
implement identified activities  [241], [232].   
In other countries such as Mali, local governments took on an intermediary role 
between the community and the service provider, with communities communicating 
their needs or complaints regarding health services through their elected councillor, 
who then negotiated with providers and the technical decision-makers [245].  There 
is some evidence of this role for local government emerging in Kenya, with members 
of county assembly describing this as one of their main responsibilities.  Other 
mechanisms for raising awareness include the media (such as a public information 
campaign in Uganda), with public access to information found to be a strong 
deterrent to corruption [273]. 
Our study found challenges with ensuring the most hard-to-reach and ‘vulnerable’ 
members of the community were included in public participation meetings, with 
discussions often led by local elite.  This was in keeping with findings from a 
systematic review of health facility management committees, which acknowledged 
the influence of social hierarchies, economic and political division on participation in 
committees and “not infrequently health facility committees reflected these 
hierarchies and patterns of power and patronage”  (page 457 [274]).   Likewise review 
of community health committee minutes from Nigeria found that committees 
function and operate within existing social, cultural and religious norms.  Existing 
power asymmetries limit committee capacity to influence the government’s 
provision of health services [275].     
Introducing community governance structures, such as the new public participation 
forums occurs within the local political context.  As Rifkin (1986) identified any 
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decision which now involves people who “traditionally have not been included in that 
decision is a question of power and control” (page244 [276]).  This means that those 
who hold the power are now asked/ forced to agree to transfer this power.  Naturally 
this is likely to result in a range of conflicts.   
Barriers to accountability and transparency:  Devolution brings with it the fear that 
local elites may capture and redistribute resources through patronage systems [245], 
potentially leading to deepening inequities within counties.  Our data revealed 
evidence for this occurring in some study counties.  A recent study which assessed 
the newly elected governors in Kenya, found that candidates used existing patronage 
networks to consolidate support by emphasising their track record in delivering 
patronage, such as jobs.  This suggests the entrenchment of existing elites and 
patronage networks [25].  This was also reflected in Mali, Tanzania, Philippines and 
elsewhere, where after decentralisation patronage in the selection process for health 
workers was common [229], [245], [255], [266].  Political interference in health 
decision-making by local authorities, to obtain spurious benefits has been described 
both within our study and previous studies elsewhere [64], [241].   
Study in the Philippines and Brazil, highlight the need for careful and thorough 
consideration of the context, including longstanding norms such as corruption, 
patronage networks and paternalism before changing governance systems [232], 
[277].  Key recommendations applicable within Kenya include:   Activities to raise 
community and health committee awareness about their rights, governance and 
public participation; identifying and sharing key policies and guidance, building 
capacity and expertise for local governance institutions to monitor health expenses, 
ensure involvement of marginalised groups and training local governance institutions 
on negotiation strategies [232], [277]. 
5.3 Implications for health equity 
Equity was commonly described by respondents, both technical and to a lesser 
degree political, as both a driver for devolution and one of the values which should 
underpin the priority-setting process (see section 4.1.1 and section 4.3.2).    
308 | P a g e  
 
Discerning how equity is understood by different actors affords perspective to find 
out the reasoning behind decisions and why some priorities are favoured over others.  
National and county respondents tended to define improving equity in terms of 
increasing geographic and financial access to health services (see section 4.5.1).  This 
may in part explain the promotion of free maternal health, the building of new health 
facilities and purchase of ambulances to strengthen referral services topping their list 
of priorities.  In other counties strengthening community health approaches to reach 
more remote communities has been a top priority.  At health worker and community 
level, the need for effective coverage was identified – community respondents 
recognised that the available health services were not much use if they were 
ineffective (see section 4.3.5).  This was in keeping with findings from Tanzania 
following decentralisation, where users were concerned about both the availability 
and quality of services which were delivered [278].  Devolution reforms in Kenya have 
increased the availability of health facilities, through construction of new 
infrastructure, in keeping with  similar reforms in Tanzania following decentralisation 
[278].  However, despite increased availability of services, a number of community 
members still experience considerable challenges and barriers to using these as a 
consequence of intersecting dimensions of social inequality, such as geographic 
location, poverty level, religion, or disability (among others).   
5.3.1 Intersectionality approach to understanding power dynamics at community 
and household level and implications for health equity  
Applying aspects of intersectionality based policy analysis as outlined by Hankivsky 
et al. (2012) allows us to consider how people experience different social locations, 
which are created by the intersecting of different dimensions of social inequality and 
the societal structures which reinforce these (see Figure 31 and Figure 32).  Paying 
attention to how people experience different social locations permits us to consider 
how they benefit (or not) from the changing power dynamics, how they contribute 
their voice within health priority-setting (or not) and how they benefit (or not) from 
services following devolution in Kenya.   
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The following sections will seek to illuminate how various forces intersect with 
gender and other dimensions of social inequality to create barriers to full effective 
coverage with services by using examples from the results.   Where devolution has 
brought change which seeks to reduce inequity this is highlighted.   
Gender-related intersectionality analysis 
Gender roles and needs are key to achieving equity through decentralisation, as they 
affect men and women’s access to healthcare, health-seeking behaviours, health 
status and the way policies and programmes are designed and delivered [278].  
Women’s roles and needs are central to decentralisation processes, but have largely 
remained unstudied [278].   
Role of gender in leadership:  In Kenya, mechanisms have been introduced alongside 
devolution to address gender imbalance and inequality among county leaders, such 
as the ‘two thirds’ gender rule for county government leadership.  In our study this 
rule would appear to be followed to some degree, as some of the female politicians 
interviewed described (without probing) having been elected as a consequence of 
this rule.  Yet the fact that they were elected purely because there is a law which 
mandates their participation would indicate that their communities still view men as 
the best choice for leadership.  In an earlier study which assessed selection of 
governors in Kenya, no women were elected for governor, thought to be a 
consequence of women’s exclusion from existing patronage networks [25].  Clearly, 
there is still some way to go before women are considered equal to men in making 
decisions and participating in discussions about health, both at the county level and 
within their community, particularly for women who experience other intersecting 
dimensions such as geographic location, tribe and age.    This is in keeping with earlier 
study in Kenya, which found that while women were represented on committees for 
determining spending of Constituency Development Funds, they often held general 
positions rather than influential ones, such as the chair or secretary [17]. The 
implications of these findings reveal promising gender developments, with the 
introduction of the ‘two thirds’ gender rule, but need for development of guidance 
for promoting gender equity in health at the county level. 
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Role of gender among health workers, including CHVs:  “Gender plays a critical role 
in influencing the location of women and men in the health labour force and their 
subjective experiences” (page 75 [279]).  How men and women’s contributions are 
recognised and valued has consequences both professionally and personally [279].  
Women typically carry out more of the non-institutional care of the sick [280], [281].  
Even within the health workforce gender differentiation and hierarchies are 
common, with women being less likely than men to occupy senior professional, 
managerial or policy-making roles [281].   This was reflected in our study as captured 
in Table 13, where women occupied more of the low/ unpaid CHV/ CHV team leader 
positions compared with men and fewer of the mid-level to senior national positions.  
Given the withdrawal of financial support for CHV stipend by many donors and 
county discretion to provide stipends (or not), this creates inequitable working 
conditions for CHVs, particularly women, who were acknowledged to be more likely 
to continue working voluntarily after stipends finished, compared with men.  This is 
in keeping with previous study of lay health workers in South Africa, which found that 
most care work is done by women [282]. 
Gender was found to intersect with other dimensions such as geographic location as 
Table 7 indicates that for mid-level workers (including CHEWs and facility in-charges 
to sub-county officers) there were largely equal numbers of men and women 
interviewed in Nairobi, whereas in the more remote counties of Kitui and Marsabit, 
there were far more men than women in these positions interviewed.  Given that 
patriarchal norms were more commonly described in rural counties, particularly 
within nomadic communities in Marsabit, this has implications in terms of cause and 
effect for this imbalance, with gender imbalances in education and willingness to 
work in a more remote area leading to more men occupying these positions.  In terms 
of effect there may be potential barriers to women seeking care from a man, as a 
recent study among women from pastoralist communities in Kenya found that there 
was a sense of shame associated with being exposed during delivery, particularly if 
the nurse or doctor was male.  In that study some women described experiences of 
returning home without treatment in the event they found a male skilled birth 
attendant at the facility [283].  During discussions about human resource 
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management with county decision-makers, gender imbalance in the health 
workforce was not raised by respondents (neither was it explicitly probed). 
Gender and use of services:  Counties in Kenya are broadly classified as urban, 
agrarian or nomadic/ pastoralist, although some include both pastoralist and 
agrarian populations.  Pastoralist societies are patriarchal and women do not 
generally make major contributions to decision-making at community level, typically 
having limited power or control over assets or money [283].  At community level, we 
found limited evidence for changes to existing gender inequalities since devolution.  
Gender was found to intersect with a woman’s geographic location and occupation, 
for example women living in pastoralist settings were left behind, with no known 
source of income during dry season when the men left to seek pasture.    Societal and 
cultural norms and forces, such as patriarchy, which disempowers women and girls 
led to FGM, early marriage, low education for girls and low economic empowerment 
among girls from certain tribes and pastoralist communities.  This perpetuates a cycle 
where less empowered women and girls are at increased risk of complications during 
delivery, as a result of scarring from FGM and teen pregnancy as a result of early 
marriage.   
Deliveries to women who have undergone FGM are significantly more likely to be 
complicated by need for Caesarean section, post-partum haemorrhage and to need 
resuscitation of the infant with higher perinatal death, compared with deliveries to 
women who have not had FGM [284].  The increased likelihood of a complicated 
delivery and need for infant resuscitation may lead to neonatal morbidity and long 
term disability.  Intergenerational disempowerment may continue as respondents 
discussed, particularly within nomadic communities, where persons with disability 
encountered more stigma and greater barriers to joining public participation and 
receiving the healthcare they need, compared with persons without a disability.  For 
poor disabled persons living in remote areas opportunities to seek healthcare when 
they are unwell are further complicated by poverty, long distance, limited public 
transport and limited mobility, intersecting to erode their power and ability to seek 
medical care. Although not discussed by respondents in this study, employment 
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opportunities for persons with disability are lower than persons without disability.  In 
high income settings, women with disabilities earn considerably less than women 
without disabilities [152].  Within our study patriarchy was so strong and women so 
disempowered in selected communities, that the introduction of gender 
interventions among women to reduce occurrence of FGM were unable to change 
practices, as they failed to engage with men who continued to hold power and 
demanded that girls undergo FGM prior to marriage.  
Dimensions of social inequality such as gender, age, education, culture, poverty level, 
religion, geographic remoteness interact leading to a person’s unique social location 
which varies according to time and place.  These interactions and their effects may 
lead many pregnant women to continue to deliver at home with an unskilled 
attendant in some nomadic counties, despite heavy investment in new health 
facilities by county governments.  This is in keeping with a recent study of delivery 
practices among pastoralists in Kenya, which found that distance, poor roads, lack of 
funds for transport, difficulty obtaining transport, perception of disrespectful 
treatment at health facility, shame of delivering with male skilled birth attendant, 
lack of education, local cultural values associated with home delivery and supportive, 
respectful traditional birth attendant (TBA), interacted to explain why many 
pastoralist women continued to deliver at home, despite health services becoming 
more geographically accessible [283].  In some cases, the county government have 
improved accessibility in terms of financial and geographic aspects, but have not yet 
addressed the acceptability of skilled delivery by engaging with cultural and religious 
beliefs and community perception of health workers.  By contrast, counties studied 
which have introduced demand generation strategies, such as community health 
approaches, where CHVs and TBAs encourage pregnant women to attend have seen 
encouraging results, with one respondent in a nomadic county describing skilled 
delivery rates having increased from 8% to 42%.   
Gender norms at community level:  The photovoice research with youth provided a 
range of additional insights and the opportunity to learn more from those not 
typically included in health priority-setting, in keeping with the ‘diverse knowledge’ 
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principle applied within intersectionality based policy analysis [223].  Gender-based 
violence was commonly discussed, particularly in urban informal settlements, 
although it was also discussed in rural counties as well.  It was a common source of 
discussion among youth photographers in the informal settlement, where rape has 
unfortunately become commonplace, with participants commonly identifying places 
where girls would be at risk of being raped (see section 4.5.2).  A recent study of high 
school girls aged 14 – 21 years in Korogocho (where photovoice was conducted) and 
Kariobangi informal settlements, found that 24.5% reported having experienced 
sexual assault in the previous year [285].  Solutions identified by youth in our study 
dealt with the symptom of gender-based violence, such as building toilets within 
housing plots, rather than seeking to address the cause, by addressing women’s 
empowerment and perpetrator’s attitude towards women.  Addressing the complex 
interaction of risk and protective factors, relating to the individual, relationship, 
community and society [286] is necessary.  This will need to address factors such as 
level of  education among both victim of violence and perpetrator; alcohol abuse; 
challenging societal acceptance of violence and weak community sanctions in 
response to violence; challenge traditional gender and societal norms which may 
support violence and combatting poverty [286].  Findings from our study reflect the 
social factors which increase risk of experiencing gender-based violence.  It was most 
frequently discussed by participants who experienced many of these risk factors - 
adolescents, who were school drop-outs, living in an informal settlement with high 
levels of poverty and alcohol misuse in the community.  A possibility for girl’s 
empowerment may be self-defence, with a recent pilot in informal settlements in 
Nairobi finding that a six-week self defence programme with high school aged girls 
was found to reduce incidence of sexual assault from 24.6% at baseline to 9.2% at 
follow up [285].   
Broader intersectionality analysis:  Poverty within the informal settlement interacts 
with a vast number of other dimensions of social inequality to compound exposure 
to risks for ill health and is a factor in determining where someone lives.  In Nairobi 
this resulted in the poorest people living within informal settlements. The oppression 
generated by certain geographic contexts have previously been shown to be further 
314 | P a g e  
 
compounded by  extent of remoteness, unfair geographic access to services, lack of 
public transportation, environmental matters such as pollution and weather [152].  
Poverty is also known to be connected with limited education, as lack of money 
creates barriers to attending school and drives the need for an additional wage.  
According to the 2014 DHS, net attendance ratio for primary school attendance was 
71% for the lowest wealth quintile and 92.2% for the highest quintile [161].  Lack of 
education has been shown to negatively impact employment, which in turn impacts 
food and housing security [152].   
Employment is a marker for family and community wellbeing, with regular 
meaningful employment potentially providing a pathway out of poverty [152].  
However, within the informal settlement unemployment rates are high, with only 
42% having wage employment [287].  Scarce and inconsistent employment 
opportunities compound poverty and limit choice and power for those seeking work.  
Limited education, age and living within an informal settlement interact to produce 
limited employment opportunities which can lead residents, including OVCs and 
others to undertake jobs with negative health implications, such as brewing 
‘chang’aa’ illegally, which was considered by respondents to be associated with 
dangers, such as alcohol abuse and risky sexual behaviour increasing potential 
exposure to HIV (see section 4.5.2).  Alcohol abuse is another risk factor for gender-
based violence, as described above.  Scavenging on dump sites was associated with 
health implications such as respiratory infections through burning of rubbish, 
wounds and wound infections, as a result of working without needed protective 
equipment (see section 4.5.2).  Previous study of air pollution, in part caused by 
burning rubbish in informal settlements in Nairobi (including Korogocho), found that 
respondents expressed sentiments of fatalism when asked about air pollution, 
demonstrating a lack of agency to be able to respond and address the air pollution 
where they live [288].  The low pay received from scavenging – enough only for the 
day, would compound any illness, as a result of lack of time or money to attend the 
local health facility in the event they were unwell.  This intersection of poverty and 
lack of education was highlighted in an intersectionality analysis of violence in 
Mexico, where lack of alternative opportunities led men (in this context gendered 
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expectations meant that men were obligated to provide financially for their families), 
to take jobs which placed them at increased risk of exposure to violence [158].   
However, as photovoice respondents highlighted, living in an informal settlement did 
not result in standard exposure to risk factors for ill health.  There was myriad 
variation between and within villages, even within the one informal settlement.  
Respondents highlighted variation in income, levels of nutrition (with some 
households owning a cow or a sack-based kitchen garden), standard of housing, 
access to amenities such as latrine, access to schools, levels of (in)security within the 
same informal settlement.  This variation in exposure to risk factors within a single 
informal settlement and their impact on an individual’s vulnerability, highlights how 
multiple dimensions intersect together within the lives of residents, leading to varied 
social location and levels of vulnerability and resilience.  This variation is in keeping 
with an intersectionality  analysis of HIV and disability [156], which found that the 
manner in which these two determinants intersected in the lives of respondents, 
resulted in a range of outcomes for their access to health services.  Some experienced 
negative outcomes, as a result of oppression and stigma, but some had positive 
experience due to receiving supportive treatment from health workers, with their 
disability acting as a “catalyst for better health-promoting behaviours” [156].  
Implications for action are described in the next section. 
Use of photovoice participatory photography as a research method allowed for a 
more in-depth consideration of health behaviours and life hazards among youth in 
Korogocho informal settlement.  Through use of this method the youth 
photographers were able to develop skills of critical analysis in considering their 
environment.  This was visible as images captured and discussed progressed in 
tackling issues of power as the research continued, with youth initially sharing 
photographs of rubbish and sewage and later sharing photographs which highlighted 
issues of power imbalance.  Some of these photographs included images which 
highlighted locations where girls may be at risk of rape, images of community 
members scavenging rubbish, due to lack of other employment options.  In addition, 
the photovoice research drew out dimensions of social inequality and how they 
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intersect.  Findings generated through this method highlighted the variation in 
vulnerability and power experienced by citizens living within the same informal 
settlement, providing a depth of understanding which would not have been achieved 
without its use.  Further discussions would be useful to explore more about the 
underlying reasons for power imbalances highlighted by the youth photographers.   
5.3.2 Opportunities to address forces which lead to exclusion through intersectoral 
approaches 
The social justice principle within intersectionality emphasises “the transformation 
of social structures in equitable ways” (page118 [208]).  Social determinants for 
health are inter-related and intersect in the lives of individuals and communities.  
Changing one dimension may well affect others (even more in the fast moving 
context following devolution) and so integrated health, social and economic actions 
are needed within the design of health and social systems, to achieve equitable 
health and welfare [44].  In considering which interventions can improve 
participation and the degree to which people of varying social locations (resulting 
from multiple intersecting dimensions of social inequality) benefit from health 
services, intersectoral approaches employed in Latin American countries have shown 
some degree of success.  This success has contributed towards improving population 
health outcomes and addressing equity (see section 2.3.3) [44].  Within our study 
there was limited discussion about adoption of these approaches employed 
following devolution so far, with the exception of one county which was seeking to 
overhaul the community health approach and integrate it with other services such as 
agriculture, to provide integrated community level services which can tackle 
underlying social determinants (see case study 1).  Devolution provides the chance 
for revitalisation of Kenya’s approach to service delivery. The three main 
opportunities presented by devolution and examples from Latin America are 
highlighted in Table 16. 
 
317 | P a g e  
 
Table 16 Opportunities for intersectoral action and lessons from Latin America 
Opportunity presented by 
devolution 
Lessons from Latin America [44] 
1. New governance 
structures which are 
closer to the 
community to identify 
community needs and 
priorities 
Social participation is essential for mobilising political support for 
policies and sustaining changes brought about through the re-
distribution of power, for example in Brazil where social participation 
is central to health system governance.  It also strengthens 
democracy as decision-makers take into account citizens’ views, e.g. 
in Cuba and Venezuela (with socialist regimes) social participation in 
the development of public policy is encouraged.  Inclusion of 
marginalised groups is crucial. 
2. County scope to tailor-
make community-
based primary health 
care services which 
benefit all citizens 
Sustained investment in promotion and prevention measures that 
address the social determinants of health are needed, along with 
stronger community level monitoring and use of data about health 
and social inequities.  Brazil’s community-based family health 
programme provides an excellent example of this (explained more 
fully in section 5.3.3. 
3. The ability to identify 
marginalised groups 
and in collaboration 
with other 
departments to plan 
actions which not only 
increase their access 
and use of health 
services, but also 
change their social 
determinants for 
health.  
The importance of addressing demand-side (such as providing cash 
transfers), as well as the supply-side of interventions is crucial to 
uptake of services.  Targeted measures for marginalised populations 
similar to ‘Bolsa Familia’ seeks to create employment opportunities 
(through actions that create employment and income generating 
opportunities, including access to means of production, technical 
assistance to increase production and access to markets), to increase 
access to public services and provide income transfers for families in 
poverty in Brazil.  Increased support and links to social programmes 
for more disadvantaged households with children under-five years in 
Chile or nutrition and child care for children from poor households in 
Colombia. 
However, despite the positives which have resulted from intersectoral action in Latin 
American countries, there is still room for improvement.  Lessons learned which 
could be applied in Kenya include the need for involvement and strengthened 
capacity for managerial processes at sub-national and community levels and 
flexibility within budgeting to enable empowerment and freedom for local actors to 
jointly address problems and find solutions [44].   
5.3.3 What are the implications for access, utilisation and effective coverage?   
Interestingly throughout discussions with those involved with setting priorities, there 
was much discussion about the fact that equity was a driver for devolution and the 
importance of equity when setting priorities.  However, there was a dearth of 
discussion about how decisions which promote and extend universal health coverage 
and equity are made.  Some counties are seeking to extend community and primary 
care services for all, and are attempting to ensure that vulnerable and disadvantaged 
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groups are not left behind.  Meanwhile, other counties have lost sight of the strategy 
identified in the World Health Report for realising UHC, that services should first be 
categorised into priority services, with expansion of high priority services for 
everyone first and a focus on ensuring that vulnerable groups are not left behind [7].  
The following section will consider our study’s findings in light of the access, 
utilisation and quality/effective coverage components of the Tanahashi framework 
(see Figure 5).   
Accessibility – availability and affordability:  In the push to address geographic 
access, many counties have sought to build new health facilities and extend curative 
services, but public health and population measures such as promotive, preventive 
and rehabilitative services, which are all necessary for universal health coverage have 
been neglected to varying degrees [7], [92].   
Investment in infrastructure and equipment have been focused across both primary 
health facilities and hospitals.  While primary health care has previously been 
demonstrated to be pro-poor, public hospitals in Kenya have historically been 
primarily used by the rich, with the richest quintile benefiting from two thirds of all 
hospital outpatient services [289].  Hospitals can quickly absorb vast amounts of 
money.  In Kenya they have previously consumed 50% of the health budget [289].  It 
is therefore crucial that hospital construction and refurbishment which will primarily 
benefit the rich, does not undermine community-based primary health care services 
which can benefit all.   
While a minority of counties have sought to build demand for services, this has 
commonly been neglected, with underinvestment in community health approaches, 
including CTC providers, limited health worker in-service training to build quality 
care, weakened supply chain in some areas, limited community empowerment to 
understand health and increase knowledge, attitudes and care-seeking practices and 
address social determinants within the home.  Emphasis on infrastructure over 
quality, as perceived by users, was demonstrated following decentralisation in 
Tanzania and Indonesia [278], [290].  There local leadership were poorly informed 
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about health, lacking the understanding to recognise the benefits of public health 
services [290].   
Acceptability and utilisation:  As Figure 5 indicates, in order to attain universal health 
coverage services must also be acceptable to the population if they are to be utilised.  
Demand-side barriers including cultural and religious barriers, decision-making and 
gender autonomy and access to knowledge and information about health and 
services are all barriers which must first be addressed and overcome if health services 
are to be used [8].  Similar to other countries, devolved counties have generally been 
slow to approach these barriers [104].  In one nomadic area a new health facility had 
opened, but the community had not been engaged and so when a pregnant woman 
started bleeding she did not seek care at the health facility and instead died at home, 
without ever attending (see section 4.4.6).  Community health approaches can 
address and reduce many of these barriers [9], alleviating and reducing the forces 
which reinforce exclusion and thereby helping to improve acceptability and use of 
services.   
Many technical decision-makers across counties have recognised the benefits of 
community health approaches, but in the absence of adequate political and 
community demand, there has been limited investment and hence limited action to 
expand and strengthen quality community health services.  Brazil’s central 
government had the vision to introduce a community-based Family Health 
Programme, providing preventive and curative care through a multi-disciplinary 
team including one doctor, one nurse, one nurse assistant and six CHWs [107].  Each 
Family Health team works in a specific geographical area, right down to the 
household level, where they are responsible to enrol and monitor the population’s 
health status providing primary care and referrals to other levels of care as needed 
[107].  While these services initially started in the poorest areas, they have 
consistently expanded to cover over 90% of the population over a fifteen-year 
period.  Similar to community health in Kenya, while it was originally conceived as a 
national programme, the responsibility for implementation now rests with the sub-
national level [107].  The success and improved health equity resulting from the 
programme, has been the result of collaboration and co-ordination between central 
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and sub-national levels.  The central government provide a per capita payment for 
community-based primary care services, paid directly to the sub-national 
municipalities, while sub-national municipalities defined and implemented their own 
context appropriate model.  They hired the work force and maintain management of 
the programme, including co-financing the programme, collecting and analysing 
information and evaluating and supervising the family health teams [107]. 
Effective coverage:  Quality was rarely described as a value for priority-setting and 
infrequently described as a priority which counties were seeking to address.  Instead, 
quality gaps such as limited functionality of community health services, lack of 
consistent drug supply chain in some counties, lack of funds to support supervisors 
for transport to carry out their tasks were described.  As a result of the perceived lack 
of quality at public health facilities a ‘rich-poor’ divide was evident (see section 4.4.5).  
The less poor seek care at a private facility and those who can’t afford this, use public 
health services, seek informal treatment from a traditional healer or informal drug 
seller or are simply unable to seek medical assistance at all.  While this is not a new 
phenomenon since devolution in Kenya, county governments have so far 
demonstrated little commitment to improving the quality of health services at public 
health facilities.  In fact some of the interventions introduced prior to devolution to 
promote quality, such as transferring funds directly from the national treasury to 
health facility bank accounts [289], have potentially been undermined as a result of 
the control of funds at county treasury level, leading to delayed and lower transfers 
to health facility bank accounts.  If not addressed, this may lead to similar outcomes 
as Indonesia, where following devolution there was a greater divide between rich 
and poor, with rich patients attending private health facilities and poor patients 
attending public health facilities, where the service quality was perceived to be poor 
as a result of doctors having moved to private practice following devolution and 
limited stocks of drugs at public facilities [263].   
In summary, actions to expand primary health infrastructure and strengthen referral 
systems will lead to improved availability and geographic access to health services.  
The free maternal health policy and free services at dispensary and health centre will 
promote affordability and increase financial access to services.  When wisely 
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implemented these are needed improvements to attaining universal health coverage 
and will strengthen the supply of health services.  However, three additional features 
should be considered if acceptability, use and quality of services are to be improved.   
1. Ensure full coverage with a community-based element to primary health care 
with CHVs, CHEW and facility nurses working in collaboration to provide 
comprehensive preventive and curative services at the health facility, in the 
home and in the community, similar to the Family Health Programme in Brazil 
[235]. 
2. Strengthen community understanding of health, their role in priority-setting and 
governance, building capacity for genuine engagement and ownership for health. 
3. National government to monitor service coverage and quality, by keeping track 
of county health management team’s achievement of performance contract 
indicators, drug availability, client satisfaction etc. and implementing sanctions 
as needed, rather than the ‘soft-approach’ adopted in the Philippines, where 
deteriorating service quality and failure to provide basic services remained 
unaddressed [229]. 
5.4 Choice of frameworks  
In approaching the discussion I have chosen to adopt four different frameworks, to 
create a new conceptual framework within which to analyse the study findings (see 
Figure 5).  Given the importance of power dynamics within the findings an 
intersectionality lens was applied, to consider changing power and privilege following 
devolution.    Multiple frameworks were selected and combined, in order to provide 
the means within which to analyse the differing facets of the study of priority-setting 
processes for health over time.  In this section I will briefly highlight some of the 
reasons for selection of these frameworks and limitations associated with their use.   
5.4.1 Reasons for selection and limitations 
In order to analyse the actors and the process for devolution I quickly became aware 
of the highly political nature of the priority-setting process and the importance of the 
changing power dynamics in the early years since devolution commenced.  After 
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initially considering one of the more traditional forms of political economy analysis, 
I instead selected the framework by Walt and Gilson (1994), due to its wide 
application for evaluating health policy and its strong commonality with political 
economy concepts [53], [244].  I found it most useful when applied to analysis of the 
process of reforms.  While the accountability for reasonableness framework was 
used to guide development of the topic guide, the proceduralist conditions within 
Barasa et al. (2015) framework were used to evaluate the process of priority-setting.  
This selection was made because study findings were more closely reflected by this 
framework (based on systematic review) than by the accountability for 
reasonableness framework.  The second half of the Barasa et al. (2015) framework 
for consequentialist outcomes was not applied as some of these had not been the 
focus of data collection.   Bossert’s (1998) decision space mapping approach provided 
scope to examine the consequences of decentralisation’s reforms and the resulting 
degrees of choice afforded to the various actors, by evaluating the sub-national 
government characteristics, ability to innovate and performance of the health system 
[28].  While there is some degree of overlap with the health policy analysis 
framework in examining how incentives provided by central national actors can 
influence behaviour by sub-national actors to bring about positive outcomes, the 
analysis of the performance of the health system adds further perspective.  Finally, 
given the focus of this thesis on health equity and community health there needed 
to be a robust analysis of how power played out through priority-setting in terms of 
the effective coverage of health services.  However, equity is inadequately 
considered through the Bossert framework (1998), which only seeks to assess 
targeting of priority populations by sub-national authorities.  Nor is it explicitly 
described in the Walt and Gilson framework.  The Tanahashi model (1978) was 
selected to analyse the equity implications following devolution, given its ability to 
analyse the various aspects of coverage (availability, accessibility, acceptability, first 
contact, effective coverage) and to identify potential bottleneck areas which can 
impede effective coverage [99].   
The role of the CTC provider was not expressly included in any of the frameworks 
selected.  I made the decision not to introduce a further framework to specifically 
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assess community health-related findings as I felt that CTC providers are already 
positioned within the frameworks described.  I therefore sought to highlight their 
position as an actor in the Walt and Gilson (1994) and Barasa et al. (2015) 
frameworks; implications of devolution for community health performance through 
the Bossert (1998) framework and the mechanisms through which they can improve 
effective health coverage through the Tanahashi (1978) framework.  However, to 
some degree the latter half of the second objective ‘Explore felt impact of devolution 
for the health system, particularly delivery of community health services’ may be 
less comprehensively analysed than the other objectives.  This may be as a 
consequence of the decision not to add an additional community health specific 
framework or as a result of the limitations in the methodology.  It may also reflect a 
gap in the design of devolution and the thinking of county decision-makers, resulting 
in CTC providers not yet adequately included in priority-setting in such a way that 
realises their potential role in empowering their community and strengthening 
linkages with the health system.  It is therefore not a surprise that they are somewhat 
silenced in the findings. 
5.4.2 Reflections on conceptual framework 
Reflecting back on the conceptual framework, having now completed the study, 
there are a number of limitations.  Firstly, the framework as originally presented 
demonstrates a linear relationship between the process, the content of priorities set 
and the degree of equity within the health system.  As this study has indicated 
priority-setting is a complex and adaptive process, just as the process influences the 
priorities and equity, so changes occurring following implementation of priorities can 
influence community empowerment, which in turn can influence equity, the priority-
setting process and priorities set.  In addition, this study has highlighted the 
importance of an analysis of the expressions and forms of power at play during 
priority-setting (section 4.3.2.), the leadership capacity (section 5.1.4.) and 
governance and accountability mechanisms (section 5.2.5.) between state actors, 
health providers and citizens.  In response to these reflections, I have modified the 
original conceptual framework to better accommodate and reflect upon these 
findings (see Figure 34).   The revised framework seeks to link together  
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1) Three governance principles necessary for successful reforms, as identified by 
Brinkerhoff and Bossert (2008), namely:  build and reinforce political will for 
reform; balance supply-side interventions with support for demand; and 
integrate health governance with health systems operations, financing, and 
capacity building. 
2) Acknowledgement of how the socio-economic and political context impacts 
social determinants of health, accountability mechanisms and the priority-setting 
process, the content of priorities set and actors expressions of power in line with 
Walt and Gilson (1994) model for health policy analysis as included within the 
original framework.  In addition, after reflecting on the central importance of 
power the framework now includes the four expressions of power as identified 
by Veneklasen (2002).   
3) Identifications of how these factors combine to influence the availability of health 
services, along with an individual’s ability to afford, accept, access and use these 
services and ultimately the effectiveness of services provided in line with 
Tanahashi framework (1978) as identified in the original framework.   
In addition, due to the dynamic nature of the process arrows have been added to 
highlight how changes to community empowerment to demand services, can 
influence uptake and use of services and vice versa.   
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Figure 34 Revised conceptual framework 
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5.5 Study limitations 
The limitations for this study relate to three key areas, including generalizability, 
community and CTC provider insights and position as a foreign researcher.  With the 
benefit of hindsight, I would ensure that questions and probes which explored the 
role of CTC providers and community members were included during interviews or 
discussions with respondents at these levels.  In addition, I would plan to include 
observations and review of minutes from public participation meetings, to learn 
more about the extent to which CTC provider and community members are involved 
and lead priority-setting discussions at these meetings.  Along with the extent to 
which priorities identified during these meetings are included within county annual 
work plans and budgets.     
Generalizability: The 47 counties in Kenya are extremely diverse with a wide range 
of demographic, geographic, social, cultural and economic differences, leading to 
possible limitations with the generalizability of findings.  Given the extent of diversity, 
ten counties were purposively selected in order to try to ensure as much diversity of 
findings as possible.  While no two counties are the same, the inclusion of such a 
breadth of counties seeks to ensure that the net for learning lessons has been thrown 
over a wide area, allowing for learning of best practices and challenges.    
Another limitation has been that while county decision-makers from ten counties 
were interviewed, sub-county and health workers from only three counties and 
REACHOUT community level data from two counties were included as a result of time 
and resource constraints.  However, despite the reduced number of counties 
included for greater depth of investigation, the three counties selected ensured 
representation according to rural agrarian, nomadic and urban, with varied levels of 
poverty and diversity regarding approaches to community health following 
devolution.   
Photovoice research was carried out in one informal settlement in one county only, 
thereby having limited generalizability of findings.  However, while some of the issues 
photographed and discussed were context specific, such as illness relating to rubbish 
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collection, many of the findings were triangulated by respondents across health 
systems levels across multiple counties, such as challenges with drug stock-outs and 
insufficient health workers. 
Community and CTC provider insights to priority-setting:  A leading limitation of the 
study was that community and CTC provider insights into the priority-setting process 
and their role within public participation and other community meetings were not 
directly sought, as questions and probes relating to this were not included within 
topic guides.  This was as a result of the community data having been collected 
through the REACHOUT study baseline, prior to the rest of the study and before 
identifying the need to include questions and probes in this area.  However, 
perspectives were sought directly from other levels and some community 
respondents discussed priority-setting to some degree, even though not directly 
probed.  This would be an important area for future research. 
Position as a foreign researcher:  As a foreigner, respondents may have felt more or 
less able to share openly their true opinions and feelings about devolution as 
reflected upon in section 3.1.  Due to the sensitive nature of some of the discussions 
about devolution, respondents may have been hesitant to share their true opinion.  
Respondents were advised that all findings would be anonymised and data would be 
kept confidential in order to try to allay some of the fears which they may have held.  
Further, as a foreign researcher from the former colonising UK, perhaps some 
respondents may not have wanted to discuss possible factors which influence 
priority-setting, such as impacts of colonialism which impacted the importance of 
tribe in priority-setting in some counties.   
I found that in general most respondents were extremely accommodating.  They 
found time in busy schedules to meet with me and demonstrated a genuine 
willingness to share their opinions and experiences.  Upon reflection it is unclear to 
what extent this may have been influenced by my position as a foreign researcher, 
or whether there was a degree of power which I held by nature of my ‘outsider’ 
status, in gaining access to meet with a considerable number of elite decision-
makers.  Or whether it was predominantly a genuine interest in research and desire 
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to contribute to improving health, after devolution from the respondents. Many 
respondents were keen to receive feedback about the study findings and so 
disseminating research findings will form an important study component.  
Community dissemination of photovoice findings was carried out as part of the study 
and plans are underway to share findings with national and international actors at a 
conference to be held in Nairobi, to produce policy brief and to meet with national 
level community health actors through REACHOUT symposium and to explore 
opportunities to disseminate with county executive committee members for health.  
Preliminary findings were also considered during development of the SQALE research 
project which seeks to embed a culture of quality improvement by strengthening 
leadership and coordination at national, county and community level. 
As a foreign researcher from a position of privilege in a high income country, whether 
I should in fact be researching and studying priority-setting in the context of a middle-
income country, has been a subject of much consideration for me.  While presenting 
at a recent international conference, my foreign status presenting research from 
Kenya was pointed out as less than ideal by an audience member.  Would it be more 
suitable for a local Kenyan researcher to conduct this study instead?  While there are 
benefits which I as a ‘neutral’ outsider, able to travel to multiple counties across the 
country can bring to the research, do these justify my having carried out this study?  
And to what degree will stakeholders be open to acknowledging recommendations 
from this study?  Ultimately, I have not yet reached a conclusion surrounding the 
value (or not) of my position in conducting this research.  However, from a reflexivity 
and intersectionality position I have sought to acknowledge and make this explicit.  
5.6 Recommendations 
This thesis approached priority-setting for health at sub-national (county) level in 
Kenya by applying an intersectionality approach and framing findings according to 
the study conceptual framework (Figure 5).  Since this study has been conducted 
during the early years in the process of devolution, there is ample opportunity to 
maximise the opportunities provided by devolution through introduction of timely 
interventions.  As a result, 12 recommendations are identified. 
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National Level Recommendations 
1) Collaboration between national and county level governments to identify clear 
processes for the filtering and selection of priorities, including categorisation of 
services into priority classes (high, medium, low), budget and other guidance, 
cost-effectiveness, priority for most vulnerable, financial risk protection 
principles.  These processes should be shared with the full community.   
2) Monitoring of key public health indicators (such as immunisation and family 
planning) by national departments, with introduction of measures to ensure 
adequate funding towards public health, community-based primary health care 
services, such as:   
a) Targeted capacity building for wise decision-making 
b) Use of conditional grants to encourage public/community-based primary 
health approaches 
c) Consideration of quota or earmarking of funds for public/community-based 
primary health interventions, as and where needed to ensure counties fulfil 
their mandate to provide essential health services for their constituents. 
3) Working together with counties to integrate community health approaches 
within primary health care, generating more integrated community-based 
primary health care.  National level to craft an advocacy plan to promote 
community and political demand for community-based primary health care 
services, such as media campaign and introduction of uniform to increase CHV 
visibility within communities.   
4) Encouraging innovation within counties (for example from case study county 2 or 
training CHVs to screen for NCDs) by monitoring and encouraging county-to-
county sharing of best practices.  National level to provide clear guidance about 
what aspects of services are non-negotiable and must be provided and which are 
open for re-invention to better meet local communities’ needs. 
5) Clarifying roles and responsibilities for county, sub-county level workers, health 
workers at facility and community level and community members, including 
those considered ‘marginalised’ in priority-setting for health.  Counties to ensure 
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capacity building is carried out for all decision-making actors to understand role, 
priority-setting processes and negotiation skills. 
6) Collaboration of national and county levels to harmonise central and county 
salaries, establish clear career progression and promotion guidance (for facility 
level and close-to-community providers) and clarification surrounding inter-
county transfers.  Celebrating and supporting strong county level transparency 
and collaboration between technical and political decisions makers throughout 
the priority-setting process. 
County Level Recommendations 
7) Build capacity of decision-makers (both technical, political actors and at 
community level) to understand health holistically, maintaining health, through 
community health approaches, equity and universal health coverage principles.    
Involve CHVs throughout the process to share their experiences with politicians 
and clinical decision-makers and to build capacity at community level.  Building 
capacity of community and CHVs to understand the promotive and preventive 
aspects of health care in order to develop their ‘power to’ hold political actors to 
account by demanding holistic health care, in order to resolve the current 
emphasis on politically appealing infrastructure and ambulance services. 
8) Ensure governance and accountability measures, such as public participation are 
meaningful, by introducing public deliberation concepts such as providing 
community members with easily understood information about the range of 
choices available to them, the reasoning behind those choices and the process 
for filtering choices.  Reducing the knowledge imbalance can contribute to 
developing ‘power within’ and encouraging ‘power to’ participate in priority-
setting by community members.  This could be monitored by reviewing meeting 
minutes for the priorities identified by community against technical priorities and 
related budget allocation.  Innovative approaches to ensure participation in 
priority-setting from those considered ‘marginalised’, such as women only 
meetings in certain contexts or use of social media platforms with youth. 
9) Ensure a quality focus at each level within existing accountability mechanisms, so 
that as coverage extends functionality is maintained.  For example, county 
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decision-makers should seek to incorporate community feedback about the 
effectiveness of services provided in priority-setting processes.  This could include 
feedback collected through established channels, such as community dialogue 
days, complaints box at health facility or member of county assembly feedback 
from constituents.  New opportunities should be explored including monitoring 
of local news reporting of concerns or establishment of a quality platform 
through social media.    
10) Recruitment of trained and experienced human resource managers within county 
public service boards, with earmarking of funds for staff salaries within the 
county.  Build county procurement capacity.  Build stronger platforms to engage 
health workers (community and health facility level) in priority-setting and in 
demanding fair treatment from county public service boards, in order to build 
‘power within’ and encourage their participation and sharing of ‘power with’ 
other actors in priority-setting.  Ensure that health worker involvement in public 
participation meetings is included as part of their job description.  Establish two-
way feedback platforms for health workers to confidentially report and receive 
feedback about unfair treatment to county level management.  
11) Counties to consider further partial decentralisation to sub-county, health facility 
and community unit level, with needed governance mechanisms in place, to 
accommodate local problem solving and ensure funding for needed activities 
currently neglected in many places under devolution, such as funding for travel 
for supervisors.  
12) Ensure that equity is a focus when tracking service coverage and uptake, by 
expanding high-priority services for everyone and ensuring that vulnerable 
groups are not left behind.  County government to identify vulnerable groups 
within their county and then to build capacity for data collection and use, such as 
community score cards/ barriers to service uptake by close-to-community 
providers, who should be tasked with ensuring participation of vulnerable 
groups.  Prioritise sharing and use of community level data to develop tailored 
approaches at community, health facility, sub-county and county levels in 
planning; track locations of new health facilities built and operational; build skills 
of health workers to monitor percentage uptake of services such as skilled 
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delivery, by calculating estimated target for health facility catchment population 
groups.   
5.7 Further research 
Over the course of this study I have identified a number of key areas for further 
research.  In response I recommend: 
1.  Further study of community and CHV role within priority-setting during public 
participation and other forums, combining observation of these meetings with 
qualitative interviews and discussion to explore how community members and CHVs 
are involved (or not) with priority-setting, how these meetings are facilitated and 
how this influences the selection of priorities.  This should include a particular focus 
on observing the presence and participation (or not) of vulnerable groups, along with 
discussions to explore their participation.   
2. Tracking county budget spending towards community-based primary health care.  
This will need break down of the county budget to provide this detail, which is not 
currently available in most county budgets, in order to allow researchers to track 
spending towards this fundamental health service as time progresses. 
3. Triangulation of this broad outsider perspective with deeper insider perspectives 
on devolution, health and equity. 
4. Study of leadership practices adopted by key county level actors involved with 
guiding the priority-setting process.  This study could include observation of how 
meetings are facilitated, in-depth interviews with leaders and other decision-makers 
about leadership approach used.   
5.7 Contribution to new knowledge 
This thesis is the first study of post-devolution priority-setting processes in Kenya of 
this scale.  It seeks to triangulate findings across multiple counties and between 
respondents from national, county, health worker, close-to-community provider and 
community level.  By using qualitative methods to explore priority-setting processes, 
with application of participatory photography to explore equity it also provides 
insights through the eyes of those considered ‘disadvantaged’ to how social 
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determinants of health effect day-to-day life in an urban informal settlement. This 
thesis is the first known study to apply an intersectionality lens to interpret how 
changing power dynamics following decentralisation intersect to influence how and 
why priorities are set, who is involved (or not involved in the process) and how this 
influences the access, use and effective coverage of health services.  It brings a 
unique approach to analysis following health systems reform.   
In addition, it has progressed conceptual framing of power, politics and process 
surrounding health reforms and their equity implications, leading to development 
and progression of a conceptual framework.  This is the first known framework to 
bring together lenses for power, politics, governance, priority-setting, decision-
space, equity and intersectionality.  It is potentially of use for other researchers 
seeking to conduct holistic health systems reform research.  Combined together 
these insights provide contemporary and multi-faceted findings, analysis and 
recommendations about priority-setting and its implications for health equity.  
5.8 Conclusion: How might devolution influence Kenya’s progress towards UHC? 
The rationale for the Kenyan devolution process was driven by the need to ensure 
responsiveness to county contexts and has had positive ramifications for health 
equity in previously neglected counties. However, the rapidity of the process 
combined with limited technical capacity and guidance has meant that decision-
making and prioritisation have been captured for political and power interests.  
Mitchell and Bossert (2010) point out the need to consider two questions for 
decentralisation – ‘are you doing the right thing?’ and ‘are you doing the thing right?’  
They suggest that provided conditions of good governance exist, then decentralising 
the health sector is the right thing to do [37].  The findings from this study would 
suggest that by devolving health services, Kenya is doing the right thing in the long 
term, by bringing decision-making closer to communities and increasing 
opportunities to reduce inequities, improve efficiency and responsiveness of county 
development.  Governance mechanisms have been established through the two 
arms of the county government – county executive committee and county assembly.  
With channels for community participation and governance through existing health 
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facility boards and management committees and the new public participation 
meetings in place.  However, in response to the second question ‘are you doing the 
thing right?’ the findings from this study conducted in the immediate post-devolution 
era would suggest that considerable improvements still need to be made.  Devolution 
has presented a myriad of opportunities - some have already been grasped, but many 
have yet to be fully realised.  In light of learning from other contexts we identify key 
recommendations for how to address inadequacies and build on early successes.   
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Appendices 
Appendix 1:  Priority-setting, Devolution and Community Health Topic Guide 
Many thanks for agreeing to the interview, I would like to start by asking you about 
how decisions are made and priorities set in this county  
Priority-setting 
1. Please tell me more about your role, relating to health within the county 
2. Who are the main people involved with making decisions/setting priorities about 
health services in this county 
3. What are the health priorities specific for this county? 
4. How are priorities set for health in this county? 
5. How do you make decisions about service provision for health priorities in the 
district? 
Relevance/criteria 
6. What kind of information is used for priority-setting? 
7. What factors/criteria/values are taken into account when setting priorities? 
8. In your opinion do you think the process is relevant to the needs and challenges 
of your county? 
Implementation 
9. Please describe how your priorities are implemented 
Communication  
10. What happens after a decision is made? 
a. How do you disseminate the priorities set? 
b.  Do you think that the process you have described is publicly accessible?   
c. How do you communicate with the recipients of priorities?   
Equity 
11. What is your understanding of equity/fairness? 
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12. Do you think that the process for setting priorities is fair/equitable? Please 
explain 
Accountability 
13. What is your understanding of accountability? 
14. Do you think that the process for setting priorities is accountable?  Please explain 
Transparency 
15. What do you understand by transparency? 
16. In your opinion do you think the process is transparent? 
Appeals and revision 
17. Please tell me about opportunities for appeal and revision within the process? 
18. How do you resolve disagreements on a priority? 
Leadership 
19. Who leads the process of priority-setting? 
20. Tell me more about leader’s initiatives to ensure implementation of the priorities 
identified? 
21. How would you describe the skills of leadership? 
Now I would like to ask you more about devolution 
Devolution 
22. What do you think is the purpose of devolution for health services?   
23. What are the main changes which you have seen since devolution? 
a. What changes have you seen in decision-making for financing and setting 
budgets? 
b. What changes have you seen in decision-making for service delivery? 
c. What changes have you seen in disease surveillance and response to 
disease outbreaks? 
d. What changes have you seen in decision-making for human resources? 
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e. What changes have you seen in supply chain for drugs and supplies? 
f. What changes have you seen for equipment and transport? 
g. What changes have you seen for infrastructure? 
h. What changes have you seen for health and management information 
systems? 
i. What changes have you seen in decision-making for governance and 
community participation? 
24. What is the most significant change?  Why? 
25. What are the benefits and challenges of these changes? 
26. What indicators do you think should be used to measure progress or performance 
for health since devolution? 
27. Has how you set priorities changed since devolution?  Please explain 
28. Do you feel you have the space to make all the decisions needed within the 
county?  Please explain 
29. Who are vulnerable groups? 
30. Has how you provide services for vulnerable groups changed since devolution? 
31. Is health and service provision for vulnerable groups being tracked through 
devolution?  Please explain 
Now I would like to discuss more about the community health strategy 
CHS progress to date 
32. Please tell me about how the community health strategy has been rolled out (in 
this county)? 
CHS indicators 
33. What do you think are the most important indicators to measure performance of 
community health? 
Decision-making for community health 
34. What are the mechanisms for CHWs and CHEWs to feed into policy and practice? 
35. How are decisions made about where community units are established? 
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36. Do you feel that devolution has influenced provision of community health 
services? 
37. What would you say is the ratio for allocation of the current budget for curative 
vs preventative services within the county? 
38. Is data from dialogue days used in making decisions for community health?  How? 
CHS Equity 
39. Can you tell me how equitable you think the community health strategy is? 
40. What would equitable community health services look like? 
41. To what extent do you feel that community health services in this county 
addresses the needs of vulnerable people? Why? How? 
42. Are there any other groups of people within the county who don’t benefit from 
community health services? Who are they? Why don’t they benefit? 
43. Do you feel that CHWs are representative of the members of their community? 
CHS Sustainability 
44. Can you tell me more about how sustainable you feel the community health 
strategy is?  Please explain 
45. What is the county’s role in ensuring sustainability of the CHS? How can this be 
improved? 
Suggestions 
46. Do you have any additional suggestions about what else would help make the 
provision of community health services more equitable? 
41. Is there anything else which we have not discussed but you feel is relevant to this 
topic? 
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Appendix 2:  Topic guide for health workers and community health personnel 
1. Please tell me more about your role and responsibilities in your current 
position 
2. Please tell me what your role is for making decisions about health 
3. Please tell me your feelings about devolution for health 
4. Can you tell me more about what changes you have seen since devolution? 
a. What changes have you seen in how you make annual workplans and 
set your budget? 
b. What changes have you seen in how you manage finances and 
manage budgets? 
c. What changes have you seen in service delivery? 
d. What changes have you seen in disease surveillance and response to 
disease outbreaks? 
e. What changes have you seen in staff availability? Staff turnover?  Staff 
performance?  Supervision of staff? 
f. What changes have you seen in supply chain for drugs and supplies? 
g. What changes have you seen for equipment and transport? 
h. What changes have you seen for infrastructure? 
i. What changes have you seen for health and management information 
systems? 
j. What changes have you seen in governance, community participation 
and relationship to community? 
k. Do you feel that devolution has influenced provision of community 
health services? 
l. Probe Benefits and challenges 
5. Who do you feel owns these changes for health? 
6. Please tell me more about if/how your role has changed since devolution 
7. What does equity mean to you? 
8. Who do you think are vulnerable groups? 
9. To what extent do you feel that the (community) health strategy addresses 
the needs of vulnerable people? 
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10. Have you seen any changes to how health services are provided for 
vulnerable groups since devolution? 
11. To what extent does this sub-county/ health facility/community unit have 
flexibility in responding to local needs? 
12. Do you receive feedback on decisions made and on your progress and equity 
of this? 
13. Do you think that the current structure for decision-making during annual 
planning and budgeting for health is relevant to your needs and challenges?  
Why? Why not? 
Community health specific 
14. How are decisions made about where community units are established? 
15. Please tell me more about the benefits devolution creates for community 
health 
16. Please tell me more about the challenges devolution creates for community 
health 
17. Any other comments on how to improve? 
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Appendix 3:  National Level Priority-setting, Devolution and Community Health 
Topic Guide 
Priority-setting 
1. Please tell me more about your role, relating to health  
2. What role do you/ your department play in guiding decision-making for 
community health/budget/ general health?  
3. What have been the benefits/ challenges associated with your role?   
Devolution 
4. What do you think is the purpose of devolution for health services?   
5. Do you feel that this purpose is being achieved?  Why? 
6. When was the handover of health service delivery from national to county 
governments made? 
7. What are the main changes for health which you have seen since devolution 
across the country? 
j. What changes have you seen in decision-making for financing and setting 
budgets? 
k. What changes have you seen in decision-making for service delivery? 
l. What changes have you seen in disease surveillance and response to 
disease outbreaks? 
m. What changes have you seen for immunisation? 
n. What changes have you seen in decision-making for human resources? 
o. What changes have you seen in supply chain for drugs and supplies? 
p. What changes have you seen for equipment and transport? 
q. What changes have you seen for infrastructure? 
r. What changes have you seen for health and management information 
systems? 
s. What changes have you seen in decision-making for governance and 
community participation? 
t. What changes have you seen for community health services? 
8. What is the most significant change?  Why? 
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9. What are the benefits and challenges of these changes? 
10. What indicators do you think should be used to measure progress or 
performance for health since devolution? 
Relevance/criteria 
11. How should counties be setting priorities for health? 
12. What kind of information should counties be using for priority-setting? 
13. What guidelines are available to guide counties in decision-making? 
Implementation 
14. How effective do you feel implementation of health service delivery is 
following devolution?   
Communication and guidance 
15. What happens after guidance document is developed? 
Equity 
16. What is your understanding of equity/fairness? 
17. Please tell me about policies which have been put in place to promote equity 
for health within Kenya 
18. How effective do you think these policies have been in practice?  Why? 
19. What are the main challenges to health equity?  Why? 
20. Do you think that devolution is more or less fair/equitable? Please explain 
21. How has devolution influenced health equity? 
22. How can health equity be improved? 
Accountability 
23. What is your understanding of accountability? 
24. Do you think that the process for setting priorities is accountable?  Please 
explain 
Transparency 
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25. What do you understand by transparency? 
26. In your opinion do you think the process is transparent? 
CHS/ budget/ general advice 
27. Please tell me about how the community health strategy/ budgeting/ general 
health has been rolled out across the country (since devolution)? 
28. What support/ guidance does national level provide for CHS/ budget/ general 
health? 
29. Who is this support for? 
30. How much money was allocated to CHS before devolution?  Why? 
31. How much money was allocated to CHS after devolution?  Why? 
32. How has community health changed since devolution?  Why? 
33. How has provision of CHS services changed since devolution? 
34. Which counties have embraced CHS?  Which have not? 
35. What do you think are the most important indicators to measure 
performance of community health? 
36. How are decisions made about where community units are established? 
CHS Sustainability 
37. Can you tell me more about how sustainable you feel the community health 
strategy is?  Please explain 
38. What is the national role in ensuring sustainability of the CHS?  How can this 
be improved? 
Suggestions 
39. What are your current recommendations for county governments about 
community health/budget/ general health?  
40. Is there anything else which we have not discussed but you feel is relevant to 
this topic? 
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Appendix 4:  Quality Improvement In-depth Interview Guide: Community Health 
Worker  
 
Baseline Evaluation 
 
1. Work Background 
a. Please tell us about your daily tasks and activities 
 
b. What do you enjoy about your work as CHW?  
 
c. How happy/ unhappy do you feel to do your work as a community health 
services provider? 
 
d. How long/ how many years do you intend to work as a community health 
services provider? 
 
e. What recognition do you receive for your work?  
 
 
2. Supervision 
a. Please describe the supervision you receive. 
 
b. What do you feel about the supervision you receive?   
 
c. How do your different supervisors work together to coordinate your work 
within the program and outside the program? 
 
d. How could the supervision be improved to motivate you further?  
 
3. Referral 
a. How do you conduct referral from the community to the facility? 
 
b. What are some of the reasons for community going or not going for 
referral? 
 
c. How do you think referral could be improved? 
 
4. Community Engagement 
a. How do you interact with the community in your work aside from visiting 
them at home? 
 
b. What do you feel about how the community thinks about your work? 
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c. What is your role in enhancing community participation? 
 
d.  What challenges do you face in carrying out the role and what could be the 
reasons? 
 
 
5. Fairness in service provision 
a. What does fairness in providing health services mean to you? 
 
b. Who are those people who find it difficult to seek health services in the 
community you work in?   (Or which groups of people in the community you 
work in mostly need health services, but you face challenges in providing 
them with community health services)  
 
c. How are the people you have mentioned above able to get help for any 
community health needs they have (e.g. referrals, health education)? 
 
d. To what extent do you feel that you as a community health service provider 
meets the community health needs of these people within your catchment 
area? 
 
e. Is there anything that helps you to provide health services for everyone, 
including the people mentioned above in the community you work in? 
 
f. Are there any local initiatives that you are aware of which have been 
successful for ensuring that everyone in the community gets the community 
health services that they need? 
 
g. Do you have any ideas or suggestions about what would help ensure that 
everyone gets the community health services which they need? 
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Appendix 5 Focus Group Discussion: Community level - English 
BASELINE EVALUATION 
1. Problem description 
a. What are the main challenges of getting health care in the community you 
live in? 
 
b. What are the main challenges with health services provided by CHWs in the 
community you live in? 
 
c. Who are there people in your community who don’t have regular contact 
with the CHWs? How come? 
 
2. Supervision of CHWs and CHEWs 
a. What kind of supervision do CHWs receive?  
 
b. How do you think CHWs should be supervised? 
 
c. Who supervises the supervisors of CHWs? 
 
3. Referral 
a. In what circumstances do CHWs make referrals?  
 
b. How do people feel if the CHW refers them to a health facility? 
 
c. Whose advice do you trust or take when making decisions about seeking 
health care?   
 
d. How do you think referral for health services should be improved? 
 
4. Community Engagement 
a. What role do you as community members play in the provision of community 
health services? 
 
b. How is your participation as community members facilitated in the provision 
of community health services in your community? 
 
c. What hinders you from participating in the provision of community health 
services in your community? 
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5. Fairness in service provision  
a. What does fairness in service provision mean to you? 
 
b. Who in the community you live in uses the services provided by the CHWs? 
 
c. Who are the people who face the most difficulties in seeking health services 
in the community you live in?   (Or which groups of people in the community 
you work in mostly need health services, but community health service 
providers face challenges in providing them with services)  
 
d. How are the people you have mentioned above able to get help for any 
community health needs they have (e.g. referrals, health education)? 
 
e. To what extent do CHWs meet the health needs of these people within the 
community you live in? 
 
f. What challenges do you face in accessing and using community health 
services? Why do you think these challenges exist? 
   
g. Has anything changed in the community you live in since the community 
health service providers started working there? 
 
h. What would make it easier for you and for vulnerable people in the 
community you live in to use community health services? 
  
383 | P a g e  
 
Appendix 6:  Coding Framework 
1. Priority-setting 
1.1 Persons involved 
1.1.1  MCA 
1.1.2 CEC and governor 
1.1.3 Persons consulted 
1.1.4 CHMT 
1.1.5 community 
1.2 Role 
1.2.1 Decision-making 
1.3 Leadership 
1.3.1 Leaders 
1.3.2 Leadership in priority-setting 
1.4 Health Priority 
1.4.1 Curative vs preventive 
1.4.2 health conditions 
1.5 Priority-setting process 
1.5.1 Public participation 
1.5.2 Politics and priority-setting 
1.5.3 Budgeting and cost-effectiveness 
1.5.4 Context consideration 
1.5.5 National 
1.6 Relevance 
1.6.1 Information 
1.6.2 Values 
1.6.3 Guiding documents 
1.7 Implementation of priorities 
1.8 Budgeting 
1.8.1 Emergency budget 
1.9 Publicity 
1.9.1 Who with 
1.9.2 Process for communication 
1.10 Accountability 
1.10.1 Accountability definition 
1.10.2 Accountability in priority-setting 
1.11 Transparency 
1.11.1 Transparency definition 
1.11.2 Transparency in priority-setting 
1.12 Appeals and revision 
1.12.1 Opportunity for appeals 
1.12.2 Disagreement resolution 
2. Devolution 
2.1 Purpose for devolving health 
2.2 Changes in health system 
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2.2.1 HRH 
2.2.2 Supplies 
2.2.3 Service delivery 
2.2.4 Finance 
2.2.5 Infrastructure 
2.2.6 Governance 
2.2.7 Information 
2.2.8 Community empowerment 
2.2.9 Disease control 
2.3 Most significant change 
2.4 Benefits of change 
2.5 Challenges of change 
2.5.1 Tribalism 
2.6 Priority-setting and devolution 
2.7 Decision space 
2.8 History before devolution 
2.9 Transition authority 
2.10 Partner 
2.11 Changes in health indicators 
2.12 Provincial issues 
2.13 National 
2.14 corruption 
2.15 changes to sub county 
2.16 change to health facility 
2.17 recommendations 
3. Community Health Strategy 
3.1 CHS process 
3.2 CHS benefits 
3.3 CHS challenges 
3.4 CHS performance indicators 
3.5 CHW and policy 
3.6 CU coverage and location 
3.7 Devolution and CHS 
3.8 Partners 
3.9 Dialogue day data 
3.10 CHS sustainability 
3.10.1 County role 
3.11 CHS and national 
3.12 CHS innovation 
3.13 CHW representativeness 
3.14 Quality CHS 
3.15 CHS budgeting and advocacy 
3.16 Reason for CHS 
4. Equity 
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4.1 Equity definition 
4.2 Priority-setting and equity 
4.3 CHS and equity 
4.4 Vulnerable groups 
4.4.1 Who are vulnerable 
4.4.2 Vulnerable groups and devolution 
4.4.3 Tracking vulnerable groups 
4.5 CHS unmet need 
4.6 PROGRESS 
4.6.1 Place of residence 
4.6.2 Religion 
4.6.3 Occupation 
4.6.4 Gender 
4.6.5 Race tribe 
4.6.6 Education 
4.6.7 Socio economic status 
4.6.8 Social capital 
4.6.9 Disability 
4.6.10 Sexual orientation 
4.6.11 Culture 
4.6.12 Age 
4.6.13 Other 
4.7 Recommendations 
4.9 equity actions 
4.9 stigma 
4.10 equity and devolution 
4.11 Quality 
5. Background 
5.1 Respondent role 
5.2 County context 
5.2.1 Children issues 
5.2.2 Gender issues 
5.3 HS structure 
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Appendix 7:  REACHOUT coding framework 
 
1.  Community 
1.2 Community problem solving 
1.3 Community accountability or ownership and 
responsibility 
1.4 Local politics 
1.5.Community meetings 
1.5.1 Dialogue Days 
1.5.2 Action Days 
1.6 Community support of CTCP 
1.6.1 Presence of support 
1.6.2 Lack of support 
1.7 Advocacy 
1.8 Health promotion 
1.9 Desire for curative services 
1.10 Empowerment 
1.11 Community attitude to CHW 
1.12 NGO involvement 
1.13 corruption 
2. Community behaviour& attitudes 
2.1 Health seeking behaviour 
2.2 Health related decision-making 
2.3 Social influences on health 
2.4 Community needs& problems 
2.5 Change in behaviour 
2.5.1 Changes after intervention 
2.5.2 Changes for other reason 
3. Coordination and organization 
3.1 Coordination activities processes 
3.1.1Training 
3.2 Communication  
3.3 Partnership 
3.5 Work environment 
3.6 Support received 
3.7 Effectiveness of services 
3.8 Political issues 
3.8.1 Negative consequences 
3.8.2 Positive consequences 
3.9 Efficiency 
3.10 Devolution 
4. Motivation of CTCPs 
4.1 Extrinsic 
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4.1.1 Financial 
4.1.2Non financial 
4.2 Intrinsic motivation 
4.3 How to improve 
4.4 Demotivators 
4.5 Motivation+ Organizational Commitment 
4.6 Motivation + Conscientiousness 
4.7 Motivation + Satisfaction 
4.8 Motivation + Community Commitment 
5. Equity 
5.1 Identifying vulnerable or marginalized groups 
5.2 Access to services for vulnerable groups 
5.3 Use of services by vulnerable groups 
5.4 Quality of services for vulnerable groups 
5.5 Community empowerment and advocacy 
5.6 Stigma and discrimination and confidentiality 
5.7 Devolution and equity 
5.8 Understanding of equity 
6. Referral 
6.1 Reason for uptake 
6.2 Reason for non-uptake  
6.3 Reason for referral 
6.4 Access and quality 
6.5 Referral tools 
6.6 Referral Process 
6.7 Follow up 
7.Supervision 
7.1 Types of supervision 
7.2 Outcome of supervision 
7.2.1  Potential usefulness & results 
7.2.2 Actual impact 
7.3 Approach 
7.4 Training 
7.5 Reporting and feedback 
7.6 Checklists and other tools 
7.7 Frequency of supervision 
7.8 Functions of supervision 
7.9 Supervisor skills and quality 
7.10 Supervisory structure 
7.11 Who supervises 
8. Intervention design 
8.1 Understanding of intervention design and purpose 
8.2 Opinion of REACHOUT 
8.3 Suggestions about design & implementation 
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8.4 Intervention sustainability 
9. Provider issues 
9.1 Competencies and skills 
9.2 Problem solving 
9.3 Quality of care 
9.4 CTCP Tasks 
9.4.1 Health promotion disease prevention 
9.4.2 Curative tasks 
9.4.3 Additional tasks 
9.5 Attitudes towards community 
9.6 Accountability 
9.7 other work 
9.8 Career 
10. Sustainability of CHS 
11. Fabulous quotes 
 
 
 
